Brent Meeker writes:
> > I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness > > that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than > > their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the > > carriages of a train. It is not necessary that t
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
Brent Meeker writes:
> > I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness > >
that observer moments don't *need*
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > Yes, sharing the memory is *not* the same as having the original > > experience, but this applies to recalling one's own past as well.> > > Are you really sure? When two people share memories, they can only > share third person information, which will trigger their res
Le 30-juin-06, à 15:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I have the subjective experience of being a person persisting through time because I feel that I know in a 1st person way what I did in the past. If I really did know in a 1st person way what I did in the past I could not possibly doubt i
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>>> I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness that
>>> observer moments don't
>>> *need* anything to connect them other than
>>
>> their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the
>>
>> carriage
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To:
> Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM
> Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousn
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
...
> > > This is not to say that my mind can or should overcome [Lee Corbin
> > > disagrees on the "should"] the deeply ingrained belief or illusion
> > > that I am a unique, one-track individual living my life from start to
> > > finish,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some
1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in
implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like
I am Napoleon just after Waterloo), then I will believe correctly that
I am Na
--- Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
(unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature
underneath comes from him):
...
Stathis wrote:
...
> I would say that the 1st person experience is *not*
> an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very
> opposite, in a >way: the most real thing,
John M wrote:
>
> --- Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> (unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature
> underneath comes from him):
> ...
> Stathis wrote:
> ...
>
>>I would say that the 1st person experience is *not*
>>an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very
>>opposite,
Hi John,
Le Vendredi 30 Juin 2006 21:06, John M a écrit :
> An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing
> the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?).
> I would not say "dead", rather 'changed' as into some
> different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being
> thought of a
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