Re: From Hardegree to Chellas for Joyce + Restall
>On Thu, Sep 26, 2002 at 12:46:29PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I would say the difference between animals and humans is that humans >> make drawings on the walls ..., and generally doesn't take their body >> as a limitation of their memory. I certainly enjoyed the beauty of this idea. Thanks, Bruno. I think you touched "culture" with all that belongs to it. Every word after that is redundant. To "redund" I offer a very plain paraphrasing: humans are within a more involved complexity than the other animals. But this is not 'beautiful'. Physical? I may say so. John Mikes
Re: From Hardegree to Chellas for Joyce + Restall
At 19:05 -0400 29/09/2002, Wei Dai wrote: >On Thu, Sep 26, 2002 at 02:58:57PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Originally the passage from the first person to the first person plural was >> done in reaction to my ex-boss wanting an explanation of the comp >> indeterminacy in term of betting games. > >What do you mean by this? Explanation or reference please? Explanation. Take the duplication W M. Suppose you will be duplicated from here to two different places W and M. In computer jargon you are cut here and paste in W and in M. Comp indeterminacy comes from the fact that you cannot be sure in advance where you will feel yourself being, from a 1-person point of view,. At first, probabilities, perhaps in the frequency type approaches, could be justified by iterating the procedure. If you repeat the procedure 64 times, the majority of the 2^64 resulting person would recognize their inability to predict their path (WWMWMMM). Not all "probabilist" accept such sort of justification and some objects that the 1-person uncertainty has no operational meaning. Indeed, you cannot apparently use the duplication to win or lose a bet in a fair game with a third person. Two cases can be considered: the Candidate C (the one who will undergo the duplication W M) put one dollar in a bank. The third person bets one dollar that C will find himself in W, against C who bets one dollar that he will find himself in M. Of course C is transformed into C_M and C_W in the duplication process. CW must gives one dollar to the third person who must gives one dollar to the C_M. The third person neither can win nor lose. The money is just exchanged between the "doppelgangers". A similar exchange occurs if the candidate have his money with him so that his account is duplicated (except the bill loose his value ...). Now, the point I make is that betting strategies for handling uncertainty can be re-established by ... duplicating the third person too, sharing the W-M trips with the candidate. In some sense, it is a way for the third person to entangle its story with the candidate's story. In that case the multiplied third person will recognize in each of his stories that he has win or lose the bet. This gives rise to a notion of first person plural discourse, which is just sharable first person discourse, and which can make some of the typical first person notions (like the 1-indeterminacy) into locally third person notions (like the apparant quantum indeterminacy). This is what I happen in the description of multi-observer measurements has explained by Everett. Looking to the up or down state of 64 photon beam each in the superposition state (up + down), you will find yourself multiplied in the 2^64 "UP UP DOWN ..."-like stories, but if you did decide to phone me for telling in which story you are you will multiplied me in a coherent way. The strict coherence giving the right entanglement has not yet been derived from comp. Nor has been proved comp give incorrect coherence conditions. The many world, or any modal realism, multiplies collection of observers. If the multiplication is enough coherent, this entails first person plural notions which appears to the observers inside each population as third person. Technically, it is here that a "nice" tensorial product should rise. Bruno
Re: From Hardegree to Chellas for Joyce + Restall
On Thu, Sep 26, 2002 at 02:58:57PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Originally the passage from the first person to the first person plural was > done in reaction to my ex-boss wanting an explanation of the comp > indeterminacy in term of betting games. What do you mean by this? Explanation or reference please? > I think I can apply the move to make > the comp indeterminacy coherent with decision based interpretation of > probability. That would be great. I look forward to seeing this result.
Re: From Hardegree to Chellas for Joyce + Restall
At 14:49 -0400 25/09/2002, Wei Dai wrote: >I recommended Joyce more for its philosophy rather than its mathematics, >but I'm glad you found that useful too. I am indeed less sure about its philosophy. I guess this should have been apparent from my comment of Newcomb paradox, which I have made before I got Joyce book, of course, so I have not yet a definite opinion. I am still think about it. At 14:49 -0400 25/09/2002, Wei Dai wrote: >Here's a new question for you, Bruno. What interpretation of probability >theory do you subscribe to? I've been saying that the meaning of >probabilities come from decision theory and specificly a probability only >has meaning if it actually is relevant to making a decision. Originally the passage from the first person to the first person plural was done in reaction to my ex-boss wanting an explanation of the comp indeterminacy in term of betting games. I think I can apply the move to make the comp indeterminacy coherent with decision based interpretation of probability. Bruno
Re: From Hardegree to Chellas for Joyce + Restall
On Wed, Sep 25, 2002 at 12:02:20PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Just to tell you that the Joyce book you refer to us is indeed > interesting and could motivate for mathematical tools common in decision > theory, philosophical logic, and theories related to the machine interview > I am engaged in. I recommended Joyce more for its philosophy rather than its mathematics, but I'm glad you found that useful too. Now can you go back and answer some earlier questions at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3814.html? I'll quote them here for you: Here's a new question for you, Bruno. What interpretation of probability theory do you subscribe to? I've been saying that the meaning of probabilities come from decision theory and specificly a probability only has meaning if it actually is relevant to making a decision. So far no one has posted a disagreement with that philosophy, but perhaps we don't all agree. Would you like to clarify your position on this issue? On Wed, Jul 17, 2002 at 04:13:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > The mind-body problem is hard to formulate purely formally because it > search a link between the somehow formal body and the non formal mind. I think you can formalize the problem, or at least an aspect of it, in the language of decision theory. So perhaps you can come back to this question after reading Joyce's book.
