Re: Fwd: Implementation/Relativity
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Earlier I think Hans said that one possible observer was the conscious entity himself. I am an observer of my own consciousness. My consciousness (or lack thereof) is subjective, and varies depending on the observer, but one of the observers is me. Does this mean that there is a special consciousness, which is that consciousness observed by the observer himself? Under different interpretations, there are many such special internal observers, all different and mostly unaware of each other, who each see themselves implemented in the same body and brain. (Same as for Putnam rocks or my sun creatures.) What makes the usual you extra special out of all those is that it is implemented in a way that allows the rest of us to communicate with it easily. Does this self-interpretation have a privileged position, and if so could we choose to say that it is the true consciousness of Hans himself? Because it is the communication that selects out the true consciousness from the myriad alternatives, a Turing test is the best way to identify it. But different outside observers, who interpret your stuff in different ways, won't necessarily register human-talk as meaningful. They might instead achieve a meaningful conversation with one of the other self-aware observers in a different interpretation of your structure. For them (as for itself) that other internal observer would be the true you. We see a hint of this when animals respond to our subconscious emotions rather than our conscious beliefs and intentions. There could even be observers that interpret your structure in enough different ways to find several different consciousnesses in you to talk to. They would find the notion of true consciousness rather pointless. i.e. which is the true consciousness is observer-relative.
Re: Fwd: Implementation/Relativity
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I don't think we ever discussed the concept of attributing consciousness to inanimate objects before Hans came along. But I think you DID agree to attribute consciousness to purely abstract entities, notably mathematically defined universes containing SASes. Correct. This is the definition of SAS. That we don't yet have a reasonable definition of either SAS or consciousness is not a cause of concern. It just means there is more work to be done. I merely pointed out that it is possible, even natural and common, to map such abstractions containing self-aware systems onto many things we commonly encounter. Anthropomorphism may be common, but this doesn't mean it is correct, nor useful. This violates some reflexive assumptions you carry, many instilled by a western education. Those assumptions badly need to be violated. They may have been good during our recent naive materialist phase of development, but that phase is ending. This list's discussion topic is one symptom of that end, as are looming questions about conscious machines. Other traditions have no problem seeing minds in inanimate objects, when such interpretation facilitates interaction. That acceptance has much to do with the Japanese comfortable acceptance of robots. Western stinginess in attributing minds, on the other hand, is becoming a Luddite-rousing impediment to progress. How so? Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
Re: Fwd: Implementation/Relativity
Hans Moravec, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes: Christopher Maloney [EMAIL PROTECTED]: If our tools were sophisticated enough, we could figure out what that creature was experiencing at that moment, independent of his or her report. NO! We may determine the full physical structure of an organism well enough to simulate it faithfully as a purely physical object. However, any experiences we impute to it will remain a subjective matter with different answers for different observers. Some observers will be content to say there are no experiences in any case, including when they simulate you or me. In trying to understand these ideas, I have a question. Earlier I think Hans said that one possible observer was the conscious entity himself. I am an observer of my own consciousness. My consciousness (or lack thereof) is subjective, and varies depending on the observer, but one of the observers is me. Does this mean that there is a special consciousness, which is that consciousness observed by the observer himself? In other words, I may impute a certain consciousness to Hans, and someone else may interpret his actions as caused by a different consciousness, but Hans himself interprets his consciousness in a certain way as well. Does this self-interpretation have a privileged position, and if so could we choose to say that it is the true consciousness of Hans himself? Hal
Re: Fwd: Implementation/Relativity
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]: conciousness we experience directly ... generated by some kind of self-referential process ... is intrinsically a different to the Turing type tests we perform to attribute conciousness in external objects. ... nor do I think it a particularly useful way of thinking. But it is enormously useful for deciding whether to deal with particular robots as conscious! I don't see any problem in attributing consciousness to a robot that convinces me that it is conscious, in just the same way as I attribute consciousness to a dog. Animal consciousness such as a dogs only appear to differ in degree rather than in kind to me. On the other hand a supposed conscious rock would truly differ in kind, as the attribution of consciousness gives us no predictive power on their properties. I also agree with the idea that consciousness is a relative property, one that is in the eye of the beholder. In the eye of this beholder, free will is an essential property of consciousness, and its hard for me to see how a Turing machine could have free will. Of course, it is not necessary to construct robots from Turing machines, but most likely they will be able to simulate a Turing machine, as the human brain can do. I really suspect that the human brain is capable of more than a Turing machine can do. The simplest operation I can think of that Turing machines can't do is generate true random numbers (real computers can do this, albeit in usually in very kludgy ways). I'm not entirely sure that the human brain can generate truly random numbers either, but probably it can. This is why I speculate that the random number generator may be necessary and sufficient for free will. Yours isn't. Your quest already has a few centuries of western philosophy of mind under its belt, and is no closer to finding the objective qualities that constitute consciousness. Like the effort to define the properties of phlogiston or the luminiferous ether, it doesn't work because its subject matter is an abstraction that changes with viewpoint. And you a proposing that considering rocks as conscious will help find these qualities too? Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
