>-Original Message-
>From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Thursday, October 14, 2004 7:36 AM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
>[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
>
>
>
>Brent Meeker and Jesse Mazer a
Brent Meeker and Jesse Mazer and others wrote:
Well, lots and lots of complex mathematical argument on the two envelope
problem...
But no-one has yet pointed out a flaw in my rather simplistic analysis:
(1) One envelope contains x currency units, so the other contains 2x
currency units;
(2) If
>-Original Message-
>From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 11:01 PM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
>
>
>>>-Original Message-
>>>From: Jesse
Thanks, Kory, that takes care of my confusion.
The same to Jesse's post.
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Kory Heath" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, October 10, 2004 7:17 PM
Subject: Re: observation selection effects
> At 02:
At 07:17 PM 10/10/2004, Kory Heath wrote:
We can also consider the variant in which the Winning Flip is determined
after people decide whether or not to switch.
In a follow-up to my own post, I should point out that your winning chances
in this game depend on how your opponents are playing. If al
You're right, as was discussed last week. It seems I clicked on the wrong
thing in my email program and have re-sent an old post. My apologies for
taking up the bandwidth!
--Stathis
From: Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: re: observation selection
At 04:47 PM 10/10/2004, Jesse Mazer wrote:
If I get heads, I know the only possible way for the winning flip to be
heads would be if both the other players got tails, whereas the winning
flip will be tails if the other two got heads *or* if one got heads and
the other got tails.
I agree with thi
At 02:57 PM 10/10/2004, John M wrote:
Then it occurred to me that you made the same
assumption as in my post shortly prior to yours:
a priviledge of "ME" to switch, barring the others.
I think this pinpoints one of the confusions that's muddying up this
discussion. Under the Flip-Flop rules as the
John M wrote:
Dear Kory,
your argument pushed me off balance. I checked your table and found
it absolutely true. Then it occurred to me that you made the same
assumption as in my post shortly prior to yours:
a priviledge of "ME" to switch, barring the others.
I continued your table to situations wh
At 10:35 AM 10/9/2004, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
From the point of view of typical player, it would seem that there is
not: the Winning Flip is as likely to be heads as tails, and if he played
the game repeatedly over time, he should expect to break even, whether he
switches in the final step o
0:35
AM
Subject: re: observation selection
effects
Here is a similar paradox to the
traffic lane example:
In the new casino game called
Flip-Flop, an odd number of players pay $1 each to gather in individual
cubicles and flip a coin (so no player can see what another play
Here is a similar paradox to the traffic lane example:
In the new casino game called Flip-Flop, an odd number of
players pay $1 each to gather in individual cubicles and flip a coin (so no
player can see what another player is doing). The game organisers tally up the results, and the re
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Hal Finney writes:
> >Not to detract from your main point, but I want to point out that
> >sometimes there is ambiguity about how to count worlds, for example in
> >the many worlds interpretation of QM. There are many examples of QM
> >based world-counting which seem
Hal Finney writes:
Not to detract from your main point, but I want to point out that
sometimes there is ambiguity about how to count worlds, for example in
the many worlds interpretation of QM. There are many examples of QM
based world-counting which seem to show that in most worlds, probability
t
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Suppose that according to X-Theory, in the next minute the world will split
> into one million different versions, of which one version will be the same
> sort of orderly world we are used to, while the rest will be worlds in which
> it will be immediately obvious t
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Sorry Jesse, I can see in retrospect that I was insulting your intelligence
as a rhetorical ploy, and we >shouldn't stoop to that level of debate on
this list.
No problem, I wasn't insulted...
You say that you "must incorporate whatever information you have, but no
mor
This has been an interesting thread so far, but let me bring it back to
topic for the Everything List. It has been assumed in most posts to this
list over the years that our current state must be a "typical" state in some
sense. For example, our world has followed consistent laws of physics for
Addition to my last post:
(1) The original game: envelope A and B, you know one has double the amount
of the other, but you don't know which. You open A and find $100. Should
you switch to B, which may have either $50 or $200?
(2) A variation: everything is the same, up to the point where you ar
Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think that's a good counterargument, because the whole concept of
probability is based on ignorance...
No, I don't agree! Probability is based in a sense on ignorance, but you
must make full use of such information as you do have.
Of course--I didn't mean it was based
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think that's a good counterargument, because the whole concept of
probability is based on ignorance...
No, I don't agree! Probability is based in a sense on ignorance, but you
must make full use of such information as you do have.
Of course--
Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think that's a good counterargument, because the whole concept of
probability is based on ignorance...
No, I don't agree! Probability is based in a sense on ignorance, but you
must make full use of such information as you do have. If you toss a fair
coin, is Pr(heads)
in my last response to Brent Meeker I wrote:
As for your statement that "P(s)=exp(-x) -> P(l)=exp(-x/r)", that can't be
true. It doesn't make sense that the value of the second probability
distribution at x would be exp(-x/r), since the range of possible values
for the amount in that envelope is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problem is that you are reasoning as if the amount in each envelope can
vary during the game, whereas in fact it is fixed. Suppose envelope A
contains $100 and envelope B contains $50. You open A, see the $100, and
then reason that B may contain either $50 or $200,
Norman Samish writes:
QUOTE-
Assume an eccentric millionaire offers you your choice of either of two
sealed envelopes, A or B, both containing money. One envelope contains
twice as much as the other. After you choose an envelope you will have the
option of trading it for the other envelope.
Suppo
On Tue, 2004-10-05 at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >I always forget to reply-to-all in this list.
> >So below goes my reply which went only to Hal Finney.
> >
> >-Forwarded Message-
> >> From: Eric Cavalcanti <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >> > Think about if the odd number of players was exactly
-Original Message-
From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 8:45 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
If the range of the smaller amount is infinite,
as in my P(x)=1/e^x
example, then it would no longer
>-Original Message-
>From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 8:45 PM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
>
>
>Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>>-Original Message-
Brent Meeker wrote:
-Original Message-
From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 6:33 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
Brent Meeker wrote:
On reviewing my analysis (I hadn't looked at for about
Original Message
Subject:
Re: Observation selection effects
Date:
Sat, 04 Sep 2004 02:29:54 -0400
From:
Danny Mayes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
[EMAIL PRO
ave a good day
John Mikes
PS: to excuse my lingo: my 1st Ph.D. was Chemistry-Physics-Math. J
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything-List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 6:19 PM
Subject: RE: Observation
Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course in the real world you have some idea about how much
money is in play so if you see a very large amount you infer it's
probably the larger amount. But even without this assumption of
realism it's an interesting problem and taken as stated there's
still no paradox. I s
pensive
though it is, in my opinion), which is based on his PhD thesis and discusses
the self-sampling assumption as applied to, among many other things, the
infuriating Doomsday Argument.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:
I always forget to reply-to-all in this list.
So below goes my reply which went only to Hal Finney.
-Forwarded Message-
> From: Eric Cavalcanti <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
> Dat
>-Original Message-
>Norman Samish:
>
>>The "Flip-Flop" game described by Stathis Papaioannou
>strikes me as a
>>version of the old Two-Envelope Paradox.
>>
>>Assume an eccentric millionaire offers you your choice
>of either of two
>>sealed envelopes, A or B, both containing money. One
>en
Norman Samish:
The "Flip-Flop" game described by Stathis Papaioannou strikes me as a
version of the old Two-Envelope Paradox.
Assume an eccentric millionaire offers you your choice of either of two
sealed envelopes, A or B, both containing money. One envelope contains
twice as much as the other.
ing is NOT valid - but I am unable,
at the moment, to tell you why!
Norman Samish
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, October 04, 2004 5:43 PM
Subject: RE: Observati
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> In the new casino game Flip-Flop, an odd number of players pays $1 each to
> individually flip a coin, so that no player can see what another player is
> doing. The game organisers then tally up the results, and the result in the
> minority is called the Winning Fli
Here is another version of the paradox, where the way an individual chooses
does not change the initial probabilities:
In the new casino game Flip-Flop, an odd number of players pays $1 each to
individually flip a coin, so that no player can see what another player is
doing. The game organisers
On Mon, 2004-10-04 at 10:42, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Eric Cavalcanti writes:
>
> QUOTE-
> And this is the case where this problem is most paradoxical.
> We are very likely to have one of the lanes more crowded than
> the other; most of the drivers reasoning would thus, by chance,
> be in the
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
> Suppose, in the room problem, that instead of a biased coin,
> everyone tossed a fair coin, as in Stathis original problem, and
> enters a room by the decision of the coin. If the number of people
> is large enough, it is highly likely that one of the rooms will
> be more
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
QUOTE-
And this is the case where this problem is most paradoxical.
We are very likely to have one of the lanes more crowded than
the other; most of the drivers reasoning would thus, by chance,
be in the more crowded lane, such that they would benefit from
changing lanes; ev
On Mon, 2004-10-04 at 07:55, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> On Sun, 2004-10-03 at 16:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Hal Finney writes:
> >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> > > >Here is another example which makes this point. You arrive before two
> > > >adjacent closed doors(...) However, this c
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Here is another example which makes this point. You arrive before two
> adjacent closed doors, A and B. You know that behind one door is a room
> containing 1000 people, while behind the other door is a room containing
> only 10 people, but you don't
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> Here is another example which makes this point. You arrive before two
> adjacent closed doors, A and B. You know that behind one door is a room
> containing 1000 people, while behind the other door is a room containing
> only 10 people, but you don't know which door
Eric Cavalcanti writes:
From another perspective, I have just arrived at the
road and there was no particular reason for me to
initially choose lane A or lane B, so that I could just
as well have started on the faster lane, and changing
would be undesirable. From this perspective, there
is no gain
Eric Cavalcanti writes regarding
http://plus.maths.org/issue17/features/traffic/index.html:
> I agree with the general conclusion:
> "when we randomly select a driver and ask her
> whether she thinks the next lane is faster, more
> often than not we will have selected a driver from
> the lane whic
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