Re: Copying?

Stephen, you've hit a nerve with *'copying':* ** *Fundamental *questions: *1.WHO *(what) is copying and *HOW*? 2.*INTO* what(?) is copying being done? Then are continuing questions: 3. Does the 'COPY' (to be considerably identical) have identical interconnective circumstances as does the 'origina

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

Stathis, I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: >"...What I find incoherent is the idea that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul cannot be duplicated."< If you accept the top

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 20 Feb 2009, at 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/20 Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> Review of a book that may be of interest to the list. >> >> Brent Meeker >> >> Original Message >> >> Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews >> >> 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online >>

Re: AUDA Page

Hi Bruno, will incorporate your changes as soon as time permits :-) Best Wishes, Günther Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Günther, > > Nice work Günther. Now my comment is longer than I wish. I really would > insist on one change. See (**) below. > > On 16 Feb 2009, at 22:54, Günther Greindl wrote:

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009/2/23 John Mikes : > Stathis, > > I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: > >>"...What I find incoherent is the idea > that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but > nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul > cannot be

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal : > From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for > many reasons to the doctor. > The copy will not even behave as you. > The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. > The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but >

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Stathis, Bruno, List, >> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up >> to the unspeakable "you = ONE"). >> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable. >> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much >> more precise. >