Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
Dear folks, I think there is a bit of confusion here due to an ambiguity in the idea of computation. A function is computable for a given input only if it has an equivalent Turing machine that halts. A function is a computation if it is representable by a Turing machine. (I assume the Church-Turing thesis in both cases. However there are lots of Turing machines that do not halt (more than that do halt). So it is quite possible for a function that is noncomputable to be representable by a Turing machine. Wolfram, for example, is fairly clear on this. If you know Rosen's work, the computable cases are what he calls synthetic models. The noncomputable cases are what he calls analytic but not synthetic models. Krivine showed a long time ago that Newtonian mechanics allows noncomputable functions that are nontrivial. This is not surprising, really, since it is possible to model any Turing machine with a mechanical (colliding spheres, say) system. Interestingly, Turing left some work on computer models that are not Turing computable. In any case, the natural computations (to allow Gordana her sense of this idea) need not be computable. These cases are nonreducible in the sense of not computable from boundary conditions and the combinatorics of lower level interactions. See my A dynamical account of emergence ( http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Account%20of%20Emergence.pdf ) (Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 15, no 3-4 2008: 75-100), http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Account%20of%20Emergence.pdf for some more detail on the reduction and boundary condtions issue. Incidentally, to the best of my knowledge it was Conrad, Michael and Koichiro Matsuno (1990). The boundary condition paradox: a limit to the university of differential equations. Applied Mathematics and Computation. 37: 67-74 that first analyzed the boundary system problem. For some even more rigourous detail, also C.A. Hooker's chapter on emergence in C. A. Hooker, Philosophy of Complex Systems. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 10. 20011: Elsevier pp. 195ff. Cheers, John Professor John Collier Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 email: colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>> On 2012/05/15 at 03:35 PM, in message <20120515093552.322364lbu120x...@www.cbl.umces.edu>, "Robert Ulanowicz" wrote: Quoting Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic : > 2. Whatever changes in the states of the physical world there > are, we understand them as computation. Dear Gordana, I'm not sure I agree here. For much of what transpires in nature (not just in the living realm), the metaphor of the dialectic seems more appropriate than the computational. As you are probably aware, dialectics are not computable, mainly because their boundary value statements are combinatorically intractable (sensu Kauffman). It is important to note that evolution (which, as Chaisson contends, applies as well to the history of the cosmos [and even the symmetrical laws of force]) is driven by contingencies, not by laws. Laws are necessary and they enable, but they cannot entail. Regards, Bob ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis Please find our Email Disclaimer here: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/disclaimer/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
Dear Friends - please do not take the following critique as disrespectful but the following amusing thoughts came into my head as I read that the cosmos is engaged in computing and is a cosmic computer. During the age of polytheism the different aspects of the cosmos were at war with each other and the cosmos was a battleground. Then with monotheism the cosmos bifurcated into the good side with angels fluttering about God sitting on a throne and the cosmos was basically praying and doing all kinds of good things except for the fallen angels who stoked the fires of the inferno somewhere in the netherworld. Then came Newton or as Alexander Pope put it Nature and nature's laws lay hid in night; God said "Let Newton be" and all was light. Suddenly the cosmos was a machine, a clockworks, that God created, set in motion and the cosmos mechanically followed the Creator's law. My couplet for our current time with attribution to Alexander Pope is: Now we are in the brave new age of information God said "Let Turing be" and all was computation. Suddenly the cosmos has evolved into a cosmic-super-computer having evolved from the clockwork universe which had in turn evolved from the dual domain of God's heaven and the Devil's hell which had in turn evolved from the battleground of the gods. What's next. Well from biology we got the Gaia hypothesis, the earth as an organism. What would be the next step - yes you guessed it the Cosmic Organism. Just google "cosmic organism" and you will find some 20,200 hits. It does not stop there either - here are the following cosmoses as revealed by Google quantum cosmos - 194,000 hits string theory cosmos - 10,000 hits holographic cosmos - 2,200 hits black hole cosmos 20,200 In fact take any metaphor from science or technology and someone will have a theory how our cosmos operates as that technology or science metaphor. With the concept of the multiverse or multiple universes we are back to the polytheistic world since every universe will have its own God. My conclusion is that there is one cosmos with multiple ways of describing it each of which employs a particular metaphor. The computational universe is just one example in a long line of cosmic metaphors and as our science and technology evolves so will the metaphors to describe this cosmos of ours. with kind regards - Bob Logan On 2012-05-15, at 9:42 AM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote: > Dear Bob, > > I am not sure if I have right to reply, but you make a very important remark. > > The answer is: computing nature performs much more than existing computers. > > What is computable in computing nature is what nature is able to perform > through its continuous changes. > Dialectical processes are also typical in nature and thus in the framework of > computing nature, those also are computations. > > In short the question is: what kind of computations are those dialectical > processes? > > That is what we want to learn. > > All the best, > Gordana > > > -Original Message- > From: Robert Ulanowicz [mailto:u...@umces.edu] > Sent: den 15 maj 2012 15:36 > To: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic > Cc: Bruno Marchal; fis@listas.unizar.es > Subject: Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday > > Quoting Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic : > > >> 2. Whatever changes in the states of the physical world there >> are, we understand them as computation. > > Dear Gordana, > > I'm not sure I agree here. For much of what transpires in nature (not > just in the living realm), the metaphor of the dialectic seems more > appropriate than the computational. As you are probably aware, > dialectics are not computable, mainly because their boundary value > statements are combinatorically intractable (sensu Kauffman). > > It is important to note that evolution (which, as Chaisson contends, > applies as well to the history of the cosmos [and even the symmetrical > laws of force]) is driven by contingencies, not by laws. Laws are > necessary and they enable, but they cannot entail. > > Regards, > Bob > > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis __ Robert K. Logan Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
Dear Bob, I am not sure if I have right to reply, but you make a very important remark. The answer is: computing nature performs much more than existing computers. What is computable in computing nature is what nature is able to perform through its continuous changes. Dialectical processes are also typical in nature and thus in the framework of computing nature, those also are computations. In short the question is: what kind of computations are those dialectical processes? That is what we want to learn. All the best, Gordana -Original Message- From: Robert Ulanowicz [mailto:u...@umces.edu] Sent: den 15 maj 2012 15:36 To: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic Cc: Bruno Marchal; fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday Quoting Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic : > 2. Whatever changes in the states of the physical world there > are, we understand them as computation. Dear Gordana, I'm not sure I agree here. For much of what transpires in nature (not just in the living realm), the metaphor of the dialectic seems more appropriate than the computational. As you are probably aware, dialectics are not computable, mainly because their boundary value statements are combinatorically intractable (sensu Kauffman). It is important to note that evolution (which, as Chaisson contends, applies as well to the history of the cosmos [and even the symmetrical laws of force]) is driven by contingencies, not by laws. Laws are necessary and they enable, but they cannot entail. Regards, Bob ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
Quoting Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic : > 2. Whatever changes in the states of the physical world there > are, we understand them as computation. Dear Gordana, I'm not sure I agree here. For much of what transpires in nature (not just in the living realm), the metaphor of the dialectic seems more appropriate than the computational. As you are probably aware, dialectics are not computable, mainly because their boundary value statements are combinatorically intractable (sensu Kauffman). It is important to note that evolution (which, as Chaisson contends, applies as well to the history of the cosmos [and even the symmetrical laws of force]) is driven by contingencies, not by laws. Laws are necessary and they enable, but they cannot entail. Regards, Bob ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
Dear Bruno and FIS colleagues, Here are my three comments on the current discussion: (1) It seems to me that one thing should be taken into account: computationalism is not a monolithic body of theory, and old approaches should not be mixed with the current ones. Here is what Matthias Scheutz says (and I agree) in Computationalism: New Directions: "Classical computationalism -- -the view that mental states are computational states -- -has come under attack in recent years. Critics claim that in defining computation solely in abstract, syntactic terms, computationalism neglects the real-time, embodied, real-world constraints with which cognitive systems must cope. Instead of abandoning computationalism altogether, however, some researchers are reconsidering it, recognizing that real-world computers, like minds, must deal with issues of embodiment, interaction, physical implementation, and semantics. This book lays the foundation for a successor notion of computationalism. It covers a broad intellectual range, discussing historic developments of the notions of computation and mechanism in the computationalist model, the role of Turing machines and computational practice in artificial intelligence research, different views of computation and their role in the computational theory of mind, the nature of intentionality, and the origin of language." http://books.google.se/books?id=Y59zyNWnNfYC&printsec=front_cover&redir_esc=y (2) "The usual critics always assume type of first person/third person identity thesis which are incompatible both with computationalism or with quantum mechanics." (Bruno) All we know with confidence about the first person is from the third persons accounts about first persons. When it comes to first person accounts on the same first person, the "person" telling the story anyway is not the same person experiencing the world, because those two exist in different instants of time. (Here I refer to Minsky's view of dynamical societies of mind) So my account about my experiences comes from my memory and is a reconstruction. Psychologists know how unreliable self- accounts are. Why not simply admit that all the knowledge about the first person simply comes from the third persons accounts about first persons? (3) When it comes to digital/analog and discrete/continuous debate, it must be pointed out that some of computationalist approaches are purely discrete (what here is called digital) while others allow for both discrete and continuous representations.* I also agree with Hector and Wolfram that physics has primacy. If at some level of abstraction such as quantum mechanics one observes both continuum and discrete states, that means understanding the nature as a computational system at that level of abstraction, computations are both discrete and continuous (like computations of an analog computer). Our models of reality are not the same thing as reality. It is not the reality that is continuous or discrete - it is our best models of reality that are continuous or discrete. Reality is always more than our models. We are discussing our models. We are always in a search for the best (richest, most productive, most general etc.) models of reality, and we learn through the process and we will continue to learn. Learning does not depend only on the nature of reality, it also depends on human effort invested in our interactions with the world and the construction of increasingly better models. Best regards, Gordana *A very good and elucidating account of the discrete, continuous, analog, digital will be found in: Maley, C.J. Analog and digital, continuous and discrete. Philos. Stud. 2010, 155, 117-131. Also here: http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/2/3/460 From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: den 12 maj 2012 11:03 To: Hector Zenil Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es Information Science Subject: Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday On 12 May 2012, at 00:55, Hector Zenil wrote: On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 11:23 PM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: On 11 May 2012, at 13:10, Hector Zenil wrote: Information that readers may find interesting: Stephen Wolfram has written the first in a series of blogs posts about NKS titled "It's Been 10 Years; What's Happened with A New Kind of Science?": http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/its-been-10-years-whats-happened-with-a-new-kind-of-science/ Stephen will also be hosting an Ask Me Anything (AMA) on Reddit, where he will be taking questions about NKS and his research program on Monday, May 14 at 3pm EST. I think it is a good opportunity to start an interesting discussion about several topics, including of course information and computation. It looks like advertising for a type of universal system, the cellular automata. Coin
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
On 12 May 2012, at 00:55, Hector Zenil wrote: On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 11:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 May 2012, at 13:10, Hector Zenil wrote: Information that readers may find interesting: Stephen Wolfram has written the first in a series of blogs posts about NKS titled "It's Been 10 Years; What's Happened with A New Kind of Science?": http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/its-been-10-years-whats-happened-with-a-new-kind-of-science/ Stephen will also be hosting an Ask Me Anything (AMA) on Reddit, where he will be taking questions about NKS and his research program on Monday, May 14 at 3pm EST. I think it is a good opportunity to start an interesting discussion about several topics, including of course information and computation. It looks like advertising for a type of universal system, the cellular automata. Coincidently, Wolfram wrote today (http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/living-a-paradigm-shift-looking-back-on-reactions-to-a-new-kind-of-science/ ): "Looking through reviews, there are some other common themes. One is that A New Kind of Science is a book about cellular automata—or worse, about the idea (not in fact suggested in the book at all) that our whole universe is a giant cellular automaton. For sure, cellular automata are great, visually strong, examples for lots of phenomena I discuss. But after about page 50 (out of 1280), cellular automata no longer take center stage—and notably are not the type of system I discuss in the book as possible models for fundamental physics." Using cellular automata has an important role in modeling physics, notably diffusion processes. Using other models can hev their role, like quantum computation. My critics is about the implicit use of any particular computable model, which, I can argue, cannot work for a logical reason. If we are machine, then it means that there is a level of substitution of my part where my consciousness remains invariant for local functional substitution. This entails a notion of first person indeterminacy and makes us distributed on infinities of computations (that is not entirely trivial to explain; please look at the papers in my URL), so that physics arise more from a sum on all computational model than a particular computational model. This lead to verifiable consequence of computationalism, already explaining most quantum weirdness. It makes also computationalism testable. I gave an algorithm generating the experimental device configuration testing the physics as we have to extracted it from comp, accepting the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4). People keep repeating what other say about others... (in this case, that his view is all about cellular automata). My view comes from the reading on the first edition of his book, sometimes ago, I admit. And then from the blog you kindly send to us, which does not address the quantum nature of the physical reality, nor consciousness, nor the (computationalist) mind body problem (my domain of study). ... Digital physics implies computationalism, but if you take the 1/3 person points of view distinction into account, computationalism entails a non digital physics. So digital physics is conceptually erroneous. See the references in my URL for a proof of that statement. You need only Church's Turing thesis, and the assumption that consciousness is invariant for *some* digital transformation (which follows from computationalism). This does not preclude that cellular automaton are very interesting, and can have many applications, but it is not clear to make it into a new science. We want to ask what about that science is, for it does not seem to address the most fundamental questions. Then perhaps you can ask him next Monday on his Reedit session I think he has some concerns about the place of observers in a digital world scenario. My point is that if "we" are digital, the world, or whatever responsible for the existence of our consciousness, cannot be digital. We must dissociate the hypothesis of a digital world and the hypothesis of the locally "digitalness" of person (computationalism). Digital physics implies computationalism, but computationalism implies the negation of digital physics. As for computationalism, he as I do, think that the question is about physics, the answer won't come therefore from a model of math or computation. But it can't come from physics, without begging the question of where physics come from, as Wheeler did foreseen. This is assuming Aristotelianism at the start, which is inconsistent with the assumption that "we" are locally digital. And as I said, computationalism in the cognitive science is incompatible with weak form of materialism and with physicalism in physics. I currently explain this in detail currently on the FOAR mailing list, if you are interested(*). The usual critics always
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
Not long time ago, people like John von Neumann were doing both, math and physics, and even computation. Earlier, such people were also doing philosophy and music, and medicine, etc. Ask yourself why? It is only a phenomenon of modern times with the increasing fragmentation of science that the left hand does not know what the right one is doing. ... Best, Plamen Sent from my iPhone Am 12.05.2012 um 00:55 schrieb Hector Zenil : > On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 11:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 11 May 2012, at 13:10, Hector Zenil wrote: >> >> Information that readers may find interesting: >> >> >> Stephen Wolfram has written the first in a series of blogs posts about >> >> NKS titled "It's Been 10 Years; What's Happened with A New Kind of >> >> Science?": >> http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/its-been-10-years-whats-happened-with-a-new-kind-of-science/ >> >> >> Stephen will also be hosting an Ask Me Anything (AMA) on Reddit, where >> >> he will be taking questions about NKS and his research program on >> >> Monday, May 14 at 3pm EST. >> >> >> I think it is a good opportunity to start an interesting discussion >> >> about several topics, including of course information and computation. >> >> >> It looks like advertising for a type of universal system, the cellular >> automata. > > Coincidently, Wolfram wrote today > (http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/living-a-paradigm-shift-looking-back-on-reactions-to-a-new-kind-of-science/): > > "Looking through reviews, there are some other common themes. One is > that A New Kind of Science is a book about cellular automata—or worse, > about the idea (not in fact suggested in the book at all) that our > whole universe is a giant cellular automaton. For sure, cellular > automata are great, visually strong, examples for lots of phenomena I > discuss. But after about page 50 (out of 1280), cellular automata no > longer take center stage—and notably are not the type of system I > discuss in the book as possible models for fundamental physics." > > People keep repeating what other say about others... (in this case, > that his view is all about cellular automata). > > ... > >> Digital physics implies computationalism, but if you take the 1/3 person >> points of view distinction into account, computationalism entails a non >> digital physics. So digital physics is conceptually erroneous. >> >> See the references in my URL for a proof of that statement. You need only >> Church's Turing thesis, and the assumption that consciousness is invariant >> for *some* digital transformation (which follows from computationalism). >> >> This does not preclude that cellular automaton are very interesting, and can >> have many applications, but it is not clear to make it into a new science. >> We want to ask what about that science is, for it does not seem to address >> the most fundamental questions. > > Then perhaps you can ask him next Monday on his Reedit session. I > think he has some concerns about the place of observers in a digital > world scenario. > > As for computationalism, he as I do, think that the question is about > physics, the answer won't come therefore from a model of math or > computation. > >> >> Bruno Marchal >> >> >> >> >> >> Sincerely. >> >> ___ >> >> fis mailing list >> >> fis@listas.unizar.es >> >> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 11:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 11 May 2012, at 13:10, Hector Zenil wrote: > > Information that readers may find interesting: > > > Stephen Wolfram has written the first in a series of blogs posts about > > NKS titled "It's Been 10 Years; What's Happened with A New Kind of > > Science?": http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/its-been-10-years-whats-happened-with-a-new-kind-of-science/ > > > Stephen will also be hosting an Ask Me Anything (AMA) on Reddit, where > > he will be taking questions about NKS and his research program on > > Monday, May 14 at 3pm EST. > > > I think it is a good opportunity to start an interesting discussion > > about several topics, including of course information and computation. > > > It looks like advertising for a type of universal system, the cellular > automata. Coincidently, Wolfram wrote today (http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/living-a-paradigm-shift-looking-back-on-reactions-to-a-new-kind-of-science/): "Looking through reviews, there are some other common themes. One is that A New Kind of Science is a book about cellular automata—or worse, about the idea (not in fact suggested in the book at all) that our whole universe is a giant cellular automaton. For sure, cellular automata are great, visually strong, examples for lots of phenomena I discuss. But after about page 50 (out of 1280), cellular automata no longer take center stage—and notably are not the type of system I discuss in the book as possible models for fundamental physics." People keep repeating what other say about others... (in this case, that his view is all about cellular automata). ... > Digital physics implies computationalism, but if you take the 1/3 person > points of view distinction into account, computationalism entails a non > digital physics. So digital physics is conceptually erroneous. > > See the references in my URL for a proof of that statement. You need only > Church's Turing thesis, and the assumption that consciousness is invariant > for *some* digital transformation (which follows from computationalism). > > This does not preclude that cellular automaton are very interesting, and can > have many applications, but it is not clear to make it into a new science. > We want to ask what about that science is, for it does not seem to address > the most fundamental questions. Then perhaps you can ask him next Monday on his Reedit session. I think he has some concerns about the place of observers in a digital world scenario. As for computationalism, he as I do, think that the question is about physics, the answer won't come therefore from a model of math or computation. > > Bruno Marchal > > > > > > Sincerely. > > ___ > > fis mailing list > > fis@listas.unizar.es > > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Stephen Wolfram discussing his ANKS in Reedit this Monday
On 11 May 2012, at 13:10, Hector Zenil wrote: Information that readers may find interesting: Stephen Wolfram has written the first in a series of blogs posts about NKS titled "It's Been 10 Years; What's Happened with A New Kind of Science?": http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2012/05/its-been-10-years-whats-happened-with-a-new-kind-of-science/ Stephen will also be hosting an Ask Me Anything (AMA) on Reddit, where he will be taking questions about NKS and his research program on Monday, May 14 at 3pm EST. I think it is a good opportunity to start an interesting discussion about several topics, including of course information and computation. It looks like advertising for a type of universal system, the cellular automata. They are certainly very interesting, but such system are harder to use to reflect about the first person / third person distinction, crucial in our matter. The fundamental theories have to be machine independent, and the classical study of the ideally self-referentially correct machine, seems to me more informative for the question relating the first person points view to the third person points of view. It helps to formulate the questions, even if in toy situation. This already suggest why our "physical" neighborhoods seem to be emulable in polynomial time only by a quantum computer. Using Wolfram type of approach for fundamental studies, is a form of digital Aristotelianism. It does not work. It assumes mind-body identity thesis which contradict computationalism. It takes for granted a conception of reality hardly sustainable both with the facts, and with what comp predicts machine's facts can possibly be. Digital physics implies computationalism, but if you take the 1/3 person points of view distinction into account, computationalism entails a non digital physics. So digital physics is conceptually erroneous. See the references in my URL for a proof of that statement. You need only Church's Turing thesis, and the assumption that consciousness is invariant for *some* digital transformation (which follows from computationalism). This does not preclude that cellular automaton are very interesting, and can have many applications, but it is not clear to make it into a new science. We want to ask what about that science is, for it does not seem to address the most fundamental questions. Bruno Marchal Sincerely. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
