Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> > I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP hypothesis
> > is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of system
> > instantiates a computation. Howe
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 11:11:15PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> I am mostly referring to the philosophical literature on the problems of
> what counts as an instantiation, as well as responses considered here
> and elsewhere. One online paper is Chalmers' "Does a Rock Implement
> Every Finite-
"Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do the
> simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
> complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
> work. If you know for ce
Hal Finney writes:
> I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that> I reached when I did that analysis. I did not expect to conclude that> teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).> This was not the starting point of the analysis, but the con
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> > I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that
> > I reached when I did that analysis. I did not expect to conclude that
> > teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).
> >
Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> If computationalism is true, then a person is instantiated by all
> equivalent computations. If you change one instantiation to something
> inequivalent, then that instantiation no longer "instantiates" the
> person. The person continues to exist, as
Hi Hal,
Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
> What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the
> implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person
> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way
> in principle to tell whet
Dear Quentin et al,
I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for
mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation
in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to g
On Wed, Jun 21, 2006 at 10:31:16AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > If computationalism is true, then a person is instantiated by all
> > equivalent computations. If you change one instantiation to something
> > inequivalent, then that instantiation
Hal Finney writes:
> > Yes, but every theoretical scientist hopes ultimately to be vindicated> > by the experimentalists. I'm now not sure what you mean by the second> > sentence in the above quote. What would you expect to find if (classical,> > destructive) teleportation of a subject in Bruss
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
>Dear Quentin et al,
>
>I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
>itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for
>mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation
>in terms
Stathis writes
> Lee Corbin writes:
> > Well, people here are prepared to accept that at each
> > moment the universe splits into innumerable copies,
> > that physics is governed by equations that Feynman
> > (erroneously IMO) says nobody can understand, and
> > our lives are not as they appear
Stephen writes (BTW, thanks for using plain text :-)
> I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
> itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for
> mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation
> in terms o
George writes
> Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This
> is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain
> the physics and the objects.
>
> This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether
> for waves to propagate?
Stephen,
I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?", which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way.
Hi Lee,
Lee Corbin wrote:
George writes
Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This
is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain
the physics and the objects.
This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney,
> "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?", which looks at
> the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a
> rock can be mapped onto any
Lee Corbin writes:
> > Actually, my personal view is that *none* of my copies > > are me, whether in the future, the past, in a parallel > > universe or coming out of a teleporter in this universe.> > Of course, you realize the cost to our communication the> taking of this stance entails. I do k
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