Re: [Fis] If always n>0 why we need log

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Sung et al.,

I appreciate human bias in terms of numerical scale, but I don’t think that is 
what we actually achieve by using logarithms.  If the universe of possibility 
is fractal, using a logarithm does not eliminate the problem of large numbers.  
I think the primary outcome achieved by using logarithms is that units come to 
represent proportions rather than absolute (fixed scale) amounts.  It reveals 
an aspect of scale-free form.



On Jun 3, 2018, at 10:42 AM, Sungchul Ji 
mailto:s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>> wrote:


Hi Krassimir,

I think the main reason that we express 'information'  as a logarithmic 
function of the number of choices available, n, may be because the human brain 
finds it easier to remember (and communicate and reason with)  10 than  
100, or 100 than 10. . . . 0, etc.

All the best.

Sung




From: Krassimir Markov mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>
Sent: Sunday, June 3, 2018 12:06 PM
To: Foundation of Information Science
Cc: Sungchul Ji
Subject: If always n>0 why we need log

Dear Sung,

A simple question:

If always n>0 why we need log in

I = -log_2(m/n) = - log_2 (m) + log_2(n)   (1)

Friendly greetings

Krassimir


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Re: [Fis] Is information physical? 'Signs rust.'

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Joseph,

Thank you for this concise statement.  It very closely matches my own 
perspective.  I would only add the notion that meaningfulness or 
meaninglessness is not an inherent property of information.  It is entirely 
contingent upon the affect, or the absence of affect, of encountered 
information on an agent.

Regards,

Guy



On Apr 26, 2018, at 7:31 AM, 
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

Information refers to changes in patterns of energy flow, some slow (frozen), 
some fast, some quantitative and measurable, some qualitative and 
non-measurable, some meaningful and some meaningless, partly causally effective 
and partly inert, partly present and partly absent, all at the same time.

Best wishes,

Joseph

Message d'origine
De : u...@umces.edu
Date : 25/04/2018 - 08:14 (PDT)
À : mbur...@math.ucla.edu
Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

Dear Mark,

I share your inclination, albeit from a different perspective.

Consider the two statements:

1. Information is impossible without a physical carrier.

2. Information is impossible without the influence of that which does not exist.

There is significant truth in both statements.

I know that Claude Shannon is not a popular personality on FIS, but I
admire how he first approached the subject. He began by quantifying,
not information in the intuitive, positivist  sense, but rather the
*lack* of information, or "uncertainty", as he put it. Positivist
information thereby becomes a double negative -- any decrease in
uncertainty.

In short, the quantification of information begins by quantifying
something that does not exist, but nonetheless is related to that
which does. Terry calls this lack the "absential", I call it the
"apophatic" and it is a major player in living systems!

Karl Popper finished his last book with the exhortation that we need
to develop a "calculus of conditional probabilities". Well, that
effort was already underway in information theory. Using conditional
probabilities allows one to parse Shannon's formula for diversity into
two terms -- on being positivist information (average mutual
information) and the other apophasis (conditional entropy).


This duality in nature is evident but often unnoticed in the study of
networks. Most look at networks and immediately see the constraints
between nodes. And so it is. But there is also indeterminacy in almost
all real networks, and this often is disregarded. The proportions
between constraint and indeterminacy can readily be calculated.

What is important in living systems (and I usually think of the more
indeterminate ecosystems, rather than organisms [but the point applies
there as well]) is that some degree of conditional entropy is
absolutely necessary for systems sustainability, as it provides the
flexibility required to construct new responses to novel challenges.

While system constraint usually abets system performance, systems that
become too efficient do so by decreasing their (mutually exclusive)
flexibility and become progressively vulnerable to collapse.

The lesson for evolutionary theory is clear. Survival is not always a
min/max (fitt*est*) issue. It is about a balance between adaptation
and adaptability. Ecosystems do not attain maximum efficiency. To do
so would doom them.

 The balance also
puts the lie to a major maxim of economics, which is that nothing
should hinder the efficiency of the market. That's a recipe for "boom
and bust". 


Mark, I do disagree with your opinion that information cannot be
measured. The wider application of information theory extends beyond
communication and covers the information inherent in structure, or
what John Collier calls "enformation". Measurement is extremely
important there. Perhaps you are disquieted by the relative nature of
information measurements. Such relativity is inevitable. Information
can only be measured with respect to some (arbitrary) reference
distribution (which is also known in the wider realm of thermodynamics
as "the third law".)

Remember how Bateson pointed to the overwhelmingly 

Re: [Fis] "Mental model" ???

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Krassimir,

Thanks for asking this important question.  I’m curious to see how others might 
answer it.  For me, the “mental model” is a centralized system for information 
processing that receives inputs from multiple sensory mechanisms and can induce 
action as a consequence.  In biology, this can be a centralized nervous system 
and whole organism behavior as the form of an output.  We illustrate this 
process as we read and write FIS posts.

Are you looking for more detail about the “mental model”, or is this the sort 
of thing you have in mind?

Cheers,

Guy

Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
Department of Biology
University of Nevada Reno

Phone:  775-784-4860
Fax:  775-784-1302



On Feb 26, 2018, at 2:48 PM, Krassimir Markov 
<mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>> wrote:

Dear colleagues,

I understand that it is not so easy to answer to the simple question.

But the mental models are very important for understanding the information and 
communication phenomena.

So, again the same simple question: What is the “mental model”?

Friendly greetings
Krassimir



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Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Christophe,

I completely agree that there is an important distinction between the 
communication between attached beams and the semantic communication between 
agents.  Like you, I have long been interested in the evolution of biological 
signaling systems.  My dissertation research included explorations of the 
potential meaning attached to courtship displays by a damselfish species.  In 
the decades since I did that work, my view of communication has broadened.  
Semantics is context dependent and is manifested internally by the agents 
(perception), which makes it very hard to study empirically.  The best I could 
do, and I think this may be a general limitation, was to model the hypothetical 
semantic content of a signal, naively predict how the perceiver ‘should’ 
respond to the hypothetically encoded meaning, and judge whether the empirical 
data fit my model of the system.  Note that I did my dissertation research at a 
time when the leading idea was that  all signals were deceptive devices for 
maximizing personal fitness (e.g., Krebs and Davies, 1984).  My observational 
and experimental work on this system led me to think more deeply about the 
evolution of signaling systems, and I proposed the following:


  *   individuals assess all of the information they perceive, some of which 
represents signals expressed by other individuals
  *   far more information about individuals can be useful than the information 
‘packaged’ in a signal
  *   individuals signal to other individuals in unconventional ways, in 
addition to conventional ways (evolved signaling systems)
  *   evolved, codified kinds of signals generally started as one of those 
unconventional kinds of signals that conferred fitness gains for both the 
signaler and the perceiver, on average
  *   such useful signals tend to persist and they have an opportunity for 
adaptive fine-tuning, morphological integration (e.g., a color patch used for 
display), and amplification
  *   I think these become the classical animal signaling systems we are so 
familiar with

So, for me, codified semantic signals are embedded in, and deeply connected to, 
a sea of information about other individuals.  Such signals may be anywhere 
along a spectrum from simple information transfer (similar to the beams) to 
semantically-based language.  Semantics is a fascinating and important target 
of study, but I think limiting our terminology to that domain misleadingly 
suggests that it is more disconnected from less formalized modes of 
communication than it really is.  I also think it suggests that semantic 
communication is more disconnected from the universal physico-chemical laws 
than it really is.  I prefer to think of semantic communication as a subset of 
all communication, and I see value in understanding the information transfer 
between connected beams as sharing some fundamental similarities to semantic 
communication.

Regards,

Guy

On Feb 14, 2018, at 3:05 PM, Christophe Menant 
<christophe.men...@hotmail.fr<mailto:christophe.men...@hotmail.fr>> wrote:


Yes Guy,
Unconsciously I take communications as related to meaning generation.
But, as you say, we could use the word for the two beams attached to each other 
with bolts and that ‘communicate’ relatively to the strength of the building.
The difference may be in the purpose of the communication, in the constraint 
justifying its being.
The ‘communication’ between the two beams is about maintaining them together, 
satisfying physical laws (that exist everywhere). It comes from the decision of 
the architect who is constrained to get a building that stands up. The 
constraint is with the architect, not with the beams that only obey physical 
laws.
In the case of living entities the constraints are locally present in the 
organisms (‘stay alive’). The constraint is not in the environment of the 
organism. And the constraint addresses more than physico-chemical laws.
If there is meaning generation for constraint satisfaction in the case of 
organisms, it is difficult to talk the same for the two beams.
This introduces the locality of constraints as a key subject in the evolution 
of our universe. It is an event that emerged from the a-biotic universe 
populated with physico-chemical laws valid everywhere.
Another subject interesting to many of us
All the best
Christophe


________
De : Guy A Hoelzer <hoel...@unr.edu<mailto:hoel...@unr.edu>>
Envoyé : mardi 13 février 2018 18:18
À : Foundations of Information Science Information Science
Cc : Terry Deacon; Christophe Menant
Objet : Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

Hi All,

I want to pick on Christophe’s post to make a general plea about FIS posting.  
This is not a comment on meaning generation by agents.  Christophe  wrote:

"Keeping in mind that communications exist only because agents need to manage 
meanings for given purposes”.

Thi

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi All,

I want to pick on Christophe’s post to make a general plea about FIS posting.  
This is not a comment on meaning generation by agents.  Christophe  wrote:

"Keeping in mind that communications exist only because agents need to manage 
meanings for given purposes”.

This seems to imply that we have such confidence that this premise is correct 
that it is safe to assume it is true.  However, the word “communication” is 
sometimes used in ways that do not comport with this premise.  For example, it 
can be said that in the building of a structure, two beams that are attached to 
each other with bolts are “communicating” with each other.  This certainly fits 
my notion of communication, although there are no “agents” or “meanings” here.  
Energy (e.g., movement) can be transferred from one beam to the next, which 
represents “communication” to me.  I would personally define communication as 
the transfer of information, and I prefer to define “information” without any 
reference to “meaning”.  If the claim above had been written as a contingency 
(e.g., “If we assume that communications exist…”), then I could embrace the 
rest of Christophe’s post.

I think the effectiveness of our FIS posts is diminished by presuming everybody 
shares our particular perspectives on these concepts.  It leads us to talk past 
each other to a degree; so I hope we can remain open to the correctness or 
utility of alternative perspectives that have been frequently voiced within FIS 
and use contingent language to establish the premises of our FIS posts.

Regards,

Guy


On Feb 13, 2018, at 5:19 AM, Christophe Menant 
> wrote:


Dear Terry and FISers,
It looks indeed reasonable to position the term 'language' as ‘simply referring 
to the necessity of a shared medium of communication’. Keeping in mind that 
communications exist only because agents need to manage meanings for given 
purposes.
And the concept of agent can be an entry point for a ‘general theory of 
information’ as it does not make distinctions.
The Peircean triadic approach is also an available framework (but with, alas, a 
limited development of the Interpreter).
I choose to use agents capable of meaning generation, having some compatibility 
with the Peircean approach and with the Biosemiotics 
Umwelt.(https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2)

All the best
Christophe
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Re: [Fis] If "data = information", why we need both concepts?

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Jose,

I agree that the semantic and physical notions of ‘information’ are 
intertwined, and I think we can be more explicit about how the are related.  I 
claim that physical information is general, while semantic information is 
merely a subset of physical information.  Semantic information is composed of 
kinds of physical contrasts to which symbolic meaning has been attached.  
Meaningfulness cannot exist in the absence of physical contrast, but physical 
information can exist independently of sensation, perception, cognition, and 
contextual theory.

Regards,

Guy


On Oct 3, 2017, at 12:53 PM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero 
<javierwe...@gmail.com<mailto:javierwe...@gmail.com>> wrote:


Dear all,

What if, in order to understand information and its relationship with data and 
meaning, we distinguish the kind of system we are talking about in each case?

We may distinguish systems by their type of operation and the form of their 
selforganization. There are living systems, mind systems, social systems and 
artificial systems.

What information is depends on the type of system we are talking about. Maybe 
distinguishing between information and meaning in living systems and artificial 
systems might not make much sense, but it is crucial for social systems. Bits 
of information codify possibilities of experience and action (following 
somewhat loosely Luhmanns social systems theory) and meaning cristalizes when a 
posibility is fulfilled for a particular subsystem (interaction systems, 
organizations...). The role of language in social systems is another reason to 
distinguish information from meaning.
In artificial systems it might make sense to distinguish between data and 
information, being data everything a computer needs to make a calculations and 
information the results of those calculations that enable it to do more 
calculations or to render an output of whatever kind. So what is information at 
some stage of the process becomes data on other.

It is obvious that all of these systems operate closely intertwined. They 
couple and decouple, retaining their specificity.

Best regards,

El oct 3, 2017 4:28 PM, "Guy A Hoelzer" 
<hoel...@unr.edu<mailto:hoel...@unr.edu>> escribió:
Dear Krassimir et al.,

Your post provides an example of the importance that semantics plays in our 
discussions.  I have suggested on several occasions that statements about 
‘information’ should explicitly distinguish between a purely heuristic 
definition, such as those involving ‘meaning’, and definitions focused on a 
physical phenomena.  I personally prefer to adopt the latter definition, which 
would make your post false.  For example, when I type the symbol ‘Q’ I have 
created information because there is a contrast between white and black regions 
of its local space.  Meaning is utterly irrelevant to the attribute of 
‘information’ from this perspective.  I can create an instance of information 
by writing ‘Q’, and you can receive that information by viewing it, even if it 
means nothing to either of us.  The symbol ‘Q’ might be attached to some 
meaning for one or both of us, but for me that is irrelevant to the question of 
information content which can be measured in  a variety of ways in this 
example.  If we agree on a symbolic meaning of ‘Q’, then the information 
transfer can also carry the transfer of ‘meaning’.

In other words, I would argue that data is indeed information, unless it is 
perfectly uniform.  Meaning is attached to data by putting the data in the 
context of a theory, but this is an analytical option.  For example, you could 
always display the data on graphs without a theoretical context, and such an 
analysis might make trends or patterns more evident, even without meaning 
attached.  Descriptive or observational data are often presented this way in 
young scientific disciplines that have yet to develop a rich theoretical 
context in which to interpret the meaning of data.

On the other hand, if you start by explicitly stating that you are using the 
semantic notion of information at the start, I would agree whole heartedly with 
your post.

Best Wishes,

Guy



> On Oct 3, 2017, at 4:16 AM, Krassimir Markov 
> <mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>> wrote:
>
> Dear John and FIS Colleagues,
>
> I am Computer Science specialist and I never take data to be information.
>
> For not specialists maybe it is normal "data to be often taken to be
> information" but this is not scientific reasoning.
>
> Simple question: if "data = information", why we need both concepts?
>
>
> Friendly greetings
>
> Krassimir
>
>
> Dear list,
>
>
> As Floridi points out in his Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
> 2010. A volume for the Very Short Introduction series. data is often taken
> to be information. If so, then the below distinction is somewhat
> arbitra

Re: [Fis] If "data = information", why we need both concepts?

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Krassimir et al.,

Your post provides an example of the importance that semantics plays in our 
discussions.  I have suggested on several occasions that statements about 
‘information’ should explicitly distinguish between a purely heuristic 
definition, such as those involving ‘meaning’, and definitions focused on a 
physical phenomena.  I personally prefer to adopt the latter definition, which 
would make your post false.  For example, when I type the symbol ‘Q’ I have 
created information because there is a contrast between white and black regions 
of its local space.  Meaning is utterly irrelevant to the attribute of 
‘information’ from this perspective.  I can create an instance of information 
by writing ‘Q’, and you can receive that information by viewing it, even if it 
means nothing to either of us.  The symbol ‘Q’ might be attached to some 
meaning for one or both of us, but for me that is irrelevant to the question of 
information content which can be measured in  a variety of ways in this 
example.  If we agree on a symbolic meaning of ‘Q’, then the information 
transfer can also carry the transfer of ‘meaning’.

In other words, I would argue that data is indeed information, unless it is 
perfectly uniform.  Meaning is attached to data by putting the data in the 
context of a theory, but this is an analytical option.  For example, you could 
always display the data on graphs without a theoretical context, and such an 
analysis might make trends or patterns more evident, even without meaning 
attached.  Descriptive or observational data are often presented this way in 
young scientific disciplines that have yet to develop a rich theoretical 
context in which to interpret the meaning of data.

On the other hand, if you start by explicitly stating that you are using the 
semantic notion of information at the start, I would agree whole heartedly with 
your post.

Best Wishes,

Guy



> On Oct 3, 2017, at 4:16 AM, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> 
> Dear John and FIS Colleagues,
> 
> I am Computer Science specialist and I never take data to be information.
> 
> For not specialists maybe it is normal "data to be often taken to be
> information" but this is not scientific reasoning.
> 
> Simple question: if "data = information", why we need both concepts?
> 
> 
> Friendly greetings
> 
> Krassimir
> 
> 
> Dear list,
> 
> 
> As Floridi points out in his Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
> 2010. A volume for the Very Short Introduction series. data is often taken
> to be information. If so, then the below distinction is somewhat
> arbitrary. It may be useful or not. I think that for some circumstances it
> is useful, but for others it is misleading, especially if we are trying to
> come to grips with what meaning is. I am not sure there is ever data
> without interpretation (it seems to me that it is always assumed to be
> about something). There are, however, various degrees and depths of
> interpretation, and we may have data at a more abstract level that is
> interpreted as meaning something less abstract, such as pointer readings
> of a barometer and air pressure. The pointer readings are signs of air
> pressure. Following C.S. Peirce, all signs have an interpretant. We can
> ignore this (abstraction) and deal with just pointer readings of a
> particular design of gauge, and take this to be the data, but even the
> pointer readings have an important contextual element, being of a
> particular kind of gauge, and that also determines an interpretant. Just
> pointer readings alone are not data, they are merely numbers (which also,
> of course, have an interpretant that is even more abstract.
> 
> So I think the data/information distinction needs to be made clear in each
> case, if it is to be used.
> 
> Note that I believe that there is information that is independent of mind,
> but the above points still hold once we start into issues of observation.
> My belief is based on an explanatory inference that must be tested (and
> also be useful in this context). I believe that the idea of mind
> independent information has been tested, and is useful, but I am not going
> to go into that further here.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> John
> 
> PS, please note that my university email was inadvertently wiped out, so I
> am currently using the above email, also the alias coll...@ncf.ca If
> anyone has wondered why their mail to me has been returned, this is why.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 2017/09/30 11:20 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
> 
> Dear Christophe and FIS Colleagues,
> 
> I agree with idea of meaning.
> 
> The only what I would to add is the next:
> 
> There are two types of reflections:
> 
> 1. Reflections without meaning called DATA;
> 
> 2. Reflections with meaning called INFORMATION.
> 
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
> 
> 
> --
> Krassimir Markov
> Director
> ITHEA Institute of Information Theories and Applications
> Sofia, Bulgaria
> presid...@ithea.org
> 

Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

[Guy A Hoelzer]

I agree with Arturo.  I understand information exclusively as matter and 
energy, and the diversity of their states through space/time.  What else it 
there?  The alternative would be to accept ‘information’ as merely an heuristic 
concept that helps us to communicate and make sense of our lives without the 
goal of identifying real phenomena.  I think the freedom to create and use such 
heuristic concepts is essential for many reasons, but we are constantly 
challenged as scientists with distinguishing between these terms and those we 
think and hope approximate real phenomena.  A grad student I worked with 
suggested the term “tool words” to label terms we recognize as mainly 
heuristic.  As an evolutionary biologist, I would suggest the term “fitness” 
has been a very useful heuristic term, but that “fitness” does not actually 
exist.  This statement might surprise or even put off many of my colleagues, 
which I think illustrates the problem caused by failing to make this 
distinction explicit.  As I have argued before, I think clearly distinguishing 
between ‘information’ and ‘meaning’ would be a good first step in this 
direction.

Regards,

Guy

Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
Department of Biology
University of Nevada Reno

Phone:  775-784-4860
Fax:  775-784-1302



On Sep 15, 2017, at 6:16 AM, 
tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it> wrote:

Dear FISers,
I'm sorry for bothering you,
but I start not to agree from the very first principles.

The only language able to describe and quantify scientific issues is 
mathematics.
Without math, you do not have observables, and information is observable.
Therefore, information IS energy or matter, and can be examined through 
entropies (such as., e.g., the Bekenstein-Hawking one).

And, please, colleagues, do not start to write that information is subjective 
and it depends on the observer's mind. This issue has been already tackled by 
the math of physics: science already predicts that information can be 
"subjective", in the MATHEMATICAL frameworks of both relativity and quantum 
dynamics' Copenhagen interpretation.
Therefore, the subjectivity of information is clearly framed in a TOTALLY 
physical context of matter and energy.

Sorry for my polemic ideas, but, if you continue to define information on the 
basis of qualitative (and not quantitative) science, information becomes 
metaphysics, or sociology, or psychology (i.e., branches with doubtful 
possibility of achieving knowledge, due to their current lack of math).



Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Farturotozzi.webnode.it%2F=01%7C01%7Choelzer%40unr.edu%7C97485102689b43316b2308d4fc3c1d76%7C523b4bfc0ebd4c03b2b96f6a17fd31d8%7C1=zC9isQ6gnnAJWc3ZKGqZh6YWPC4x7kiQ%2BAuKKa2WZ3g%3D=0>


Messaggio originale
Da: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
<pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es<mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>>
Data: 15/09/2017 14.13
A: "fis"<fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Ogg: [Fis] PRINCIPLES OF IS

Dear FIS Colleagues,

As promised herewith the "10 principles of information science". A couple of 
previous comments may be in order.
First, what is in general the role of principles in science? I was motivated by 
the unfinished work of philosopher Ortega y Gasset, "The idea of principle in 
Leibniz and the evolution of deductive theory" (posthumously published in 
1958). Our tentative information science seems to be very different from other 
sciences, rather multifarious in appearance and concepts, and cavalierly moving 
from scale to scale. What could be the specific role of principles herein? 
Rather than opening homogeneous realms for conceptual development, these 
information principles would appear as a sort of "portals" that connect with 
essential topics of other disciplines in the different organization layers, but 
at the same time they should try to be consistent with each other and provide a 
coherent vision of the information world.
And second, about organizing the present discussion, I bet I was too optimistic 
with the commentators scheme. In any case, for having a first glance on the 
whole scheme, the opinions of philosophers would be very interesting. In order 
to warm up the discussion, may I ask John Collier, Joseph Brenner and Rafael 
Capurro to send some initial comments / criticisms? Later on, if the 
commentators idea flies, Koichiro Matsuno and Wolfgang Hofkirchner would be 
very valuable voices to put a perspectival end to this info principles 
discussion (both attended the Madrid bygone FIS 1994 conference)...
But this is FIS list, unpredictable in between the frozen states and the 
chaotic states! So, everybody is invited to get ahead at his own, with the only 
customar

[Fis] _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: On mathematical theories and models in biology

[Guy A Hoelzer]

I personally consider metabolism to be at the core of what constitutes ‘life’, 
so the notion of autopoeisis is very attractive to me.  It is also possible 
that the richness of life as we know it depends on having metabolisms 
(activity), genomes (memory), and reproduction combined.  The reductionistic 
approach to singling out one of these three pillars of life as its essence may 
be futile.  However, I want to point out that the most reduced version of 
‘life’ I have seen was proposed by Terry Deacon in the concept he calls 
“autocells”.  Terry has made great contributions to FIS dealing with related 
topics, and I hope he will chime in here to describe his minimalist form of 
life, which is not cellular, does not have any metabolism or genetically 
encoded memory.  Autocells do, however, reproduce.

Regards,

Guy

On Mar 29, 2016, at 1:55 PM, Louis H Kauffman 
> wrote:

This is a reply to Plamen’s comment about autopoeisis. In their paper 
Maturana,Uribe and Varela give a working model (computer model) for autopoeisis.
It is very simple, consisting of a subtrate of nodal elements that tend to bond 
when in proximity, and a collection of catalytic nodal elements that promote 
bonding in their vicinity. The result of this dynamics is that carapaces of 
linked nodal elements form around the catalytic elements and these photo-cells 
tend to keep surviving the perturbations built into the system. This model 
shows that cells can arise from a very simple dynmamic geometric/topological 
substrate long before anything as sophisticated as DNA has happened.

On Mar 29, 2016, at 2:54 PM, Stanley N Salthe 
> wrote:

Plamen wrote:

 I begin to believe that the transition from abiotic to biotic structures, 
incl. Maturana-Varela.-Uribe’s autopoiesis may, really have some underlying 
matrix/”skeleton”/”programme” which has nothing in common with the nature of 
DNA, and that DNA and RNA as we know them today may have emerged as secondary 
or even tertiary “memory” of something underlying deeper below the 
microbiological surface. It is at least worth thinking in this direction. I do 
not mean necessarily the role of the number concept and Platonic origin of the 
universe, but something probably much more “physical”


S: An interesting recently published effort along these lines is:

Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and 
Theoretical Enquiry (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences 12) 
Springer

They seek a materialist understanding of biology as a system, attempting to 
refer to the genetic system as little as possible.

I have until very recently attempted to evade/avoid mechanistic thinking in 
regard to biology, but, on considering the origin of life generally while 
keeping Howard Pattee's thinking in mind, I have been struck by the notion that 
the origin of life (that is: WITH the genetic system) was the origin of 
mechanism in the universe.  Before that coding system, everything was mass 
action.  I think we still do not understand how this mechanism evolved.

STAN

On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 7:40 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov 
> wrote:

Dear Lou, Pedro and All,


I am going to present a few opportunistic ideas related to what was said before 
in this session. Coming back to Pivar’s speculative mechano-topological model 
of life excluding genetics I wish to turn your attention to another author with 
a similar idea but on a sound mathematical base, Davide Ambrosi with his resume 
at 
https://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/cim/events/cim-mathmod-workshop-2015_abstracts.pdf[uni-muenster.de]:
“Davide Ambrosi:
A role for mechanics in the growth, remodelling and morphogenesis of living 
systems  In the XX Century the interactions between mechanics in biology were 
much  biased by a bioengineering attitude: people were mainly interested in  
evaluating the state of stress that bones and tissues undergo in order to  
properly design prosthesis and devices. However in the last decades a new 
vision is emerging. "Mechano-biology" is changing the point of view, with 
respect to "Bio-mechanics", emphasizing the biological feedback. Cells, tissues 
and organs do not only deform when loaded: they reorganize, they duplicate, 
they actively produce dynamic patterns that apparently have multiple biological 
aims.
In this talk I will concentrate on two paradigmatic systems where the interplay 
between mechanics and biology is, in my opinion, particularly challenging: the 
homeostatic stress as a driver for 

Re: [Fis] New Year Lecture: Aftermath

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Terry,

I have used the term ‘perception’ in referring to in-formation that affects 
internal structure or dynamics.  This would contrast with forms of potential 
information that might pass through the system without being ‘perceived’.  For 
example, we have a finite number of mechanisms we call senses, each of which is 
sensitive to particular modes of information we encounter in our environment, 
but we are not able to perceive every form of information that we encounter 
(e.g., UV light).  I think you are using the term ‘interpretation’ to describe 
the same thing.  Do you agree?  Do you think the notions of perception and 
interpretation are effectively the same thing?

Cheers,

Guy

Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
Department of Biology
University of Nevada Reno

Phone:  775-784-4860
Fax:  775-784-1302
hoel...@unr.edumailto:hoel...@unr.edu

On Apr 24, 2015, at 10:22 AM, Terrence W. DEACON 
dea...@berkeley.edumailto:dea...@berkeley.edu wrote:

Hi Pedro,

Indeed, you capture a fundamental point of my work. I entirely agree with your 
comment about living processes and their internal informative organization. 
The three exceedingly simple molecular model systems (forms of autogenesis) 
that I discuss toward the end of the paper were intended to exemplify a minimal 
life-like unit that—because of its self-reconstituting and self-repairing 
features—could both exemplify an origin of life transition and a first simplest 
system exhibiting interpretive competence. It is only because these autogenic 
systems respond to disruption of their internal organizational coherence that 
they can be said to also interpret aspects of their environment with respect to 
this. My goal in this work is to ultimately provide a physico-chemical 
foundation for a scientific biosemiotics, which is currently mostly exemplified 
by analogies to human-level semiotic categories.

Thank you for your thoughtful comments and your mediation of these discussions.

Sincerely, Terry

On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:34 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan 
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.esmailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:
Dear Terry and colleagues,

I hope you don't mind if I send some suggestions publicly. First, thank you for 
the aftermath, it provides appropriate closure to a very intense discussion 
session. Second, I think you have encapsulated very clearly an essential point 
(at least in my opinion):

Among these givens is the question of what is minimally necessary for
 a system or process to be interpretive, in the sense of being able to utilize 
present
intrinsic physical properties of things to refer to absent or
displaced properties or phenomena. This research question is ignorable
when it is possible to assume human or even animal interpreters as
part of the system one is analyzing. At some point, however, it
becomes relevant to not only be more explicit about what is being
assumed, but also to explain how this interpretive capacity could
possibly originate in a universe where direct contiguity of causal
influence is the rule.

My suggestion concerns the absence phenomenon (it also has appeared in some 
previous discussion in this list --notably from Bob's). You imply that there is 
an entity capable  of dynamically building upon  an external absences, OK quite 
clear,  but what about internal absences? I mean at the origins of 
communication there could be the sensing of the internal-- lets call it 
functional voids, needs, gaps, deficiencies, etc. Cellularly there are some 
good arguments about that, even in the 70's there was a metabolic code 
hypothesis crafted on the origins of cellular signaling. For instance, one of 
the most important environmental  internal detections concerns cAMP, which 
means you/me are in an energy trouble... some more evolutionary arguments can 
be thrown.  Above all, this idea puts the life cycle and its self-production 
needs in the center of communication, and in the very origins of the 
interpretive capabilities. Until now I have not seen much reflections around 
the life cycle as the true provider of both communications and meanings, maybe 
it conduces to new avenues of thought interesting to explore...

All the best!
--Pedro


Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Dear FIS colleagues,
Herewith the comments received from Terry several weeks ago. As I said
yesterday, the idea is to properly conclude that session, not to restart
the discussion. Of course, scholarly comments are always welcome, but
conclusively and not looking for argumentative rounds. Remember that in
less than ten days we will have a new session on info science and library
science. best --Pedro

--

Retrospective comments on the January 2015 FIS discussion

Terrence Deacon (dea...@berkeley.edumailto:dea...@berkeley.edu)

During the bulk of my career since the early 1980s I studied brain
organization with a particular focus on its role in the production and
interpretation of communication

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Steps to a theory of reference significance] Terry Deacon

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Terry,

I have a question about your ‘PS’.  I think of MEP as being constrained by 
potentials and a limited set of material opportunities (the adjacent 
possibilities).  I think of it as a thermodynamic version of natural selection 
in which some alternative states are thermodynamically favored over others, but 
this does not guarantee that dissipation will proceed to completion or that the 
particular alternative that absolutely generates the most efficient or 
effective dissipation will always be the manifested outcome (if there are a 
number of similarly optimal paths available).  Contingency on idiosyncratic 
configurations within and in the neighborhood of a system might lead the system 
to follow a variety of alternative paths.  Would you argue that autogenesis is 
not an MEP process from this somewhat fuzzy perspective?

Cheers,

Guy

Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
Department of Biology
University of Nevada Reno

Phone:  775-784-4860
Fax:  775-784-1302
hoel...@unr.edu

 On Jan 9, 2015, at 3:35 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es 
 wrote:
 
 Message from Terry Deacon
 
  Original Message 
 Subject:  Re: [Fis] Steps to a theory of reference  significance
 Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2015 03:32:22 +0100
 From: Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu
 To:   Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
 References:   54ad3798.7060...@aragon.es 54ae7ca4.9080...@aragon.es
 
 
 
 This very brief reply should be routed to the FIS list please...
 
 One response: My choice of autogenesis is motivated by ...
 1. It is the simplest dynamical system I have been able to imagine that 
 exhibits the requisite properties required for an interpretive system (i.e. 
 one that can assign reference and significance to a signal due to intrinsic 
 properties alone - that is these features are independent of any extrinsic 
 perspective). A simple organism is far too complex. As a result it is 
 possible to make misleading assumptions about what we don't account for 
 (allowing us to inadvertently sneak in assumptions about what information is 
 and is not - for example just assuming that DNA molecule are intrinsically 
 informational). As I note when introducing this model, developing a simplest 
 but not too simple model system is the key to devising clear physical 
 principles.
 2. Autogenesis is not the same as autopoiesis (which is only a description of 
 presumed requirements for life) rather autogenesis is a well-described 
 empirically testable molecular dynamic, that is easily model able in all 
 aspects. Autopoiesis fit with the class of models assuming that simple 
 autocatalysis is sufficient and then simply adds (by assertion) the 
 (non-realized) assumption that autopoiesis can somehow be causally closed and 
 unitary, whereas in fact autocatalytic systems are intrinsically dissipative* 
 and subject to error catastrophe. More importantly, the assumption about 
 coherent finite unity and internal synergy is the critical one, and so it 
 needs to be the one feature that is explicitly modeled in order to understand 
 these aspects of information. 3. The self-regulating self-repairing 
 end-directed dynamic of autogenesis provides a disposition to preserve a 
 reference target state (even when its current state is far from it). This 
 serves as the necessary baseline for comparative assessment, without which 
 reference and significance cannot be defined because these are intrinsically 
 relativistic informational properties (there is a loose analogy here to the 
 3rd law of thermodynamics and the relativistic nature of thermodynamic 
 entropy).
 
 * PS: Autogenesis is also not a Maximim Entropy Production process because it 
 halts dissipation before its essential self-preserving constraints are 
 degraded and therefore does not exhaust the gradient(s) on which its 
 persistence depends.
 
 — Terry
 
 On Thu, Jan 8, 2015 at 1:48 PM, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es 
 mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:
 
   Dear Terry and colleagues,
 
   Thanks a lot for the opening text! It is a well crafted Essay full
   of very detailed contents. My impression is that the microphysics
   of information has been solved elegantly --at least at the level of
   today's relevant knowledge-- with your work and the works of related
   authors, one of them Karl Friston, who could be linked as a
   complementary approach to yours (in particular his recent Life as
   we know it, Royal Society Interface Journal, 10: 20130475). His
   Bayesian approach to life's organization, coupled with (variational)
   free energy minimization principle, conduces to the emergence of
   homeostasis and a simple form of autopoiesis, as well as the
   organization of perception/action later on. Thus, quite close to
   your approach on autogenic systems. About the different sections of
   the Essay, the very detailed points you deal with in section 4
   (steps to a formalization of reference

Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi All,

Like many here, I am very interested in the notion of neuroinformation and the 
contrast between information as static pattern or temporal process.  I want to 
suggest a way to think of the static and process views of information as 
identical concepts.  I take the static view to be something like the existence 
of a physical gradient or contrast in state between proximate spaces.  The 2nd 
law of thermodynamics tells us that all such gradients will tend to bread down 
(disorganize) over time.  Therefore, maintenance of static information requires 
a process.  This idea could apply nicely to neuroinformation.  For example, 
memories can fade if they are not accessed occasionally.  From this point of 
view, static contrasts and the processes that maintain them cannot be 
separated, much like pattern and process cannot be separated in the dissipative 
systems of Prigogine.

Regards,

Guy

Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
Department of Biology
University of Nevada Reno

Phone:  775-784-4860
Fax:  775-784-1302
hoel...@unr.edumailto:hoel...@unr.edu

On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:57 AM, Krassimir Markov 
mar...@foibg.commailto:mar...@foibg.com wrote:

Dear Bob,
I think, there is no conflict between two points of view – information may be a 
process and it may be a static depending of what kind of reflection it is.
For instance, we reflect the world around:
- as static - by photos, art images, sculptures, etc.;
- as dynamic - by movies, theater plays, ballet, etc.;
- and, at the end, by both types – by static text which creates dynamical 
imaginations in our consciousness.
Friendly regards
Krassimir

PS: This is my second post for this week. So, I say: Goodbye to the next one!



From: Bob Loganmailto:lo...@physics.utoronto.ca
Sent: Thursday, December 04, 2014 3:54 PM
To: Joseph Brennermailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?

Dear all - I support Joseph's remarks and would suggest that information in 
general is a process that unfortunately is formulated as a noun. Inspired by 
Bucky Fuller's I think I am a verb I suggest that Information is a verb It is 
a verb because it describes a process. Although that solves one problem we need 
to be able to describe a set of signs that have the potential to initiate the 
process of informing through interpretation. I would not suggest we create 
another word but recognize that the word information has many meanings and that 
when it is describing a process it has a verb-like quality to it and when it 
describes a set of sign that have the potential to be interpreted and hence 
become information it is acting as a noun. I would also suggest that a simple 
definition of the term information is not possible because its meaning is so 
context dependent. This is true of all words but even more so for information. 
For those that agree with my sentiments the above is information and for those 
that do not it is nonsense. My best wishes to both groups,  Bob Logan
__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/loganhttp://www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publicationshttp://www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications








On 2014-12-04, at 6:40 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

Dear Dr. Isiegas,

I will add my support to the extended concept of information that inheres in 
the work of Robert Ulanowicz and John Collier. I would just add that I like to 
call it information-as-process, to call attention to its 'structure' being 
dynamic, with individual neurones involved in a cyclic (better spiral or 
sinusoidal) movement between states of activation and inhibition. I have 
ascribed an extension of logic to this form of alternating actual and potential 
states in complex processes at all levels of reality.

Best wishes,

Joseph B.

- Original Message - From: Robert E. Ulanowicz 
u...@umces.edumailto:u...@umces.edu
To: Carolina Isiegas cisie...@gmail.commailto:cisie...@gmail.com
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 6:30 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?


Dear Dr. Isiegas:

I envision neuroinformation as the mutual information of the neuronal
network where synaptic connections are weighted by the frequencies of
discharge between all pairs of neurons. This is directly analogous to a
network of trophic exchanges among an ecosystem, as illustrated in
http://people.biology.ufl.edu/ulan/pubs/SymmOvhd.PDF.

Please note that this measure is different from the conventional
sender-channel-receiver format of communications theory. It resembles more
the structural information inhering in the neuronal network. John
Collier (also a FISer) calls such information enformation to draw
attention to its different nature.

With best wishes for success,

Bob Ulanowicz

Re: [Fis] Informational Bookkeeping

[Guy A Hoelzer]

I have never understood the process of telomere shortening and this is a 
tantalizing idea.  What factor might drive the evolution of a bookkeeping 
mechanism like telomere shortening in cells?  I ask my question this way to 
intentionally avoid the assumption that it must represent an adaptation 
benefitting cell fitness.  It might be an adaptation of sorts, or it might be, 
for example, a side effect of other cellular processes that are critical for 
cellular function.

Cheers,

Guy

On Sep 9, 2014, at 12:09 AM, Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com 
wrote:

 Hello,
 
 One process that could be viewed as a form of bookeeping in cells is 
 telomeric shortening subsequent to cell division. Telomeric shortening, it 
 seems, is related to the diminishing life capital of each living cells. 
 Just as our bank accounts diminish with spending.
 
 This could be a good example where information is somewhat seperated from 
 energy. Indeed, the cells' internal energy do not seem to diminish with 
 each cell division. What seems to be reduced is the potentia of each cell 
 to live a long life. This potentia must be related to the cell's capacity to 
 adapt to its environment which in turn could be related to the its 
 informational content...It's just an idea.
 
 Best
 
 Pridi  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - Mail original -
 De: Raquel del Moral rdelmoral.i...@aragon.es
 À: fis@listas.unizar.es
 Envoyé: Lundi 8 Septembre 2014 14:11:48
 Objet: Re: [Fis] Informational Bookkeeping
 
 Dear Pedro,
 
 The concept of bookkeeping looks very interesting for biology, however, 
 I can't see clearly how to apply it below the level of nervous systems. 
 Counting maybe found in most biomolecules, but really registering in a 
 book keeping manner is possible in the lower levels? e.g. unicellulars. 
 Do you think that they modify their behaviour after checking their own 
 bookkeeping registers?
 
 Just this brief comment!
 
 Best,
 Raquel
 
 
 El 05/09/2014 14:14, Pedro Marijuan escribió:
 Dear FIS colleagues,
 
 A very interesting comment by Bob about energy as a bookkeeping device
 in the other discussion track motivates these rough reflections.
 
 Actually, within the culture of mechanics (following Frank Wilczek)
 energy appears as the more reliable concept, beyond its cousins force
 and mass. Mechanics, like most scientific theories, finally is but a
 method to count upon variable aspects of simplified phenomena and
 provide inter-subjective objectivity(?). Numbers are due to our mental
 counting operations; and concepts, formulas and theories become
 bookkeeping devices to obtain more complex counting that dovetail with
 more complex phenomena. That our mental counting dovetails with nature's
 pretended counting is what the experimental side of science tries to
 establish. It becomes of great merit that energy constructs such as
 those mentioned by Bob do their bookkeeping accurately, in spite of
 their intrinsic limitations.
 
 My concern with the views expressed in the other track is that
 informational bookkeeping appears to be rather different from the
 mechanical physical bookkeeping or counting. There are new aspects not
 covered by the extensive and inflexible mechanical-dynamic counting,
 and which are essential to the new informational organizations we are
 discovering --and practicing around-- and to the new worldview that
 presumably we should search and promote. Is there bookkeeping in life?
 Do molecules count? Do bacteria or unicellulars bookkeep--and organisms?
 And complex brains? And individuals? And social groups? And companies
 and markets? And cities, regions and countries?
 
 Admittedly it is a potpourri; but yes, there are some clear instances
 where quite explicit a bookkeeping is maintained. It may be about
 signaling flows, about self production stuff flows, or about their
 inextricable mixing--involving whatever aspects. But these bookkeepings
 are made with attentional flexibility and different closure
 procedures that allow for new forms of compositional hierarchy
 (informational) not found in the mechanical. They are adaptive, they
 recognize, they are productively engaged in life cycles where the
 meaning is generated, they co-create new existential realms... In our
 own societies, the  exaggerated importance of new informational devices
 (historically: numbers, alphabets, books, calculi, computers, etc.)
 derives from their facilitation and acceleration of all the enormous
 bookkeeping activities that subtend the social complexity around.
 
 Who knows, focusing on varieties of bookkeeping might be quite 
 productive!
 
 best ---Pedro
 
 
 *Pedro C. Marijuán Fernández*
 Dirección de Investigación
 
 Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud (IACS)
 Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria Aragón (IIS Aragón)
 Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
 Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta 1
 50009 Zaragoza
 Tfno. +34 976 71 

Re: [Fis] Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT.

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Krassimir et al.,

I like your view very much with one exception.  I think it confounds 
information with meaning, which I think can lead to problems.  For example, I 
could give two people the same message written on your identical pieces of 
paper.  It is written in English, but only one of the readers understands 
English.  My message might be meaningful to one reader, but it cannot be 
meaningful to the other.  I would argue that both pieces of paper contain the 
same information.  In other words, for me it is important to recognize 
information as existing in the absence of its appreciation or interpretation.  
Perception and interpretation are generated by an agent, so they are not direct 
representations of the information and (perhaps universally?) add some error or 
distortion in the process.  I would suggest a revision to what you wrote as 
follows:

Energy AND INFORMATION are objective phenomena.  PERCEPTION AND MEANING are 
subjective phenomena.

Can anybody see a problem with this form of the statement?

Regards,

Guy Hoelzer

On Aug 25, 2014, at 11:51 AM, Krassimir Markov 
mar...@foibg.commailto:mar...@foibg.com wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

Thank you for comments and remarks.
Many thanks to Mark for his interesting post.
Really, the correspondence between energy and information is fundamental and 
needs to be clearly explained.

I want to present my point of view because it is different from other ones.

It is clear, the energy is needed to create a reflection.
Without energy no internal changes (reflections) in the entities may be 
realized.
This means that energy is needed to realize reflection which may become 
information for given subject.
Without energy information is impossible.

But the opposite correspondence does not exist.
Energy does not depend on information.
It exists in reality without subjects’ “decisions”.
Energy is objective phenomenon , Information is subjective phenomenon.

Let see a simple example.

Let we have two equal pieces of paper.
They contain some energy, let assume that its quantities are equal in both 
pieces.
In other words, for instance, if we burn these pieces they will release 
practically the same quantities of energy.
If I have such piece of paper  and you have another such one, we may exchange 
them as equivalent without any additional conditions.

Let now the pieces of paper are painted with some colors.
The paint will add some additional energy to pieces.
Let assume that again it is in equal quantities in both pieces.
Again, we may exchange pieces as equivalent without any additional conditions.

At the end, let pieces of paper are painted as follow:
- the first piece is painted as USD 100 (one hundred dollars)
- the second one is pained as RUB 100 (one hundred rubles)
i.e. let have two real banknotes.

Now, we will not agree to exchange these pieces of paper without additional 
conditions.
As it is shown by Bloomberg, on 08/25/2014, 12.59:59, 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDRUB:CUR)
US DOLLAR-RUSSIAN RUBLE Exchange Rate is:
Price of 1 USD in RUB is 36.1646,
i.e now the first piece of paper is equivalent to more than 36 pieces of second 
one.
Because of information for the subjects, the pieces became different 
notwithstanding that the energy quantities are equal in both pieces.
The subjective decisions have important role in this case.

In conclusion, the energy and information are different phenomena – objective 
and subjective, respectively.

Energy may be explained by triple (see Mark’s nice explanations about triples!) 
: (source, recipient, transition) = (x, y, f) = y=f(x) .
Information has to be explained by quadruple (source, recipient, evidence, 
subject). Here, it is important to remember Mark’s “Infological System”  as 
Subject.
The triples are object of study by Mathematics, quadruples – by Informatics.

Friendly regards
Krassimir





From: Stanley N Salthemailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 4:51 PM
To: fismailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

Bob wrote:

Recall that some thermodynamic variables, especially work functions like
Helmholz  Gibbs free energies and exergy all are tightly related to
information measures. In statistical mechanical analogs, for example, the
exergy becomes RT times the mutual information among the molecules

S: So, the more organized, the more potential available energy.

I happen to be a radical who feels that the term energy is a construct
with little ontological depth.

S: I believe it has instead ontological breadth!

It is a bookkeeping device (a nice one, of course, but bookkeeping nonetheless).
It was devised to maintain the Platonic worldview. Messrs. Meyer  Joule simply
gave us the conversion factors to make it look like energy is constant.

S: It IS constant in the adiabatic boxes used to measure it.

*Real* energy is always in decline -- witness what happens to the work 
functions I
just mentioned.

S

Re: [Fis] Physics of computing

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Greetings All,

While I like to think that I am not limited to reductionistic thinking, I find 
it difficult to understand any perspective on information that is not limited 
to physical manifestation. I would appreciate further justification for a 
non-physicalist perspective on information.  How can something exist in the 
absence of physical manifestation?  I am not interested in a metaphysical 
perspective here, which might have heuristic value even if it is not 'real'.  
The issue of 'content' and 'meaning' strikes me as entirely physical, so 
mentioning those issues doesn't help me understand what non-physical 
information might be.  I would say that if information is physically manifested 
by contrasts (gradients, negentropy, …), then content or meaning refers to the 
internal dynamics of complex systems induced by interaction between the system 
and the physically manifested information.  If there is no affect on internal 
dynamics, then the system did not 'perceive' the information.  If the 
information merely causes a transient fluctuation of the internal dynamics, 
then the perceived information was not meaningful to the system.  At least this 
is a sketch of my view that I hope illustrates why the notions of 'content' and 
'meaning' does not depart the physical realm for me.

Regards,

Guy

From: Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez 
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.esmailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 04:19:31 -0700
To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science 
fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Physics of computing

Dear discussants,

I tend to disagree with the motto information is physical if taken too 
strictly. Obviously if we look downwards it is OK, but in the upward 
direction it is different. Info is not only physical then, and the dimension of 
self-construction along the realization of life cycle has to be entered. Then 
the signal, the info, has content and meaning. Otherwise if we insist only 
in the physical downward dimension we have just conventional computing/ info 
processing. My opinion is that the notion of absence is crucial for advancing 
in the upward, but useless in the downward.
By the way, I already wrote about info and the absence theme in a 1994 or 1995 
paper in BioSystems...

best

---Pedro



walter.riof...@terra.com.pemailto:walter.riof...@terra.com.pe escribió:

Thanks John and Kevin to update issues in information, computation, energy and 
reality.

 I would like point out to other articles morefocused in how coherence and 
entanglement are used by living systems (far from thermal equilibrium):



Engel G.S., Calhoun T.R., Read E.L., Ahn T.K., Mancal T., Cheng Y.C., 
Blankenship R.E., Fleming G.R. (2007) Evidence for wavelike energy transfer 
through quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems. Nature, 446(7137): 782-786.



Collini E., Scholes G. (2009) Coherent intrachain energy in migration in a 
conjugated polymer at room temperature.  Science, vol. 323 No. 5912 pp. 369-373.



Gauger E.M., Rieper E., Morton J.J.L., Benjamin S.C., Vedral V. (2011) 
Sustained Quantum Coherence and Entanglement in the Avian Compass. Phys. Rev. 
Lett., 106: 040503.



Cia, J. et al, (2009)  Dynamic entanglement in oscillating molecules.  
arXiv:0809.4906v1 [quant-ph]





Sincerely,





Walter








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Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Telf: 34 976 71 3526 ( 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.esmailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.eshttp://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
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Re: [Fis] Meaning Information Theory ---From Gavin

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Gavin,

I am having trouble following your implicit argument about meaning information 
theory.  I do understand your complaint about evidence, tests, corroboration 
and corresponding logic and mathematics, although I'm not sure I agree that 
things are so bleak.  The 'implicit' part I detect (please let me know if I am 
wrong) is that you seem to be confounding meaningfulness (semantics) with a 
physical basis for information.  I personally embrace the notion that 
information can only exist as physically manifested structure and process 
(negentropy), but I don't connect meaningfulness to the existence of 
information.  I see meaning as something that might or might not become 
attached to information when it is perceived.  In fact, I think Shannon was 
focused on meaning, rather than the physicality of information.  He was, after 
all, working on codes and code-breaking.  Are you indeed tying physical 
manifestation of information to meaningfulness?  If so, why?

Regards,

Guy

From: Gavin Ritz garr...@xtra.co.nzmailto:garr...@xtra.co.nz
Reply-To: Gavin Ritz garr...@xtra.co.nzmailto:garr...@xtra.co.nz
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 15:33:01 -0700
To: 'Christophe Menant' 
christophe.men...@hotmail.frmailto:christophe.men...@hotmail.fr, 
Foundations of Information Science Information Science 
fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Meaning Information Theory ---From Gavin

Hi there Christophe
Thank you for your papers I have had a look through them to identify the 
propositions and arguments.

And I guess this is what my contention is none of this is based on any 
evidence, tests, corroboration and corresponding logic and mathematics.

It does not look like we are any further down the road that Ogden  Richards 
(the Meaning of Meaning-1923) or Plotkin (Darwin Machines 1993) 70 years later.

I have delved into many of the original papers around information and cannot 
find any corroborative evidence or propositions with logical arguments that can 
highlight the concept of information per se as presented by the meaning 
informationists(those that are not proposing Shannon’s theory).

If we are going into the concept of meaning that would include, human 
knowledge, learning and creativity (is learning acreative act?) etc.

Your final conclusions are that you need some notion of constraint, possibly 
the co-limit, subobject classifier, object-arrow, associativity, and identity 
of Mathematical Category Theory.

Afterthought, the concept of meaning information also includes this concept of 
memes presented by Dawkins in Chapter 11 in the Selfish Gene, there is not on 
scrap of evidence or tests, or any factual data to conclude that the concept of 
memes are anything but a conjecture.



Dear Gavin,
As you find some interest for a Theory of Meaningful Information, it may be 
pertinent to recall a systemic approach to meaning generation:
When a system submitted to a constraint (stay alive, avoid obstacle, ...) 
receives from its environment an information that has a connection with the 
constraint , it generates a meaning (a meaningful information) that willl be 
used to implement an action aimed at satisfying the constraint.
It’s this I don’t understand, where is the evidence and the tests to prove this 
proposition. How do we know that this is what a biological system does? Where 
is the evidence?

I have searched to find evidence for this statement  “receives information from 
its environment”. It just cannot be proved, plainly there’s something wrong 
here.

Regards
Gavin

The approach makes available a simple Meaning Generator System applicable to 
all cases where you can define the system and the constraint. Is not Shannon 
information theory. It links with Dretske and philosophy of mind. It has been 
used in several evolutionary approaches.
2003 Entropy paper on subject: http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf
2010 short paper: http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf
Part of IACAP 2011 presentation: http://cogprints.org/7584/
Best
Christophe

Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 18:22:08 +0200
From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.esmailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
To: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin

Message from Gavin Ritz



On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Gavin Ritz 
garr...@xtra.co.nzmailto:garr...@xtra.co.nz wrote:


Stan, John list members

I have had a number of off list email dialogue with list members, from this
list and others.

There seems to be a group of listers that have a Theory of Meaningful
Information (It’s not Shannon’s mathematical Information theory), it’s all
about meaning and electrical communication (I guess in this case
neurological).

The common links seem to be Dawkins, Dennett, Searle and a few others.

Does anyone have any clear propositions, with their logical arguments,
evidence. tests, 

Re: [Fis] meaningful information

[Guy A Hoelzer]

This is an interesting question.  What is the meaning of meaning?  I would
define as something like the affects of perception on a perceiving system.
Once a system has been affected it might change its behavior, but I would
hesitate to equate a behavioral response directly to the meaning of a
perceived signal.  While your definition has the advantage of external
observation, I think behavior is too far removed from internal
meaningfulness.  I wouldn't be comfortable, for example, saying that
Skinner's bell meant salivation to his dog subjects.

Regards,

Guy


On 7/20/11 11:47 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@semeiosis.org wrote:

 
 There is a lot of concept overloading in the community involving the term
 meaning. So it would help me if you and Antony could just give a one
 sentence definition of the term. For example, for me:
 
 meaning = the behavior that is the product of apprehending a sign.
 
 Which is an extreme pragmatic definition in the spirit of Peirce. Note that
 this definition excludes, or rather characterizes differently, descriptive
 sentences of the form The dog runs toward the house. The meaning of which is
 not that the dog runs toward the house, but the behavior of the apprehender.
 
 With respect,
 Steven
 
 
 On Jul 20, 2011, at 10:41 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
 
 Dear colleagues,
 
 Some of you may be interested in this context in my forthcoming article ³
 Meaning as a sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and
 simulation of the communication of knowledge and meaning, Social Science
 Information 50(3-4) (2011) 1-23. In preprint available at
 http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1011/1011.3244.pdf .
 
 I argue that the dynamics of meaning are very different from those of
 information.
 
 Best wishes,
 Loet
 
 
 Loet Leydesdorff
 Professor, University of Amsterdam
 Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
 Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
 Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
 
 From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
 Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan
 Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2011 1:38 PM
 To: fis@listas.unizar.es
 Subject: Re: [Fis] meaningful inforamtion
 
 Thanks, Anthony, for the info on your book. As you will see during future
 discussion sessions (currently we are in the vacation pause) some parties in
 this list maintain positions not far away from your own views. In our archive
 you can check accumulated mails about the matter you propose --e.g.
 discussions during the last spring. But I think you are right that the whole
 biological scope of information has been rarely discussed.  best wishes
 ---Pedro
 
 FIS website and discussions archives: see http://infoscience-fis.unizar.es/
 
 
 aread...@verizon.net escribió:
 I emailed an earlier version of the following contribution to the listserve a
 few days ago and am interested in finding out if it is suitable  for
 dissemination and, if os, when it might be included. My main interest is in
 promoting discussion about the approach it takes to dealing with the
 observer-dependent aspects of information.
 
 My book  Meaningful Information: The BridgeBetween Biology, Brain and
 Behavior' has just been published by Springer. Itintroduces a radically new
 way of thinking about information and the importantrole it plays in living
 systems. Thiså opens up new avenues for exploring howcells and organisms
 change and adapt, since the ability to detect and respondto meaningful
 information is the key that enables them to receive their geneticheritage,
 regulate their internal milieu, and respond to changes in their
 environment.The types of meaningful information that different species and
 different celltypes are able to detect are finely matched to the ecosystems
 in which theylive, for natural selection has shaped what they need to know to
 functioneffectively within them. Biological detection and response systems
 range fromthe chemical configurations that govern genes and cell life to the
 relativelysimple tropisms that guide single-cell organisms, the rudimentary
 nervoussystems of invertebrates, and the complex neuronal structures of
 mammals andprimates. The scope of meaningful information that can be detected
 andresponded to reaches its peak in our own species, as exemplified by our
 specialabilities in language, cognition, emotion, and consciousness, all of
 which areexplored within this new framework.
 
 The book's home page can be found at:
 http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/evolutionary+%26+developmental+biology/
 book/978-1-4614-0157-5
 
 I am eager tofind out what members think about it.
 
 Anthony Reading
 
 
 
 ___
 fis mailing list
 fis@listas.unizar.es
 https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
 
 
 
 -- 
 -
 Pedro C. Marijuán
 Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
 Instituto 

Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin, Colophon

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Mark,

The only part that I take exception to is at the end of your colophon.  
Specifically, I disagree with the statement “it is evident that to consider 
that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts principles of 
science.”  I see contrast, or difference, as fundamental to the concept of 
information.  All ‘things’ must be bounded such that there is a distinction 
between the inside and outside of the thing; therefore I don’t see how it is 
possible or reasonable for anything not to be information.

Regards,

Guy


On 6/7/11 6:34 PM, Mark Burgin mbur...@math.ucla.edu wrote:



Discussion colophon



  Dear all participants of the discussion (active and passive),



  I would like to express my gratitude to Pedro for asking me to start a 
discussion about basic problems of information theory and methodology, in which 
many qualified researchers have participated. I also appreciate efforts of all 
active participants of the discussion, who shared their interesting ideas 
related to information theory and practice, and especially to Joseph Brenner, 
who expertly distilled communication of different participants separating more 
or less direct answer to the suggested questions. As these questions have 
quintessential importance for information theory and methodology, I would like 
to suggest tentative answers to these questions, giving arguments in support of 
this approach.

Question 1. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict distinction 
between information as a phenomenon and information measures as quantitative or 
qualitative characteristics of information?

 All educated people understand that a person and her/his measure, for example 
height, are essentially different entities. It’s impossible to reduce a person 
to one measure. The same is true for subatomic particles and other physical, 
chemical and biological objects. However, when it comes to information, even 
qualified researchers don’t feel a necessity to make a strict distinction 
between information as a phenomenon and information measures, although there 
are infinitely many information measures. We can often hear and read such 
expressions as “Shannon information” or “Fisher information”.



Question 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not encompassed by 
the general theory of information (GTI)?

  A grounded answer to this question depends what we understand when we 
say/write “types or kinds of information”, that is, on information definitions. 
If we take intrinsic information definitions, then the answer is YES as it is 
demonstrated in the book (Burgin, 2010).

  At the same time, if we take all information definitions suggested by 
different people, then the answer is NO because some of those definitions 
define not information but something else, e.g., information measure or 
knowledge or data. There are also other “definitions” that actually define 
nothing. Naturally, these definitions and related concepts (if there are any) 
are not encompassed by the GTI. However, GTI organizes all existing knowledge 
on information and information processes in one unified system, allowing one to 
discern information from other phenomena.

Question 3. Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction between 
information and an information carrier?

 In the mundane life, it is possible not to make a distinction between 
information and an information carrier. For instance, we do not make 
distinctions between an envelope with a letter and the letter itself, calling 
both things “a letter”, or between a book with a novel and the novel itself, 
calling both things “a novel”.

 At the same time, a proper theory of information demands to make a distinction 
between information and an information carrier, especially, because any thing 
contains information and thus, is an information carrier, but it is evident 
that to consider that everything IS information is unreasonable and contradicts 
principles of science.



 I would appreciate any feedback to the ideas from this e-mail.



 Sincerely,

Mark



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Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: [Fwd: Info Theory]--From John Collier

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Gavin,

I’m not quite sure how to respond as you didn’t ask a particular question.  
Here are my thoughts about your points.

Waves are indeed about energy, which I think fits nicely into the scheme I 
described regarding information.  I suggested a very simple definition of 
information as a contrast.  Physical gradients provide a nice example of 
contrast between different conditions on either side of a gradient.  Energy 
generically fits this view whether you think about it in either particle (e.g., 
photon) or wave form.  I am not a physicist, but I think energy always exists 
as some sort of localized concentration with a gradient between regions of 
higher energy and regions of lower energy.  In this sense, energy can always be 
considered as a spatially configured pattern, and thus as information.

I also agree that flows are about entropy production, and they must always be 
channeled in a way that requires a structural configuration.   This is how I 
think about self-organizing dissipative systems.  Flows cross gradients and 
dissipate those gradients in the process, which diminishes the contrast and 
thus the amount of information exhibited by the gradient.  I would describe the 
emergent structure of such systems as information captured by the system, or 
transferred to the system, as the gradient is diminished.  I see this as an 
alternative way to say that the system captures free energy from the flow and 
uses it to construct itself.  I generally see information as the inverse of 
entropy, so the existence of information goes hand-in-hand with the existence 
of entropy.  Whether information/entropy exist or are just heuristic concepts 
is an issue for others to debate.  I do think, though, that it IS related to 
baryonic matter.

I hope this helps to make more sense of my previous post.

Regards,

Guy


On 2/4/11 4:22 PM, Gavin Ritz garr...@xtra.co.nz wrote:

Hi there Guy

I'm at a loss still about information you mention below.

If one talks about waves, light, sound these are all energy (frequency) 
concepts. Chemistry and physics are really only about energy, entropy and 
transduction's and conversions of energy in one form or the other of matter.

Any flows of available energy are more than likely entropy production or free 
energy. (Gibbs type free energy)

The only codes, and notations are the ones we give it, it is of our own making, 
if information does have an existence then its more than likely related to non 
baryonic matter.

After all we are making assumptions about a universe with only a less than 4% 
understanding of its contents.

Regards
Gavin


Greetings All,

I want to second Joseph’s claim that something may be transferred as 
information, even if Stan’s “stuff” itself is not transferred.  Waves, for 
example, can often pass from one medium into another without a concomitant 
transfer of stuff, and the form of the wave may be changed when it enters the 
new medium.  The energy of the wave, which can generally be measured by its 
physical manifestations (e.g., particle densities, free energy concentrations, 
local gradients and potentials...) may be sustained in a temporally and 
spatially coherent way as it flows.  I personally like to think about 
information as contrast, such as with local gradients, and in this sense we 
might say that it it the information itself that flows into a recipient.  
Interpretation, then, involves the change in form that can occur in the new 
medium.  Of course, information, like waves, are not always able to penetrate 
any new medium or system.  It can be damped out in some transitions, and 
amplified through resonance in others.

I think this perspective bridges some of the seemingly disparate views that 
have been voiced over the last week.

Regards,

Guy


On 1/31/11 9:29 AM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

Dear All,

In coming to Krassimir's defense, I do not wish to abrogate the science of the 
last 100-150 years, but to suggest only that the appeal to authority, here as 
elsewhere, should not block criticism. The standard meaning of information is 
also restricted in some senses.

The dimension that Krassimir and his source are pointing to is not just 
poetic, but describes real interactions between sender and receiver. However, I 
would criticize absolute statements such as nothing is transferred. In my 
approach to logic (which I hope John includes in his various logics), it is 
not necessary to make an absolute distinction between the concept of 
information and its causal and material properties. They are dialectically 
linked.

On the other hand, I think it is important to emphasize, as Krassimir does, 
that there are properties of information that cannot be measured. This point, 
and the others above, will not constitute an entire, monolithic Information 
Theory, nor its entire essence. But they should be taken into account as part 
of the common meanings of various theories which I, /pace/ John :-) find 

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: [Fwd: Info Theory]--From John Collier

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Greetings All,

I want to second Joseph’s claim that something may be transferred as 
information, even if Stan’s “stuff” itself is not transferred.  Waves, for 
example, can often pass from one medium into another without a concomitant 
transfer of stuff, and the form of the wave may be changed when it enters the 
new medium.  The energy of the wave, which can generally be measured by its 
physical manifestations (e.g., particle densities, free energy concentrations, 
local gradients and potentials...) may be sustained in a temporally and 
spatially coherent way as it flows.  I personally like to think about 
information as contrast, such as with local gradients, and in this sense we 
might say that it it the information itself that flows into a recipient.  
Interpretation, then, involves the change in form that can occur in the new 
medium.  Of course, information, like waves, are not always able to penetrate 
any new medium or system.  It can be damped out in some transitions, and 
amplified through resonance in others.

I think this perspective bridges some of the seemingly disparate views that 
have been voiced over the last week.

Regards,

Guy


On 1/31/11 9:29 AM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

Dear All,

In coming to Krassimir's defense, I do not wish to abrogate the science of the 
last 100-150 years, but to suggest only that the appeal to authority, here as 
elsewhere, should not block criticism. The standard meaning of information is 
also restricted in some senses.

The dimension that Krassimir and his source are pointing to is not just 
poetic, but describes real interactions between sender and receiver. However, I 
would criticize absolute statements such as nothing is transferred. In my 
approach to logic (which I hope John includes in his various logics), it is 
not necessary to make an absolute distinction between the concept of 
information and its causal and material properties. They are dialectically 
linked.

On the other hand, I think it is important to emphasize, as Krassimir does, 
that there are properties of information that cannot be measured. This point, 
and the others above, will not constitute an entire, monolithic Information 
Theory, nor its entire essence. But they should be taken into account as part 
of the common meanings of various theories which I, /pace/ John :-) find most 
interesting.

Best,

Joseph

Ursprüngliche Nachricht
Von: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Datum: 31.01.2011 17:35
An: fis@listas.unizar.es
Betreff: [Fis] [Fwd: Re:  [Fwd:  Info Theory]--From John Collier

(Msg. from John Collier)

Unfortunately for your position, Krassimir, there is a well established usage 
of information in physics going back to Szillard's discussion of Maxwell's 
Demon in 1929, well before the dawn of communication theory. This usage is 
firmly entrenched in physics, used by such notables as Gell Mann, Wheeler and 
Hawking. So as far as usage of the word information is concerned, you were 
trumped long ago. I suggest that you, when using the word information make 
clear that you are using a specific restricted meaning rather than the general 
term. In fact I think that everyone on the list should practice similar hygiene.

The word information has a range of meanings that are related much like 
Wittgenstein's family resemblances. It is perhaps a paradigmatic case of this. 
Anything in common is pretty basic, and not very interesting, to my mind, but 
worth working out in any case.

There are connections of information theory to various logics, including the 
logic of distinctions and its extensionally equivalent propositional logic, 
predicate logic, and various other logics of a more restricted realm. These are 
all worth working out.

However I think it is pointless, or nearly so, to try to find the one true 
meaning of 'information' (I use the philosopher's convention for single and 
double quotes in this post). I wish people would just let it go, and learn to 
be more flexible and open to different approaches that they don't find 
intuitively or experientially appealing.

John



At 01:22 PM 1/31/2011, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

From: Krassimir Markov mailto:mar...@foibg.com
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2011 2:13 AM
To:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Info Theory
Â
Dear Colleagues,
Â
In the beginning of the XX-th century (approximately 100 years ago!) the great 
Bulgarian poet Pencho Slaveikov wrote:
Â
The speaker doesn't deliver his thought to the listener,
but his sounds and performances provoke the thought of the listener.
Â
Between them performs a process like lighting the candle,
where the flame of the first candle is not transmitted to another flame,
Â
but only cause it.
Â
Â
From my point of view, this is the essence of the Info Theory and, especially, 
of the Communication Theory.
Â
Really, nothing is transferred but everything CAUSE our mind to “light”.
Â
“Information” is a human concept.
Please ask your dog or cat, or the birds 

Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 543, Issue 19

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Colleagues,

I have some sympathy for Pedro's call for acceptance of a fuzzy definition
for intelligence, or perhaps a large set of operational definitions. This
is familiar to me as an evolutionary biologist.  We treat the concept of
fitness exactly this way, and I think both concepts hold great heuristic
value even in fuzzy form.  My concern under these circumstances is that we
have a sufficiently clear definition that it sustains a cogent discussion.
If the definition is so fuzzy that disagreements commonly boil down to
presumptive differences, then serious discussion is likely to be
unproductive.  I would personally find it helpful to know what the
limitations are on the meaning of intelligence, and what operational
definitions are being used when individuals intend to address more narrow
definitions.  Is it acceptable for a single entity or action to be
considered intelligent by one observer and unintelligent by another?

Regards,

Guy


On 11/22/10 9:01 AM, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:

 Dear FIS colleagues,
 
 very briefly stated (ugh, no spare time, devoured by ugly application
 forms!), I think that quantification as Guy demands can only occur in
 some small corners of our discussion areas, but not in the fundamental
 ideas, not well crafted yet. For instance, I take from a recent response
 of Raquel to Stan the notion of intelligence as the capability to
 process information for the purpose of adaptation or problem solving
 activities. In the case of cells, problems can be caused by the
 environment, extracellular aggressions, communications, etc. Well, we
 can quantify (and have already done) the portions of the signaling
 system involved, their correlation with genome size, etc., but have not
 developed a good conceptual integration of signaling with transcription
 ---and to my taste nobody as done yet, as signaling means the
 topological governance of an enormous gene network... I mean,
 premature emphasis on quantificationmay backtrack and obfuscate on
 misunderstanding the big picture.
 
 I understand Joseph lamentations, but do not share them, as logical
 clarification of an intrinsically evolutionary phenomenon --without any
 major discontinuity-- as intelligence is (at least in my view), becomes
 too big or too daring an undertaking. To make better sense of the
 evolutionary phenomenon of intelligence, I suggested populational
 thinking (see msg. below). Now I ad optimality to the mix, meaning
 the presence or better the emergence of collective principles of
 optimality that guide the distributed processes by the agent populations
 participating in the game (roughly, optimization principles running
 within cells, nervous systems, social markets). And a third ingredient ,
 very subtle one, could be labeled as doctrine of limitation. It refers
 to consequences of the fundamental limitations of all participants at
 whatever level to have a complete info on the occurring collective
 game, or a complete processing capability. In my view, this is the
 most difficult and consequential point --besides, it directly militates
 against the God's view we attribute to scientific observer... we already
 discussed a little bit about this in Beijing!
 
 best wishes
 
 ---Pedro 
 
 
 Guy A Hoelzer escribió:
 Pedro et al.,
 
 My previous cautionary post did not get much traction in this thread, but I
 still think my point was an important one to ensure that we are all talking
 about the same thing.  My point was that ³intelligence² in inherently
 subjective (in the eye of the beholder), unless we can agree on the criterion
 of performance quality.  I think this is necessary if we are to jump from
 mere information processing (cascades of effects resulting from the input of
 information to a system) to a notion of ³intelligence².  We could, for
 example, define human intelligence as measured by performance on an IQ test.
 We could more generally define intelligence in an evolutionary context as
 measured by the fitness effects of information processing.  I am personally
 not a big fan of either of these criteria.  John and Pedro seem to suggest
 using the degree of ³functionality² resulting from information processing as
 a general criterion.  I am intrigued by this option, although I¹m not sure
 how functionality can be measured objectively.
 
 I wonder whether this point did not get much traction previously because
 others disagree, or just don¹t think it is important.  If my point is both
 correct and important, then I think we should agree on a sufficiently general
 performance criterion for the evaluation of intelligence early in this
 thread.  Is there a perspective on ³intelligence² that would contradict this
 point?
 
 Regards,
 
 Guy
 
 
 On 11/19/10 4:11 AM, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez
 pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:
 
 Dear John and FIS colleages,
 
 I much agree (below) with the return to the biological; also Gordana and
 Raquel had already

Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 543, Issue 19

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Pedro et al.,

My previous cautionary post did not get much traction in this thread, but I 
still think my point was an important one to ensure that we are all talking 
about the same thing.  My point was that “intelligence” in inherently 
subjective (in the eye of the beholder), unless we can agree on the criterion 
of performance quality.  I think this is necessary if we are to jump from mere 
information processing (cascades of effects resulting from the input of 
information to a system) to a notion of “intelligence”.  We could, for example, 
define human intelligence as measured by performance on an IQ test.  We could 
more generally define intelligence in an evolutionary context as measured by 
the fitness effects of information processing.  I am personally not a big fan 
of either of these criteria.  John and Pedro seem to suggest using the degree 
of “functionality” resulting from information processing as a general 
criterion.  I am intrigued by this option, although I’m not sure how 
functionality can be measured objectively.

I wonder whether this point did not get much traction previously because others 
disagree, or just don’t think it is important.  If my point is both correct and 
important, then I think we should agree on a sufficiently general performance 
criterion for the evaluation of intelligence early in this thread.  Is there a 
perspective on “intelligence” that would contradict this point?

Regards,

Guy


On 11/19/10 4:11 AM, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez 
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:

Dear John and FIS colleages,

I much agree (below) with the return to the biological; also Gordana and Raquel 
had already argued along these guidelines. It does not mean that things become 
very much clearer initially in the connection between information and 
intelligence, but there is room for advancement. Thus, in Yixin's question, 
What is the precise relation between intelligence and information?, one of 
the basic aspects to explore becomes populational thinking --not much 
considered in AI schools (perhaps very secondarily in the neural networks 
school.

In fact, in all realms of intelligence in Nature (cellular, nervous systems, 
societies), we find populations of processing agents. In cells, it is the 
population of many millions of enzymes and proteins performing catalytic tasks 
and molecular recognition activities --any emphasis in molecular recognition 
will get short of the enormous importance this phenomenon has in biological 
organization, it is the alpha and omega (Shu-Kun-Lin has produced one of the 
best approaches to the generality of this phenomenon). How populations of 
enzymes achieve an emergent capability of intelligence? Unfortunately, we can 
barely answer... (some googling about the term cellular intelligence will 
show). The discussion on neuronal intelligence carries a similar problem, as  
the neurodynamic underpinnings of animal behavior and animal intelligence still 
lack a central theory (most of the debate on consciousness is but an 
uninteresting quagmire)... Finally, a much debated contemporary topic related 
with social intelligence deals with the problem solving capacity of markets. A 
very extended conception about social organization hinges in the faith that the 
creativity of individuals coupled with the invisible hand of markets can 
solve all problems, climate change included... given the magnitude of 
civilization survival problems of today, the topic of social intelligence 
deserves some second thoughts.

Anyhow, the above were just tidbits. Taken seriously, populational thinking 
can produce a new discourse in the relationship between information and 
intelligence. I keep saying what I argued during the Beijing conference, we 
need a new way of thinking.

best regards

---Pedro


This is a common situation in
biology. In fact I have been told that some
proteins pass through membranes through
successive conformational changes that remove
energy barriers to the transfer, much like the
simple experiment reported in the article. This
has been known for at least 15 years, I think.
Inasmuch as there is functionality here, semiotic
considerations may be relevant in this case. But
not in the case in the article. Intelligence is a
special case of the biological (so far).
Conformational change is even more important and
less dependent on the energetic substrate, and
more on other conformations and their changes (e.g., in inference).





The intelligent systems mainly do the same.




Everything does the same. It is how it is done that is important.

My best,
John


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Re: [Fis] Tactilizing processing

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi All,

I appreciate this topic and discussion.  I find myself in strong agreement
with the basic point made by Stan and Bob.  Not all fluctuations penetrate
upwardly across levels of functional organization.  Structural resonance in
the organization at some level makes it sensitive to certain kinds of
fluctuations in embedded lower levels of organization.  John seems to raise
an issue that follows this view.  That is, are there processes
(synchronization, harmonization, rhythmic entrainment...) that lead complex
adaptive systems to evolve mechanisms for sensing particular kinds of lower
level fluctuations?  It certainly seems that such mechanisms have indeed
evolved in biological systems, but is this a generic expectation?

Regards,

Guy


On 11/1/10 2:46 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:

 At 09:13 AM 01/11/2010, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
 Dear colleagues,
 
 It seems to me that we have a more elaborated apparatus for discussing the
 distances of a perturbation across a number of interfaces.
 
 Two information processing systems can be considered as structurally
 coupled when the one cannot process without the other. A single
 (system/environment) interface is then involved. If two interfaces are
 involved, the in-between system mediates; the coupling can then be
 considered as operational since the mediating system has to operate before
 transfer can take place across the interfaces. When more than two interfaces
 are involved, the coupling becomes increasingly loose, and another mechanism
 thus has to be specified for the explanation.
 
 There is an attempt to deal with this sort of thing at
 http://complex.unizar.es/~yamir/papers/phys_rep_08.pdf
 
 It is quite a bit more general. With my administrative load right now
 I haven't had time to read the paper, just to glance over it. Their
 central interest is not information or information processing,
 but it is mentioned in several places.
 
 Synchronization is another term like harmonization and
 rhythmic entrainment.
 
 A friend who sent me the reference says that the mathematics
 starts off well, but gets shakier through the paper.
 
 Now back to the budget.
 
 John
 
 
 --
 Professor John Collier, Acting HoS  and Acting Deputy HoS
 colli...@ukzn.ac.za
 Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
 T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
 http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html
 
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Re: [Fis] Revisiting... --From Dieter Gernert

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi all,

I have been enjoying the current discussion and appreciate Dieter’s focus on 
process.  I am an evolutionary biologist, not a physicist, but I would like to 
suggest one way in which some of the views expressed in different posts might 
be reconciled.

From a simplistic point of view, I think it is fair to posit that spatial 
pattern (e.g., the existence of particles) is manifested information, and that 
pattern is generated by process (e.g., particle interaction).  Process itself 
can also be viewed as information in the form of temporal pattern.  Pattern 
and process are inextricably linked in self-organizing dissipative systems, 
which represent a special class of “its”.  Other kinds of “its” include 
artifacts of dissipative system dynamics, which stumble from one local entropy 
peak to another under thermodynamic constraints.  Of course, particulate 
artifacts can also be swept up in other thermodynamic cascades, including 
those exploited by other dissipative systems.

The Prigogine notion of dissipative systems provides a compelling case, in my 
view, for including both pattern and process in generic treatments of 
information.

Regards,

Guy
--
Dr. Guy A. Hoelzer
Department of Biology, MS 314
University of Nevada Reno
Reno, NV  89557



On 9/29/10 3:38 AM, Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez 
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:

(herewith a very interesting text received off-line from a newcomer to our list 
--welcome Dieter!---Pedro)


--

1. For many years I highly estimate the work of Michael Conrad – whom I never 
could see or hear in person. So the study was restricted to reading some 
papers, and to store them as a separate file. I am very glad for the references 
to more recent work.
2. Before making any comment on the transmitted text, I must admit that I do 
not have sufficient knowledge on biology to give convincing remarks.
3. Modern physics must necessarily be physics at the Planck scale. I do not 
know whether in this moment there is a sufficient, explicit physics at the 
Planck scale such that one build up on this basis. Anyway, it must be a theory 
of processes, not of particles.
4. Anti-entropy or negentropy are children of the classical Shannon-Weaver 
theory, which is incorrectly (only due to a certain historical development) 
called information theory. There are specific (narrow, local) situations in 
biology where Shannon-Weaver is sufficient. But in the general case – and for a 
modern, futuristic theory – it can really be doubted whether Shannon-Weaver 
(here it is always meant: together with extensions and ramifications) will be 
sufficient. It seems to me that the comprehensive theory is needed, which 
(again for historical reasons) is named theory of pragmatic information. This 
is not opposed to Shannon-Weaver, but the latter is included as a special case 
(one can state conditions under which Sh.-W. will be adequate for a situation). 
An overview (including the historical development) can be found:
 Gernert, D., Pragmatic information: historical development and general 
overview. Mind and Matter, vol. 4 no. 2 (2006) 141-167.
 Here I am really only a reporter and historian – I did not make concrete 
contributions. The article can be downloaded  (google   dieter gernert).
 5. For any concept setting out to connect the manifest and the unmanifest a 
mathematical structure is required which permits us to describe the manifest 
and the nonmanifest and the interaction between both realms, or more precisely: 
conditions for an influence to occur in a single situation. It seems to me that 
one can do this along the lines sketched in my paper:
Gernert, D., Formal treatment of systems with a hidden organizing structure, 
with possible applications to physics. Int. J. of Computing Anticipatory 
Systems 16 (2004) 114-124.
 It will become inevitable to use a vector space on the basis C (the algebraic 
field of complex numbers). Best candidates in this moment are C^3 and C^4 (such 
that we have 6-  or 8-parametric manifolds – not 6 or 8 dimensions!). Equally 
important is a measure for the similarity between complex structures. To both 
issues I published proposals, and if there will be better ones, I shall quickly 
adopt them.
6. Models like particle/anti-particle pair production is a matter of the 
underlying physical structure; it will not contribute to explain the 
interaction or non-interaction between two complex structures. Any answer to 
the question interaction between these two or not? must take into account the 
entire structure of those two.
 7. I do not believe that consciousness has something to do with rather 
elementary processes like the unmasking mentioned in the text. From the 
viewpoint of a research strategy one can put off this question and first try to 
understand the processes.


Kindest regards,

Dieter Gernert
Professor of Computer Science
Technical University of Munich

Re: [Fis] The Assymetry of Information

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Joseph,

This is an interesting topic having to do specifically with the way humans 
process and weigh the validity of socially transmitted information.  I would 
like to add entry order effects to the positive/negative bias you describe.  
I personally view cognition as a process that generates and relies on heuristic 
models, which are generally prone to entry order effects.  In this context I 
think we tend to attribute validity to ideas or claims that we encounter first. 
 The validity-bar is raised for subsequently encountered alternatives.  Neither 
of these biases seem to reflect natural probabilities, although I can imagine 
that they might have had (still have?) selective value for our ancestors.

Regards,

Guy


on 11/12/09 9:26 AM, Joseph Brenner at joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

Here is a possible, and timely, FIS discussion topic:

The refusal of large numbers of people, especially health professionals, to be 
vaccinated against H1/N1 flu poses the question of the information, if any, on 
which they base this decision.

If one goes back to the beginning of the epidemic, one notes several systems of 
highly negative (frightening) information: the new flu might be extremely 
dangerous; the pharmaceutical industry will be unable to produce a vaccine; 
even if it does, it will be dangerous because not tested sufficiently for 
profit reasons.

Assuming the sources of this information are the media and certain experts, 
one can see the assymetry in terms of responsibility: if the media are right to 
be negative, they look prescient; if they are wrong, and all goes well, as 
appears to be the case, no one cares and their role in propagating the 
information is quickly overlooked, if not forgotten. If, however, the media 
information had been neutral or positive, i.e. there was no reason to be 
alarmed, they might be attacked legally if a flu pandemic occurred. Negative 
information sells better than positive information.

The really frightening result of the original negative information, however, is 
that it seems to override the current positive information, statements by 
Ministers of Health, etc: people don't get vaccinated, and the pandemic becomes 
more probable!

My questions are to what extent has the theory of value-laden information and  
this kind of dynamic been studied and what kind of public discussion of it is 
desirable and possible?  I look forward to comments.

Best wishes,

Joseph


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Re: [Fis] Economic modeling

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Robin (and other FISers),

I hope this isn't just being picky.

I would argue that both booms and busts are driven by positive feedback.
Buying begets more buying in one instance and selling begets selling in the
other.  Negative feedback tends to stabilize the dynamics of a system.

Regards,

Guy Hoelzer


on 11/14/08 5:00 AM, Robin Faichney   (by way of Pedro Marijuan
[EMAIL PROTECTED]) at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Thursday, November 13, 2008, 7:54:55 PM, I wrote:
 
 Not only economists have economic models.
 
 In my opinion the most important complicating factor in economics, as
 in other aspects of human culture, is the fact that every agent,
 including institutions as well as individuals, models both other
 agents and, in many cases, the system as a whole.
 
 For instance, agents observe the economic behaviour of, and the
 deals obtained by, many other agents. This informs consumer and
 business confidence and is what enables the negative and positive
 feedback loops that lead to booms and busts, respectively.
 
 Oops! It is, of course, positive feedback that causes bubbles (in
 particular sectors) and booms (across an economy), and negative
 feedback that causes busts.

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Re: [Fis] Re: info meaning

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Giuseppe et al.,

I find the issues of meaning and interpretation very interesting, but I
think this FIS discussion needs to find some common ground if we are to get
anywhere.  For example, Giuseppe wrote:

 There is no purely physical status of information, since a physical
structure yields no information, per se.

I couldn't disagree more, although I'm not sure that we disagree at all in
substance.  I take structure, organization, contrast, and gradients to be
the physical essence of all information by definition.  This is why I see a
fundamental connection between information and entropy.  The problem is that
I find myself unwilling to suspend my personal lexicon in order to better
appreciate the substance of posts like the one below,  and others seem to be
equally inflexible with semantics in this context.   I wonder if we can
agree upon a set of terms for our discussion (and beyond?) that will help to
clarify the scope and limitations of the ideas we are discussing.

Here is my attempt to apply Stan's specification hierarchy to the levels
targeted for the term 'information' in our discussion:

(physical structure (observer perception and interpretation) signals and
communication)))

As I see it, there is nothing for an observer to perceive in the absence of
physical structure, and signals cannot transmit meaning' if observers are
unable to perceive and interpret them.  My personal preference is to ally
'information' with structure at the base of it all, but we should find a set
of terms to keep these levels distinct in our conversation that is agreeable
to all of us.  We may be working too hard in arguing about which of these
three levels is the basis of 'information'.

Regards,

Guy


on 10/15/07 10:04 AM, Giuseppe Longo at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 On Sunday 14 October 2007, mjs wrote:
 If information is not physical, and therefore governed by physical
 principles, then what is its ontological status?
 
 why any scientific notion should have a physical ontological status?
 the issue is never ontological, but just theoretical: which theory, with its
 own theoretical principles, can handle this or that notion? that is the
 question.
 And, within theories of inert, within which physical (theoretical) principles?
 classical, relativistic, quantum?
 
 Information is in signs and languages, it needs an interpreter, or a compiler
 as in operational semantics (in computers).
 In some contexts, information may be formalised by the same equations as
 (neg-)entropy. But the coincidence of equations does imply the formation of
 the same invariants, the underlying objects: the wave equation applies to
 water waves as well as to Quantum Mechanics (Schroedinger, modulo the passage
 to the complex field and Hilbert spaces). In no way a quantum state yields
 the same invariants or intended physical object as a water wave: formalisms
 may have very different (structural, physical) meanings.
 The connection between information and (physical) entropy is not ontological;
 indeed, not even theoretical, just formal: a theory requires both a formalism
 and the formation of invariants (like with Noether's theorems in Physics:
 invariance as symmetries defines the physical objects, by their properties;
 no common invariants between Shannon and Boltzmann)
 
 There is no purely physical status of information, since a physical
 structure yields no information, per se. Signs must be implemented in
 physical ink or digits, of course, but this needs a writer and, then, an
 interpreter. This shows up clearly in the issue of finiteness.
 In a finite space-time volume, typically, we can only put a finite amount of
 signs, thus of information.
 But is there, per se, a finite amount of information in a finite space-time
 volume?  What then about Riemann sphere, as a model of Relativity, which is
 finite, but illimited? how much information does it contain? Infinite? The
 question simply does not make sense, in absence of a specification of a
 writer and an interpreter (or compiler).
 And in a finite space-time volume in Quantum Physics? one needs a wave
 equation in a, possibly infinite, dimensional Hibert space, to talk of one
 quanton within it; is this finite or infinite information?
 A finite number of quanta may, of course, be represented by finitely many
 independent state vectors, n say, but quantum superposition allow to obtain
 any result, as measure, in R^d, an infinite space.
 
 What is this mystic, absolute, reference to physical principles?  we just
 have (current) theories.
 Classical, relativistic principles or quantum mecanical happen to be
 incompatible as entaglement or, more specifically, the quantum field have no
 classical nor relativistic sense, as physical principles.
 Which is the physical connection between the (wild) DNA and the (normal)
 form of the nose? according to which physical theory can we relate them?
 The differential method, as used in molecular biology, radically differs form
 its use in 

Re: [Fis] info meaning

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Bob,

If the notions of Entropy and Shannon Information are alternative approaches
to characterize the same phenomenon in Nature, then the ways they have been
modeled would not necessarily reveal an underlying and fundamental
commonality.  I think that many of us suspect that this is the case and we
are striving to understand and articulate (model) the fundamental
commonality.  We may be wrong, of course, but your argument doesn't dissuade
me.  In fact, I must admit sheepishly that I'm not sure how one would go
about analyzing the relationship between these ideas in a way that could
dissuade me.  If such an analysis is not possible, then I suspect that the
question of a fundamental commonality will have to die slowly as progress
fails to occur.

Regards,

Guy


on 10/12/07 12:01 PM, bob logan at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Loet et al - I guess I am not convinced that information and entropy
 are connected. Entropy in physics has the dimension of energy divided
 by temperature. Shannon entropy has no physical dimension - it is
 missing the Boltzman constant. Therefore how can entropy and shannon
 entropy be compared yet alone connected?
 
 I am talking about information not entropy - an organized collection
 of organic chemicals must have more meaningful info than an
 unorganized collection of the same chemicals.
 
 
 On 11-Oct-07, at 5:34 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
 
 Loet - if your claim is true then how do you explain that a random
 soup of
 organic chemicals have more Shannon info than an equal number of
 organic
 chemicals organized as a living cell where knowledge of some
 chemicals
 automatically implies the presence of others and hence have less
 surprise
 than those of the  soup of random organic chemicals? -  Bob
 
 Dear Bob and colleagues,
 
 In the case of the random soup of organic chemicals, the maximum
 entropy of the systems is set by the number of chemicals involved (N).
 The maximum entropy is therefore log(N). (Because of the randomness of
 the soup , the Shannon entropy will not be much lower.)
 
 If a grouping variable with M categories is added the maximum entropy
 is log(N * M). Ceteris paribus, the redundancy in the system increases
 and the Shannon entropy can be expected to decrease.
 
 In class, I sometimes use the example of comparing Calcutta with New
 York in terms of sustainability. Both have a similar number of
 inhabitants, but the organization of New York is more complex to the
 extent that the value of the grouping variables (the systems of
 communication) becomes more important than the grouped variable (N).
 When M is extended to M+1, N possibilities are added.
 
 I hope that this is convincing or provoking your next reaction.
 
 Best wishes,
 
 
 Loet
 
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Re: [Fis] Re: info meaning

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Greetings All,

In my view Œmeaning¹ exists (or not) exclusively within systems.  It exists
to the extent that inputs (incoming information) resonate within the
structure of the system.  The resonance can either reinforce the existing
architecture (confirmation), destabilize it (e.g., cognitive
disequilibrium), or construct new features of the architecture (e.g.,
learning).  Social communication often involves the goal of re-constructing
architectural elements present in the mind of one agent by another agent.  I
am using highly metaphorical language here, but a very straightforward
example of this at the molecular level is the transfer of structural
information between prions and similar proteins folded in Œordinary¹ ways.
In this sense, meaning itself cannot be transferred between agents; although
a new instance of meaning can be constructed.  This is essentially the idea
behind the Dawkins model of populations of memes (concept analogs of genes).

From this point of view, the Œexactness¹ of a meaning doesn¹t seem to make
sense.  A meaning defines itself without error.  It would make sense,
however, to talk about the degree of similarity between meanings when the
social goal was to replicate a particular instance of meaning.  Perhaps this
is what Jerry meant and I have over-analyzed the idea here, but if this is a
novel or erroneous perspective I would like to see some discussion of it.  I
guess my main point here is to separate the notion of meaningfulness from
the social context that demands the sharing of meanings and constrains the
construction of meanings to resonate at the level of the social network.

Regards,

Guy Hoelzer


on 10/2/07 3:24 AM, Pedro Marijuan at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Dear colleagues,
 
 Answering to a couple of Jerry's questions,
 
 
 Under what circumstances can the speaker's meaning or the writer's meaning be
 _exact_?
 
 Is _meaning_ a momentary impulse with potential for settling into a local
 minimum in the biochemical dynamic?
 
 A previous point could be---what entities are capable of elaborating that
 obscure item we call meaning? Just anything (eg, some parties have stated
 that molecules or atoms may communicate), or only the living beings?
 
 My understanding of what Bob has proposed along the POE guideliness is that
 only the living cell would be capable --and of course, all the further more
 complex organisms.  This point is of some relevance.
 
 After decoding and interpretation of the organic codes, the meaning of my
 message about meaning and information may have meaning to you.
 
 Maybe. But I suffer some information overload (perhaps overload is just the
 incapablity to elaborate meaning under the present channels or means of
 communication).
 
 best
 
 Pedro 
 =
 Pedro C. Marijuán
 Cátedra SAMCA
 Institute of Engineering Research of Aragon (I3A)
 Maria de Luna, 3. CPS, Univ. of Zaragoza
 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
 TEL. (34) 976 762761 and 762707, FAX (34) 976 762043
 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 =
 
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Re: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Greetings,

I agree with Loet and Pedro that it seems important to distinguish between
environmental constraints (including material constraints emanating from the
qualities of components of a system) and self-imposed limitations associated
with the particular path taken as a dynamical system unfolds through time.
In other words, I see some information being generated by the dynamics of a
system, much of which can emerge from the interaction between a system and
the constraints of it's environment.  I have come to this view largely by
considering the process of biological development.  For example, I have come
to the conclusion that the genome is far from a blueprint of a phenotype,
although it is more than a static list of building parts.  I see the genome
as containing a small fraction of the information ultimately represented by
an adult organism, and I think that most of that information is generated
internally to the system as a consequence of the interaction between the
genome and its environment.

Regards,

Guy


on 2/27/07 6:24 AM, Pedro Marijuan at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Dear colleagues,
 
 As for the first track (planning vs. markets) I would try to plainly put
 the informational problem in terms of distinction on the adjacent (Guy
 has also argued in a similar vein). Social structures either in markets or
 in central plans become facultative instances of networking within the
 whole social set. Then the market grants the fulfillment of any
 weak-functional bonding potentiality, in terms of say energy, speed,
 materials or organization of process; while the planning instances restrict
 those multiple possibilities of self-organization to just a few rigid
 instances of hierarchical networking. This is very rough, but if we relate
 the nodes (individuals living their lives, with the adjacency-networking
 structure, there appears some overall congruence on info terms... maybe.
 
 On the second track, about hierarchies and boundary conditions, shouldn't
 we distinguish more clearly between the latter (bound. cond.) and
 constraints? If I am not wrong, boundary conditions talk with our
 system and mutually establish which laws have to be called into action,
 which equations.. But somehow constraints reside within the laws, polishing
 their parameter space and fine-tuning which version will talk, dressing
 it more or less. These aspects contribute  to make the general analysis of
 the dynamics of open systems a pain on the neck--don't they? I will really
 appreciate input from theoretical scientist about this rough comment.
 
 
 best regards
 
 Pedro 
 
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RE: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Stan,

Aren't all constraints a form of information?  I see constraints as informing 
the bounds of the adjacent possible and adjacent probable.  If this is correct, 
then it would seem to render the economy as almosst pure information.  In 
fact, I think it would render all emergent systems as pure information.  
Wouldn't it?

Regards,

Guy


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Stanley N. Salthe
Sent: Sat 2/24/2007 2:51 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural   Complexity
 
Pedro said:

Dear Igor and Stan,

-snip-

The realm of economy is almost pure information. Rather than planning,
markets are very clever ways to handle informational complexity. They
partake a number of formal properties (eg, power laws) indicating that they
work as info conveyors on global, regional  sectorial, local scales.
Paradoxically, rational planning can take a man to the moon, or win a
war, but cannot bring bread and butter to the breakfast table every day.
Planning only, lacks the openness, flexibility, resilience, etc. of
markets. A combination of both, with relative market superiority looks
better...
 It is hard for me to visualize the economy as being almost pure
information!  This is to forget about so-called 'externalities' -- sources
and sinks, storms, wars, climate change -- even holidays!  The larger scale
material environment constrains the economy, while that(perhaps mostly as
information) constrains human action.

STAN

with regards,

Pedro

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Re: [Fis] Joseph Tainter's Social and Cultural Complexity

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Pedro and colleagues,

I want to respond only to the first paragraph of your recent post.

on 12/15/06 3:11 AM, Pedro Marijuan at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Dear FIS colleagues,
 
 I disagree with the comments by Steven and Stan on the nature of
 complexity. How can one substantiate and quantify social complexity if the
 previous complexity within the society's individuals has not been solved?
 At the time being, there is no accepted rigorous evaluation of biological
 complexity --neither number of genes, RNA transcripts, proteins, nor genome
 size, chromosome number etc., provide individually any solid estimation;
 together more or less. Perhaps, the only accepted single number as a proxy
 of organismic complexity is the number of differentiated cell types
 ---becoming similar to Joe's approach in societies (social roles, or
 professions, plus other issues related to number of artifacts, etc.).
[snip]

In my view, measures of complexity at one level of organization ought not
depend on the details or complexity of the lower levels upon which it is
built.  This is to me the essence of systems emergence, which is the
functional unification of lower level parts.   These parts may or may not be
highly complex themselves.   In the social sphere of biology, the parts are
organisms, or groups of organisms, but I see the complexity of  a social
system as utterly independent of the complexity of organisms.  The stock
exchange, or the economy in general, is extraordinarily complex.   We would
indeed need an objective measure to compare compare the complexities of
organisms to that of economies, but economies need not be more complex than
organisms.  The system manifested by food coops, for example, is a system of
very low complexity compared to the complexity of the people who compose the
coop.

I am not saying that I expect there to be no correlation between a system's
complexity and the complexities of its component parts.  Indeed, I think
this is a reasonable expectation, because more complex parts are likely to
have a much more diverse and unpredictable range of behaviors than less
complex, or non-complex, parts.   However, this need not always hold true,
and it is not the only factor determining system complexity.

To sum up, I like the catch phrase complexity breeds simplicity, because
it emphasizes the notion that functional unification through system
emergence releases us from the need to drill down to the bottom in order to
FULLY understand higher order systems.  In other words, it frees us from the
tedious demands of the reductionistic paradigm.

Regards,

Guy Hoelzer

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Re: [Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, SOLVED

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Dear Arne,

I count myself as a realist and, to paraphrase your statement, I see any
reason in what you wrote to convert me.  Your points about limitations and
biases of the mind regarding our understanding of reality are good ones, and
I think it is important for realists to keep these cautions in mind.
However, your position seems to be that the one thing we can know exists is
the mind itself.  I see this as a useful proposition in the scientific study
of brain function and mental phenomena, but I don't see how it can permit
science to study anything else.  If we don't start with the premise that
there is a reality to study, and which can be understood in some way, it
would seem that science (other than a science of mind) would have no
validity.  In my view, science has demonstrated plenty of validity (e.g.,
modern technology), and I don't see how this could have been achieved if a
coherent reality did not exist or if science was not sufficiently effective
at revealing aspects of reality.  Therefore, I think that the realists
perspective has proven itself.  Nevertheless, it will be interesting to
learn about the ways our minds can mislead us within the context of science.
It would be even more fantastic to learn about particular limitations of our
minds that might prevent us from understanding aspects of reality that might
exist, if it is possible to learn such a thing.

Regards,

Guy Hoelzer


on 11/8/06 1:28 AM, Arne Kjellman at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Dear Karl and FIS-collegues,
 
 
 
 Yes Karl, in spite of your touch of scorn, I can see 'things' but contrary
 to realists I (like Bohr and Feynman and many others) don't place the 'thing'
 of my perception into some obscure reality endowed with some magic
 properties like objectivity or accessibility on equal terms like some
 imaginary world of Platonian ideas. We place this concept where it occurs -
 namely IN OUR MINDS. And this is the deciding difference between the realist
 and constructivist (or antirealist if you prefer). And as I have told you
 before - unless you can resolve the REALIST'S DILEMMA I can see no sound
 reason for me converting to realism - and neither for you being one, no
 matter how many mantras you are able to produce.
 
 
 
 There is something most annoying in the realist's efforts to run away from
 the realist's dilemma (the silence is total) - I mean after all almost
 everybody can understand that a physicist using a measuring instrument he
 doesn't understand (lacks a model of) cannot understand the status of the
 entities or phenomena he is measuring. When he claims these entities to be
 the things of a common world he, to my mind, simply admits he doesn't
 understand the worldly things. So what is then the point of discussing man's
 eventual reception of information from such unknown worlds? All we know
 then is its scientific name - reality. And this parallels the way other
 believers use the word God. When saying so I do not say we are not entitled
 to believe in a God, Evolution or reality - or that it might be something
 like this beyond human reason. Not at all - I simply say that that certain
 knowledge in these questions is beyond human knowing and doesn't belong to
 science. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent::
 Wittgenstein.
 
 
 
 Therefore we have better discuss WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT - our impressions and
 personal experience and do so carefully.  So please help me instead to
 clarify the realist's dilemma because I think such a discussion could
 resolve the realist/antirealist controversy and provide a useful step
 towards the understanding of information.
 
 
 
 Best Arne
 
 - Original Message -
 From: Karl Javorszky [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: 'Stanley N. Salthe (by way of Pedro Marijuan[EMAIL PROTECTED])'
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]; fis@listas.unizar.es
 Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 4:04 PM
 Subject: [Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, SOLVED
 
 
 Dear Stan,
 
 In your last posting, you said:
 SS:  Of course, the origin of the genetic system is arguably the most
 outstanding problem facing natural science.  It seems that, other than
 the
 (to me) unconvincing RNA World idea, there is no compelling model of it.
 
 The model that the RNA (together with the DNA) is a sequence and that the
 genetic mechanism copies the information from a sequence (the dna/rna)
 into
 a nonsequenced assembly (the living organism) and from there (by means of
 the ovaries and the testes) back into a sequence is a quite compelling
 model.
 
 The term information has been shown in this chatroom to mean the cuts
 that
 segregate, separate and distinguish summands;
 The term sequence has been defined by Peano;
 The term nonsequenced /=commutative/assembly is indeed hairy, as there
 exists no definition for multidimensional partitions, although this is
 what
 it means;
 The term copies means a filter restriction on a set of entries into a
 database (a restricted, in optimal case, bijective map between

Re: [Fis] Post-concluding remarks:Realism/anturealism: Laws of nature?

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Bob,

I doubt we disagree in substance here, but I would take issue with the
statement that there are no laws for biology in the same sense as the laws
of physics, because I think the laws of physics apply in all realms.  In
other words, the laws of physics are not limited to physics in an
exclusionary way, because all other disciplines exist within the bounds of
physics.  Therefore, the laws of physics are also laws of biology to me.
After picking this nit, I would agree that there are no additional,
proprietary laws of this sort within biology that do not extend to
non-biological physical systems.

Cheers,

Guy Hoelzer


on 10/26/06 7:16 AM, Robert Ulanowicz at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 On Thu, 26 Oct 2006, Andrei Khrennikov wrote:
 
 If we follow the line of Arne of realism/antirealism, then what should
 we say about LAWS OF NATURE? I think that we would come to the
 conclusion that there is no such laws at all. Such a conclusion is not
 astonishing in the light of modern views to QM. Since QM (by the
 conventional Copenhagen interpretation) declared the death of
 determinism (and not because our impossibility to find such
 deterministic dynamics, but because quantum randomness is irredusible),
 it seems that at the quantum level we are not able to consider physical
 laws. We are able only to find some statistical correlations.
 
 I think that this is totally wrong position. As Newton was, I am also
 surprised by harmony and consistence in Nature. It could not be just a
 product of our social agreement. Well, finally Newton came to the idea
 of God who was responsible for this harmony.
 
 Dear Andrei:
 
 Like Walter Elsasser, I believe there are no laws for biology in the same
 sense as the laws of physics.
 
 Yes, I agree there is regularity and order in the biological world.
 
 Whence the order? Processes, not law.
 
 For further details, please see:
 
 http://www.cbl.umces.edu/~ulan/ISEPP.DOC
 
 The best,
 Bob
 
 -
 Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: (410) 326-7266
 Chesapeake Biological Laboratory   |  FAX: (410) 326-7378
 P.O. Box 38|  Email [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 1 Williams Street  |  Web http://www.cbl.umces.edu/~ulan
 Solomons, MD 20688-0038|
 --
 
 
 
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