Re: Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism
On 06 Sep 2013, at 23:03, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, A simple question. Lucid dreams are such that you are awake in your dream. ? I can ascribe meaning to this as some metaphor, but of course, when we dream in the nocturnal sleep we are asleep, and thus, with the usual definition, not awake. I would say that a lucid dream is a dream in which we believe that we are dreaming. It is reassuring in some nightmare (OK, what a relief, it is just a dream!). An even more positivistic definition would be that a dream is lucid if in the report of the dream contains a statement equivalent with I am dreaming. So my question is whether a lucid qualifies as 1. being awake or 2. in a dream, or a third state. In lucid dream, we are asleep, and thus not awake (in the usual sense, you might be 'awake' in possible other deep or mystical sense). I suggest that the third state may be in the realm of the afterlife, along with all dreams, Yes, in that more mystical sense, we can be more awake in some dream than when awake at works, for example. except that you may be rational and have choice in a lucid dream, somewhat like salvia. Not sure we can make choice under salvia (depending on the dosage). In fact, with salvia most people lost lucidity, to the point of denying that they have smoked salvia. That is why it is recommended to smoke in the company of a sober person. Salvia can induce super-realist dream at night, which can induce lucidity, though. After an experience salvia, I made the only lucid dream where I was unable to fly, and I attribute it to the salvia gravity effect (an effect which makes you feel infinitely heavy and melting into the ground). The salvia hallucination is or can be very special: it is the hallucination that your entire life was an hallucination, including the fact that you smoked salvia. It is the hallucination that life is an usual, non lucid dream. The experience can be very realistic, making you feeling it more real than what you remember to experience usually in life. It is an hallucination, or perhaps experience, of awakening. If salvia is true, we are not lucid in the everyday life, and we are lucid under salvia. if salvia is false, the contrary is possible (but still doubtful if we assume computationalism, I think). Bruno Richard On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Roger, and people, On 05 Sep 2013, at 00:32, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism Materialists argue that in essence we are no more than our bodies. Empiricists such as Hume ruled out the possible influence of anything transcendental in our perception of objects. But that position was disproven by Kant, for example in his transcdendent deduction of the role of the self in perception http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/ in which cognitive science and philosophers such as Dennett and Chalmers seems to have overlooked the critical importance of the transcendental. As a result, Kant gave this argument against materialism and empiricism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant Kant proposed a Copernican Revolution-in-reverse, saying that: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects [materialism and positivism] but ... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition[transcendental idealism]. The mechanist hypothesis, and the usual Occam razor go farer: the physical reality becomes derivable from the theology of numbers (itself entirely derived from addition + multiplication + Church thesis + some common analytical definition of belief and knowledge). Kant is very good. No doubt. But we have progressed, and from that perspective we are closer to Plato and Plotinus, and all those who does not oppose mystic and rationalism. But now we have a math problem: to derive explicitly the physical laws from a precise theory of number dreams. Physical realties are stable computational sharable dreams. That sharability gives the first person plural points of view. With mechanism or computationalism, you have to add something magical in the mind to attach it to some magical primitive matter. Kant has gone far, but assuming computationalism, there is not much choice than going much farer, as farer as Plato of the Parmenides, or Plotinus or Proclus theology. Then computationalism gives the tools, indeed theoretical computer science, to make this into an experimentally testable theory. Up to now, it fits. Kant is right: the why and how of the physical laws emerge from the laws of cognition, which follows from comp + computer science and logic, so we can indeed test such idea. Some people are unable to doubt this *primitive* matter (in need of Einstein conscious act
Re: Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism
Hi Roger, and people, On 05 Sep 2013, at 00:32, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism Materialists argue that in essence we are no more than our bodies. Empiricists such as Hume ruled out the possible influence of anything transcendental in our perception of objects. But that position was disproven by Kant, for example in his transcdendent deduction of the role of the self in perception http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/ in which cognitive science and philosophers such as Dennett and Chalmers seems to have overlooked the critical importance of the transcendental. As a result, Kant gave this argument against materialism and empiricism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant Kant proposed a Copernican Revolution-in-reverse, saying that: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects [materialism and positivism] but ... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition[transcendental idealism]. The mechanist hypothesis, and the usual Occam razor go farer: the physical reality becomes derivable from the theology of numbers (itself entirely derived from addition + multiplication + Church thesis + some common analytical definition of belief and knowledge). Kant is very good. No doubt. But we have progressed, and from that perspective we are closer to Plato and Plotinus, and all those who does not oppose mystic and rationalism. But now we have a math problem: to derive explicitly the physical laws from a precise theory of number dreams. Physical realties are stable computational sharable dreams. That sharability gives the first person plural points of view. With mechanism or computationalism, you have to add something magical in the mind to attach it to some magical primitive matter. Kant has gone far, but assuming computationalism, there is not much choice than going much farer, as farer as Plato of the Parmenides, or Plotinus or Proclus theology. Then computationalism gives the tools, indeed theoretical computer science, to make this into an experimentally testable theory. Up to now, it fits. Kant is right: the why and how of the physical laws emerge from the laws of cognition, which follows from comp + computer science and logic, so we can indeed test such idea. Some people are unable to doubt this *primitive* matter (in need of Einstein conscious act of faith, as I realize reading Jammer's book on Einstein Religion), but perhaps the primitive belief has been probably wired by evolution, in our probable stories (which explains what it is hard to doubt it)). Yet, nature, our probable histories have given us an experience which rises the doubt: the dream. Here is a good exercise for the honest researcher on the fundamental. Ask yourself every hour of the day Am I dreaming or am I am awake?, for a month (or more if necessary). During that time, write all your dreams in a diary, and when going to sleep, keep attention to dreaming and to that question again. Now when awake, most people hardly doubt that they are awake, and see dreams as fuzzy bizarre experience, hard to remember. But the training above leads easily to a dream where the subject will ask her/himself if she/he is awake, and she/will will usually either conclude of course I am awake, or induce a lucid dream. The first case will make the point, as it illustrates that you can dream that you are *sure* of being awake, and that is enough to learn to doubt that an experiment or an experience can teach us a certainty, above self-consciousness. In a sense, this go against nature, as nature provided us a brain wired for taking seriously the predator/prey measurement done, for example, but computationalism saves the theology of numbers from nihilism, by its high non triviality and its capacity of being tested, by the constraints on the observable logics. Bruno PS - I found my Max Jammer Philosophy of QM, in the remaining box. Thanks God! - Apology for sending this to both lists but it can clarify different points made in the different list. I will try to avoid this. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism
Bruno, A simple question. Lucid dreams are such that you are awake in your dream. So my question is whether a lucid qualifies as 1. being awake or 2. in a dream, or a third state. I suggest that the third state may be in the realm of the afterlife, along with all dreams, except that you may be rational and have choice in a lucid dream, somewhat like salvia. Richard On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Roger, and people, On 05 Sep 2013, at 00:32, Roger Clough wrote: Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism Materialists argue that in essence we are no more than our bodies. Empiricists such as Hume ruled out the possible influence of anything transcendental in our perception of objects. But that position was disproven by Kant, for example in his transcdendent deduction of the role of the self in perception http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/ in which cognitive science and philosophers such as Dennett and Chalmers seems to have overlooked the critical importance of the transcendental. As a result, Kant gave this argument against materialism and empiricism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant Kant proposed a Copernican Revolution-in-reverse, saying that: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects [materialism and positivism] but ... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition[transcendental idealism]. The mechanist hypothesis, and the usual Occam razor go farer: the physical reality becomes derivable from the theology of numbers (itself entirely derived from addition + multiplication + Church thesis + some common analytical definition of belief and knowledge). Kant is very good. No doubt. But we have progressed, and from that perspective we are closer to Plato and Plotinus, and all those who does not oppose mystic and rationalism. But now we have a math problem: to derive explicitly the physical laws from a precise theory of number dreams. Physical realties are stable computational sharable dreams. That sharability gives the first person plural points of view. With mechanism or computationalism, you have to add something magical in the mind to attach it to some magical primitive matter. Kant has gone far, but assuming computationalism, there is not much choice than going much farer, as farer as Plato of the Parmenides, or Plotinus or Proclus theology. Then computationalism gives the tools, indeed theoretical computer science, to make this into an experimentally testable theory. Up to now, it fits. Kant is right: the why and how of the physical laws emerge from the laws of cognition, which follows from comp + computer science and logic, so we can indeed test such idea. Some people are unable to doubt this *primitive* matter (in need of Einstein conscious act of faith, as I realize reading Jammer's book on Einstein Religion), but perhaps the primitive belief has been probably wired by evolution, in our probable stories (which explains what it is hard to doubt it)). Yet, nature, our probable histories have given us an experience which rises the doubt: the dream. Here is a good exercise for the honest researcher on the fundamental. Ask yourself every hour of the day Am I dreaming or am I am awake?, for a month (or more if necessary). During that time, write all your dreams in a diary, and when going to sleep, keep attention to dreaming and to that question again. Now when awake, most people hardly doubt that they are awake, and see dreams as fuzzy bizarre experience, hard to remember. But the training above leads easily to a dream where the subject will ask her/himself if she/he is awake, and she/will will usually either conclude of course I am awake, or induce a lucid dream. The first case will make the point, as it illustrates that you can dream that you are *sure* of being awake, and that is enough to learn to doubt that an experiment or an experience can teach us a certainty, above self-consciousness. In a sense, this go against nature, as nature provided us a brain wired for taking seriously the predator/prey measurement done, for example, but computationalism saves the theology of numbers from nihilism, by its high non triviality and its capacity of being tested, by the constraints on the observable logics. Bruno PS - I found my Max Jammer Philosophy of QM, in the remaining box. Thanks God! - Apology for sending this to both lists but it can clarify different points made in the different list. I will try to avoid this. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post
Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism
Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism Materialists argue that in essence we are no more than our bodies. Empiricists such as Hume ruled out the possible influence of anything transcendental in our perception of objects. But that position was disproven by Kant, for example in his transcdendent deduction of the role of the self in perception http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/ in which cognitive science and philosophers such as Dennett and Chalmers seems to have overlooked the critical importance of the transcendental. As a result, Kant gave this argument against materialism and empiricism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant Kant proposed a Copernican Revolution-in-reverse, saying that: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects [positivism] but ... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition[transcendental idealism]. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough .com/malfunct -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism
Kant's disproof of materialism and empiricism Materialists argue that in essence we are no more than our bodies. Empiricists such as Hume ruled out the possible influence of anything transcendental in our perception of objects. But that position was disproven by Kant, for example in his transcdendent deduction of the role of the self in perception http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/ in which cognitive science and philosophers such as Dennett and Chalmers seems to have overlooked the critical importance of the transcendental. As a result, Kant gave this argument against materialism and empiricism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant Kant proposed a Copernican Revolution-in-reverse, saying that: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects [materialism and positivism] but ... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition[transcendental idealism]. Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
