Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

2012-10-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 11.10.2012 17:20 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:

http://s33light.org/post/33296583824

Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?



I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.

Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but
they just do not have causal power on human behavior.

Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
goes through physical states directly. The difference with
eliminativism is subtle.

There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.

You will find nice podcasts about it at




Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and
comp, than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her
first person perspective on arithmetic.

Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not
eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically
compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use
in cognitive science.


This podcast reviews physicalism-based models of consciousness,  
hence one could refer to it as Aristotelian models of consciousness  
indeed.


As long as you don't use comp (implicitly and explicitly), which is  
often the case. The problem is that most physicalist believes in comp,  
or can be shown to believe (perhaps unconsciously) in comp.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

2012-10-11 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 10.10.2012 21:45 Craig Weinberg said the following:



 On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi
 wrote:
...



Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
goes through physical states directly. The difference with
eliminativism is subtle.



Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?



Reductive Physicalisms starts with a metaphysical assumptions that 
mental states are identical to physical states. Hence it is a starting 
point that consciousness is identical with some physical states.


Eliminativism on the other side plays induction. They say that the 
history of science shows us that physics explains us more and more from 
the area of consciousness. The conclude by induction that at some day 
physics will explains everything of consciousness.


Evgenii



You will find nice podcasts about it at

A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind



Thanks! Will check em out when I can!

Craig




Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html





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Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

2012-10-11 Thread Richard Ruquist
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 2:59 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
 On 10.10.2012 21:45 Craig Weinberg said the following:


 On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi
 wrote:
 ...


 Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
 to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
 goes through physical states directly. The difference with
 eliminativism is subtle.


 Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?


 Reductive Physicalisms starts with a metaphysical assumptions that mental
 states are identical to physical states. Hence it is a starting point that
 consciousness is identical with some physical states.

 Eliminativism on the other side plays induction. They say that the history
 of science shows us that physics explains us more and more from the area of
 consciousness. The conclude by induction that at some day physics will
 explains everything of consciousness.

 Evgenii

Evgenii, True if string theory is included in physics, Richard

 You will find nice podcasts about it at

 A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
 http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind


 Thanks! Will check em out when I can!

 Craig



 Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html





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Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

2012-10-11 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Craig Weinberg  

Cool.  I just signed up at tumblr previously. 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/11/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-10, 11:16:43 
Subject: Survey of Consciousness Models 


http://s33light.org/post/33296583824 

Have a look. Objections? Suggestions? 

http://media.tumblr.com/tumblr_mboeqxC0Vl1qe3q3v.jpg 

http://media.tumblr.com/tumblr_mboih6q3e11qe3q3v.jpg 

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http://media.tumblr.com/tumblr_mboin0ueLw1qe3q3v.jpg 

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Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

2012-10-10 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:

http://s33light.org/post/33296583824

Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?



I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.

Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that 
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. 
Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they 
just do not have causal power on human behavior.


Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to 
physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes 
through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is 
subtle.


There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.

You will find nice podcasts about it at

A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html

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Re: Survey of Consciousness Models

2012-10-10 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

 On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following: 
  http://s33light.org/post/33296583824 
  
  Have a look. Objections? Suggestions? 
  

 I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness. 


Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between 
awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint 
which is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what 
can evolve awareness and what never can.
 


 Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that 
 epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. 


I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that 
eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying 
that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an 
experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even 
make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater.
 

 Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they 
 just do not have causal power on human behavior. 


Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a 
lot of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you 
believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the 
same category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints 
are. Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not 
but offers no explanation about what it is.
 


 Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to 
 physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes 
 through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is 
 subtle. 


Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?
 


 There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism. 


Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point 
to who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like 
Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others. 
It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks 
in.
 


 You will find nice podcasts about it at 

 A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind 
 http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind 


Thanks! Will check em out when I can!

Craig
 


 Evgenii 
 -- 
 http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html 


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