On Fri, Dec 12, 2003 at 06:23:48AM +0100, Anthony G. Atkielski wrote:
But since ISOC's firewalls have not been updated, you won't be able to
get to their site from Linux.
Nonsense. I'm running Linux, several versions. I can get to the ISOC
site from all of them.
--
Kent Crispin
be lost in the
normal noise of ietf processes.
Regards
Kent
On Dec 18, 2003, at 3:01 PM, Vernon Schryver wrote:
1. on-topic messages from subscribers
2. on-topic messages from non-subscribers
3. noise from subscribers
4. noise from non-subscribers
5. pure spam such as advertisements
-dresden.de/1.php
http://www.micronuke.net/1.php
http://www.stadthagen.org/1.php
etc
--
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On Wed, Apr 11, 2007 at 01:54:53PM +0200, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
Ted,
Well, if IPR owners don't actually care, why are they asking people to
send a postcard? It would seem to be an unnecessary administrative
burden for the IPR owners, yes?
My assumption is that they care if the party
be a whole
lot of boxes in this situation.
Kent
PS -- I'm not sure this will actually make it to the ietf list :-) ...
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; in light of
all
this I'm going to have to rethink that decision. For a server, the
combination of enabling ipv6 and using this particular anti-spam technique
may drastically increase the number of false positives -- especially as ipv6
gets more widely deployed.
Best Regards
Kent
, and in my experience, most
people would rather deal with some spam than lose important email.
Kent
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/Registrar
protocol that may appear later.
Agreed!
Likewise.
--
Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] lonesome." -- Mark Twain
Paul,
I object to the characterization of my comments as "propagating FUD."
One might equally well suggest that 2267 constitutes a naive model of
how to prevent IP spoofing, but I was polite enough not to say that
:-).
From a security perspective, it is never desirable to rely on a
Dan,
I'll suggest one course of action, but I keep emphasizing the issue
is not one of alternates, but of recognizing the limitations of
proposals now on the table and considering approaches that may work
irrespective of whether everyone performs filtering.
With regard to a wide range of DoS
Eliot,
Some of the DoS attacks we saw last week were good, old-fashioned SYN
floods. Hosts do have a responsibility here, more than ISPs, since
it is quite feasible to tie up a host's pool of TCBs with a small
number of packets, even if the attack tool does not use spoofed
sourced addresses
Steve,
The ATT experiences might be different, but at GTE-I, a SYN flood
was the primary attack mechanism for one major web site that we host.
Also, it is not at all clear that our network had a problem handling
the other flooded traffic (ICMP Echo Reply and UDP traffic) that was
sent to 3
Keith,
Without comments on other aspects of the technology in question, I
would like to make some observations about the security aspects of
the processing you cite as violating IP.
By now we all should know that it is a bad idea to rely on an
unauthenticated IP address as a basis for
Leslie,
I understand your point, but we leave ourselves open to many forms of
attacks, or errors, by assuming that "what you receive is what was
sent" in this era of the Internet. Security is not black and white,
but the gray area we're discussing does bother me. If one cares
about knowing
Keith,
Stephen,
perhaps the reason that the tools are not used is that they are not
adequate for the task. but it certainly does not follow that "if
one doesn't use the tools, then one does not care very much".
or perhaps, one does not care enough ...
Steve
Paul,
I have a time machine.
I just went back 20 years in time, convinced everybody that it
was always more important to implement proper security than to
make do with existing features and quick fix solutions. Having
thus changed the future, I went back forward in time.
Guess what---there
Christian,
Suppose, rhetorically, that we were to encrypt every IP packet using IPSEC.
What happens if a box takes your packet and deliver it to the "wrong"
address, for example to an ISP controlled cache? Well, the cache cannot do
anything with it, except drop it to the floor. We are thus
In many RFCs, "internet" is used as adnoun.
"adnoun"? Is that like an adverb?
--
Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] lonesome." -- Mark Twain
frames -- as far as I know, there are no frames
in the entire ICANN site;
2) the secure registration page is OPTIONAL; you can register through a
nonsecure path.
--
Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] lonesome.&quo
Adrian,
Just to confirm that I too have problems with the standard which I'm
prepared to express at some length.
Technically, it'll sure it'll fly but I'm really, really worried
about the evidential rigour. Ultimately, the TSA will have to
testify in a court and it has got to work - for the
I want to second Bob Braden's pithy observation re I-Ds. If they
make it through the process and become RFCs (including informational
RFCs) then they clearly merit retention and they achieve it, since
RFcs are archival. However, many I-Ds do not make it through the
process and to archive
Pete,
Stephen Kent wrote:
I want to second Bob Braden's pithy observation re I-Ds. If they
make it through the process and become RFCs (including informational
RFCs) then they clearly merit retention and they achieve it, since
RFcs are archival
And I'll make a pithy counter
Tim,
The April fool's day RFCs aside, I agree that not all I-Ds that fail
to make the cut as an RFC are inferior. However, there are many other
venues for publishing technical material, many of which subject the
material to review. An I-D that contains good material but fails to
become an
As someone who was around when the notion of an I-D was created, let
me disagree somewhat. There was a very definite intent to cause I-Ds
to "officially" disappear after a limited time frame.
Steve
rior art raises an interesting
possibility: forged or altered IDs being used to challenge patents.
That's another reason to have a definitive archive available.
--
Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] lonesome." -- Mark Twain
no such claim would be possible.
I'm sure it would be an interesting legal case...
--
Kent Crispin "Do good, and you'll be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] lonesome." -- Mark Twain
fle
innovation, then they lose legitimacy. I don't want to put words in
Keith's mouth, but I think he would say that the core of his concern is
that patents are now being used to stifle creativity.
--
Kent Crispin "Be good, and you will be
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
At 1:15 PM -0400 6/12/02, Keith Moore wrote:
I don't want to discount the importance of cert discovery, but I do
think it's a stretch to believe that you're going to be willing to trust
all of the certs that you discover in a chain of significant length, for
a significant set of
At 10:42 PM -0700 6/12/02, Einar Stefferud wrote:
May I suggest that someone do a little work on proving the trust is
transitive, as that is what this is really all about, and if it
turns out that trust in not transitive, then what was the point?
Maybe if you ask Google about trust
At 12:51 PM -0700 6/13/02, Christian Huitema wrote:
A PKI modeled on the DNS would parallel
the existing hierarchy and merely codify the
relationships expressed
by it in the form of public key certs.
so what you're saying is that the cert would mean something like:
;-)
At 3:32 PM -0400 6/13/02, Harald Koch wrote:
Of all the gin joints in all the towns in all the world, Stephen Kent
had to walk into mine and say:
Why does everyone keep thinking that explicit trust is an essential
element of every PKI?
If the reasonably intelligent, technically skilled
At 2:54 PM -0700 6/13/02, Einar Stefferud wrote:
At 2:15 PM -0400 6/13/02, Stephen Kent wrote:
[snip]... [snip]... [snip]... [snip]... [snip]... [snip]...
[snip]... [snip]...
You are the one who keeps saying that trust is transitive. I'm the
one saying that it's not, and that a DNS-based PKI
At 11:30 PM -0700 6/13/02, Einar Stefferud wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
On Fri, 14 Jun 2002 10:52:47 +1200, Franck Martin [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
Ideally, we should rate each CA in our applications and the application
should give us a level of risk...
Hey.. it's the PGP Web of Trust.
At 2:47 PM -0400 6/13/02, Keith Moore wrote:
A modest, realistic ambition for a DNS-based PKI would be to improve
the security of the binding between DNS entries and the associated
machines
yes, I think this is right. it eliminates some kinds of threats. but
it still doesn't guarantee
Ed,
Keith Moore wrote:
A PKI modeled on the DNS would parallel
the existing hierarchy and merely codify the relationships expressed
by it in the form of public key certs.
so what you're saying is that the cert would mean something like:
;-) actually, to a lawyer, a PKI cert says
Ed,
Stephen Kent wrote:
Ed,
snip
I think your sample CPS, while more than a little tongue in cheek, is
a good example of what a CA may assert. But, in the DNS context, many
of the issues you note are much less serious concerns than in a
general CA context, because of the existing
Stef,
Thank You Steve for clarifying your simple little error and
correcting the record on what I did or did not say. I admit that
the error was small in commission but you must admit that it was
huge in affect, so it is good for you to corrected the record.
I will assume that it was not
At 11:30 AM -0700 6/14/02, Ed Gerck wrote:
Stephen Kent wrote:
snip
Could you elaborate, perhaps privately, with why you believe a true
PKI needs multiple roots?
snip
My view is that too many
folks have tried to get too much out of any single PKI, and that has
caused a lot of our
Stef,
Hi Steve -- Now we are beginning to connect with the real meta issue.
I am talking about Trust Transitivity in general.
We agree that the DNS offers no trust functions, useful or otherwise.
So, my focus is not on PKI as related to DNS, which is what you
addressed here.
It the
At 11:03 AM -0500 6/18/02, Alex Audu wrote:
Ed,
You made some interesting points which leads me to wonder if
we can define Trust in such a way that its parameters are verifiable,
then we can verify that it is transitive. In other words, if Jon gets
a dollar from Mike, and Jon can verify the
At 5:25 PM -0700 6/20/02, Ed Gerck wrote:
Stephen Kent wrote:
Your example does not require cross-certification. It only
requires that the relying parties be members of, or have access to
the (CA) credentials for, the communities to which the individuals
belong. Cross certification is one
At 11:58 AM -0400 6/25/02, Keith Moore wrote:
We seem to agree that the DNS could be sued to distribute certs, so
the question is what should the certs attest to and who should issue
them. I argue that we need certs that support validation of DNS
bindings, and that the only
Mr. Baptista,
In reading your message re the history of security and the Internet I
my attention was drawn to the following paragraph:
DARPA planners unfortunately were short sighted and did not
anticipate the technology would become an international standard for
communications.
At 9:27 AM +1200 3/13/03, Franck Martin wrote:
I think the trouble with this attachment is that the whole e-mail is
encrypted in clear (anybody can decrypt) to save space when you send the
e-mail (SSL/TLS includes compression).
It's not encrypted, it's encoded in a form (base 64) that is unlikely
At 1:36 AM -0700 5/29/03, Einar Stefferud wrote:
I suggest that those who wish to more fully understand all this
trust stuff might find it useful to look at http://mcg.org.br/.
Cheers...\Stef
I would recommend this web site only to folks who want to see a very
narrow view of what trust and
At 3:10 PM -0700 5/30/03, Einar Stefferud wrote:
Pity the poor Zealot; who, when he loses sight of his objective,
simply redoubles his efforts.
For sure, do not let any new ideas leak into the IETF!
Cheers...\Stef
Pity the poor fellow who ventures outside his realm of knowledge and
then
At 19:03 -0700 8/23/03, Karl Auerbach wrote:
On Sat, 23 Aug 2003, Dean Anderson wrote:
H.323 and ASN.1 eventually surpass ...
Ummm, based on my own direct experience with ASN.1 since the mid 1980's
(X.400, SNMP, CMIP...), I disagree.
It has been my experience that ASN.1, no matter which encoding
At 8:39 -0800 12/12/03, Tony Hain wrote:
vinton g. cerf wrote:
...
Unfortunately, the discussion has tended to center on ICANN as the only
really visible example of an organization attempting to develop policy
(which is being treated as synonymous with governance
To further your point, an area
Keith,
I've authored several papers that capture what I see as the essence
of your characterizations, in a simple form. The central notion is
that most of these relationships are NOT about trust, but rather
about authority. if one views them in this fashion, then it becomes
apparent that the
At 4:31 +0900 12/16/03, Masataka Ohta wrote:
Stephen Kent;
I've authored several papers that capture what I see as the essence
of your characterizations, in a simple form. The central notion is
that most of these relationships are NOT about trust, but rather
about authority. if one views them
At 6:08 +0900 12/16/03, Masataka Ohta wrote:
Stephen Kent;
I'm having a feeling that you call a set of software/hardware
to handle certs a PKI.
no, there is a lot more to a PKI than hardware and software.
The problem for such PKI is that, if we have certs based on
existing trust (e.g. I trust
At 11:34 -0500 12/30/03, Ken Hornstein wrote:
From my reading of the Korean Embassy web page, it seems that US residents
will require a visa to attend the Seoul IETF. I'm wondering if anyone
has gotten a visa to enter South Korea before, and if so, can they provide
any tips on the visa process?
.
ESP is not generaly run over TCP.
RFC 2402 describes the use of ESP.
Steve Kent
author of 2401, 2402, 2406, ...
Thius is a note for all of the folks who flew on UA 893 on Friday,
2/27, with the unexpected 24 hour delay via Seattle.
I just got off the phone with UA Customer Service (not Mileage Plus).
They offered a 5K mile good will compensation for our
inconvenience. These miles will not count toward
At 12:40 -0500 3/5/04, John C Klensin wrote:
--On Friday, March 05, 2004 11:26 -0500 Stephen Kent
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Thius is a note for all of the folks who flew on UA 893 on
Friday, 2/27, with the unexpected 24 hour delay via Seattle.
I just got off the phone with UA Customer Service
Harald,
You are right that the scheme I proposed inn 1422 did not succeed,
and today I would not suggest it. But, the reason I would not suggest
it today is because I have come to believe that one should adopt CAs
that are authoritative for the certs they issue, not trusted third
parties. The
of this thread is vacuous.
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Yakov,
Ultimately the marketplace will decide, but when a WG provides
multiple solutions to the same problem it has the potential to
confuse the marketplace, retard adoption of any solution, interfere
with interoperability, etc.
Standards ought to avoid confusion, not contribute to it.
At 2:35 PM -0700 7/19/05, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
Host and application security are not the job of the network.
They are the job of the network interfaces. The gateway between a
network and the internetwork should be closely controlled and guarded.
Nobody is really proposing embedding
Phil,
...
Boy are you in for a shock when you try to connect to an ethernet with
802.1x.
I have yet to do so. I do have the facility on my Mac, but I've never
had to turn it on.
Authentication is being built into the NIC cards. At some point in the
future it will not be possible for any
Phil,
layered defenses are a good notion, but mostly when the layers are
under the same administrative control. all too often people forget
that relying on the security provided by someone else is a risky
proposition, as in your example of ISPs providing ingress filtering.
I would
Dave Michael,
In the DoD environment, a threat analysis for a system identifies the
classes of adversaries that the author believes are of concern, and
describes their capabilities and motivations. Russ's three questions
are a concise way of stating this:
- The bad actors are
Folks,
I thought that what Russ asked for was not a threat analysis for
DKIM, but a threat analysis for Internet e-mail, the system that DKIM
proposes to protect. The idea is that only if we start with a
characterization of how and why we believe adversaries attack e-mail,
can we evaluate
At 3:08 PM -0700 8/11/05, Ned Freed wrote:
I thought that what Russ asked for was not a threat analysis for
DKIM, but a threat analysis for Internet e-mail, the system that DKIM
proposes to protect. The idea is that only if we start with a
characterization of how and why we believe adversaries
system than just human sentiment. There
is heavy duty infrastructure, both human and physical, involved.
--
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it happen many times.
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currently
available.
The clearest methods currently available might include visio diagrams or
powerpoint slides -- at least according to some people.
--
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case.
Kent
--
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to believe themselves smart.
Would that things were so simple.
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At 10:16 AM -0400 5/18/06, Russ Housley wrote:
I received this note from Angelos Keromytis regarding the
draft-housley-tls-authz-extns document. I plan to accommodate this
request unless someone raises an objection.
Russ
OK, I'll object :-).
KeyNote has no IETF status, to the best of my
Russ,
I concur with Pasi's observations. I don't recall seeing a similar
structure in an RFC, where a part is informative, in what is
otherwise a standards track document.
Steve
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-drive, cli client I wrote and it doesn't
retransmit at all (perhaps not the best UI experience). I'll check with
the other implementers to see what they did. But you are right, guidance
needs to be given, especially if these things get embedded into automated
scripts.
s/if/when/
--
Kent
At 12:29 AM -0700 6/13/07, Lakshminath Dondeti wrote:
Folks,
One person has voiced concerns on my taking a strong public
position in the Should I* opinions be afforded a special status?
thread while serving as the chair of the 2007-8 nomcom. Perhaps
there are others with similar concerns.
At 6:36 PM +0900 7/7/07, Masataka Ohta wrote:
Keith Moore wrote:
Also from the draft:
At least for the strong security requirement of BCP 61 [RFC3365], the
Security Area, with the support of the IESG, has insisted that all
specifications include at least one mandatory-to-implement strong
At 10:54 AM +0900 7/10/07, Masataka Ohta wrote:
...
Stephen Kent wrote:
The notion of CA compromise and ISP comprise are not completely
comparable, which makes your comparison suspect.
As I already mentioned, social attacks on employees of CAs and
ISPs are equally easy and readily
At 1:13 PM -0700 7/10/07, Douglas Otis wrote:
On Jul 8, 2007, at 10:34 PM, Eliot Lear wrote:
This can be said of any technology that is poorly managed.
So, you merely believe that the infrastructure of PKI is well managed.
In all but a single instance I have no evidence to the contrary.
At 4:36 PM +0200 8/8/07, Iljitsch van Beijnum wrote:
On 8-aug-2007, at 12:07, Harald Alvestrand wrote:
Routing certificates are simple. If HP sells (lends, leases,
gifts, insert-favourite-transaction-type-here) address space to
someone, HP issues a certificate (or set of certificates) saying
At 9:32 AM -0400 8/9/07, David Harrington wrote:
Hi,
The issue was raised during ISMS WGLC that there is a difference
between our use of the word authenticate and the glossary in RFC2828.
Since ISMS extends SNMPv3, ISMS is using terminology consistent with
the SNMPv3 standard, which reflects
At 6:35 AM -0700 8/9/07, Bill Manning wrote:
...
The RIRs are working to enable clean transfer of address space
holdings, using X.509 certs. While one could do what what Harald
suggested, the new address space holder would have to worry about HP
revoking the cert it issued to effect the
At 9:03 AM -0700 8/9/07, Bill Manning wrote:
...
The RIRs are recognized as neutral, primary address space allocators
who have contractual relationships with the folks to whom they
allocate addresses. I think it might be more attractive to the new
holder of address space to have a
At 11:40 AM -0700 8/9/07, Bill Manning wrote:
O...
ICANN is also a legal entity, with the same vulnerabilities
as all other companies including RIR's... which was my point.
Special is reserved for governments... :)
The U.S. Dept. of Commerce recognizes ICANN
Henning,
Some WGs issue Informational RFCs that represent WG consensus, but
which are not viewed as suitable Standards track documents, for
various reasons. For example, RFC 3647 is one of the most widely
cited of the PKIX RFCs, yet it is Informational because its a policy
and procedures
At 11:23 AM -0700 8/23/07, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
If we can meet the needs of 80% of Internet users with some form of
shared access there will be more addresses left for the 20% with
greater needs.
I suspect that the actual percentages are more like 95% and 5%.
My Internet use is
Joe,
I disagree with your suggestion The software performance of security
protocols has been the more substantial issue, and is likely to
continue to be for the forseeable future.
I suspect that most desktop users do not need hardware crypto for
performance. Irarely if ever drive my GiGE
Joe,
This discussion seems to have moved from a discussion of crypto use
on home/office computers, to use in routers. There is no good
motivation for other than edge (CPE?) routers to make use of IPsec
for subscriber traffic. We know, from discussions with operators,
that use of IPsec to
Sam Hartman identified an issue with one name type (URI) that may
appear in the Subject/Issuer alternative names, when applying the
Name Constrains extension to such names. The issue arises when the
URI does not contain an authority component (a host name in a DNS
name or e-mail address),
At 7:34 PM +0100 12/4/07, Martin Rex wrote:
The document
- 'Memorandum for multi-domain Public Key Infrastructure
Interoperability'
draft-shimaoka-multidomain-pki-11.txt as an Informational RFC
creates the impression that trust anchors must always be
self-signed CA certificates.
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just
Comment on draft-klensin-net-utf8-07.txt:
--
Network Virtual Terminal (NVT) occurs first in Appendix A.
The explanation of the abbreviation should (also) be given at
the first occurence of NVT in the document.
--
Section 2, point 2,
on page 4) for NFC in Net-UTF-8 applies.
The reciever cannot be sure that NFC has been applied. Nor can it be
sure that conversion of all line endings to CR+LF (there-by loosing
information about their differences) has been applied.
/kent k
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.
/kent k
This interpretation was also, I believe,
incorporated by Jon Postel in the rules for NVT and for RFC
formatting.
I can't believe I am reopening this old topic... ;-(
Bob Braden
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that, we could also do away with the entire next line
debate by prohibiting even CRLF and requiring the use of LS
LS would be a bad idea. See my other email (sent at approx. the
same time as this one). You would get (to you) unexpected effects
from bidi processing.
/Kent Karlsson
to
beginning of line). If it were not for that, I would agree
that VT is not very interesting (though it does provide for
a hack to distinguish line separation from paragraph separation
by ignoring the tabulation aspect of VT, also for pure 8-bit
character encodings).
/Kent Karlsson
At 6:00 PM -0600 1/11/08, Nicolas Williams wrote:
...
Finally, multi-user systems may need to authenticate individual users to
other entities, in which case IPsec is inapplicable[*]. (I cannot find
a mention of this in the I-D, not after a quick skim.)
[*] At least to my reading of RFC4301,
At 2:06 PM -0600 1/14/08, Nicolas Williams wrote:
...
Ipsec does support
^
You're slipping :) :)
oh my!
per-user authentication if protocol ID and port pairs can be used to
distinguish the
Mike,
I have to disagree with your characterization of the proper role of
the IAB with regard to the NOMCOM process.
I have been on three NOMCOMs, including the one prior to this, so I
too have some experience in the process.
My feeling is that the IAB may have been trying to assert too
Chad,
Your message of 4/8 ended with a list of changes needed to IPv6
implementations to implement RNET. Changes to processing logic are
just as serious as change to the format.
Steve
---
The following changes need be made to the IP Version 6 Protocol Logic, in
routers, in order to
Alex,
The conclusion I draw from this experience differs from yours. If the
individuals who sent the messages in question choose to become
involved constructively, then there can be some benefit. But, the act
of sending the messages in question has generated ill will, so it was
a bad way to
At 9:00 PM -0800 2/19/09, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary=_=_NextPart_001_01C99318.3582B8D8
Just as a matter of observation, there is not and never has been a
security requirement to rigidly
At 7:06 PM -0800 2/20/09, Dave CROCKER wrote:
Stephen Kent wrote:
At 9:00 PM -0800 2/19/09, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
Just as a matter of observation, ...
...
I have not read the doc in
question,...
Hey guys. As someone who is frequently faced with trying to parse
out what
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