On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 11.10.2012 17:20 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.
Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but
they just do not have causal power on human behavior.
Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical
to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything
goes through physical states directly. The difference with
eliminativism is subtle.
There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.
You will find nice podcasts about it at
Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and
comp, than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her
first person perspective on arithmetic.
Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not
eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically
compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use
in cognitive science.
This podcast reviews physicalism-based models of consciousness,
hence one could refer to it as Aristotelian models of consciousness
As long as you don't use comp (implicitly and explicitly), which is
often the case. The problem is that most physicalist believes in comp,
or can be shown to believe (perhaps unconsciously) in comp.
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