Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, May 10, 2005 at 04:44:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Goldblatt (see ref in my thesis) has made also a startling modal 
> analysis of Minkowsky space time through an old greek Diodorean 
> modality, which I wish to extract in the arithmetical frame imposed by 
> comp, but I don't even smell it (alas).
> 
> Bruno
> 

I do not get Minkowskian spacetime either with my approach - it is
definitely an add-in, as it is with Frieden's work and Stenger's work.

I suspect (dimly) that it can be related back to the observer by
asking about topological effects on the network structure of universal
Turing machines. Nobody has done any stuff on this, that I can make
out. But if true, then at least with COMP you can get a necessary, or
perhaps only likely requirement for Minkowskian space-time.

Cheers

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Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Danny,
First there is a basic notion of TIME which is taken as primitive (and 
perhaps related to the TIME hypothesis of Russell Standish, I don't 
know) and which is just the (first order logic) notion of successive 
natural numbers. This TIME is fixed and lives atemporally in Platonia, 
and constitutes the core skeleton of arithmetical truth.

The parameter time of the physicist is a mystery for me, and I don't 
get it by comp, and perhaps it is not necessary, because even physicist 
doubt it exist (at least the relativist physicists). It would be just a 
type of "other universe" like in David Deutsch's conception of time 
(see its FOR book).

The Heraclitean Brouwerian Bergsonian sort of subjective duration time 
is what appear automatically with comp once the first person is defined 
modal-logically, and it is given by the modal logic S4Grz and S4Grz1 
(see perhaps my SANE paper). I talk about this one to Stephen some time 
ago.

I would like to say more but I have not the time (paraphrasing a recent 
joke by Charles on the FOR LIST:)

I promise to Brian to explain what is the observer in comp, but I need 
to explain at least a minimal amount of modal logic, and this without 
technics, I will try asap, but then I can explain what is S4Grz and 
modal time).
Grz is for Grzegorczyk, a big polish logician.

Goldblatt (see ref in my thesis) has made also a startling modal 
analysis of Minkowsky space time through an old greek Diodorean 
modality, which I wish to extract in the arithmetical frame imposed by 
comp, but I don't even smell it (alas).

Bruno
Le 10-mai-05, à 16:04, danny mayes a écrit :
Bruno,
You've probably already addressed this recently, but given the number 
of posts and my work load I have not been able to read the much of the 
list recently.  What does comp make of time?  Is it merely some 
measure of the relationships among bitstrings in platonia?
Danny

Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-mai-05, à 19:39, Brent Meeker a écrit :
In what sense does "the program" exist if not as physical tokens?  
Is it
enough
that you've thought of the concept?  The same "program", i.e. 
bit-string,
does
different things on different computers.  So how can the program 
instantiate
reality independent of the compu

By the magic of Church thesis, going from one computer to another is 
just like
making a change of basis in some space. All result in Algorithmic 
information theory
are independent of the choice of computer modulo some constant. The 
same
for recursion theory (abstract computer or generalized computer 
theory) even without constant.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[danny mayes]

Bruno,
You've probably already addressed this recently, but given the number of 
posts and my work load I have not been able to read the much of the list 
recently.  What does comp make of time?  Is it merely some measure of 
the relationships among bitstrings in platonia? 

Danny
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-mai-05, à 19:39, Brent Meeker a écrit :
In what sense does "the program" exist if not as physical tokens?  
Is it
enough
that you've thought of the concept?  The same "program", i.e. 
bit-string,
does
different things on different computers.  So how can the program 
instantiate
reality independent of the compu

By the magic of Church thesis, going from one computer to another is 
just like
making a change of basis in some space. All result in Algorithmic 
information theory
are independent of the choice of computer modulo some constant. The same
for recursion theory (abstract computer or generalized computer 
theory) even without constant.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 09-mai-05, à 19:39, Brent Meeker a écrit :
In what sense does "the program" exist if not as physical tokens?  Is 
it
enough
that you've thought of the concept?  The same "program", i.e. 
bit-string,
does
different things on different computers.  So how can the program 
instantiate
reality independent of the compu
By the magic of Church thesis, going from one computer to another is 
just like
making a change of basis in some space. All result in Algorithmic 
information theory
are independent of the choice of computer modulo some constant. The same
for recursion theory (abstract computer or generalized computer theory) 
even without constant.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-mai-05, à 08:10, Hal Finney a écrit :
I'm not sure how to interpret the "z" in "x represents y to z".  If a
computer generates string y from string x, is the computer the z?
And as for Chaitin's algorithmic complexity, I am afraid that you have
it backward, that it does apply to finite strings.  I'm not even sure
how to begin to apply it to infinite strings.
It applies to both.
The algorithmic complexity of an infinite string is the shortest 
program, if it exists, which generates the string.
Modulo some constant it is a well defined notion, although non 
constructive. Even for finite strings.

It is misleading to say the UD just generate the strings, as Brent 
said. It also interprets them.

Russell: my last post to you was inaccurate I guess everybody see. Not 
only I wrote it to quickly but I read your's too quickly too, sorry.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness - A question

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 09-mai-05, à 01:38, Russell Standish a écrit :
The simplest description can be found in Max Tegamark's paper "Is an
Ensemble theory the ultimate TOE?". He uses the term "frog
perspective" for 1st person, and "bird perspective" for 3rd person.
I agree more or less. Tegmark, like many physicists forget the  
"uncommunicable (subjective, private, personal) aspects of the  
1-person. That's why he missed the hardness (and impossibility) of  
attaching the experience to one story in one (mathematical) universe.  
So he missed the emergence of physics from something like ALL  
mathematical structure  (which by the way is too big and unnecessary  
once we postulate the comp hyp).


Bruno Marchal has also written quite a bit about it in Chapter 5 of
his (Lille) thesis. This is unfortunately is not as accessible as
Tegmark's paper (not only is it written in French, which is not
particularly a problem for me, but it is also written in the language
of modal logic, which I'm only slowly gaining an appreciation of its
power and utility).
From what I understand of the chapter, 1st person communicable  
phenomena is
described by a logic G, and incommunicable by G*\G. The square box
operator [] represents knowledge, ie []p means one knows p. The
interpretation of [] is basically that p is true, and that I can prove
it. So this is essentially what we might call "mathematical"
knowledge. How this relates to "physical" knowledge, which a la Popper
is more "not proven false", I don't really know.

3rd person phenomena on the other hand is identified with Z, where the
box operator corresponds to "proving p and not being able to prove p
is false", ie basically the collection of self-consistent formal
systems. Z seems remarkably similar to Max Tegmark's original  
proposal...
Mmh.. It's a little bit the contrary G and G* will be 3 person. S4Grz  
will be the first person knower and at the time will be ... subjective  
time (like in Brouwer consciousness theory). Z1* will be the observer.
No hurry. I'm rather buzy now, but of course we will come back on this  
...
People can read the post on this list which I refere in my url (below).

I'm still rereading these chapters, and I'm sure I'll have some more
questions on the subject other than "Where does Popper fit in?"

Excellent question. The basic idea is that if physics is derivable from  
comp, well, let us derive it, and then let us compare with empirical  
physics. If comp implies F = Ma^2, it would be reasonnable to conclude  
comp is refuted!

Cheers,
Bruno

On Sun, May 08, 2005 at 02:54:48PM -0400, Jeanne Houston wrote:
I am a mere layperson who follows your discussions with great  
interest, so forgive me if I'm about to ask a question whose answer  
is apparent to all but me.  I am very familiar with the "first  
person" and "third person" concept in everyday life and literature,  
but I am a little unclear about the specific meaning that it holds in  
these discussions; I feel like I'm missing something important that  
is blocking my understanding of how you are applying first and third  
person to your work in terms of multiverses and MWI.  Could someone  
please direct me to some links that could help me better understand  
these perspectives as they apply to the discussions.  Thank you.

Jeanne
--  
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
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--- 
-
A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics 	   0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 	 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia 
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
--- 
-

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

You're right in one way, but there *is* a difference between what we 
experience in the first person and everything else. It is *possible* to 
doubt everything about the external world, but it is *impossible* to doubt 
that you are having a first person experience/ a thought/ an 
observer-moment/ whatever you want to call it.

-- Stathis Papaioannou
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
Date: Sat, 7 May 2005 22:57:22 -
There are many things we can't test conclusively - in fact there is nothing 
we
*can* test conclusively.  All scientific knowledge is provisional.  So I 
don't
see why you jump from the fact that we can't conclusively test for other 
minds
to saying that we take it on faith.  I'd say that I have a lot of evidence 
for
other minds.

Brent Meeker
>-Original Message-
>From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 5:47 AM
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
>
>
>Dear Stephen,
>
>COMP is basically a variant of the familiar "Problem of Other Minds", 
which
>is not just philosophical esoterica but something we have to deal with in
>everyday life. How do you know that all your friends and family are 
really
>conscious in the way you are conscious, and not merely zombies who behave 
as
>if they are conscious?  There isn't any empirical test that can help you
>decide the answer to this question conclusively; in the final analysis, 
you
>assume that other people have minds as a matter of faith. This troubles 
me
>as much as it troubles you, but alas, there is nothing we can do about 
it.
>
>--Stathis Papaioannou
>
>>From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>CC: 
>>Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
>>Date: Sat, 7 May 2005 10:27:45 -0400
>>
>>Dear Stathis,
>>
>>It is exactly this seeming requirement that we accept COMP by faith 
and
>>demand no possibility of empirical falsification that troubles me the 
most.
>>For me, a theory must make predictions that "might be confirmed to be
>>incorrect" otherwise all one has, at best, is the internal consistensy 
of
>>the theory. In light of Goedel's theorems, the utility of such theories 
to
>>answer questions is in doubt.
>>There must be always some way for independent observers to agree 
upon
>>the falsifiable implications of a theory. Here we are considering a 
theory
>>of observers themselves...
>>
>>Stephen
>>
>>- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou"
>><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>Cc: 
>>Sent: Saturday, May 07, 2005 9:13 AM
>>Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
>>
>>
>>snip
>>>OK, I agree. AI research is an experimental science. It may or may not 
be
>>>possible to build and program a computer so that it behaves like an
>>>intelligent and self-aware entity. Even if this difficult feat is
>>>eventually accomplished, there will then be the philosophical questions
>>>casting doubt on whether it is *really* conscious. This is the old 
problem
>>>of possibility of knowing whether other people really have minds like 
us,
>>>or whether they are just zombies acting like conscious beings. 
Ultimately,
>>>and regretfully, we can only be sure that we ourselves are conscious, 
and
>>>we have to take the existence of other minds on faith. However, if we
>>>believe that other humans are conscious because they seem to behave 
like
>>>we do, but refuse to believe that a computer which behaves in the same 
way
>>>(i.e. passes the Turing test) is conscious, then we are being
>>>inconsistent, and it is this inconsistency which I have called 
biological
>>>chauvinism.
>>>
>>>Having said that, it was not the purpose of my original post to show 
that
>>>observer-moments are Turing emulable. Rather, it was to show that Bruno
>>>Marchal's UDA can work without explicitly defining or explaining
>>>consciousness. I believe Bruno himself has aknowledged that the
>>>computational hypothesis (which he calls "comp") may ultimately have to 
be
>>>taken as a matter of faith. This sort of bothers me because I spent a
>>>large part of my adolescence heaping scorn on religion and other
>>>faith-based belief systems, but I can't do anything about it.
>>>
>>>--Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
>_
>Sell your car for $9 on carpoint.com.au
>http://www.carpoint.com.au/sellyourcar
>
>

_
REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings   
http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au

Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness - A question

[Russell Standish]

The simplest description can be found in Max Tegamark's paper "Is an
Ensemble theory the ultimate TOE?". He uses the term "frog
perspective" for 1st person, and "bird perspective" for 3rd person.

Bruno Marchal has also written quite a bit about it in Chapter 5 of
his (Lille) thesis. This is unfortunately is not as accessible as
Tegmark's paper (not only is it written in French, which is not
particularly a problem for me, but it is also written in the language
of modal logic, which I'm only slowly gaining an appreciation of its
power and utility).

From what I understand of the chapter, 1st person communicable phenomena is
described by a logic G, and incommunicable by G*\G. The square box
operator [] represents knowledge, ie []p means one knows p. The
interpretation of [] is basically that p is true, and that I can prove
it. So this is essentially what we might call "mathematical"
knowledge. How this relates to "physical" knowledge, which a la Popper
is more "not proven false", I don't really know.

3rd person phenomena on the other hand is identified with Z, where the
box operator corresponds to "proving p and not being able to prove p
is false", ie basically the collection of self-consistent formal
systems. Z seems remarkably similar to Max Tegmark's original proposal...

I'm still rereading these chapters, and I'm sure I'll have some more
questions on the subject other than "Where does Popper fit in?"

Cheers

On Sun, May 08, 2005 at 02:54:48PM -0400, Jeanne Houston wrote:
> I am a mere layperson who follows your discussions with great interest, 
> so forgive me if I'm about to ask a question whose answer is apparent to all 
> but me.  I am very familiar with the "first person" and "third person" 
> concept in everyday life and literature, but I am a little unclear about the 
> specific meaning that it holds in these discussions; I feel like I'm missing 
> something important that is blocking my understanding of how you are applying 
> first and third person to your work in terms of multiverses and MWI.  Could 
> someone please direct me to some links that could help me better understand 
> these perspectives as they apply to the discussions.  Thank you.
> 
> Jeanne
> 

-- 
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a
virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
Mathematics0425 253119 (")
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02



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Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness - A question

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Jeanne:
It is much the same thing.  More or less the first person is the one
standing in Bruno's transporter and the third person is the one operating
it. 
Several years ago I started a FAQ for this list but lacked the necessary
time to finish.
Hal Ruhl 

At 02:54 PM 5/8/2005, you wrote:

    I am a mere layperson who follows your discussions
with great interest, so forgive me if I'm about to ask a question whose
answer is apparent to all but me.  I am very familiar with the
"first person" and "third person" concept in everyday
life and literature, but I am a little unclear about the specific meaning
that it holds in these discussions; I feel like I'm missing something
important that is blocking my understanding of how you are applying first
and third person to your work in terms of multiverses and MWI. 
Could someone please direct me to some links that could help me better
understand these perspectives as they apply to the discussions. 
Thank you.
 
Jeanne
 

- Original Message - 
From: Stephen Paul King 
To:
everything-list@eskimo.com
 
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 11:35 AM
Subject: Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness

Dear Norman,
 
    You make a very interesting point
(the first point)  and I think that we could all agree upon it as it
is but I notice that you used two words that put a sizable dent in the
COMP idea: "snapshot" and "precisely represented". It
seems that we might all agree that we would be hard pressed to find any
evidence at all in a single snapshot on an entity to lead us to believe
that it somehow has or had some form of 1st person viewpoint, a
"subjective" experience. 
    Even if we were presented with many snapshots,
portraits of "moments frozen in time" like so many insects in
amber, we would do no better; but we have to deal with the same criticism
that eventually brought Skinnerian behaviorism down: models that only
access a 3rd person view and disallow for a "person" making the
3rd person view will, when examined critically, fail to offer any
explanation of even an illusion of a 1st person viewpoint! And we have
not even dealt with the Representable by
"string-of-zeroes-and-ones" . 
 
    Bitstring representability only gives
us a means to asks questions like: is it possible to recreate a 3rd
person view. Examples that such are possible are easy to find, go to your
nearest Blockbuster and rent a DVD... But again, unless we include the
fact that we each, as individuals, have some 1st person view that somehow
can not be known by others without also converging the 1st person
viewpoints of all involved, we are missing the obvious. A
"representation of X" is not necessarily 3rd person identical
to X even though it might be 1st person indistinguishable!
 
    About the multiverse being infinite
in space-time: You seem to be thinking of space-time as some kind of a
priori existing container, like a fish bowl, wherein all universes
"exists", using the word "exists" as if it denoted
"being there" and not "somewhere else". This is
inconsistent with accepted GR and QM in so many ways! GR does not allow
us to think off space-time as some passive "fishbowl"!
Space-time is something that can be changed - by changing the
distributions of momentum-energy - and that the alterable metrics of
space-time can change the distributions of momentum-energy - otherwise
known as "matter" - stuff that makes up planets, people,
amoeba, etc. 
    QM, as interpreted by Everrett et al tells us that
each eigenstate(?) of a QM system is "separate" from all
others, considered as representing entirely separate distributions of
matter/momentum-energy, and thus have entirely different and unmixed
space-times associated. The word "parallel" as used in MWI
should really be "orthogonal" since that is a more accurate
description of the relationships that the Many Worlds have with each
other.
 
    Now, what are we to make of these two
statements taken together? I don't know yet. ;-)
 
Stephen

- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish 
To:
everything-list@eskimo.com
 
Cc:
everything-list@eskimo.com
 
Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 3:14 AM
Subject: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness

Gentlemen,
I think that we all must be "zombies who behave as if they are
conscious," 
in the sense that a snapshot of any of us could, in principle, be
precisely 
represented by a string of zeroes and ones.

If it is true that the multiverse is infinite in space-time, is it
not true 
that anything that can exist must exist?  If so, then, in
infinite 
space-time, there are no possible universes that do not exist.

Norman Samish
~~~~~~~~~~
- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou"
<
[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:

Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness - A question

[Jeanne Houston]

    I am a mere layperson who 
follows your discussions with great interest, so forgive me if I'm about to ask 
a question whose answer is apparent to all but me.  I am very familiar with 
the "first person" and "third person" concept in everyday life and literature, 
but I am a little unclear about the specific meaning that it holds in these 
discussions; I feel like I'm missing something important that is blocking my 
understanding of how you are applying first and third person to your work in 
terms of multiverses and MWI.  Could someone please direct me to some links 
that could help me better understand these perspectives as they apply to the 
discussions.  Thank you.
 
Jeanne
 

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 11:35 AM
  Subject: Re: Everything Physical is based 
  on Consciousness
  
  Dear Norman,
   
      You make a very interesting point (the 
  first point)  and I think that we could all agree upon it as it 
  is but I notice that you used two words that put a sizable dent in the 
  COMP idea: "snapshot" and "precisely represented". It seems that we might all 
  agree that we would be hard pressed to find any evidence at all in a single 
  snapshot on an entity to lead us to believe that it somehow has or had some 
  form of 1st person viewpoint, a "subjective" experience. 
      Even if we were presented with many 
  snapshots, portraits of "moments frozen in time" like so many insects in 
  amber, we would do no better; but we have to deal with the same 
  criticism that eventually brought Skinnerian behaviorism down: models that 
  only access a 3rd person view and disallow for a "person" making the 3rd 
  person view will, when examined critically, fail to offer any explanation of 
  even an illusion of a 1st person viewpoint! And we have not even dealt with 
  the Representable by "string-of-zeroes-and-ones" . 
   
      Bitstring representability only gives us 
  a means to asks questions like: is it possible to recreate a 3rd person view. 
  Examples that such are possible are easy to find, go to your nearest 
  Blockbuster and rent a DVD... But again, unless we include the fact that we 
  each, as individuals, have some 1st person view that somehow can not be known 
  by others without also converging the 1st person viewpoints of all involved, 
  we are missing the obvious. A "representation of X" is not necessarily 3rd 
  person identical to X even though it might be 1st person 
  indistinguishable!
   
      About the multiverse being infinite in 
  space-time: You seem to be thinking of space-time as some kind of a priori 
  existing container, like a fish bowl, wherein all universes "exists", using 
  the word "exists" as if it denoted "being there" and not "somewhere else". 
  This is inconsistent with accepted GR and QM in so many ways! GR does not 
  allow us to think off space-time as some passive "fishbowl"! Space-time is 
  something that can be changed - by changing the distributions of 
  momentum-energy - and that the alterable metrics of space-time can change the 
  distributions of momentum-energy - otherwise known as "matter" - stuff that 
  makes up planets, people, amoeba, etc. 
      QM, as interpreted by Everrett et 
  al tells us that each eigenstate(?) of a QM system is "separate" from all 
  others, considered as representing entirely separate distributions of 
  matter/momentum-energy, and thus have entirely different and unmixed 
  space-times associated. The word "parallel" as used in MWI should really be 
  "orthogonal" since that is a more accurate description of the relationships 
  that the Many Worlds have with each other.
   
      Now, what are we to make of these two 
  statements taken together? I don't know yet. ;-)
   
  Stephen
  
- Original Message - 
From: 
Norman 
Samish 
To: everything-list@eskimo.com 

Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com 

Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 3:14 
AM
Subject: Everything Physical is based 
on Consciousness

Gentlemen,I think that we all must be 
"zombies who behave as if they are conscious," in the sense that a 
snapshot of any of us could, in principle, be precisely represented by a 
string of zeroes and ones.If it is true that the multiverse is 
infinite in space-time, is it not true that anything that can exist must 
exist?  If so, then, in infinite space-time, there are no possible 
universes that do not exist.Norman 
Samish~~- Original Message 
- From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Cc: 
<everything-list@eski

Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness

[Norman Samish]

Dear Stephen,I have no doubt that your critique of my 
two statements is correct according to your understanding of what I 
said.  However, I think that I was unsuccessful in conveying what 
I meant.  Let me try again.  (Effective communication is, for me 
at least, very difficult in this forum.)My first statement was "I 
think that we all must be 'zombies who behave as if they are conscious,' in 
the sense that a snapshot of any of us could, in principle, be precisely 
represented by a string of zeroes and ones."  What I mean by this is 
that my premise is that we are in a mechanistic, if unpredictable, 
universe.  We are no more than an ordered collection of fundamental 
particles, quarks.  Each particle and its relationship to other particles 
can be precisely represented by a bitstring.  Even if the particles are 
made of vibrating strings and involve hidden 
dimensions, that can also be represented by bitstrings.  
This string of zeroes and ones therefore contains the information necessary to 
exactly duplicate the original, including first-person memories.  There is 
nothing metaphysical in a person's makeup.
 
Do you disagree with this premise?  If so, 
why?
 
My second statement was "If it is true that the multiverse 
is infinite in space-time, is it not true that anything that can exist must 
exist?  If so, then, in infinite space-time, there are no possible 
universes that do not exist."  I meant "time" to include the future, 
so perhaps what I should have said is "there are no possible universes that WILL 
not exist."  
 
However, this gets me into the same implicit 
assumption (that you correctly objected to) of the fish-bowl multiverse 
with unchangeable space-time!  If space-time could be changed 
enough, perhaps it is NOT true that "anything that can exist must exist."  
Would this then mean that the multiverse is NOT necessarily infinite in 
space-time?
 
Thanks for your comments,
Norman Samish
``
 
- Original Message - From: Stephen Paul King 
To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 8:35 
AMSubject: Re: Everything Physical is based on ConsciousnessDear 
Norman,    You make a very interesting point (the first 
point)  and I think that we could all agree upon it as it is but I notice 
that you used two words that put a sizable dent in the COMP idea: "snapshot" and 
"precisely represented". It seems that we might all agree that we would be hard 
pressed to find any evidence at all in a single snapshot on an entity to lead us 
to believe that it somehow has or had some form of 1st person viewpoint, a 
"subjective" experience.     Even if we were presented with 
many snapshots, portraits of "moments frozen in time" like so many insects in 
amber, we would do no better; but we have to deal with the same criticism that 
eventually brought Skinnerian behaviorism down: models that only access a 3rd 
person view and disallow for a "person" making the 3rd person view will, when 
examined critically, fail to offer any explanation of even an illusion of a 1st 
person viewpoint! And we have not even dealt with the Representable by 
"string-of-zeroes-and-ones" .     Bitstring 
representability only gives us a means to asks questions like: is it possible to 
recreate a 3rd person view. Examples that such are possible are easy to find, go 
to your nearest Blockbuster and rent a DVD... But again, unless we include the 
fact that we each, as individuals, have some 1st person view that somehow can 
not be known by others without also converging the 1st person viewpoints of all 
involved, we are missing the obvious. A "representation of X" is not necessarily 
3rd person identical to X even though it might be 1st person 
indistinguishable!    About the multiverse being infinite 
in space-time: You seem to be thinking of space-time as some kind of a priori 
existing container, like a fish bowl, wherein all universes "exists", using the 
word "exists" as if it denoted "being there" and not "somewhere else". This is 
inconsistent with accepted GR and QM in so many ways! GR does not allow us to 
think off space-time as some passive "fishbowl"! Space-time is something that 
can be changed - by changing the distributions of momentum-energy - and that the 
alterable metrics of space-time can change the distributions of momentum-energy 
- otherwise known as "matter" - stuff that makes up planets, people, amoeba, 
etc.     QM, as interpreted by Everrett et al tells us that 
each eigenstate(?) of a QM system is "separate" from all others, considered as 
representing entirely separate distributions of matter/momentum-energy, and thus 
have entirely different and unmixed space-times associated. The word "parallel" 
as used in MWI should really be "orthogonal" since that is a more accurate 
description of the relationships that the Many Worlds have with each 
other.    Now, what are we to make of these two 
statements taken together? I don't know y

Re: Everything Physical is based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Norman,
 
    You make a very interesting point (the 
first point)  and I think that we could all agree upon it as it is but 
I notice that you used two words that put a sizable dent in the COMP idea: 
"snapshot" and "precisely represented". It seems that we might all agree that we 
would be hard pressed to find any evidence at all in a single snapshot on an 
entity to lead us to believe that it somehow has or had some form of 1st person 
viewpoint, a "subjective" experience. 
    Even if we were presented with many 
snapshots, portraits of "moments frozen in time" like so many insects in 
amber, we would do no better; but we have to deal with the same 
criticism that eventually brought Skinnerian behaviorism down: models that only 
access a 3rd person view and disallow for a "person" making the 3rd person view 
will, when examined critically, fail to offer any explanation of even an 
illusion of a 1st person viewpoint! And we have not even dealt with the 
Representable by "string-of-zeroes-and-ones" . 
 
    Bitstring representability only gives us a 
means to asks questions like: is it possible to recreate a 3rd person view. 
Examples that such are possible are easy to find, go to your nearest 
Blockbuster and rent a DVD... But again, unless we include the fact that we 
each, as individuals, have some 1st person view that somehow can not be known by 
others without also converging the 1st person viewpoints of all involved, we are 
missing the obvious. A "representation of X" is not necessarily 3rd person 
identical to X even though it might be 1st person 
indistinguishable!
 
    About the multiverse being infinite in 
space-time: You seem to be thinking of space-time as some kind of a priori 
existing container, like a fish bowl, wherein all universes "exists", using the 
word "exists" as if it denoted "being there" and not "somewhere else". This is 
inconsistent with accepted GR and QM in so many ways! GR does not allow us to 
think off space-time as some passive "fishbowl"! Space-time is something that 
can be changed - by changing the distributions of momentum-energy - and that the 
alterable metrics of space-time can change the distributions of momentum-energy 
- otherwise known as "matter" - stuff that makes up planets, people, amoeba, 
etc. 
    QM, as interpreted by Everrett et 
al tells us that each eigenstate(?) of a QM system is "separate" from all 
others, considered as representing entirely separate distributions of 
matter/momentum-energy, and thus have entirely different and unmixed space-times 
associated. The word "parallel" as used in MWI should really be "orthogonal" 
since that is a more accurate description of the relationships that the Many 
Worlds have with each other.
 
    Now, what are we to make of these two 
statements taken together? I don't know yet. ;-)
 
Stephen

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Norman Samish 
  
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 3:14 AM
  Subject: Everything Physical is based on 
  Consciousness
  
  Gentlemen,I think that we all must be 
  "zombies who behave as if they are conscious," in the sense that a 
  snapshot of any of us could, in principle, be precisely represented by a 
  string of zeroes and ones.If it is true that the multiverse is 
  infinite in space-time, is it not true that anything that can exist must 
  exist?  If so, then, in infinite space-time, there are no possible 
  universes that do not exist.Norman 
  Samish~~- Original Message 
  - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: 
  <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Cc: Sent: 
  Saturday, May 07, 2005 10:47 PMSubject: Re: Everything Physical is Based 
  on ConsciousnessDear Stephen,COMP is basically a variant 
  of the familiar "Problem of Other Minds", whichis not just philosophical 
  esoterica but something we have to deal with ineveryday life. How do you 
  know that all your friends and family are reallyconscious in the way you 
  are conscious, and not merely zombies who behave as if they are 
  conscious?  There isn't any empirical test that can help youdecide 
  the answer to this question conclusively; in the final analysis, youassume 
  that other people have minds as a matter of faith. This troubles meas much 
  as it troubles you, but alas, there is nothing we can do about 
  it.--Stathis 
Papaioannou

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Dear Stephen,
COMP is basically a variant of the familiar "Problem of Other Minds", which 
is not just philosophical esoterica but something we have to deal with in 
everyday life. How do you know that all your friends and family are really 
conscious in the way you are conscious, and not merely zombies who behave as 
if they are conscious?  There isn't any empirical test that can help you 
decide the answer to this question conclusively; in the final analysis, you 
assume that other people have minds as a matter of faith. This troubles me 
as much as it troubles you, but alas, there is nothing we can do about it.

--Stathis Papaioannou
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: 
Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
Date: Sat, 7 May 2005 10:27:45 -0400
Dear Stathis,
   It is exactly this seeming requirement that we accept COMP by faith and 
demand no possibility of empirical falsification that troubles me the most. 
For me, a theory must make predictions that "might be confirmed to be 
incorrect" otherwise all one has, at best, is the internal consistensy of 
the theory. In light of Goedel's theorems, the utility of such theories to 
answer questions is in doubt.
   There must be always some way for independent observers to agree upon 
the falsifiable implications of a theory. Here we are considering a theory 
of observers themselves...

Stephen
- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Saturday, May 07, 2005 9:13 AM
Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

snip
OK, I agree. AI research is an experimental science. It may or may not be 
possible to build and program a computer so that it behaves like an 
intelligent and self-aware entity. Even if this difficult feat is 
eventually accomplished, there will then be the philosophical questions 
casting doubt on whether it is *really* conscious. This is the old problem 
of possibility of knowing whether other people really have minds like us, 
or whether they are just zombies acting like conscious beings. Ultimately, 
and regretfully, we can only be sure that we ourselves are conscious, and 
we have to take the existence of other minds on faith. However, if we 
believe that other humans are conscious because they seem to behave like 
we do, but refuse to believe that a computer which behaves in the same way 
(i.e. passes the Turing test) is conscious, then we are being 
inconsistent, and it is this inconsistency which I have called biological 
chauvinism.

Having said that, it was not the purpose of my original post to show that 
observer-moments are Turing emulable. Rather, it was to show that Bruno 
Marchal's UDA can work without explicitly defining or explaining 
consciousness. I believe Bruno himself has aknowledged that the 
computational hypothesis (which he calls "comp") may ultimately have to be 
taken as a matter of faith. This sort of bothers me because I spent a 
large part of my adolescence heaping scorn on religion and other 
faith-based belief systems, but I can't do anything about it.

--Stathis Papaioannou

_
Sell your car for $9 on carpoint.com.au   
http://www.carpoint.com.au/sellyourcar

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Stathis,
   It is exactly this seeming requirement that we accept COMP by faith and 
demand no possibility of empirical falsification that troubles me the most. 
For me, a theory must make predictions that "might be confirmed to be 
incorrect" otherwise all one has, at best, is the internal consistensy of 
the theory. In light of Goedel's theorems, the utility of such theories to 
answer questions is in doubt.
   There must be always some way for independent observers to agree upon 
the falsifiable implications of a theory. Here we are considering a theory 
of observers themselves...

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Saturday, May 07, 2005 9:13 AM
Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

snip
OK, I agree. AI research is an experimental science. It may or may not be 
possible to build and program a computer so that it behaves like an 
intelligent and self-aware entity. Even if this difficult feat is 
eventually accomplished, there will then be the philosophical questions 
casting doubt on whether it is *really* conscious. This is the old problem 
of possibility of knowing whether other people really have minds like us, 
or whether they are just zombies acting like conscious beings. Ultimately, 
and regretfully, we can only be sure that we ourselves are conscious, and 
we have to take the existence of other minds on faith. However, if we 
believe that other humans are conscious because they seem to behave like 
we do, but refuse to believe that a computer which behaves in the same way 
(i.e. passes the Turing test) is conscious, then we are being 
inconsistent, and it is this inconsistency which I have called biological 
chauvinism.

Having said that, it was not the purpose of my original post to show that 
observer-moments are Turing emulable. Rather, it was to show that Bruno 
Marchal's UDA can work without explicitly defining or explaining 
consciousness. I believe Bruno himself has aknowledged that the 
computational hypothesis (which he calls "comp") may ultimately have to be 
taken as a matter of faith. This sort of bothers me because I spent a 
large part of my adolescence heaping scorn on religion and other 
faith-based belief systems, but I can't do anything about it.

--Stathis Papaioannou

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Stephen Paul King wrote:
   Could I oppose the idea that consiousness is not Turing Emulable 
without being a "biological chauvinist"?  ;-)The main problem I have is 
that these two assumptions are mutually exclusive!

1) Observer-moments exist: This requires that observer-moments have an 
ontological status that does not depend on anything other that they 
consistensy; they are elevated by postulation to having the same status as 
mathematical tautalogies, like 1 = 1, 1+2 = 3, etc.
Arguably, the existence of an observer-moment is *at least* as fundamental 
as the truth of a mathematical tautology. If I think or write "1+2 = 3" a 
little debate is implicitly generated, since this may or may not be 
consistent, depending on the meaning of the symbols etc. If I just *think*, 
from the first person perspective, there is no debate, no definitions, no 
question that I may be mistaken in thinking that I have thought. Cogito, 
ergo cogito.

2) This mysterious consciousness thing is "Turing emulable": This requires 
that for ANY 1st person experience that ANY observer might have that there 
exist at least one string of binary numbers that, when encoded on a UTM, 
will generate an simulation that if feed into a full sensory Virtual 
Reality interface, will be indistinguishable from the 1st person content of 
the consiousness.
Yes, OK so far.
   Now, you might point out that it is obvious that the binary strings are 
members of the mathematical tautologies and thus have a "timeless" 
ontological status. I would agree with that completely, but I would point 
out that the notion of a UTM or UD does not have the same timeless status 
because it requires that there be some kind of physical process and memory 
traces/tapes/chicken scratchings/etc.
   Additionally, unless we have some kind of observer, even if it is a UTM 
or UD itself, that can be interogated via some kind of physical interface 
by some other observer, it is logically impossible to claim that 
consciousness exists. Such would be equivalent to wondering whether of not 
some black box where capable of emulating a conscious experience without 
allowing any form of interface with the black box! The "Yes Doctor" idea 
requires that the consciousness that is transfered from a biological brain 
to silicon be capable of reporting its 1st person states otherwise our 
claims are reduced to mere speculations. For example see the discussion of 
Zombies.
OK, I agree. AI research is an experimental science. It may or may not be 
possible to build and program a computer so that it behaves like an 
intelligent and self-aware entity. Even if this difficult feat is eventually 
accomplished, there will then be the philosophical questions casting doubt 
on whether it is *really* conscious. This is the old problem of possibility 
of knowing whether other people really have minds like us, or whether they 
are just zombies acting like conscious beings. Ultimately, and regretfully, 
we can only be sure that we ourselves are conscious, and we have to take the 
existence of other minds on faith. However, if we believe that other humans 
are conscious because they seem to behave like we do, but refuse to believe 
that a computer which behaves in the same way (i.e. passes the Turing test) 
is conscious, then we are being inconsistent, and it is this inconsistency 
which I have called biological chauvinism.

Having said that, it was not the purpose of my original post to show that 
observer-moments are Turing emulable. Rather, it was to show that Bruno 
Marchal's UDA can work without explicitly defining or explaining 
consciousness. I believe Bruno himself has aknowledged that the 
computational hypothesis (which he calls "comp") may ultimately have to be 
taken as a matter of faith. This sort of bothers me because I spent a large 
part of my adolescence heaping scorn on religion and other faith-based 
belief systems, but I can't do anything about it.

--Stathis Papaioannou

- Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2005 11:20 AM
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness


This is a wonderfully clear explanation of Bruno's UDA. Perhaps Bruno 
could confirm that it is what he intended.

As for the observer - or more fundamentally, the observer-moment - I think 
you can get away without explicitly defining it. All you need is two 
assumptions:

Firstly, you have to assume that observer-moments exist. I think it is 
pretty clear that this is the case; you know it and I know it. You may not 
know how to explain it, define it, or even describe it, but you definitely 
know that observer-moments exist if you are a conscious being.

Secondly, you have to assume that this mysterious consciousness thing is 
"Turing emulable". It is not nearly as obvious tha

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Lee,
- Original Message - 
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2005 5:51 PM
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness


Stephen writes
The perpetual question I have (about the epiphenomena problem that any
form of Idealism has), regarding this notion of a Platonic Reality, is
that
IF all possible Forms of existence *exist* a priori - "from the
beginning" -
what necessitates any form of 1st person experience of a world that
"evolves", has an irreversible arrow of time, etc?
Prigogine used to declaim on this a lot. I think that the
answer that many people like to give---and which has caused
me no end of headaches---is that if we regard time as just
a dimension like the others, then we can conceive everything
as a block universe (as we have all discussed a lot here
already).
[SPK]
   I have read every I could find by Prigogine many years ago. It was his
idea that lead me to wonder if Being were merely the "fixed point" of
Becoming... But that is metaphysics... ;-)
[LC]
I'm assuming that your question isn't just rhetorical. I have
to admit "they" have a strong argument. Probably Calvin in Geneva
made the same argument before them. Even Vonnegut talked about
our actions being frozen in amber, as it were. And Balfour has
explained it rather well: our *sense* time passing is a sort
of illusion, and all that really is is a set of adjacent
configurations. But, alas, I am saying nothing new here: we've
all reiterated these ideas.
[SPK]
   I have no problem with the idea of block universes in principle, in
fact, the idea of a "history" makes perfect sense in these terms. I had
mentioned something previously about light cones and closed universes
considered from the point of view of being it the Present and looking out
toward the Big Bang event horizon.
   Each observer, in this sense has a "block universe" of their own.  One
thing that we can claim to be unassailable is that any kind of "observer"
that we can imagine will always have some notion of an object of their
observations. It seems to me that the converse is also equally unassailable.
If there exists something that is observable, then there must exist some
observer that has such as an object. But the problems start when we take
this idea that abstract it to the point where the observer is some abstract
notion of a "god-like" point of view; that somehow it is possible for an
observer to exist that is the ideal voyeur that can somehow perceive all and
yet not is affected by this act of observation.
   One thing we seem to all agree upon is that the act of observation
involves some kind of creation of a persistent imprint of the act, something
that can be used to communicate the result of the observation, be it a
crystallization of silver in a photographic plate or the creation of a
connection between neurons. Are we going to somehow abstract away this and
get away with it? I do not think so!
[SPK]
It seems to me that Plato's Ideal is the ultimate case of a
system in thermodynamic equilibrium, and as such exhibits no
change of any kind, per definition. What then is the origin
of, at least, the illusion of change? How can Becoming derive
from pure Being?
[LC]
:-)  Yes, one of the titles of Prigogine's books was "From
Being to Becoming".
[SPK]
   Indeed!
[SPK]
Why is it necessary that I cannot remember the future equally
well as I can remember the past, assuming that I have not
experienced a blow to the head or oxygen deprivation?
[LC]
Of course, if we turn to the natural world for explanations, and
specifically, turn to evolution, then this question amounts to
"why are records made of the past and not the future?". I don't
know of a very good answer. Perhaps Huw Price and others in the
end say, "It's because the direction indicated by records is
what we call the past---traces of influence---and the other
direction, the direction where entropy increases, is what we
call the future."  But I would not be too surprised if a better
answer somehow obtains.
[SPK]
   I have some ideas about this but it will take a some time to explain
them. One thing for sure is that this "arrow of time"
snip
[SPK]
Just because all possible TMs *could* get some measure of runtime,
since we are assuming from the beginning
that there exists some form of hardware,
does not mean that they can all be implemented. The most notorious case
are TMs that ask the question "Do I halt?"...
[LC]
When you write "does not mean that they *can* all be implemented",
I'm not sure what you mean by can. Perhaps you mean only what the
follow-up sentence implies. Now I would say that as usual we need
to distinguish between TMs considered as abstract sets of quadruples
(or quintuples in some expositions), and an idealized littl

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Stan,
   Could I oppose the idea that consiousness is not Turing Emulable without 
being a "biological chauvinist"?  ;-)The main problem I have is that these 
two assumptions are mutually exclusive!

1) Observer-moments exist: This requires that observer-moments have an 
ontological status that does not depend on anything other that they 
consistensy; they are elevated by postulation to having the same status as 
mathematical tautalogies, like 1 = 1, 1+2 = 3, etc.

2) This mysterious consciousness thing is "Turing emulable": This requires 
that for ANY 1st person experience that ANY observer might have that there 
exist at least one string of binary numbers that, when encoded on a UTM, 
will generate an simulation that if feed into a full sensory Virtual Reality 
interface, will be indistinguishable from the 1st person content of the 
consiousness.

   Now, you might point out that it is obvious that the binary strings are 
members of the mathematical tautologies and thus have a "timeless" 
ontological status. I would agree with that completely, but I would point 
out that the notion of a UTM or UD does not have the same timeless status 
because it requires that there be some kind of physical process and memory 
traces/tapes/chicken scratchings/etc.
   Additionally, unless we have some kind of observer, even if it is a UTM 
or UD itself, that can be interogated via some kind of physical interface by 
some other observer, it is logically impossible to claim that consciousness 
exists. Such would be equivalent to wondering whether of not some black box 
where capable of emulating a conscious experience without allowing any form 
of interface with the black box! The "Yes Doctor" idea requires that the 
consciousness that is transfered from a biological brain to silicon be 
capable of reporting its 1st person states otherwise our claims are reduced 
to mere speculations. For example see the discussion of Zombies.

Kindest regards,
Stephen
Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: 
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2005 11:20 AM
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness


This is a wonderfully clear explanation of Bruno's UDA. Perhaps Bruno 
could confirm that it is what he intended.

As for the observer - or more fundamentally, the observer-moment - I think 
you can get away without explicitly defining it. All you need is two 
assumptions:

Firstly, you have to assume that observer-moments exist. I think it is 
pretty clear that this is the case; you know it and I know it. You may not 
know how to explain it, define it, or even describe it, but you definitely 
know that observer-moments exist if you are a conscious being.

Secondly, you have to assume that this mysterious consciousness thing is 
"Turing emulable". It is not nearly as obvious that this second assumption 
is true, and biological chauvinists may continue to deny it no matter what 
progress AI research may make. At some point, as Bruno says, you may have 
to take "comp" on faith; for example, say "yes doctor" to the offer of a 
durable new electronic brain when yours is starting to break down.

It should now be clear that if both of the above assumptions are true, 
then the UD should generate all the observer-moments as per Bruno and 
Brian. The "observer" is then a derivative entity, made up of certain 
subsets of observer-moments. You know what an observer-moment is through 
direct experience, but you have nowhere been forced to explicitly define 
it. If you want to say that consciousness is something utterly mysterious 
forever, you can say this, and the UDA still holds.

--Stathis Papaioannou

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

["Hal Finney"]

Stephen Paul King writes:
> I think that your characterization would be accurate if you could 
> somehow substitute each and every verb, such as "generate", "execute", 
> "compare", "detect", "create", which depend on some form of transitional 
> temporality with nouns that have a non-temporal connotation, after all all 
> of this computational structure is postulated to exist in a TIMELESS 
> Platonic realm where any notion of temporality and change is non-existent.

That's a good point.  Another way to think of it is that all bit strings
exist, timelessly; and some of them implicitly specify computer programs;
and some of those computer programs would create universes with observers
just like us in them.  You don't necessarily need the machinery of
the computer to run the program, it could be that the existence of the
program itself is sufficient for what we think of as reality.

Then the same argument applies: each computer program is actually only
a finite length; and a computer program of n bits is a prefix of 1/2^n
of the bit strings; hence it is reasonable to say that such a program
has a measure of 1/2^n.  Then we can argue that our own universe is a
relatively small program (Wolfram estimates about 2000 bits) and so it
is not all that unlikely that we observe such a universe.

So, in this sense, the Platonic existence of bit strings is enough to
explain our experience of the world.

Hal Finney

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Hal,
   I think that your characterization would be accurate if you could 
somehow substitute each and every verb, such as "generate", "execute", 
"compare", "detect", "create", which depend on some form of transitional 
temporality with nouns that have a non-temporal connotation, after all all 
of this computational structure is postulated to exist in a TIMELESS 
Platonic realm where any notion of temporality and change is non-existent.
   I may seem to be a bit too clever by half in this response to your post, 
but we must be consistent; if we postulate a timeless realm then we are 
eliminating any notion that depends of change. Time is, after all, the 
measure of change.

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: 
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2005 12:40 PM
Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness


Bruno Marchal writes:
The problem is that from the first person point of view, the arbitrary
delays, introduced by the UD, cannot be taken into account, so that
big programs cannot be evacuated so easily. This does not mean little
programs, or some little programs, does not win in the limit, just that
something more must be said.  Sorry for not explaining more because I
have a lot of work to finish (I'm still not connected at home, but in 
this
case I'm not sure I will find the time to go home...).  See you next 
week.
As I understand the explanation, what happens is that as the UD generates
programs, it inherently and unintentionally generates multiple copies of
each program. The reason is that each program has only a finite size.
If we think of the program as written in some kind of programming
language, only a finite number of the characters will be used.
Any characters beyond this ending point are never executed.
This means that as the UD generates all character strings and begins
to execute them, a program which is n bits long gets created any time
the UD generates a string that starts with those particular n bits.
Each string which has those n bits as its prefix (the bits starting at
the beginning) will represent the same program.
The UD can't detect this because a priori there is no way to tell how
long a particular program will turn out to be.  This is a corollary of
the Halting Problem, there is no way to tell by inspection how long a
program is.  So it has no choice but to multiply create programs in this
way.
The result is that if we compare two programs, one n bits long and one
m bits long, where m > n, we will find that the n bit one gets created
proportionally more times than the m bit one.  And in fact the constant
of proportionality is 2^(m-n).  This lets us define a "measure" for each
program that tells what fraction of all programs the UD creates are that
particular program.  That measure is 2^(-n) for an n bit program.
Therefore, each program gets created an infinite number of times by the
UD, and the fraction of the whole ensemble of programs which consists
of a particular n bit program is 2^(-n).
Note that this does not depend on any slowdown effect for larger programs;
that effect is not considered significant in this model because it is only
noticeable from outside and not from within the program being executed.
Rather, it depends on multiple creations of each program, and the fraction
of the whole infinite ensemble that each program represents.
Hal Finney

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

["Hal Finney"]

Bruno Marchal writes:
> The problem is that from the first person point of view, the arbitrary
> delays, introduced by the UD, cannot be taken into account, so that
> big programs cannot be evacuated so easily. This does not mean little
> programs, or some little programs, does not win in the limit, just that
> something more must be said.  Sorry for not explaining more because I
> have a lot of work to finish (I'm still not connected at home, but in this
> case I'm not sure I will find the time to go home...).  See you next week.

As I understand the explanation, what happens is that as the UD generates
programs, it inherently and unintentionally generates multiple copies of
each program. The reason is that each program has only a finite size.
If we think of the program as written in some kind of programming
language, only a finite number of the characters will be used.
Any characters beyond this ending point are never executed.

This means that as the UD generates all character strings and begins
to execute them, a program which is n bits long gets created any time
the UD generates a string that starts with those particular n bits.
Each string which has those n bits as its prefix (the bits starting at
the beginning) will represent the same program.

The UD can't detect this because a priori there is no way to tell how
long a particular program will turn out to be.  This is a corollary of
the Halting Problem, there is no way to tell by inspection how long a
program is.  So it has no choice but to multiply create programs in this
way.

The result is that if we compare two programs, one n bits long and one
m bits long, where m > n, we will find that the n bit one gets created
proportionally more times than the m bit one.  And in fact the constant
of proportionality is 2^(m-n).  This lets us define a "measure" for each
program that tells what fraction of all programs the UD creates are that
particular program.  That measure is 2^(-n) for an n bit program.

Therefore, each program gets created an infinite number of times by the
UD, and the fraction of the whole ensemble of programs which consists
of a particular n bit program is 2^(-n).

Note that this does not depend on any slowdown effect for larger programs;
that effect is not considered significant in this model because it is only
noticeable from outside and not from within the program being executed.
Rather, it depends on multiple creations of each program, and the fraction
of the whole infinite ensemble that each program represents.

Hal Finney

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 06-mai-05, à 17:20, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
This is a wonderfully clear explanation of Bruno's UDA. Perhaps Bruno 
could confirm that it is what he intended.
Quite nice indeed, except one point. See below in Brian's message. It 
*is* related to something we have already discussed.


As for the observer - or more fundamentally, the observer-moment - I 
think you can get away without explicitly defining it. All you need is 
two assumptions:

Firstly, you have to assume that observer-moments exist. I think it is 
pretty clear that this is the case; you know it and I know it. You may 
not know how to explain it, define it, or even describe it, but you 
definitely know that observer-moments exist if you are a conscious 
being.

Secondly, you have to assume that this mysterious consciousness thing 
is "Turing emulable". It is not nearly as obvious that this second 
assumption is true, and biological chauvinists may continue to deny it 
no matter what progress AI research may make. At some point, as Bruno 
says, you may have to take "comp" on faith; for example, say "yes 
doctor" to the offer of a durable new electronic brain when yours is 
starting to break down.

It should now be clear that if both of the above assumptions are true, 
then the UD should generate all the observer-moments as per Bruno and 
Brian. The "observer" is then a derivative entity, made up of certain 
subsets of observer-moments. You know what an observer-moment is 
through direct experience, but you have nowhere been forced to 
explicitly define it. If you want to say that consciousness is 
something utterly mysterious forever, you can say this, and the UDA 
still holds.

--Stathis Papaioannou


From: Brian Scurfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
Date: Fri, 06 May 2005 18:04:45 +1200
In reply to Lee Corbin on the Fabric of Reality List

Lee,
You gave us some wonderful examples of totally ridiculous Turing 
Machines
that are nevertheless possible (I would at this point ask somebody to 
take
away Charles' keyboard). You have noted that these TMs are 
improbable; we
would not expect them to be instantiated in any great measure 
throughout the
multiverse. They are similar to Harry Potter universes in this 
respect.
Surely, though, the fact that they are improbable is not a blow 
against
Bruno! His argument is concerned with measure and you are playing 
right into
that. Let me try to explain...

To make this easier, let's forget about physical reality for a while. 
Let's
consider the Universal Dovetailer (UD). For those not in the know, 
the UD is
a TM that systematically lists and executes all possible TMs. Because 
there
are an infinite number of TMs, the UD cannot wait until all the TMs 
are
listed before it executes them. It also cannot allow any one TM to
monopolise the runtime, lest that TM never halts. So it must execute 
a step
of one TM, then a step of another TM and so on, and it must do this 
while
continuing to list the TMs. The first TMs off the list will be the 
simple
ones - those with the shortest bitstrings and these are the first to 
be
kicked off. Complex TMs with very long specifications will not be 
kicked off
until much later. At any point in time in which they are still 
running,
these complex TMs will have received less runtime than any simpler TM 
that
is still running. This is important, as we shall see.

The problem is that from the first person point of view, the arbitrary 
delays,
introduced by the UD, cannot be taken into account, so that big 
programs cannot
be evacuated so easily. This does not mean little programs, or some 
little
programs, does not win in the limit, just that something more must be 
said.
Sorry for not explaining more because I have a lot of work to finish 
(I'm still not
connected at home, but in this case I'm not sure I will find the time 
to go home...).
See you next week.

Bruno

As we have discussed, some (an infinite subset) of the TMs will 
support
observers when they are executed. The observers and their worlds 
unroll as
computational histories.

What does an observer observe?
It is important to see that the computational histories of different 
TMs can
be identical up to a point and then diverge. So different TMs can 
produce
the same observer history up to a point. The observer moment, then, is
"simultaneously" generated by many different TMs. You can't pluck one
history and say you are in that history. You are part of many 
identical
histories that are about to diverge. And you can't pluck one TM and 
say that
that is the TM that is instantiating you. Your history is generated 
by many
different TMs. These are very important points. And, I think, the 
source of
much con

RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

This is a wonderfully clear explanation of Bruno's UDA. Perhaps Bruno could 
confirm that it is what he intended.

As for the observer - or more fundamentally, the observer-moment - I think 
you can get away without explicitly defining it. All you need is two 
assumptions:

Firstly, you have to assume that observer-moments exist. I think it is 
pretty clear that this is the case; you know it and I know it. You may not 
know how to explain it, define it, or even describe it, but you definitely 
know that observer-moments exist if you are a conscious being.

Secondly, you have to assume that this mysterious consciousness thing is 
"Turing emulable". It is not nearly as obvious that this second assumption 
is true, and biological chauvinists may continue to deny it no matter what 
progress AI research may make. At some point, as Bruno says, you may have to 
take "comp" on faith; for example, say "yes doctor" to the offer of a 
durable new electronic brain when yours is starting to break down.

It should now be clear that if both of the above assumptions are true, then 
the UD should generate all the observer-moments as per Bruno and Brian. The 
"observer" is then a derivative entity, made up of certain subsets of 
observer-moments. You know what an observer-moment is through direct 
experience, but you have nowhere been forced to explicitly define it. If you 
want to say that consciousness is something utterly mysterious forever, you 
can say this, and the UDA still holds.

--Stathis Papaioannou


From: Brian Scurfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
Date: Fri, 06 May 2005 18:04:45 +1200
In reply to Lee Corbin on the Fabric of Reality List

Lee,
You gave us some wonderful examples of totally ridiculous Turing Machines
that are nevertheless possible (I would at this point ask somebody to take
away Charles' keyboard). You have noted that these TMs are improbable; we
would not expect them to be instantiated in any great measure throughout 
the
multiverse. They are similar to Harry Potter universes in this respect.
Surely, though, the fact that they are improbable is not a blow against
Bruno! His argument is concerned with measure and you are playing right 
into
that. Let me try to explain...

To make this easier, let's forget about physical reality for a while. Let's
consider the Universal Dovetailer (UD). For those not in the know, the UD 
is
a TM that systematically lists and executes all possible TMs. Because there
are an infinite number of TMs, the UD cannot wait until all the TMs are
listed before it executes them. It also cannot allow any one TM to
monopolise the runtime, lest that TM never halts. So it must execute a step
of one TM, then a step of another TM and so on, and it must do this while
continuing to list the TMs. The first TMs off the list will be the simple
ones - those with the shortest bitstrings and these are the first to be
kicked off. Complex TMs with very long specifications will not be kicked 
off
until much later. At any point in time in which they are still running,
these complex TMs will have received less runtime than any simpler TM that
is still running. This is important, as we shall see.

As we have discussed, some (an infinite subset) of the TMs will support
observers when they are executed. The observers and their worlds unroll as
computational histories.
What does an observer observe?
It is important to see that the computational histories of different TMs 
can
be identical up to a point and then diverge. So different TMs can produce
the same observer history up to a point. The observer moment, then, is
"simultaneously" generated by many different TMs. You can't pluck one
history and say you are in that history. You are part of many identical
histories that are about to diverge. And you can't pluck one TM and say 
that
that is the TM that is instantiating you. Your history is generated by many
different TMs. These are very important points. And, I think, the source of
much confusion over Bruno's work.

What an observer observes depends on all the computational histories their
current moment is in and how the histories branch. The question also 
depends
on what we mean by observer, but let's put that aside for now because I
don't yet understand this part. Note that observer time has no relation to
dovetailer time.

Obviously, the computational history of a TM that consistently supports an
observer can't be random. It must perform the computations necessary for an
observer. Now the history might become random after the n-th step, at which
point the observer no longer exists. Or the observer might morph into a
completely different observer that has no memory of its former exi

RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Brian Scurfield]

In reply to Lee Corbin on the Fabric of Reality List


Lee,

You gave us some wonderful examples of totally ridiculous Turing Machines
that are nevertheless possible (I would at this point ask somebody to take
away Charles' keyboard). You have noted that these TMs are improbable; we
would not expect them to be instantiated in any great measure throughout the
multiverse. They are similar to Harry Potter universes in this respect.
Surely, though, the fact that they are improbable is not a blow against
Bruno! His argument is concerned with measure and you are playing right into
that. Let me try to explain...

To make this easier, let's forget about physical reality for a while. Let's
consider the Universal Dovetailer (UD). For those not in the know, the UD is
a TM that systematically lists and executes all possible TMs. Because there
are an infinite number of TMs, the UD cannot wait until all the TMs are
listed before it executes them. It also cannot allow any one TM to
monopolise the runtime, lest that TM never halts. So it must execute a step
of one TM, then a step of another TM and so on, and it must do this while
continuing to list the TMs. The first TMs off the list will be the simple
ones - those with the shortest bitstrings and these are the first to be
kicked off. Complex TMs with very long specifications will not be kicked off
until much later. At any point in time in which they are still running,
these complex TMs will have received less runtime than any simpler TM that
is still running. This is important, as we shall see.

As we have discussed, some (an infinite subset) of the TMs will support
observers when they are executed. The observers and their worlds unroll as
computational histories.

What does an observer observe? 

It is important to see that the computational histories of different TMs can
be identical up to a point and then diverge. So different TMs can produce
the same observer history up to a point. The observer moment, then, is
"simultaneously" generated by many different TMs. You can't pluck one
history and say you are in that history. You are part of many identical
histories that are about to diverge. And you can't pluck one TM and say that
that is the TM that is instantiating you. Your history is generated by many
different TMs. These are very important points. And, I think, the source of
much confusion over Bruno's work.

What an observer observes depends on all the computational histories their
current moment is in and how the histories branch. The question also depends
on what we mean by observer, but let's put that aside for now because I
don't yet understand this part. Note that observer time has no relation to
dovetailer time.

Obviously, the computational history of a TM that consistently supports an
observer can't be random. It must perform the computations necessary for an
observer. Now the history might become random after the n-th step, at which
point the observer no longer exists. Or the observer might morph into a
completely different observer that has no memory of its former existence (I
would argue that the observer is now a new observer). Or fluffy white bunny
rabbits might appear. The TM's executing these histories first run an
observer and then do something strange. Presumably this makes the TM more
complex because the strangeness requires extra bits to specify. These TMs
therefore get less runtime than the "unmodified" TM. 

OK, suppose you're in a set of identical computational histories that are
unfolding on many different TMs. Some of those histories are about to go
strange. For your existence as an observer to continue, they must go strange
in such a way that they still support you as an observer. Given what I have
said, do you think you are likely to branch into a strange world or to
continue on in your normal world, whatever that may be? The measure of the
computational history of the world where you continue on as normal is much
larger than the measure of the computational history of the strange branch
because the strange TMs receive less runtime (remember, many different TMs
instantiate you).

So, if you were an observer on the dovetailer, your computational history
branches in such a way that some branches are much more probable than
others. The world the observer observes will likely not be totally stupid. 

This is how you play into Bruno's hands!

Writing the above has made me realize that I may have not been accurate in
some of my earlier statements about Bruno's work. Apologies to Bruno. All I
need now is to be convinced that we can give a satisfactory definition of an
observer. Oh, and that we are most likely to observe QM.

Brian Scurfield

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Bruno,
   I, for one, will never think that you are any kind of a crack-pot! I am 
truly interested in your work on  Godel Lob Logic. The only disagreement 
that we seem to have is over whether or not Ideal monism is sufficient to 
give necessity of our experience of a physical world.
   My criticism is intended to allow you to explain your idea further. If 
you have a means to solve the epiphenomena problem I would be very happy 
because my own alternative is not even close to the elegance of your idea; 
if anyone might look like a crackpot, it will be me. My idea, btw, is a form 
of process (not substance!) dualism derived from Vaughan Pratt's work on the 
Concurrency problem in computer science.

http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/pratt95rational.html
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2005 10:47 AM
Subject: Rép : Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
snip

Brian wrote also this to Stephen:

We need to be very careful that we are not elevating our internally
generated abstraction of being able to "peek into the world from the
outside" and yet be independent of it into a postulate.
I agree. And I think what is missing in Bruno's stuff is some theory
of what an observer is. That's what sets the whole thing alight.

Of course I have a  theory of what is an observer, and a knower, and a
scientist. They are
all given by variants on the Godel Lob Logic.
But either I explain it in some simple ways, and I will look like a
crackpot (because it *is* counter-intuitive).
Or I explain the technics. And I will look like a crackpot who hides
his crackpotness into jargon!
Give me some time to find some intermediate pathway.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

[Stephen Paul King]

Dear Brian,

- Original Message - 

From: "Brian Scurfield" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2005 7:36 AM
Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness

Stephen wrote:
The perpetual question I have (about the epiphenomena problem that
any form of Idealism has), regarding this notion of a Platonic
Reality, is that IF all possible Forms of existence *exist* a priori
- "from the beginning" - what necessitates any form of 1st person
experience of a world that "evolves", has an irreversible arrow of
time, etc.
It seems to me that Plato's Ideal is the ultimate case of a system
in thermodynamic equilibrium, and as such exhibits no change of any
kind, per definition. What then is the origin of, at least, the
illusion of change? How can Becoming derive from pure Being?
[Brian]
These, of course, are very good questions, and ones whose answers
require a lot of hand-waving. In defense of Platonic Reality, I could
retort that the questions can just as saliently be directed at the
physical block Multiverse. As Charles frequently notes, the Block
universe is inescapable unless you have an infinite number of time
dimensions.
[SPK]

   This idea about an infinite time dimensions seems inevitable if we take 
the bitstring idea seriously, especially when these bitstrings are such that 
they can be run in strictly series or parallel ways. But I would like to 
point out that such processes are the exception and not the rule in the 
"real" world.

Think of the process of constructing a house, there are many different 
work crews specializing in one aspect of home construction or another, each 
trying to do their jobs. As anyone that has been in this industry would 
know, the hardest part of planning is in getting all of the crews scheduled 
so that they do not conflict or are left waiting on some other crew to start 
or finish. If we are going to take the computationalist claims seriously, 
then we must demand that they include concurrency problems in their models. 
;-)

   BTW, I have mentioned before that there are serious problems with the 
"block universe" idea, one of them is this concurrency problem. While 
quantum mechanics, ignoring the collapse postulate, is strictly 
deterministic, the existence of canonical conjugacy between observable 
quantities, such as position and momentum, (exemplified by the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle) prevents us from even constructing a space-time 
manifold where each and every event can be one-to-one and onto mapped to 
others.

   Simply put, it is impossible to define the position and momenta 
quantities of particles or waves on a slice of space-time (a "Cauchy 
hypersurface") such that any thing resembling a classical manifold obtains; 
it simply is impossible. The best we can do is to break the manifold up into 
little pieces, attach distributions of quantities to them and then try to 
stitch them together.


[SPK]
Additionally, how do we justify the assumption that the mere a
priori existence of Turing Machines does not necessitate some means
to "implement" the TMs? It is one thing to claim that software can
run on any suitable hardware, it is altogether something else to
claim that "hardware" doesn't exist!
[Brian]
I share your feelings on this. Bruno's reply would, I think, go along
the lines of: a TM and its computational history are just
relationships among integers. Those relationships, just like any other
mathematical relationships, need no hardware. When we discover a
mathematical relationship and write it down, does it then become real?
Possibly I am talking out of my hat here.
[SPK]

   I hope that you are not just defining "realness" to be "only those 
aspect of existence that can be represented by some physical means, 
reversible or not". I would argue that this definition misses the mark since 
it is easily shown that unless two more observers can agree upon , say, a 
representation of a mathematical relationship, we have no way to know that 
the scratches in the sand are no more than random marks left by grazing 
birds. ;-)

   Reality is a 3rd person aspect, it is that which we can all agree upon. 
Putting it into Anthropic terms, it is that which is both consistent and 
necessary for our existence as observers and is capable of being faithfully 
communicated. I seem to have put the cart before the horse in my response to 
your statement above but is it intentional, I am trying to point out that 
any relationship has to include some means for it to have a meaning in order 
for us to even try to claim that that relationship is "real".

   My point is that to claim that numbers and relationships between then 
exists a priori to any means of associating "meaningfulness" to them is 
self-stultifying, especially claims that reduce those to whom 
"meanin