Re: [Fis] The notion of meaning in the COST proposal
Folks -- I think that meaning can be generalized to contextuality.
I have proposed, for example, that meaning exists
in occult form in physics, in the function of
constant variables in descriptive equations. We
know that the values of constants in an equation
will influence the result. So, if we have Y =
aX^b, we are putatively interested in the dyadic
relations between X and Y. But these relations
depend upon the values of a and b (which might,
for example, be universal constants). Given
this role for the constants, we in reality have
triadic relations here, with the constants
representing the context. Physical ideology has
obscured this by way of the 'epistemic cut',
delineating the distinction between observer and
observed. But, in utilizing the values of the
constants in order to calculate the value of Y,
they have actually pulled the constant values
into the observer rather than being associated
with the observed, leaving X and Y in evidently
dyadic relations, without context. In many cases
this would seem to be pragmatically reasonable
because the values of some constants may always
be taken to be the same. One branch of chaos
theory illuminated this by showing the range of
different results one gets by changing the
constants instead of the variable parameters.
STAN
Thanks Stan,
Biosemiotics can indeed be part of the story
(http://crmenant.free.fr/Biosemiotics3/INDEX.HTMhttp://crmenant.free.fr/Biosemiotics3/INDEX.HTM
), but part only.
My point is about the importance of the notion
of meaning when talking about information.
Interpretation of information (meaning
generation) is key when information is processed
by finalized systems. Our lives are embedded in
meaning generation, from auto-immune disease to
the smile of the Joconde. Meaning generation has
probably an evolutionary story, and can deserves
(I feel) a systemic approach
(http://cogprints.org/6279/ ). So I'm just kind
of surprised not to see the notion of meaning
explicited in the proposal.
Perhaps Pedro could tell us more on this point.
All the best
Christophe
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 15:28:54 -0400
To: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr
From: ssal...@binghamton.edu
Subject: Re: [Fis] FW: Denumerability of information (II)
.ExternalClass blockquote, .ExternalClass dl,
.ExternalClass ul, .ExternalClass ol,
.ExternalClass li
{padding-top:0;padding-bottom:0;}
For your interest, I think you are tending
towards semiotics -- in particular,
Biosemiotics. You could look at the web pages
of the Biosemiotics journal.
STAN
Dear all,
Comments from Michel and Rafael bring up an
aspect of the proposal that has perhaps been
underestimated. It is the interpretation of
information which generates its content, its
meaning. From Information in cells to
information for cells we precisely have the
interpretating function where an agent creates
meaning for its own usage. Different agents
generate different meanings. And information in
antennas is not for antennas as they contain no
interpretating function.
Can the paragraph Semantics cover this point?
Perhaps, but I'm not sure that semantics for
bioinformation is currently used.
The concept of interpretation looks to me as key
when talking about information in agents. If the
proposal takes it into account from a different
perspective, perhaps it would be worth
expliciting it.
Best regards
Christophe
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 13:57:53 +0200
From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Denumerability of information (II)
(message II, responses from Díaz Nafría and Rafael Capurro)
--
Dear Michel:
Thank you for your good remarks. I agree about both. Of course, data
banks may be considered in the list. In any case, that list should be
too long if it were exhaustive. That is to say, S concern to a much
larger list that the enunciated one (and considering length I may say
that there were only 1 character left to fulfil the text of
proposal and we use them all). Anyway, data banks are certainly a
relevant case so they will be mentioned in next submissions.
About (2), I remember the controversy which arose from a question you
stated in December -I think-. I also keep in mind the interesting
answer from Rafael. I wrote him some remarks about the controversy. I
will try to find them to give you my point of view about that
interesting question.
Grateful and cordial greetings,
José María Díaz Nafría
-
Dear Michel and all,
yes, the formulation there is information in cells... could be
misleading as it means, IMO, there is information for cells or
messages that cells are able to process as information, i.e., through
a process of selection and integration in them according to their
specific way of life. What is stored in data banks is in fact not
information but potential
Re: [Fis] Denumerability of information (I)
Addressing Michel's posting -- I would interpret 'denumerability' as used here as an externalist concept, compared with 'amount' of information (this amount left vague) as being closer to the internalist view that might be held within the cell itself. Scientists may try to assess how much information (defined in some way) a cell contains, but a cell would likely not be doing this. It is, curiously, supposed the telomere ends of chromosomes are 'counting' the number of cell divisions these chromosomes have experienced as the cell lineage ages. STAN (message I, from Michel Petitjean about the contents of the COST Proposal) -- Dear All, I would just add two points: (1) In the paragraph: There is information in cells... it would be useful to add that information is stored in data banks as results of measures etc., and that data mining techniques, which are primarily intended to retrieve information in databanks, concerns us. Data banks and data mining are thus relevant keywords. (2) There was recently a debate on the FIS forum about the nature of information in respect to its denumerability: - We can say that there are many informations, and so we can count informations - We can say that there is much information and information is not denumerable I would like to hear discussions about this deep aspect of the nature of information. Raphael Capurro and other contributors have given interesting thoughts about it. But behind that there is a crucial problem to solve. Best regards, Michel. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Emerging Synthesis?
Folks --
Dear Gordana, Pedro, and colleagues,
That would be unfortunate because a reduction of the
information-theoretical approach to physics unnecessarily sacrifices
explanatory power. (As would by the way, a reduction to biology or
any other substantive theory.) At issue is --as you correctly note--
the autopoiesis model itself which allows for coordination at
different systems level. The formalisms allow us to move from one
level to another heuristically, and thus to specify if necessary
counter-intuitively.
In regard to the levels here, as in {physical dynamics {chemical
connectivities {biological forms {sociocultural organizations, if
one reduces, say, a social event, to the physical level, that higher
level in fact would not disappear. What the higher levels
accomplish, when viewed from the lowest level, is to generate
patterns of lower level entities / activities. In order to keep
track of lower level entities that are being entrained by higher
level activities, the simplest choice would be to observe the higher
level transactions themselves. Notice that I am not suggesting that
we can forget about the lower levels and just focus upon the higher.
For example, the market can be considered as a social coordination
system with its own dynamics. The coordination with other
coordination mechanisms by various forms of couplings can also be
studied using the information-theoretical approach because the
expected information content of a distribution is yet content-free.
The specification of a system of reference provides the
(Shannon-type) information with meaning. For example, when H is
multiplied with the Boltzmann constant, the entropy is expressed in
Joule/Kelvin and physics is the system of reference. However, this
is a special case. Joule and degrees have no clear meaning in the
case of the operation of the market as a coordination mechanism.
But the economic generation of patterns of joule transactions
can have meaning enough. For example, it has been suggested to
capture solar energy in the Sahara and to take it north for use in
Europe. A dispute about this arose when some folks argued that the
result concerning the energy balance of the earth was negligable.
But others argued that there would be a significant increase in heat
pollution in Europe by doing this instead of allowing the the solar
heat to dissipate from the deserts at night. It is the pattern of
solar energy dissipation that would altered by this economic
arrangement, but we still need to know that it is molecular motion
that holds the facts about dissipation.
Best wishes,
Loet
Loet Leydesdorff
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.netl...@leydesdorff.net ;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/http://www.leydesdorff.net/
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
[mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2009 2:46 PM
To: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Emerging Synthesis?
Dear Gordana and Loet,
This is what the editors of the book literally say:
The third main idea is that Coordination Dynamics deals with
informational quantities that transcend the medium through which the
parts communicate. Evidence shows that things may be coupled by
mechanical forces, by light, by sound, by smell, by touch and by
intention. In Coordination Dynamics, binding or coupling is
mediated by information, not --or not only-- by conventional forces.
Such information may not only be of a material but also of a
structural or topological nature. It may cause qualitative changes
in the dynamics of the coordinating parts and new states to emerge.
Hence, bound coordinative states in Coordination Dynamics are
informational, and information that changes bound states is
meaningful to the system. (Preface, p. IX)
I agree with Gordana that it may support a pan-physicalist approach
to information, and vice versa, a pan-informationalist approach to
physics too. Besides, the ongoing conceptualization of meaning looks
rather meager. From my view, another important objection to the 8
main ideas is the absence of any reference to self-production (very
different from self-organization!); the life-cycle notion is also
missing...
Linking with the discussion that Michel started weeks ago, rather
than situating a similar recollection of main ideas about the term
information, it could be more interesting putting into question
what it means being informational. Say, the adjective as more
holistic than the name. The whole process around the message
(generation needs, coding, emission, transmission, reception,
decoding, interpretation, action...) becomes the natural universe of
information science, rather than the focus on any single conceptual
item (wherever we may be willing to situate information).
Curiously,
Re: [Fis] information(s)
Michel -- Of course, a countable quantity certainly inheres in one aspect of information -- the Shannon version. But in English we would not say 'many informations'. Rather 'much information' could be used. 'Many' does have a countable sense of individual pieces, while 'much' is a holistic locution. 'More' is also holistic, insofar as it does not specify particular amounts. It is directive toward increase, just as 'less' is directional toward decrease. But surely there are equivalent words in French for 'much', 'more', 'less', etc. Also, it would be possible in English to say 'many pieces / bits of information'. But here we have added the sense of individual bits that may be countable. Other aspects of information, such as 'pattern', 'constraint' 'difference' might have numerical interpretations -- 'great difference', 'large constraint', 'complicated pattern', but I don't think they are intrinsically quantitative in themselves. STAN Hello FISers. Recently, one of my colleagues attract my attention on the following point. In French, we often use information as a countable quantity, so that we can write informations. In English, it seems that it is unusual, if not incorrect, to do that. (1) Please can some English native FISers give their opinion about that ? (2) Please can some FISers from non English-speaking countries tell us how is the situation in their own language ? Thank you very much. Michel. Michel Petitjean, DSV/iBiTec-S/SB2SM (CNRS URA 2096), CEA Saclay, bat. 528, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France. Phone: +331 6908 4006 / Fax: +331 6908 4007 E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://petitjeanmichel.free.fr/itoweb.petitjean.html ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Neuroscience of Art:Insights Leads
Folks As an artist (all media) my reaction to the below is quizzical. Neuroscience, information science, esthetics, etc. are logical products in the realm of 'knowing that', which I call Nature, or Reality, while the unfolding of an artistic work takes place in the realm of 'knowing how', which I call The World, or Actuality. The one is a view from the outside, the other a view from the inside, reflecting the 'externalist / internalist' duality. I think it could be urged that the current 'social intent' of external logical understanding is to serve technology (as in computation). In this it makes things replicable. An artist makes things unique, as is any actual occasion, even though it may be working within a strong tradition (e.g., medieval Islamic tilework), or with the intent of making copies (etchings, photographs). Art might be said to be the intent to focus the unique moment in the service of beauty, or expression, or shock, or (considering the modern arts) anything whatever. STAN Dear Sonu, Dear FIS Colleagues, I should first say that I claim no academic authority for my comments. As some of you know, I am self-taught. With this caveat, please let me proceed. In 1979, the Franco-Romanian thinker Stéphane Lupasco published a book entitled The Psychic Universe in which he applied his logical system to cognitive processes. Chapter 1 is called Neuropsychic Dialectics. The logical alternance of actualization and potentialization of contradictory elements becomes, here, the resting potential (dynamic electrostatic equilibrium) of the nerve cell, its depolarization and repolarization. Neurobiological processes thus also reflect the underlying fundamental duality inherent in energy. In subsequent Chapters he looks at the dialectics of afferent and efferent systems and their interactions as the eventual basis first for consciousness, and from there for ceativity and art. In 1947, Lupasco applied his logical system to an explanation of ethics and art in his Logic and Contradiction. I have summarized his view on art as follows: In his detailed application of the logic of the included middle to art, Lupasco writes that the logic of esthetics must evolve, be directed inversely to the logic of ethics, inversely to any rational or irrational process, that is, inversely to processes that lead toward the absolute identity or diversity of non-contradiction. The logic of esthetics must proceed from the non-contradictory toward the contradictory; it aims at contradiction. The artist generates a becoming from the opposition of the consciousnesses of identity and diversity - an included middle we call a work of art. Works of art are generally considered fictions, and thus false, because contradictory. As one can understand from Lupasco's logic, art does not seek the true nor the real, either rational or irrational, but the truly false, redefined as the contradiction of both affirmation and negation and of the pure identity and diversity which govern them. Thus art is neither real nor unreal. Reality is the aspect of antagonistic logical order potentialized and objectified, and unreality is the same actualized and subjectified. This is why, in the esthetic experience, the subject and object tend to overlap, or to disappear as such. A work of art will be most esthetic when most semi-subjective and semi-objective at the same time, least real and unreal or better most semi-real and semi-unreal at once. It is interesting to compare these ideas with the well-known statement by Picasso that art is a lie, but in the service of truth. My tentative reply is therefore the following: in the human brain, the same dualities are reflected in two ways: in the underlying neural processing (s) at various levels starting from initial stimuli to their complex counterparts in the creative/anti-creative conflicts and tensions in the artist, resulting in the work of art as an emergent process, also instantiating the dualities. So as you see, I have gone here from neuroscience to art: the logic of dynamic opposition is the bridge. The above ideas have not been published in my book Logic in Reality, which describes the basic theory and its application to physics and biology, but not to cognitive science. I thus look forward to comments from everyone, + and -. Who knows where they might wind up?! Best regards to all. Joseph - Original Message - From: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sonu Bhaskar To: mailto:fis@listas.unizar.esfis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Monday, September 29, 2008 1:22 PM Subject: [Fis] Neuroscience of Art:Insights Leads Dear FIS Colleagues, Regarding the sprouting interest among our FIS colleagues germane to the ''Neuroscience of Art'', let me make a humble attempt to understand the replies of our
Re: [Fis] Neuroscience of art
Lauri -- Well, let's see: (1) First Law of thermodynamics: The total energy of a thermodynamically isolated system remains unchanged. (2) Second Law of thermodynamics: If there are any energy gradients in a system, they undergo transformations from one form to another, with some of it getting taken up as heat energy at each step. (3) Third Law of thermodynamics: At Zero degrees Kelvin energy transformations must cease. (4) Fourth Law of thermodynamics: Dissipative structures in non-equilibrium conditions tend to maximize their surfaces where energy transformations take place. Can we see in what ways these might be dependent of each other? (1) All concern energy (2) Numbers 2-4 concern energy transformations. (3) Numbers 3 and 4 concern rates of energy transformations. In what ways are they independent of each other? (1) Number one establishes the condition of thermodynamic isolation. (2) Number 2 establishes a necessary decay of a system into unusable heat energy. (3) Number 3 establishes a lower bound on rate of energy transformations. (4) Number 4 establishes a relation between form and rate of energy transformations. There is currently being considered what might become elevated to a Fifth Law -- the maximum entropy production principle, to the effect that a system connected to an energy gradient, if it can reorganize to different conformations, will tend to assume the one that maximizes its entropy production from that gradient. This, like 2-4 concerns energy transformations, like 3 and 4 it concerns rates of energy transformations, like 4 it concerns system form in relation to energy dissipation. It differs from 4 in its focus particularly on entropy production rather than energy dissipation. Only some energy dissipation needs to result in heat energy, with some going to conformations of lower potential energy gradient. So, then, are these laws independent of each other? STAN -- Hi all, I am afraid that list can't be validated as a set laws. Laws should be independent of each other. Regards, Lauri Gröhn metacomposer www.synestesia.fi On 18.9.2008, at 18.30, Sonu Bhaskar wrote: The cognizance between the art and cognitive neuroscience has been relatively ignored in the scientific fraternity. The recent proposition regarding the ten laws of art, as Dr. V. S. Ramachandran puts it, has ignited a new debate among the philosophers and the neuroscientists about neural correlates of art in its different forms. Professor Ramachandran's suggested 10 universal laws of art: 1. Peak shift 2. Grouping 3. Contrast 4. Isolation 5. Perception problem solving 6. Symmetry 7. Abhorrence of coincidence/generic viewpoint 8. Repetition, rhythm and orderliness 9. Balance 10. Metaphor ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] information-meaning-knowledge
Folks -- Replying to Joseph, I use simultaneously three definitions of 'information'. Thus: a reduction in uncertainty / a constraint on entropy production / a difference that makes a difference With these, meaning is inherent in any constraint as a possibility, and any constraint could make a difference somewhere. So, the constraint aspect (e.g., Pattee's contrast between dynamics and constraint) subsumes both information and meaning. Knowledge, however, appears to be a more particular kind of thing -- an organization of meanings, a classification. So, information and meaning are, as it were, pansemiotic, while knowledge is an aspect of human (possibly animal) organization. STAN ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Reactions to ...
Loet --
Dear Stan,
Wouldn't the inability to specify the number of categories mean
that the system is not properly specified? A human body, for
example, is specified only phenotypically? Would one not have to
specify the number of categories once one specifies in terms of
what one wishes to describe/explain the phenomena? (The human body
is then an explandum, but the crucial specification is the one of
the explanantes.)
S: Yes. But you see, this loses its philosophical interest in
favor of some pragmatic task.
Marx, 11th Thesis ad Feuerbach. Pragmatic puzzles are more difficult
than philosophical considerations.
S: I have not found it to be so, Perhaps I am more an artist
and poet than a scientist.
My main argument, however, was that we do not have a parsimonous
alternative at the methodological level. In the social sciences,
for example, one is able to decompose the static complexity using
multi-variate analysis or to a very limited extent to do
time-series analysis with two co-variates. When there are three
sources of variance, it often becomes too complex for the
methodological apparatus (e.g., SPSS). This brought me to entropy
statistics long ago. One can extend the dimensionality by writing
the number of subscripts. The time dimension can additionally be
brought in as another set of subscripts (t, t-1, t+1, etc.). In
addition to the Shannon formulas, one can elaborate into
Kullback-Leibler, etc.
It is a pity if this would not work also for biological systems.
S: I suspect that a clever experimental design could handle it.
Yes: that is the scientific enterprise.
I sometimes get the impression that with these Piercean notions
which you propose as an alternative, vitalism comes back on stage
as another (non-mechanistic) explanatory scheme. Perhaps, this
would explain the differences of opinion that pop up on this list
from time to time. For example, I would consider your systems of
interpretance -- yes, I read your book! -- as theoretical, while
you may wish to consider them as a (Piercean) methodology.
S: On this vitalism issue:
(a) my main point on this has been to push the importance of
vagueness, which though very difficult to handle technologically, is
a rich property of natural things, including 'parole' as opposed to
'langue'. You can see, I think, how this applies above.
(b) On vitalism, I have deconstructed this recently for an
encyclopedia. I will send you a copy separately. Basically my point
is that vitalism was an early glimpse of the problem (for science)
of historicity.
Yes, I understand: it can then function as a heuristics. The
Piercean notions are most useful as heuristics.
S: OK.
The problem with history, however, is that it is the case which
already happened, and thus it cannot be explained.
S: I think it is more 'generic' than than that. Given the
number of contingent concatenations involved in actual occasions, it
is on principle impossible to predict or fully understand any one of
them -- even if we can pick out some salient points (as in the Irak
farrago, we can pick out Israeli influence and desire for fossil
fuels, but that would still leave 50% of the variance in collections
of them unaccounted for!)
Evolutionary mechanisms may help us to understand what could have
happened. They require a clear algorithmic specification of the
complex system under study in terms of its composing subdynamics
(Herbert Simon). This reconstruction remains a hypothesis in terms
of its epistemological status. Philosophical systems tend to reify
these hypotheses, in my opinion.
S: I see, approximately: {poetry {philosophy {science {math.
Particular events have, I think, only poetic meanings. Experiencing
many may lead to philosophy (natural, not analytical). Gathered into
ensembles we can get some science. The results may suggest some
mathematical departure.
I hope that this is some kind of a reaction which clarifies the
differences of opinion.
S: Now I don't recall a difference of opinion!
STAN
With best wishes,
Loet
Pedro said:
I keep thinking that the pragmatic way that disciplines interact is
important regarding any order/disorder characterization. For
instance, let me return to the water droplet I mentioned weeks ago.
When the water droplet decides on its motion, it may be receiving
several strong dynamic influences (from the very local, to the most
general: a punctual splash, a wave, winds, a tide, a tsunami...).
The case is that the concept of force running throughout all
scales allows the integration or better the averaging of any
dynamic influence impinging on the system.
S: I would opt for 'integrate; inasmuch as these forces are
found at different scales in different strengths. Thus, I think that
the average of 1000 and 0.01 will not contribute to anything.
If the local and general influences
Re: [Fis] reactions to ...
Addressing Loet, then Pedro S: My reply is that the difficulty (?impossibility) of quantitatively estimating the maximum entropy of a natural system does not derive from our inability to foresee its future states, but from an inability to categorize its many present possible states. Consider the human body. How may conformations shall we say that it could assume in the next moment? Of course, if we are attempting this from some narrowly pragmatic project, we could impose, say, three categories of conformations relative to the problem at hand and sample only for these, thus eliminating an unknown number of conformations of no interest. Perhaps I am too 'philosophical, but it seems to me that the 'entropy' concept is no longer of much interest here. 1. I agree that the concept of probabilistic entropy (information) is yet content-free and cannot provide you with the specification of biological categories. It is more like a calculus. 2. The claim that the maximum entropy of natural systems cannot be specified in principle because the number of categories remains unknown for philosophical reasons can easily be read as vitalism. S: Well, but the problem is even worse for abiotic dissipative structures like tornadoes. Methodologically, however, the possibility to specify the number of categories and hence the maximum entropy depends on the research question. In population dynamics, for example, this may be more easy than in the case of the human body. Stuart Kauffman once proposed to consider the number of functionally differentiated cell types as a variable across species. S: Yes. As I said above, if we define the states of interest, and subsume many similar states under some of these, we may be able to contrive a maximum entropy. Thus, for people: standing, sitting, lying down. Wouldn't the inability to specify the number of categories mean that the system is not properly specified? A human body, for example, is specified only phenotypically? Would one not have to specify the number of categories once one specifies in terms of what one wishes to describe/explain the phenomena? (The human body is then an explandum, but the crucial specification is the one of the explanantes.) S: Yes. But you see, this loses its philosophical interest in favor of some pragmatic task. My main argument, however, was that we do not have a parsimonous alternative at the methodological level. In the social sciences, for example, one is able to decompose the static complexity using multi-variate analysis or to a very limited extent to do time-series analysis with two co-variates. When there are three sources of variance, it often becomes too complex for the methodological apparatus (e.g., SPSS). This brought me to entropy statistics long ago. One can extend the dimensionality by writing the number of subscripts. The time dimension can additionally be brought in as another set of subscripts (t, t-1, t+1, etc.). In addition to the Shannon formulas, one can elaborate into Kullback-Leibler, etc. It is a pity if this would not work also for biological systems. S: I suspect that a clever experimental design could handle it. I sometimes get the impression that with these Piercean notions which you propose as an alternative, vitalism comes back on stage as another (non-mechanistic) explanatory scheme. Perhaps, this would explain the differences of opinion that pop up on this list from time to time. For example, I would consider your systems of interpretance -- yes, I read your book! -- as theoretical, while you may wish to consider them as a (Piercean) methodology. S: On this vitalism issue: (a) my main point on this has been to push the importance of vagueness, which though very difficult to handle technologically, is a rich property of natural things, including 'parole' as opposed to 'langue'. You can see, I think, how this applies above. (b) On vitalism, I have deconstructed this recently for an encyclopedia. I will send you a copy separately. Basically my point is that vitalism was an early glimpse of the problem (for science) of historicity. --- Pedro said: I keep thinking that the pragmatic way that disciplines interact is important regarding any order/disorder characterization. For instance, let me return to the water droplet I mentioned weeks ago. When the water droplet decides on its motion, it may be receiving several strong dynamic influences (from the very local, to the most general: a punctual splash, a wave, winds, a tide, a tsunami...). The case is that the concept of force running throughout all scales allows the integration or better the averaging of any dynamic influence impinging on the system. S: I would opt for 'integrate; inasmuch as these forces are found at different scales in different strengths. Thus, I think that the average of 1000 and 0.01
[Fis] reactions to ...
Reacting first to Bill, then to Loet, then to Bob
Concerning Bill Hall's posting, I note that Popper's three worlds can
be neatly repreented in the specification hierarchy format:
{World 1 {World 2 {World 3}}}
vis
{physico-chemical dynamics {biological processes {sociopolitical projects}}}
That is, each higher world depends upon the lower ones, and in turn
integrates them locally.
Replying to Loet -
S: The material reason that Shannon information cannot be used to
calculate information carrying capacity in biology (or for any
dissipative structures), is that there is no way way to find the
complete repertoire of any such system. Thus, it is not
technologically 'useful'. However, it does carry conceptual weight
nevertheless. It can be used to roughly assess relative
configurations. Thus, a tornado has more possible macroscopic
conformations than does a bird, and this has more than a snail.
In my opinion, Stan, this is confusing. For the computation of the
Shannon-type information one only needs the number of categories at specific
moments of time (log(N)). Both the maximum entropy and the observed
complexity can be expected to change over time (Brooks Wiley, 1986). Of
course, one cannot specify all possible repertoires in the future, but in
anticipatory systems the possible repertoires at each moment can again be
specified, in principle.
Thus, we may hold to information theory. This is desirable for reasons of
parsimony and because there is no alternative. As I have argued before, the
organization of the Shannon-type information can be modeled by allowing for
a second degree of freedom in the probability distribution, or in other
words to distinguish an organizing variable versus an organized uncertainty.
In addition to the Shannon-type information, one can then also most easily
compute the mutual information as a representation of the organizational
(and historical!) constraints.
S: My reply is that the difficulty (?impossibility) of
quantitatively estimating the maximum entropy of a natural system
does not derive from our inability to foresee its future states, but
from an inability to categorize its many present possible states.
Consider the human body. How may conformations shall we say that it
could assume in the next moment? Of course, if we are attempting
this from some narrowly pragmatic project, we could impose, say,
three categories of conformations relative to the problem at hand and
sample only for these, thus eliminating an unknown number of
conformations of no interest. Perhaps I am too 'philosophical, but
it seems to me that the 'entropy' concept is no longer of much
interest here.
---
Bob said -
Hi Stan - thanks for commenting on my post. I really liked your
remark highlighted in pink. But I have a problem understanding the
remarks in blue. Perhaps you could clarify for me. Why is it also
true for any dissipative system and what exactly do you mean by a
dissipative system? Also I do not see how Shannon info can be used
to roughly assess relative configurations. Also why does a tornado
have more possible macroscopic conformations than does a bird, and
this has more than a snail. Finally. what is a conformation?
These questions are not posed to challenge your assertions but
rather to help me understand them.
S: Of course. OK. I use 'dissipative structure' in the
Prigoginian sense. I use 'conformation' as in molecular biology, as
one form that may be assumed by a material object of a given
configuration - one configuration, many conformations. I would
imagine using Shannon info to assess how many conformations a
configuration might assume, and that could work for, say, a protein
in a given environment.
My general point here is that physically (thermodynamically), living
systems are not different from other dissipative structures except in
their complication (?complexity). As I see it, living systems are
just more highly specified dissipative structures, based on their
internal information storage. Indeed, leaving aside the uncanny
origin of the genetic system, the living must have been launched
upon, or took over by information import, some prior dissipative
structure(s). Now, considering that this event produced a more
definite kind of system, it is clear that the Shannon information
capacity really first appeared then in Nature as a possible inquiry,
inasmuch as abiotic dissipative structures are so vaguely embodied
(think tornado) that the category of informational entropy can hardly
be applied to them. So, in fact, I was in error to state that one
might assess how many conformations a tornado might assume. It is
too vague for such a measure.
STAN___
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Re: [Fis] Breaking my silence
Replying to Bob Logan, then to Pedro, then to Ted - -snip- Bob said: The reader will find in this paper an argument that Shannon info does not work for biological systems precisely because as has been pointed out in the discussion evolution cannot be predicted. This reinforces Bob U's remark In my judgement there are far too many folks who want to use the Shannon entropy itself as the measure of information, and I believe that doing so erects major impediments to grasping what information truly is. Bob U remark is right on the money according to POE. The material reason that Shannon information cannot be used to calculate information carrying capacity in biology (or for any dissipative structures), is that there is no way way to find the complete repertoire of any such system. Thus, it is not technologically 'useful'. However, it does carry conceptual weight nevertheless. It can be used to roughly assess relative configurations. Thus, a tornado has more possible macroscopic conformations than does a bird, and this has more than a snail. --- Pedro said - 1. The Hegelian structure of thesis - antithesis -synthesis is in my terms abstract and idealized, applicable to linguistic entities. What is the driving force, even in Hegelian terms, that enables movement from one stage to the other? 2. Real systems, on the other hand, have a dynamics, usually driven by some form of energy gradient. My approach is different in that I attribute a logic to the resulting changes, which seem to follow a pattern of alternating predominance of first one element, then the opposing one. S: It seems to me that you appear here to have joined Engels in trying yo generalize the Hegelian developmental movement to material systems --. Ted said: Let me start the metaconversation by repeating something I have said before. I think we are at the threshold of a new science that provides a better, deeper set of principles for understanding things in terms of self-organizing systems. I believe that it will help address problems that seem very hard or impossible with standard methods, and indeed insist that to be the definition of new science. S: The distinguishing factor is that modern science has worked with 'existents', and has never dealt with origins. It has been my position that the emergence-of-the-new sort of idea about origins is wrong. I think there has never been an emergence of the totally new. Rather there have been developments of initially vague tendencies into gradually more and more highly specified emergent particulars as the universe proceeded from physical to chemical to biological to sociopolitical (in some locales). From this perspective the origin of informational constraints is 'epigenetic', with the more particular molded from the vaguer, more generally present prior situations. Thus, information would be a gradient from barely liminal vaguenesses to definite particulars in an ensemble of them. STAN ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Test - Post
Replying to Jerry, then Joe, then Guenther, then Loet -
Jerry said --
To List, Pedro, Bob:
The posts on this topic have become increasingly puzzling to me.
Frankly, Pedro, you post, along with Bob's concurrence, pushed me
into writing this response.
Is our concept of information / communication to become merely the
science of info souls working off of our taxonomic instincts
such that we become a Borges category of the embalmed ones?
If I have my choice, I would prefer to enter Borges Celestial
Emporium with a mermaid or perhaps as one drawn with a very fine
camel's hair brush! ;-) :-) :-)
Of course, my effort at humor is not to be taken very seriously, but
it is not to be totally disregarded either. The point is direct:
the method of classification plays a crucial role in our logics.
Allow me to use examples.
The 81 boxes of the 9 squares of a successfully completed Sudoku
puzzle are in perfect order.
The list of chemical elements is in perfect order.
The list of integers is in perfect order.
How do these examples of order distinguish themselves?
Each of the examples follows a grammar or rules or axioms such that
the symbols convey meaning to the reader, the recipient of the
message.
The message in each statement is encoded such that the regularity of
the object can be decoded.
In other words, the concept of order is integral to the possibility
of exchanging information; the possibility of information subsumes
the notion of an order relation.
Thus, order, whether in one, two, three, four, or more dimensions,
is the antecedence of the concept of information; information is a
consequence of order or a belief in order. The notion of a message
presupposes (or subsumes) the concept of a sender and of a
(putative) receiver.
S: But information theoretic definition of information is only
one of three known. The other two are:
(2) info as constraint on entropy production (as seen in the values
of constants in equations).
(3) Info as a difference that makes a difference (within a semiotic system).
In all cases that I am aware of, that is, the observable material
universe, the source of the order is a natural one.
The natural order of our material universe appears, from a
cosmological perspective, to have emerged from the natural order of
the atomic numbers.*
(The path from the big bang to the present passes through the
atomic numbers. While less stable particles are associated with
earlier cosmological events, I will leave that can of worms to the
physicists and the theologians and justify this argument on the well
established stable scientific theory of the chemical origins of our
surroundings.)
S: I would insist that physical origins preceded the chemical, as in
{physical {chemical {biological {sociopolitical
Why is this important?
The chemical sciences admit as a foundational principle that highly
irregular objects can be formed from the chemical elements.
Irregularity is intrinsic to chemical relations. Regularity is the
*exception* to chemical structural relations and to dynamic
biochemical relations.
The role of irregularity in chemical structural relations is so
profound that we lack methods to count the number of isomers, the
number of irregularities. In addition to structural irregularity,
irregularity that can be expressed as sequence of logical
operations that follow one from another, are common in chemistry,
biology, medicine and other biological disciplines.
+++This view of the chemical nature of our environment, our
situation on this earth, is radically different from the typical
assumption of order of our physical theories. In both thermodynamics
and quantum mechanics, the order and regularity of the integers is
subsumed directly into the message, directly into the information,
directly into the encoding and decoding processes.+++
S: So, you are claiming that Nature is NOT orderly?
-
Joe -- My thoughts, as I read your below, go to fuzzy logic. How
does that interact with your effort?
Dear Colleagues (and Anti-leagues?),
Pedro has just called attention, again, to a possible role of logic in
facilitating new approaches to seemingly intractable problems and
divergences of opinion. The question is What logic? In my view, it cannot
be any classical or neo-classical bivalent predicate logic or its modal or
tense extensions. The reason is that these all have, as their elements, some
classical truth values or their mathematical equivalents.
As some of you know, I have recently had published a book, entitled Logic in
Reality, that sets forth a new kind of logic (LIR) extended to real
phenomena, including object entities seen primarily as processes and
including theories as well as the subjects of those theories. This logic is
grounded in what I see as the fundamental, oppositional dualities in nature.
It is a
[Fis] Fwd: On the Concept of Order in Relation to Scientific Information
This does not count as my second message for the week. To List, Pedro: The posts on the topic of Order have become increasingly puzzling to me. Pedro's post on streams of order conveys to me an abandonment of scientific thinking. The success of scientific thinking arises from the rigorous classification / categorization of objects in the world, potential of our mental and physiological capabilities to create order. To cite Borges The Celestial Emporium of Knowledge and assert that it is clear that there is no classification of the Universe not being arbitrary and full of conjectures. and then assert: I mean, most approaches to the order of the sciences have been guided by criteria of hierarchy, reduction, systemism, unification, integration, etc. With all due respect, Pedro, do you really believe that the modern capacities of technology were created by arbitrary conjectures? What is your notion of the concept of order or streams of order that generate your conclusions? I will take an exactly opposite position, namely, that the streams of order of categories form the logical basis of science and technology and much of human experience. Such categorical notions of order are composed from discrete concepts of identity, of matter, of space, of time and of change. Is it possible that by *not* separating human experiences - impressions from the world - into discrete categories that one conflates separate and distinct concepts such that order is not apparent? If one of these simple categories is taken by itself, then order, as revealed by deductive syllogisms, is readily apparent. Would you agree that a calendar serves as a marker for the order of the streams of time? Would you agree that carbon (atomic number 6) is different from nitrogen (atomic number 7) which is in turn is different from oxygen (atomic number 8) and that the atomic numbers serve to order all streams of matter? Would you agree that in our mental streams of thought that arithmetic operations provide for reproducible streams of order of thought? Let me turn to the notion of order itself. Perhaps the premier notion of order comes from the concept of a list. A list of pronouns (it, that abstract objects without form or essence) can form a list. Science and written human communication both depend of lists of symbols, intentional expressions of our sentience. Shannon information is grounded on ordered lists of number symbols, encodings of our sentience. Chemical sciences are grounded in the order of the list of elements. Living systems are grounded in the order of genetic elements, DNA base sequences grounded in the organization of atoms. Allow me to use illustrate the concept of order in examples that lie at the foundation of information theory. The 81 boxes of the 9 squares of a successfully completed Sudoku puzzle are in perfect order. The list of chemical elements is in perfect order. The list of amino-acids in a protein. The list of integers is in perfect order. How do these examples of order distinguish themselves from one another? Each of the examples follows a grammar or rules or axioms such that the symbols convey meaning to the reader, the recipient of the message. Thus, a concept of information demands that a list of rules or grammar or axioms exist such that the independent bit (object, concept, number, pronoun, codeword, symbol, etc) becomes a component in a system of interpretation. The notion of a message presupposes (or subsumes) the concept of a sender and of a (putative) receiver. The message in each statement is encoded such that the regularity of the object of the world can be decoded as a signification of the mental impression of the information. In other words, the concept of order is integral to the possibility of exchanging information; the possibility of information subsumes the notion of an order relation. Thus, order, whether in one, two, three, or more dimensions, is the antecedence of the concept of information; information is a consequence of order or a belief in order. In all cases that I am aware of, that is, the observable material universe, the ***source*** of the order, is a natural one. (I presuppose that neither time nor space, per se, is an observable in the sense that they have identity.) The natural order of our *material* universe appears, from a cosmological perspective, to have emerged from the natural order of the atomic numbers.* (The path from the big bang to the present passes through the atomic numbers. While less stable particles are associated with earlier cosmological events, I will leave that can of worms to the physicists and the theologians and justify this argument on the well established stable scientific theory of the chemical origins of our surroundings.) Why is this important? It is necessary to distinguish the concept of order from the concepts of regularity and
