Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
Hi Craig Weinberg By sense do you mean Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness? Or all three as a process ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 14:11:14 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the word sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be reduced to which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense in every sense, but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, pattern recognition, and categorization or discernment. Craig Richard On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time
Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 6:33:15 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg By sense do you mean Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness? Or all three as a process ? Using these as a guide: (from http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/thirdness.html) Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. I would say that sense is primordial Sixthness. The meta juxaposition of all three modalities. Sense is the totality within which Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are defined and directly experienced. Fourthness could be thought of as the change that thirdness brings to firstness and Fifthness could be perhaps the juxtaposition of that change with it's canonical conjugate in Secondness. There is no Firstness without Sixthness. In quantitative terms, the universe doesn't begin with 0 or 1, it 'begins' with the instantaneous/perpetual division of 1 into infinite fractions. Timespace is only real at the periphery/circumference of that division. Craig Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 14:11:14 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the word sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be reduced to which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense in every sense, but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, pattern recognition, and categorization or discernment. Craig Richard On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief
Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
Hi Richard Ruquist I'm well aware of that, except you don't need Godel to reach an impossibly complex state of calculations. My own position is that if you can't calculate upward any more, you calculate downward. From Platonia, except that you begin to use the forms, numbers, reason, all of that stuff. Consciousness is created from Platonia, probably more form philosophy than math. After some study, it turns out that Leibniz's substances are not based on physical materials but on their forms. Just like Plato except that there are an infinite types of materials. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 08:33:45 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? Roger, Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness itself allowing for emergence... See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf Richard On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group
Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
Hi Craig Weinberg You said, Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. That sounds potent, I'm but not sure what it means. Could you expand on it a little ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 08:29:38 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the universe is made up of quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex entities. He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to the realm of spin networks. This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. Instead, I propose the following: 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. = Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/teYzjZJLGQoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? Hi Roger, On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? No! The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. No! 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already shown this! Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness without becoming inconsistent. A slightly more technical discussion here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. I will! === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the Horse's mouth. http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect than the material world of our external experiences, but just as real. Exactly how the contact is made between the realms remains to be explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP program and I am desperately trying
Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
Hi Stephen P. King This may have little connection to what you said, but in one of Brain Greene's talks (on time) he made mention that the subjective state, the experiential state, always just experiences now. Similarly calculations flow in time as they are made, and the one being made is made now. There seems to be a connection but I can't express what it is. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:08:49 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. Craig Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already have. But I missed it. Richard Hi Richard, Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no 3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett and the materialist, try to deny its existence. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?
Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for not saying I don´t know, that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know. 2012/10/16 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net +rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ? Hi Roger, On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? No! The short answer is that I am proposing that : 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. No! 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the range of computabilitlity. No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already shown this! Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic reason, the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough mathematics to be more specific. Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness without becoming inconsistent. A slightly more technical discussion here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. I will! === A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's condition of non-computability ? http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of classical computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally bind information, and 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among neurons. That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge through looking at a phenomenon at a lower degree of magnification from above. Thus sociology is an emergent property of the behavior of many minds. Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that of Platonia as experienced. All art and insight comes from such an experience. No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the Horse's mouth. http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning
