[Evolution-hackers] Maintenance fork for Evolution / EDS 2.32

2011-04-01 Thread David Woodhouse
Although the Evolution developers have moved on to better things and consider Evolution 2.32 to be a dead end, there are distributions still trying to ship this dead end. It is the latest stable release of Evolution, after all. Rather than all the distributors working separately to keep track of

Re: [Evolution-hackers] Maintenance fork for Evolution / EDS 2.32

2011-04-01 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Fri, 2011-04-01 at 18:00 +0100, David Woodhouse wrote: I hope that eventually, we might be permitted to use the real gnome-2-32 branch in GNOME git for this, rather than having to do it elsewhere. If that branch is a dead end and would otherwise be unused, then there's no harm in letting

Re: [Evolution-hackers] Maintenance fork for Evolution / EDS 2.32

2011-04-01 Thread David Woodhouse
On Fri, 2011-04-01 at 13:28 -0400, Matthew Barnes wrote: On Fri, 2011-04-01 at 18:00 +0100, David Woodhouse wrote: I hope that eventually, we might be permitted to use the real gnome-2-32 branch in GNOME git for this, rather than having to do it elsewhere. If that branch is a dead end and

Re: [Evolution-hackers] Maintenance fork for Evolution / EDS 2.32

2011-04-01 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Fri, 2011-04-01 at 20:07 +0100, David Woodhouse wrote: Although presumably there will be 3.01 and 3.02 releases so those branches aren't *quite* as orphaned as 2.32 yet :) Yeah, 3.0.1 at least per the GNOME schedule, although we've been doing at least one additional stable update ever since

[Evolution-hackers] RFC: camel-sasl try empty password first

2011-04-01 Thread David Woodhouse
I'm working on single-sign-on support for NTLM, where we don't actually *know* the password, but just delegate the whole challenge/response thing to a helper program. That helper program is /usr/bin/ntlm_auth; the only current implementation is the Samba one which works when you've logged into

Re: [Evolution-hackers] RFC: camel-sasl try empty password first

2011-04-01 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Fri, 2011-04-01 at 23:46 +0100, David Woodhouse wrote: Thus the patch below. Anyone got a better suggestion for how to handle it? A patch to actually use this facility in the NTLM authenticator will follow, of course... One alternative approach might be to to stop letting the