Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?
On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:34, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but included in the truth. Losely speaking, OK. Numbers are objects, truth concerns only propositions. My feeling is that the truth then may be the truth(s) of information theory. Information theory is just a tiny part of computer science. The word "information" is very dangerous and overused, as people will confuse Shannon information with the meaningful information (best handled by model theory in logic). Note that computer science is essentially a tiny part of arithmetic. You must understand that after Gödel, we know that arithmetical truth is *very* big, and if we are machine (comp) then we cannot distinguish arithmetical truth from the outer God (the ONE). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/2/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18 Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ? On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse theories ? Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 Dear Roger, I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an infinite regress. Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear. They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non provably). No problem. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something "different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this. Bruno The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?
ROGER: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). BRUNO: The ONE is much more than the universal mind, as it is where the universal minds compete, perhaps before eventually recognizing themselves and reuniting, or fusing, and coming back to the ONE (Plotinus' conversion). ROGER: OK, but this is different from Leibniz, where the supreme monad is really the only mind, at least the only acting mind, although it observes/adjusts the individual monads and their minds. I suppose the changes in the monadic minds could be considered as thinking, but more in the mode of computers. The monads are essentially computer operations, the supreme monad more like the computer CPU chip. Plotinus' concept of the outgoing and incoming of the many minds is practically identical to the Tao = the One, out of which yin and yang elements go out to operate the world and then return. > > 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic > homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, > then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that > other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access > (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse > theories ? Not really because the "multiverse illusion" emerges from the statistical interference in all realities/dreams. But what you say might be locally true, if our substitution level is very low, like if a difference in the 10^(10^1000) decimal of h-bar would prevents consciousness to occur, or make it completely different (no need of zombies here). That would be astonishing, given the evidence, but comp certainly does not exclude, yet, such weird possibility. This would give a multi-multi-verse, at the least, as we already have evidence that our branches in the quantum multiverse can, and mostly, do interfere. Bruno > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/31/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-30, 12:38:34 > Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm > > > > > On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: > > [Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated > mathematically as always. > > > > > I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the > existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is > equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false > even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact. > > > > > Dear Bruno > > > > I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers. > > > No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of > conscious beings. > > > This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp > immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can > do, even in absence of any conscious observer. > > Dear Bruno, > > It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see > minds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no > ontological priority between them in my version. > > > > Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to be > short. Then it is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursively > equivalent). Matter and mind arise from the numbers (and + and *). > If you reintroduce a mind assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. It > you reintroduce matter, it will be epinomenal. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are > concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such > worlds. > > > But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number > relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human > understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations). > > > > Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You > seem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not! > > > > I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing, > except on reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you must > understand the technical result before philosophising on it. It is > subtle as comp makes a part of philosophy of mind into a branch of > science (indeed, arithmetic/computer science). > > > > > > > > > > > My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems > apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not > to numbers themselves. > > > > Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for > some machine/numbers. If not,
Re: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?
Hi Bruno Marchal Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but included in the truth. My feeling is that the truth then may be the truth(s) of information theory. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/2/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18 Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ? On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). >> >> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic >> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, >> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that >> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access >> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse >> theories ? >> >> >> Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 > Dear Roger, > > I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers > float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an > infinite regress. Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear. They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non provably). No problem. > That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be > Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not > it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable > from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an > infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot > be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish > this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is > conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something > "different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different > from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be > infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self > from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do > there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an > improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this. Bruno > > The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument > against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I > argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper > parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem. > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
