John,
On 24 Nov 2008, at 00:19, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno,
> right before my par on 'sharing a 3rd pers. opinion:
>
>>> more or less (maybe) resembling the original 'to
>>> be shared' one. In its (1st) 'personal' variation. (Cf: perceived
>>> reality).
>
> you included a remark not too dissimi
On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 12:28:45PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 24-nov.-08, à 02:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 03:59:02PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>> I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious
> >>> activity is not consc
Le 25-nov.-08, à 02:13, Kory Heath a écrit :
>
>
> On Nov 24, 2008, at 11:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> If your argument were not merely convincing but definitive, then I
>> would not need to make MGA 3 for showing it is ridiculous to endow the
>> projection of a movie of a computation with con
Thanks for providing me with even more motivations for MGA 3.
I will try to do it as soon as possible. It could time because I am
hesitating on the best way to proceed. I know that what is obvious for
some is not for others, and vice versa ... That is why we do proof, to
met universal crite
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 11:55:37AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> About MGA 3, I feel almost a bit ashamed to explain that. To believe
> that the projection of the movie makes Alice conscious, is almost like
> explaining why we should not send Roger Moore (James Bond) in jail,
> giving that ther
Just to be clear on this, I obviously agree.
Best,
Bruno
Le 25-nov.-08, à 12:05, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 11:55:37AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> About MGA 3, I feel almost a bit ashamed to explain that. To believe
>> that the projection of the movie makes Ali
On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 11:52:55AM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> As I said, I'm also interested in the notion of probability. I
> disagree with Solomonoff's universal distribution
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Solomonoff), because it assumes that
> the universe is computable. I cannot say
On Nov 25, 2008, at 2:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> So you agree that MGA 1 does show that Lucky Alice is conscious
> (logically).
I think I have a less rigorous view of the argument than you do. You
want the argument to have the rigor of a mathematical proof. You say
"Let's start with the m
On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have
> magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a
> Life board at random and accidentally duplicates the Life rules does
> that mean the computation is c
On 25 Nov 2008, at 15:49, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 25, 2008, at 2:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> So you agree that MGA 1 does show that Lucky Alice is conscious
>> (logically).
>
> I think I have a less rigorous view of the argument than you do. You
> want the argument to have the rigor of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 25 Nov 2008, at 15:49, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>>
>> On Nov 25, 2008, at 2:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> So you agree that MGA 1 does show that Lucky Alice is conscious
>>> (logically).
>> I think I have a less rigorous view of the argument than you do. You
>> want the
Russel,
Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the
universality goes away, and what "crucially depends" means, et cetera.
-Abram Demski
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 5:44 AM, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 24, 2008 at 11:52:55AM -0500, Abram Demski w
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 04:58:41PM -0500, Abram Demski wrote:
>
> Russel,
>
> Can you point me to any references? I am curious to hear why the
> universality goes away, and what "crucially depends" means, et cetera.
>
> -Abram Demski
>
This is sort of discussed in my book "Theory of Nothing",
Bruno,
Yes, I have encountered the provability logics before, but I am no expert.
>> In any given
>> generation, the entity who can represent the truth-predicate of the
>> most other entities will dominate.
>
> Why?
The notion of the entities adapting their logics in order to better
reason abou
On Tue, Nov 25, 2008 at 11:16:55AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> But who would say "yes" to the doctor if he said that he would take a movie
> of
> your brain states and project it? Or if he said he would just destroy you in
> this universe and you would continue your experiences in other br
On Nov 25, 2008, at 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You could have perhaps still a problem with the definitions or with
> the hypotheses?
I think I haven't always been clear on our definitions of mechanism
and materialism. But I can understand and accept definitions of those
terms under whi
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