Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for not saying "I don´t know", that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.
2012/10/16 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > Hi Stephen P. King > > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that > consciousness, arises at (or above ?) > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to > say that intuiton does. But that just seems > to be a conjecture of his. > > > > ugh, [email protected] <[email protected]> > 10/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Stephen P. King > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23 > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly > complexcomputations ? > > > Hi Roger, > > On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations > ? > > No! > > > > The short answer is that I am proposing that : > > 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position > that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. > > No! > > > > 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make > such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the > range of computabilitlity. > > > No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already > shown this! > > > Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed > calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic > reason, > the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know > enough > mathematics to be more specific. > > Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available > from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ > > "L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own > soundness without becoming inconsistent." > > A slightly more technical discussion here: > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox > > > > If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. > > > > I will! > > > > > ======================================================= > A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: > Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent > property" > of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: > > A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's > condition of non-computability ? > > http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html > > "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property > of classical > computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. > The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that > > 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, > 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex > temporally bind information, > and > 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity > among neurons." > > > > That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... > > > > > B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? > > Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or > emerge through looking at a phenomenon > at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an > emergent property of > the behavior of many minds. > > > Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mind is only > subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under > consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But > this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! > > > > IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser > position. > > Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: > > http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html > > One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably > that of Platonia as experienced. > All art and insight comes from such an experience. > > > > No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on > Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it > straight from the Horse's mouth. > > http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf > > This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: > > "In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, > circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately > realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those > mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, > instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of > mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible > objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is > accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, > via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's > world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving > it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and > insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect > than the material world of our external experiences, > but just as real." > > Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains to be > explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP > program and I am desperately trying to find a solution. > > > > On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the > universe is made up of > quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex > entities. > He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong > to the realm > of spin networks. > > The "physical universe" yes, he believes that... He has shown how one > can derive a crude version of space-time using spin combinatorials. > > > > This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of > non-computability, > and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, > to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. > > Not even wrong! > > > > Instead, I propose the following: > > 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position > that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. > > No! > > > > 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make > such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the > range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted > upward-directed > calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic > reason, > the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know > enough > mathematics to be more specific. > ================================================================= > > > > We must study the math, there are no short-cuts! > > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] <[email protected]> > 10/16/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > -- > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. 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