Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
Jacques M. Mallah wrote: >> I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies. > > Maybe you take it into account, but regardless of how you describe >your views, it's clear that you don't take it to be directly proportional. I am open to direct proportionality, it is not yet proved, nor even clearly defined. With UD* the domains of uncertainty are at least (with n-steps histories for any integers n) infinite countable. So you should tell me what mean "direct proportionality" here. > I see only 1 WR problem and it's not the 1-WR, but the WR, which >is more or less solved. Much more 'less' than 'more', IMO. >> >What I must explain is my now-experience. It is plausibly one of >> >many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less >> >similar and in different people. >> >> OK. > > Well, if you agree with that statement it's a major admission on >your part. From now on you're not allowed to claim that linkage of >experiences over time is a problem or the like. I don't see why. To explain the now-experience from the possible inference of machines (or SAS) which are "reconstituted" sparsely in UD*, you need to explain my now-belief in (at least apparence of) time space and energy without using these concepts. I never see a problem with the linkage of experiences over time, for time is a construct of atemporal possible (consistent) experiences. The same for space, matter, and any physicalist predicates. CF the 1-invariance assertions in UDA. > As usual you don't understand much. To be mortal, the expectation >value over the measure distribution (of observer-moments) for your age >must be finite, that's all. Perhaps I could understand if you were a little more explicit. Bruno.
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
> > You eliminate past/objective WRs. You still don't eliminate > > futur/subjective WRs. You eliminate 3-WR, not 1-WR. > > > > Of course you are denying the distinction between first and > > third person. So I guess you are vaccinated to the conclusion of UDA. > > I deny that such a distinction exists for me to be able to deny :-) > > > - - - - - - - >Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) > Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/ > > I agree with Jacques Mallah here, although undoubtedly for different reasons :). Assuming a plenitude (eg Schmidhuber's or whatever), then SASes will select a particular element of that plenitude. In my Occam paper, I make the argument that this element should with greatest measure (or liklihood in other words) be the Deutsch/Everett Multiverse. Then the computational indeterminancy experienced in the 1st person is just the quantum 1-indeterminancy of the MWI. This is a direct consequence of my "Projection" postulate of consciousness. The Multiverse itself has no white rabbits of either the 1st or 3rd person kind. All white rabbits are banished to extremely rare portions of the plenitude. Cheers Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
Russell Standish wrote: >Aha - this is the source of one of our misunderstandings. You actually >say this on page 1 of your thesis - I had just forgotten. As you say, >Schmidhuber's Plenitude is really the conjunction of assumptions 2&3, >so you explicitly assume Schmidhuber Plenitude in the first place. I'm glad you realise that! > ... >Fair enough - this was only a shot in the dark anyway. I was trying to >relate my intuitive understanding of conscious projection to some >formal mathematical process - diagonalisation is not the way to go. OK. Note that I *do* think diagonalisation has something to do with (high form of) self-consciousness. Mainly for "jumping out of oneself". A similar idea has been proposed by Hofstadter in his GEB book. In computer science self-reference is handled by a sort of double diagonalisation. The basic idea is simple: let D be a self-applier operator, i.e. D(X) gives X(X) (D is really a duplicator in fact). D captures the first diagonalisation. Then apply D to itself (second diagonalisation) and you get the self-replicator: D(D) gives D(D). >It is a "sort" of collapse, however I would argue that this "collapse" >is inherent in Everett's MWI anyway. However, before people go >charging at the red flag I'm waving, ... ...provocating red flag indeed! >I should point the very big >difference between this and the Copenhagen wavefunction collapse. With >Copenhagen, the wavefunction collapse is physical, i.e. to use your >excellent terminology - is a 3-phenomenon. In my case, the projection, >is merely the act of an observer resolving a measurement. It is a pure >1-phenomenon - a different observer will see a different projection >(although clearly in their shared histories these observation need to >be consistent). The picture as I see it is identical to the diagram >you have on page 83 of your thesis. Exactly. >Now you seem to be saying that this projection is computable - ie >Turing machines embedded within the ensemble are able to have first >person experiences like this. The fact is that if I survive teleportation through comp, I will survive duplication and I will not been able to predict with certainty the result, as I measure it myself, of the self-duplication. But the mystery of ``reawakening" is no greater in the duplication than in the simple teleportation case. >This is the part I'm having trouble >with. I seen some attempts to formulate Quantum measurement theory in >terms of induced correlations between the environment and the observer >(or measurement device) - eg Zurek's attempts in the late '80s, but >none that I've been particularly satisfied with. That's OK and I think Zurek contribution is important and could help us to bridge the gap between 3-experiment and 1-experience. But I don't think it is need for the projection case of self-duplication. It will be useful in any case (including simple teleportation, or even the experiment "do nothing, stay conscious"). *** Now I answer a question you made about the UDA. It is related to the search of "effective probability" (Mallah's term); the definition of observer moments, etc. (actually: the current thread "Renormalisation"). >> BM: Exercice: why should we search a measure on the computational >> continuations and not just the computational states? Hint: with >> just the computational states only, COMP predicts white noise for >> all experiences. (ok Chris ?). With the continuations, a priori >> we must just hunt away the 'white rabbit' continuations. >> You can also show that Schmidhuber's 'universal prior' solution >> works only in the case the level of substitution >> is so low that my generalised brain is the entire multiverse. >> > >RS: Again, I do not know what you mean by this last comment. Damned! Professional duties call for. I'l go back to this 'exercice' ASAP. Bruno
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
> > Russell Standish wrote: > > >I really am trying to understand your argument. I know I'm from a > >different conceptual background, but somewhere either you or I have an > >incorrect concept. I can't accept a statement that A is equivalent to > >B obviously, when to my understanding A and B are such different things. > > I agree. We must work until we understand the roots of our > misunderstanding. > > >i) COMP means that I can survive the replacement of my brain by some > >Turing emulation. > > > Not really. Look at the UDA. COMP is 3 things: > > 1) = what you are saying (survive a substitution done at > the right digital level, which is supposed to exist) > > 2) Church thesis (I realise Schmidhuber does not cite it > explicitely!, but the use of the compiler theorem and the use of > his "great programmer" would not work without it). > > 3) Arithmetical Realism (here is Schmidhuber plenitude!!!). > Arithmetical Realism makes all steps of the UD work (Great Programmer's > work) existing independantly of me. > Aha - this is the source of one of our misunderstandings. You actually say this on page 1 of your thesis - I had just forgotten. As you say, Schmidhuber's Plenitude is really the conjunction of assumptions 2&3, so you explicitly assume Schmidhuber Plenitude in the first place. > > >I could well imagine conscious entities diagonalising the > >UD* output to generate an experience which is not an explicit > >computation. > > Well. This is false, and even importantly false. You point > here on my deeper motivation for Church thesis: the set of all > computable functions, and the set of all computations, i.e. UD* > is closed for diagonalisation. > This is exactly why Godel, who takes time to accept Church thesis, > called that thesis really a miracle. Fair enough - this was only a shot in the dark anyway. I was trying to relate my intuitive understanding of conscious projection to some formal mathematical process - diagonalisation is not the way to go. > > >Of course you can can compute the ensemble (UD*) - this follows from > >Schmidhuber's Plenitude. Also (in a sense) you can compute the > >wavefunction in Multiverse, which in turn defines a probability > >distribution. What you can't compute (or so it seems to me) is the > >outcome of a projection (1st postulate of consciousness). It is this > >projection that introduces randomness, or indeterminism into the 1st > >person view of the world. > > This is another point where we disagree. And the disagreement is > deep (but that is what makes our conversation genuine, isn'it?). > I say that the disagreement is deep because it is independant of > comp: it bears even on Everett's MWI. > In fact it seems to me that with your notion of "projection" you > are introducing a sort of collapse in comp! > But it is really computationnalism (in a weak sense) which has > helped Everett to prove QM does not need any collapses. > In comp, it is the same. The indeterminism is the consequence of > the way machines describe the statistics of their self-localisations > and other self-measures after the natural self-multiplication > and self-delocalisation forced by the UD. > If I duplicate you, nobody, including GOD or any quasi omniscient > being can predict what you will *feel* (1-person concept) precisely. > Like Everett, comp can predict that you will not feel the split. > > Bruno > It is a "sort" of collapse, however I would argue that this "collapse" is inherent in Everett's MWI anyway. However, before people go charging at the red flag I'm waving, I should point the very big difference between this and the Copenhagen wavefunction collapse. With Copenhagen, the wavefunction collapse is physical, i.e. to use your excellent terminology - is a 3-phenomenon. In my case, the projection, is merely the act of an observer resolving a measurement. It is a pure 1-phenomenon - a different observer will see a different projection (although clearly in their shared histories these observation need to be consistent). The picture as I see it is identical to the diagram you have on page 83 of your thesis. Now you seem to be saying that this projection is computable - ie Turing machines embedded within the ensemble are able to have first person experiences like this. This is the part I'm having trouble with. I seen some attempts to formulate Quantum measurement theory in terms of induced correlations between the environment and the observer (or measurement device) - eg Zurek's attempts in the late '80s, but none that I've been particularly satisfied with. Cheers Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red C
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
Russell Standish wrote: >I really am trying to understand your argument. I know I'm from a >different conceptual background, but somewhere either you or I have an >incorrect concept. I can't accept a statement that A is equivalent to >B obviously, when to my understanding A and B are such different things. I agree. We must work until we understand the roots of our misunderstanding. >i) COMP means that I can survive the replacement of my brain by some >Turing emulation. Not really. Look at the UDA. COMP is 3 things: 1) = what you are saying (survive a substitution done at the right digital level, which is supposed to exist) 2) Church thesis (I realise Schmidhuber does not cite it explicitely!, but the use of the compiler theorem and the use of his "great programmer" would not work without it). 3) Arithmetical Realism (here is Schmidhuber plenitude!!!). Arithmetical Realism makes all steps of the UD work (Great Programmer's work) existing independantly of me. >ii) Schmidhuber means that all computations exist. (via UD*) That is equivalent to the arithmetical realism. (AR) To be sure AR seems to say that a little more than "all the computations exists", and so, at this stage comp looks like lying in between Tegmark and Schmidhuber. But ... see below. >I could well imagine conscious entities diagonalising the >UD* output to generate an experience which is not an explicit >computation. Well. This is false, and even importantly false. You point here on my deeper motivation for Church thesis: the set of all computable functions, and the set of all computations, i.e. UD* is closed for diagonalisation. This is exactly why Godel, who takes time to accept Church thesis, called that thesis really a miracle. This is a wonderfull feature of the set of computable functions because it gives us the FIRST mathematical (and until today the only) mathematical structure which does not lead us to paradoxes when it is conceived as a Totality, or an Everything Ontology. That is why in some sense Schmidhuber plenitude, or my UD*, are vastly more bigger than a priori Tegmark-like form of Platonisme. Of course there is a price, which is the non recursive axiomatisation of the set of all truth. But by Godel this is true even for elementary arithmetical truth (which indeed is somewhat equivalent to UD* although I should add some nuance here). Actually, we don't need more than arithmetical plenitude: if we are machine, we cannot prove that there is more than machines. >From the Chaitin version of Godel's theorem (also found by Post in the twinties!) a machine cannot prove that something more complex than itself is not a machine. In my annexe on Church thesis in my thesis, I explain that point and I explicitely show that Church thesis makes a case for the rehabilitation of the old Pythagorism. So remember: UD* is closed for diagonalisation. You cannot diagonalised again UD*. Any diagonalisation on UD* create something which exists in UD*. It is important: without that closure I would just be mad thinking the physical as a subspecies of the informatical. >By me - I assume you mean COMP. Lets talk about Tegmark, and yes I >believe Tegmark is referring to formal axiomatic systems (he seems to >go on about them in his paper). I can see clearly that Tegmark \subset >Schmidhuber, however it is less clear that the reverse relationship >holds. If the reverse relationship did hold, then it would make little >difference, apart from the White Rabbit problem vanishing. I'm not sure I understand. (I propose we go back to tegmark later). At this stage it is out of our basic misunderstanding, I guess. >Of course you can can compute the ensemble (UD*) - this follows from >Schmidhuber's Plenitude. Also (in a sense) you can compute the >wavefunction in Multiverse, which in turn defines a probability >distribution. What you can't compute (or so it seems to me) is the >outcome of a projection (1st postulate of consciousness). It is this >projection that introduces randomness, or indeterminism into the 1st >person view of the world. This is another point where we disagree. And the disagreement is deep (but that is what makes our conversation genuine, isn'it?). I say that the disagreement is deep because it is independant of comp: it bears even on Everett's MWI. In fact it seems to me that with your notion of "projection" you are introducing a sort of collapse in comp! But it is really computationnalism (in a weak sense) which has helped Everett to prove QM does not need any collapses. In comp, it is the same. The indeterminism is the consequence of the way machines describe the statistics of their self-localisations and other self-measures after the natural self-multiplication and self-delocalisation forced by the UD. If I duplicate you, nobody, including GOD or any quasi omniscient being can predict what you will *feel* (1-person concept) precisely. Like Everett, comp can predict that you will not feel the split. Bruno
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
> > > Hi Russell, > > I will answer your questions when I will have more time. Also > I'm not sure I understand all of them. Fair enough. We're both fairly busy, so lets do this step by step in easily digestible chunks. > Here I present just some easy comments and questions. > > >See my heirarchy above. COMP \equiv NEURO. One's expectations are > >constrained by the laws of the QM multiverse. Within that, naturally > >there is 1-indeterminism. Not all brain states are reachable by > >computational continuations from a given state. > > Remember that I show comp => physics is derivable from machine's > psychology (= computer science including 1-person machine's discourse). > So I cannot rely on QM. QM shoulb be derivable from comp, or > either comp or QM is false. > OK - I agree with this statement under the subsitution COMP <- Schmidhuber, and think that my Occam paper pretty much does that. > Note: I eliminate the NEURO hypothesis to show that my result > does not depend on the heavy argumentation (in the philosophy of mind > community) between so-called externalist (mind supervenes on brain + > environment) and internalist (mind supervenes on "biological" brain > only). I just don't care. OK - I'm not sure what the externalist position even means. But then I'm not a "philosopher of the mind". > > >I was hoping for a transparent explanation of why you *believe* > >COMP<=>Schmidhuber. > > This really astonishes me. I make a big effort, though! > To be sure I don't understand the difference you see between > Schmidhuber's assumption and mine. I am not talking of the > *consequences* we derived from comp. This is what we need to sort out: i) COMP means that I can survive the replacement of my brain by some Turing emulation. ii) Schmidhuber means that all computations exist. (via UD*) At first blush, these two assumptions appear to be completely independent. OK - Schmidhuber admits belief in COMP at the end of his paper, but it doesn't follow (at least trivially) from his Plenitude assumption. I could well imagine conscious entities diagonalising the UD* output to generate an experience which is not an explicit computation. And with i), it seems that a classical continuous universe can support Turing Machines. Assuming that I live in such a universe, but it is the one and only universe (made by God lets say!) and that I am a Turing simulation, then COMP is obviously true. However, we've just assumed Schmidhuber is wrong, but found COMP to be true. > I'm not postulating more than Schmidhuber, the computationalist > evrything is UD*, = the great programmer's work. > With this I show that machines will be confront with continua. > Schmidhuber miss that point because he confuses 1 and 3 point > of view. That's all. > Schmidhuber'plenitude => comp, because if comp is false, then > with or without NEURO, I cannot exist in that plenitude and then > it is not a plenitude. Is that not obvious? > No it is not obvious. As I said above, what if I'm diagonalising the output of UD? > Also, if by Tegmark you mean only the axiomatisable formal theory > then, from the *ontological* perspective it is easy to show > that Tegmark = me = Schmidhuber. > Some of the (seldom) remark by Tegmark in the list gives me > the feeling that he is quite open to that equivalence. > By me - I assume you mean COMP. Lets talk about Tegmark, and yes I believe Tegmark is referring to formal axiomatic systems (he seems to go on about them in his paper). I can see clearly that Tegmark \subset Schmidhuber, however it is less clear that the reverse relationship holds. If the reverse relationship did hold, then it would make little difference, apart from the White Rabbit problem vanishing. > About "digital device". You seem to think that there exists > digital device which are not Turing emulable, and you gives > me as an exemple some radioactive (quantum) device. > > If you where true Church Thesis would be violated. > Schroedinger equation and Quantum Discrete devices are > Turing emulable. The randomnes is seen by the observer when his > coupling with the 'superposed object" is emulated by the UTM. > This is quite in the spirit of Everett and any no-collapse > interpretation of QM. If you believe that a radioactive device > is not Turing-emulable, then you believe in some form of > non-computational collapse, and you are again slipping toward > Penrosian form of non-comp. > Of course you can can compute the ensemble (UD*) - this follows from Schmidhuber's Plenitude. Also (in a sense) you can compute the wavefunction in Multiverse, which in turn defines a probability distribution. What you can't compute (or so it seems to me) is the outcome of a projection (1st postulate of consciousness). It is this projection that introduces randomness, or indeterminism into the 1st person view of the world. > More importantly, please tell me exactly the difference you see > between "my comp assumption" and Schmidhuber's one.
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
Hi Russell, I will answer your questions when I will have more time. Also I'm not sure I understand all of them. Here I present just some easy comments and questions. >See my heirarchy above. COMP \equiv NEURO. One's expectations are >constrained by the laws of the QM multiverse. Within that, naturally >there is 1-indeterminism. Not all brain states are reachable by >computational continuations from a given state. Remember that I show comp => physics is derivable from machine's psychology (= computer science including 1-person machine's discourse). So I cannot rely on QM. QM shoulb be derivable from comp, or either comp or QM is false. Note: I eliminate the NEURO hypothesis to show that my result does not depend on the heavy argumentation (in the philosophy of mind community) between so-called externalist (mind supervenes on brain + environment) and internalist (mind supervenes on "biological" brain only). I just don't care. >I was hoping for a transparent explanation of why you *believe* >COMP<=>Schmidhuber. This really astonishes me. I make a big effort, though! To be sure I don't understand the difference you see between Schmidhuber's assumption and mine. I am not talking of the *consequences* we derived from comp. I'm not postulating more than Schmidhuber, the computationalist evrything is UD*, = the great programmer's work. With this I show that machines will be confront with continua. Schmidhuber miss that point because he confuses 1 and 3 point of view. That's all. Schmidhuber'plenitude => comp, because if comp is false, then with or without NEURO, I cannot exist in that plenitude and then it is not a plenitude. Is that not obvious? Also, if by Tegmark you mean only the axiomatisable formal theory then, from the *ontological* perspective it is easy to show that Tegmark = me = Schmidhuber. Some of the (seldom) remark by Tegmark in the list gives me the feeling that he is quite open to that equivalence. About "digital device". You seem to think that there exists digital device which are not Turing emulable, and you gives me as an exemple some radioactive (quantum) device. If you where true Church Thesis would be violated. Schroedinger equation and Quantum Discrete devices are Turing emulable. The randomnes is seen by the observer when his coupling with the 'superposed object" is emulated by the UTM. This is quite in the spirit of Everett and any no-collapse interpretation of QM. If you believe that a radioactive device is not Turing-emulable, then you believe in some form of non-computational collapse, and you are again slipping toward Penrosian form of non-comp. More importantly, please tell me exactly the difference you see between "my comp assumption" and Schmidhuber's one. Is there is a difference I agree that different names should be used, but introducing differences where there are none, is still more confusing. Bruno
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
> > Russell Standish, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes: > > > >I then asked you whether by digital device, you meant a "Universal > > > >Turing Machine". This is where I part company with you, as I suspect > > > >that (1-)randomness has something to do with free will. > > Suppose a Turing Machine augmented with a true random number generator > (quantum, or whatever) produced consciousness while one with only a > pseudo random number generator (a deterministic, algorithmic, but > largely unpredictable generator) did not. > > In cryptography we study pseudo RNGs which can be distinguished from > true RNGs only if certain problems can be solved which are thought > to be intractable. For exmaple, the Blum Blum Shub psuedo RNG can be > distinguished from true randomness only if an extremely large number > can be broken into its prime factors (the same problem underlying the > well known RSA cryptosystem). > > It seems implausible that the ability to perform a calculation (factoring > a sufficiently large prime) which is thought to take more computing > power than is available in the universe would make the difference between > consciousness and its absence. > > Hal > > Not really - all you are really saying is that it would be impossible to distinguish between a genuine concious entity, and one that merely simulates it to a high level of fidelity, but is nevertheless not conscious (ie a type of zombie). Incidently, I'm harping on about genuine randomness and free-will. It is not immediately obvious to me that free will is essential for consciousness. My objection does not apply to conscious entities that nevertheless do not have free will. However, Bruno will have to convince me that my free will remains intact before I get into one of his contraptions. Cheers Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)
Russell Standish, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes: > > >I then asked you whether by digital device, you meant a "Universal > > >Turing Machine". This is where I part company with you, as I suspect > > >that (1-)randomness has something to do with free will. Suppose a Turing Machine augmented with a true random number generator (quantum, or whatever) produced consciousness while one with only a pseudo random number generator (a deterministic, algorithmic, but largely unpredictable generator) did not. In cryptography we study pseudo RNGs which can be distinguished from true RNGs only if certain problems can be solved which are thought to be intractable. For exmaple, the Blum Blum Shub psuedo RNG can be distinguished from true randomness only if an extremely large number can be broken into its prime factors (the same problem underlying the well known RSA cryptosystem). It seems implausible that the ability to perform a calculation (factoring a sufficiently large prime) which is thought to take more computing power than is available in the universe would make the difference between consciousness and its absence. Hal
Re: on simply being an SAS
- Original Message - From: Christopher Maloney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > [AM:] Under AUH, unfortunately it is neither *necessary* for a SAS to perceive > > totally law-like behaviour, nor try to fit all observed behaviour to laws. > > Firstly, there will be a relatively few unlucky SAS's who *do* perceive > > dragon/WR events in any AUH (some will have more than can be explained away > > as hallucinations etc); secondly, it is the case that the majority of SAS's > > on this planet would ascribe at least some paranormal events that they see > > or think they see (like miracles, angels, or nde's) to divine, rather than > > law-based, explanations - this doesn't disqualify them from being SAS's. > > I don't like the description of this problem as the "dragon" problem > or the "flying rabbit" problem. As someone (Fred, I think) posted > recently, a dragon or a flying rabbit would not indicate lawless > behavior, but rather, would indicate strange, complicated, different > laws at work. The point about dragons/WR's is that they represent a relatively small deviation from the normal physical laws as we know them - sufficiently large to be noticeable, but not so large as to make the existence of SAS's impossible. I agree that dragons/WR's would only indicate lawless behaviour from the point of view of our known physical laws, but not from a bird-viewpoint. > I think that really what is being discussed (by all means speak up > if you disagree) is the question of why we experience any physical > laws at all. It seems to me that either we should expect the > universe to be lawful, or we should expect our senses to provide > pure white-noise static from this instant onward. I still can't > get past the nagging conviction that I got a few weeks ago that > none of the discussion I've read so far does anything to justify > the expectation of law over chaos. What convinces me that good credibility can be given to the expectation of law over chaos (including an expectation of no WR's), is that whenever the world is viewed under an AUH in a way that attempts to be totally free from anthropic bias (for instance, see my web site, Russell's paper, and my posts of July 12th and October 16th - giving four variations in total), a solution to the WR problem (ie the chaos problem) straightforwardly falls out (basically this is the same kind of solution for all variations). Alastair
Re: on simply being an SAS
Russell Standish wrote: >> No fine tuning means that any value of \alpha is allowed (at least >> physically consistent values). So the above range you quote is >> extremely fine-tuned. In reality, the level of fine-tuning is likely >> to considerably less (I'm not sure what Tegmark quoted, but I thought >> the allowable range was a few percent of \alpha - which is still fine-tuned). > Fred Chen answered: >Since I believe this to be subjective, I respect your definition of >"fine-tuning," >even your choice of adverb "extremely." But this also leads to an >interesting >conclusion: any SAS will perceive fine-tuning (as per your definition). So >we can call >this generalization of SAP/WAP the SAS-centric principle, or something >like that. I agree. But then you should try to make SAS precise. As most people know, I have proposed here the choice of self-referentially correct universal turing machines. Bruno
