Hi Roger,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:14, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Penrose's noncomputability argument is based on Godel's theorem,
which along these lines,
In his first book, Penrose is simply invalid. In the second book, he
corrected the error, but don't take into account.
From Gödel (or Löb)'s theorem you can prove that IF we are machine
(and correct) then we cannot know which machine we are. But you can't
derive from Gödel that we are not machine, or that machine cannot
think, or that we are superior to machines, etc.
IMHO also makes rational thinking leaky.
Well, just incomplete, and indeed you can use formally Gödel's theorem
to show that machine looking inward develop an intuition which they
cannot describe formally. But again, this shows that Gödel's theorem
is a chance for mechanism, not a problem. It makes universal machine
as ignorant and aware of their ignorance as us. Judson Webb wrote a
nice book on that subject (and me too in french, but this my papers in
english for concise yet complete description of the reasoning.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:20:56
Subject: Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience
On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U
Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that
consciousness is not computable, nor even definable, is a
consequence of mechanism. It does not refute mechanism, it confirms
it.
Bruno
Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory).
IMHO, that's the only way.
?
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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