Re: Isn't this a good point
>[Gordon]But this Mind Body and Math are also descriptions of patterns or >systwem contexts which you must assume exist in some way for them to >operate other wise what is operating??? I assume it exists in the same way I assume prime numbers exists. Physical space time could be (modal) projection from inside numberland. Unless I am wrong, with the comp postulate it *must* be. Bruno
Re: Isn't this a good point
At 10:05 +0200 23/05/2002, Lennart Nilsson wrote: >I might not be on the same side as you and Juergen >Schmidhuber on this, but I AM on the same side as David Deutsch which is >comforting. Even comFORting :-) (You know the FOR list I guess). I would say you are on the same side as almost all (if not really all!) physicists. And perhaps you are right of course! Concerning the quantum Landauer explicitely defend the idea that information is physical. I can even accept that a priori the quantum information field adds evidence in that direction. Now it happens that I gave a precise argumentation that IF we take seriously the COMPutationalist hypothesis in the science of mind, THEN Physics is no more a fundamental science, and physics becomes a branch of psychology/computer science/number theory. Now Deutsch explicitly subscribe to comp, so its physics is at best redundant (the Schroedinger Equation SWE should be (and almost be) a theorem of machine possible perception theory), or incorrect. Personaly I don't know, but I'm pretty sure the reasoning and its arithmetical translation is correct (it has been verify by many people). So now it is just a question of comparing the physics extracted from machine's (mathematical) psychology with the physics extracted by nature observation (QM). Unfortunately that leads toward non trivial math. I call the argument UDA (for Universal Dovetailer Argument) and its Arithmetical translation is called now AUDA. See my URL for pointers to it in this list archive. You can maintain physicalism if you want but then you must still explain how mind (qualia and other first person sensation and knowledge) is linked to that physical reality, and with uda/auda you will not succeed without abandonning comp. You can also try to find an error in uda, and I would be glad if you do so. Sincerely. Bruno -- http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Isn't this a good point
I might not be on the same side as you and Juergen Schmidhuber on this, but I AM on the same side as David Deutsch which is comforting. "Recent progress in the quantum theory of computation has provided practical > instances of this, and > forces us to abandon the classical view that computation, and hence > mathematical proof, are purely logical notions > independent of that of computation as a physical process. Henceforward, a > proof must be regarded not as an abstract object > or process but as a physical process, a species of computation" >From David Deutsch's paper: Machines, Logic and Quantum Physics (http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/math.HO/9911150) - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Lennart Nilsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 3:16 PM Subject: Re: Isn't this a good point > Lennart Nilsson wrote: > > >I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information > >transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an > >information transfer without physicalness. > > > OK, but then you postulate something physical exists. > > > >"Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's > >'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology > >and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical > >representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover > >'familiar reality'." > >arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001 > > > I appreciate very much Zurek, but like almost all physicist he does > postulate physicalness. I do not, if only because I would like an > explanation of "physicalness" without reference to physical being. > Also I showed that such reference cannot be used once we postulate > the computationalist hypothesis (comp)in the cognitive science. > Consult my URL for more explanations including discussions in this list. > > I am aware what I say is quite against the current paradigm, although > this is a point where a lot agrees (in this list), including Juergen > Schmidhuber whose work is also based on comp. The difference between > Schmidhuber and me is that Juergen search prior for the "right" computation > among all computations, and I search a (relative) measure on all computations. > But we are both trying to explain physical appearances from the > "every computations exists" where a computation is basically a collection > of relatively related numbers (not an "actual running of a concrete > machine". > > Bruno > > -- > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Isn't this a good point
Lennart Nilsson wrote: >I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information >transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an >information transfer without physicalness. OK, but then you postulate something physical exists. >"Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's >'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology >and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical >representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover >'familiar reality'." >arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001 I appreciate very much Zurek, but like almost all physicist he does postulate physicalness. I do not, if only because I would like an explanation of "physicalness" without reference to physical being. Also I showed that such reference cannot be used once we postulate the computationalist hypothesis (comp)in the cognitive science. Consult my URL for more explanations including discussions in this list. I am aware what I say is quite against the current paradigm, although this is a point where a lot agrees (in this list), including Juergen Schmidhuber whose work is also based on comp. The difference between Schmidhuber and me is that Juergen search prior for the "right" computation among all computations, and I search a (relative) measure on all computations. But we are both trying to explain physical appearances from the "every computations exists" where a computation is basically a collection of relatively related numbers (not an "actual running of a concrete machine". Bruno -- http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Isn't this a good point
I was under the impression that interaction has to do with information transfer and that that takes care of the fact that there cannot be an information transfer without physicalness. At least according to this source: "Distinct memory states label and 'inhabit' different branches of Everett's 'Many Worlds' Universe. In this manner, the distinction between epistemology and ontology is washed away: There can be no information without physical representation. Persistence of correlations is all that is needed to recover 'familiar reality'." arXiv: quant- ph/ 0105127 v1 24 2001 DECOHERENCE, EINSELECTION, AND THE QUANTUM ORIGINS OF THE CLASSICAL Wojciech Hubert Zurek - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Lennart Nilsson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 11:38 AM Subject: Re: Isn't this a good point > At 9:27 +0200 22/05/2002, Lennart Nilsson wrote (on the everything-list): > > > >In the Motion Mountain project dse.nl/motionmountain/welcome.html Christoph > >Schiller defines existence such: "(physical) existence is the ability to > >describe interactions." And furthermore explains this by saying: "It is thus > >pointless to discuss whether a physical concept 'exists' or whether it is > >'only' an abstraction used as a tool for descriptions of observations. The > >two possibilities coincide. The point of dispute can only be whether the > >descriptions provided by a concept is or is not precise." > > > >Isn't that a good point!!! > > > Sure. But I don't think my old friend Christoph really follows it :-) > > Also what is exactly an interaction? You should try to describe it > without postulating implicitely physicalness if you don't want to apply > 'exists' to physical concept. > Perhaps "Geometry of Interaction" by the logician Jean Yves Girard > is interesting from that point of view. In the same regard the > work by another logician Vaughan Pratt on the mind/body problem > (http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech) > is quite relevant. > > Bruno
Re: Isn't this a good point
At 9:27 +0200 22/05/2002, Lennart Nilsson wrote (on the everything-list): >In the Motion Mountain project dse.nl/motionmountain/welcome.html Christoph >Schiller defines existence such: "(physical) existence is the ability to >describe interactions." And furthermore explains this by saying: "It is thus >pointless to discuss whether a physical concept 'exists' or whether it is >'only' an abstraction used as a tool for descriptions of observations. The >two possibilities coincide. The point of dispute can only be whether the >descriptions provided by a concept is or is not precise." >Isn't that a good point!!! Sure. But I don't think my old friend Christoph really follows it :-) Also what is exactly an interaction? You should try to describe it without postulating implicitely physicalness if you don't want to apply 'exists' to physical concept. Perhaps "Geometry of Interaction" by the logician Jean Yves Girard is interesting from that point of view. In the same regard the work by another logician Vaughan Pratt on the mind/body problem (http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech) is quite relevant. Bruno
