Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying "I don´t know",
that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to
say I don´t know.

2012/10/16 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>

>  Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> to be a conjecture of his.
>
>
>
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net <+rclo...@verizon.net>
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Stephen P. King
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly
> complexcomputations ?
>
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations
> ?
>
>     No!
>
>
>
> The short answer is that I am proposing that :
>
> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
>
>     No!
>
>
>
> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
> range of computabilitlity.
>
>
>     No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already
> shown this!
>
>
>  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
> reason,
> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
> enough
> mathematics to be more specific.
>
>     Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available
> from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/
>
> "L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own
> soundness without becoming inconsistent."
>
> A slightly more technical discussion here:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox
>
>
>
> If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.
>
>
>
>     I will!
>
>
>
>
> =======================================================
> A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
> Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an "emergent
> property"
> of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:
>
> A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
> condition of non-computability ?
>
> http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html
>
> "Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property
> of classical
> computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
> The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that
>
> 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
> 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
> temporally bind information,
> and
> 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
> among neurons."
>
>
>
>     That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...
>
>
>
>
> B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?
>
> Now my understanding of "emergent properties" is that they appear or
> emerge through looking at a phenomenon
> at a lower degree of magnification "from above. " Thus sociology is an
> emergent property of
> the behavior of many minds.
>
>
>     Sure, but the "integrity" or "wholeness" of an individual mind is only
> subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under
> consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But
> this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow!
>
>
>
> IMHO "from above" means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
> position.
>
> Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:
>
> http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html
>
> One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
> that of Platonia as experienced.
> All art and insight comes from such an experience.
>
>
>
>     No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on
> Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it
> straight from the Horse's mouth.
>
> http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf
>
>     This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:
>
> "In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
> circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
> realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
> mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
> instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
> mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
> objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
> accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
> via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
> world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
> it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and
> insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect
> than the material world of our external experiences,
> but just as real."
>
>     Exactly how the "contact" is made between the realms remains to be
> explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP
> program and I am desperately trying to find a solution.
>
>
>
> On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the
> universe is made up of
> quantum "spin networks", which presumably can model even the most complex
> entities.
> He does not seem to deny that the "non-computational" calculations belong
> to the realm
> of spin networks.
>
>     The "physical universe" yes, he believes that... He has shown how one
> can derive a crude version of space-time using spin combinatorials.
>
>
>
> This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of
> non-computability,
> and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete,
> to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation.
>
>     Not even wrong!
>
>
>
> Instead, I propose the following:
>
> 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
> that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.
>
>     No!
>
>
>
> 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
> such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
> range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted
> upward-directed
> calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
> reason,
> the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
> enough
> mathematics to be more specific.
> =================================================================
>
>
>
>     We must study the math, there are no short-cuts!
>
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <+rclo...@verizon.net>
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> --
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>



-- 
Alberto.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to