On 17 Dec 2011, at 05:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 05:42:19PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Dec 2011, at 10:39, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 12, 2011 at 04:11:54PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Maudlin's argument relies on the absurdity the the presence or
a
On Dec 17, 4:39 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 08:26:21PM -0800, Pierz wrote:
>
> ...snip...
>
> > The problem is even deeper than this, however. How does the system
> > ‘know’ when two locations should be bilocated? This works OK for a
> > single copy of Klara, since she
On 17 Dec 2011, at 05:26, Pierz wrote:
So I’ve read Maudlin’s argument and I’ve decided to trade in my PC for
a brand new Olympia.
Good luck.
Or maybe not – I heard the water bills are a
killer. Actually I’m not so impressed, and here’s why.
Maudlin attempts to show that consciousness ca
2011/12/17 Pierz
>
>
> On Dec 17, 4:39 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 08:26:21PM -0800, Pierz wrote:
> >
> > ...snip...
> >
> > > The problem is even deeper than this, however. How does the system
> > > ‘know’ when two locations should be bilocated? This works OK for a
>
On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
> can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it
> must be as conscious as when it was running on a complete physical computer.
> N+1- you can restore the
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg
> On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> > N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
> > can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it
> > must be as conscious as when it was running on a complete physical
On Dec 17, 11:24 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg
>
> > On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> > > N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
> > > can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it
> > > must be as
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg
> On Dec 17, 11:24 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg
> >
> > > On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >
> > > > N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but
> that
> > > > can't handle counterfactual, but as the comput
On Dec 17, 2:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> > > You didn't read, that's not the argument.
>
> > > It begins by *assuming we have a conscious program*. The argument is not
> > > about what is consciousness, it's about assuming consciousness to be
> > > computational and assuming physical superve
On 12/17/2011 4:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The thought experiment is that:
1- Computationalism is true.
2- So it means there exists conscious program.
3- You just stumble accros one.
4- You run it.
5- During the run you've seen that some parts are never accessed.
6- You remove those parts.
7
On 12/17/2011 8:24 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com>>
On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux mailto:allco...@gmail.com>>
wrote:
> N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
> can't handle counterfactual,
On Dec 17, 4:05 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> But it seems like a play on our intuition as to what constitutes a
> computation. We
> hypothesize consciousness supervenes on computation because computation is
> the kind of
> thing needed to make intelligent (and therefore "conscious") acting machines
On Sat, Dec 17, 2011 at 11:59:07AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
... snip ...
>
> >In a multiverse, the
> >counterfactuals are realised, but in different branches.
>
> Not necessarily. If the computation is classical, it is the same in
> the normal continuations. The classical counterfactuals are
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