://www.dcssproject.net/
The hackathon will take place in Cardiff, the capital of Wales. Cardiff
has an international airport and is two hours from London by train.
For information about the hackathon, please contact Michael Rogers:
mich...@briarproject.org
For information about the conference, please
)
Lina Dencik (Cardiff University)
Ian Brown (Oxford University)
Michael Rogers (Briar Project, Technical University of Delft)
Jonathan Cable (Cardiff University)
--
Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of
list guidelines will get you moderated:
https
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On 07/12/14 01:18, coderman wrote:
On 12/2/14, Nariman Gharib nariman...@gmail.com wrote:
OPERATION CLEAVER: A new global cyber power has emerged; one
that has already compromised some of the world’s most critical
infrastructure. The Operation
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On 18/07/14 01:02, coderman wrote:
as thought experiment: a hidden site is setup by presumed
trustworthy experts. exploits are funneled there, then they all
dry up.
- congratulations! NSA is out of 0day! ? - congratulations! NSA is
not using
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On 14/07/14 23:29, isis wrote:
Yep, the idea is pretty old. A variant of it was even written up
into RFC1751 in 1994. [0] That one is already in the pycrypto
module, [1] at `Crypto.Util.RFC1751`.
Some people on the messag...@moderncrypto.org
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Hi Todd,
The draft has become RFC 7258.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258
Cheers,
Michael
On 10/07/14 14:12, Todd Weiler wrote:
Hi all,
This IETF draft on Pervasive Monitoring is about to expire - in
case anyone hasn't seen it, it's a
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Hi Stevens,
I think it would be irresponsible to start a new project in C or C++
given the enormous number of security issues caused by memory handling
bugs in C and C++ code. Here's a quote from a Debian security advisory
I just received, which is
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It's news because it was a covert project, which USAID supposedly
doesn't engage in.
There will be absolutely no mention of United States government
involvement, according to a 2010 memo from Mobile Accord, one of
the project's contractors.
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On 20/03/14 19:30, Yuriy Kaminskiy wrote:
Note that all above variants may be NOT actually branchless and
thus NOT really constant-time (depending on architecture, jvm
implementation and options, etc). Most likely, resulting time
difference
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On 21/03/14 12:52, Michael Rogers wrote:
Thanks for the pointer. The Javadoc doesn't say whether this is a
constant-time comparison. In OpenJDK 6 it isn't. In OpenJDK 7 it
does something similar to my original suggestion. So unfortunately
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On 20/03/14 01:42, Cypher wrote:
More features are under discussion. We would like your input on
what features you would like to see. Please keep in mind that we
are looking at functionality first. Secondly we are looking at
introducing a
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Hi Michael,
What you're trying to do is very similar to ECIES. You should probably
use ECIES, which has received more review than your design. It's
implemented in BouncyCastle, and there was recently a thread on the
BouncyCastle mailing list about
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On 06/02/14 20:56, Margie Roswell wrote:
For all I know, the lack of implementations using this kind of
one-way transformation isn't about government sluggishness but
rather about its feasibility. I'd be very curious to hear folks
ideas on
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On 18/12/13 00:44, Yosem Companys wrote:
Using this framework, it's clear that the media is focusing on the
regulative (laws) and parts of the cultural-cognitive (tech), but
ignoring the normative and affective, as Dan notes, including arts
and
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On 21/11/13 11:29, Eugen Leitl wrote:
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
For users of Adblock Plus, the following rule allows access:
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On 29/10/13 16:50, Douglas Lucas wrote:
That no one can see an HTTPS URL seems contradicted by this EFF
Tor and HTTPS diagram: https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https
For the diagram, if you click the HTTPS button to show what data
is visible
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On 11/10/13 01:14, carlo von lynX wrote:
No one anywhere has solved the problem of asynchronous,
forward-secret group cryptography.
I think you have to be a bit opportunistic about it. Briar does it
somehow, if I understood correctly.
Yes and
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On 04/10/13 16:42, Griffin Boyce wrote:
There are some questions in my mind as to the legitimacy of this
document -- particularly given that a slide is marked 2007, but
references 2012. (In particular, neither Torservers nor TorButton
existed
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On 27/09/13 15:23, Lorenzo Franceschi -Bicchierai wrote:
Thoughts?
The update feature of uVirtus's Sanctuary VPN (OpenVPN obfuscated with
obfsproxy) is a bit concerning. The source code has been removed from
Github, but judging by the description on
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On 24/09/13 05:21, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
Is Briar able to hide metadata that describes who is messaging
whom within the network from an attacker with a splitter on the
internet and a $50+ billion budget?
We'll see. :-) Briar moves communication
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On 22/09/13 20:51, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
Goodwill is a pre-internet concept that is predicated on things
like short human memories, and it wholesale ignores all the moral
hazards that come from being able to install a splitter on a
single line
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On 16/09/13 06:57, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
On 09/15/2013 02:32 PM, Michael Rogers wrote:
Friend suggestions can be based on a partial view of the social
graph - - for example, each user may be able to see their friends
and their friends' friends
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On 16/09/13 07:59, Brian Conley wrote:
On Sep 15, 2013 8:19 PM, Michael Rogers
mich...@briarproject.org mailto:mich...@briarproject.org
wrote:
On 14/09/13 11:03, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
The user have only those two platform, a browser
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On 14/09/13 11:03, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
The user have only those two platform, a browser and a mobile phone
with downloadable apps. Everything else requiring to install an
application over a desktop computer is IMHO destinated to be a
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On 15/09/13 16:49, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
I'm not completely sure, but I don't think that is possible.
For example: regardless of privacy implications, discoverability on
Facebook is a feature. Regardless of privacy implications,
suggestions
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On 13/09/13 10:04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Baseband processors leave the system wide open to all kind of
attacks. Countermeasure would be running the 2G/3G/4G stack in an
open source SDR radio, or using an open source VoIP device that
connects by WLAN
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On 05/09/13 21:10, Richard Brooks wrote:
There is a massive difference between cryptanalysis and
decade-long, well-funded, and top-secret program to subtly weaken
international cryptographic protocols and sabotage industry
implementations.
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On 06/09/13 19:25, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
I don't see any evidence of said shift in priorities. NSA
supported escrowed encryption in the 90's, and the alleged
subversion of standards is most likely similar to escrowed
encryption, but at the
, cc or
bcc forms social networks:
http://www.isi.edu/~adibi/Enron/Enron_Dataset_Report.pdf
On Mon, Sep 2, 2013 at 6:48 AM, Michael Rogers
mich...@briarproject.org mailto:mich...@briarproject.org
wrote:
Hi all,
Does anyone on the list know of any research into the way people
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Hi all,
Does anyone on the list know of any research into the way people
communicate in ad hoc groups? By an ad hoc group I mean a group formed
for the duration of a particular communication, such as the list of
people CCed in an email thread, as
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On 01/09/13 10:00, Caspar Bowden (lists) wrote:
AFAIK Deleuze, Foucault et al. did not say anything specifically
about covert (mass-)surveillance, or analyse how the inherently
secret nature of such organizations might be a causal element in
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On 25/08/13 20:14, StealthMonger wrote:
Will the other cypherpunks on this list please step forward and
help me refute this toxic propaganda? I don't have time to do it
all myself.
It isn't propaganda. Or at least, it's true.
All the problems
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Hi DC,
Thanks for the reply. Responses to your responses inline. ;-)
On 23/08/13 21:51, DC wrote:
The hash format (first 80 bits of SHA-1, encoded base32) is the
same as Onion URLs use. How do they avoid preimage attacks? (I
thought generating
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On 23/08/13 09:53, DC wrote:
One difficult problem in public-key encryption is key exchange: how
to get a recipient's public key and know it's really theirs. My
plan is to make make your email the hash of your public key. For
example, my address
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On 19/08/13 07:33, Ben Laurie wrote:
Merkle trees (a la Certificate Transparency) are more efficient
than chains. Also, if you did that, you could have a global log,
and so prove against censorship of an entire blog.
I wonder if Twitter would be
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On 12/08/13 21:32, Francisco Ruiz wrote:
So, here's my question. Does any one know of a celebrity who cares
enough about computer security to be persuaded to take one minute
of his/her time to read a hash before a camera?
I'd like to second
The app store can't substitute a different binary (no developer signing key),
users can verify that the app was what the developer produced (via pulling
the binary and checking the hash), and advanced users can verify that what
the developer produced is what they produce via the replicable
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On 09/08/13 17:43, Reed Black wrote:
CryptoCat is served up by the Chrome app store. Do you have
control over what binary gets distributed to who? Does any assurace
exist beyond the app store's own signing validation?
I thought this was like
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On 05/08/13 19:55, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
This is good from a capabilities standpoint but it doesn't cover
motive which is hugely important to threat modeling. If someone
has significant resources and their motive is to cause mayhem,
securing
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Hi Caleb,
On 03/08/13 01:33, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
We could spend a long time discussing locally effective attacks on
social networks and not be any closer to agreement.
Instead I think it's worth asking who your attacker is... I find
that
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Thanks yet again for the answers, Caleb! Responses inline.
On 02/08/13 19:03, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
That's a big if. Do you currently have a way to detect Sybil
edges?
Sure, I'd just run `cjdcmd traceroute` and look for the nodes
whose
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Hi Francisco,
On 30/07/13 23:09, Francisco Ruiz wrote:
4. A revamped Key strength meter, which won't give a perfect score
until the user has appended his/her email to the Key. This is to
combat a powerful attacker (like the NSA) who might be able
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Hi Caleb,
On 01/08/13 17:20, Caleb James DeLisle wrote:
At this point, Alice knows that Carol is real in the sense that
someone owns Carol's private key and uses it to respond to pings.
But Alice has no way to determine whether Bob and Carol are
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On 23/07/13 19:33, Mikael MMN-o Nordfeldth wrote:
PSI is Public Sector Information. It's the common term in European
politics on the subject of open data within the public sector.
Usually it implies that any data a public sector organisation has
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On 15/07/13 04:29, Sarah Lai Stirland wrote:
Thanks. This is the kind of discussion and back and forth I was
looking for ... I kind of figured this was the case, although I
don't know of any actual examples of any of this happening. I know
a lot
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On 15/07/13 01:49, Mitar wrote:
BTW, how do you propose to make Sybil nodes impossible?
I don't. I am just making an argument, that maybe there is some way
we (or I) don't yet know which would allow us to don't have to
trust other nodes with
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Hi Ben,
I'd love to see hardware support for full-disk encryption and secure
deletion. Apple is streets ahead of Android in this respect: iOS's
disk encryption key depends on a unique key built into each device, so
brute-force attempts to decrypt the
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On 08/07/13 20:35, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
Writing secure software is relatively easy, and does not rely much
on abstraction layers or whatever OOP ideology is popular at the
moment. You just document each function' input/output, test it
somehow,
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It's unfortunate that Ars Technica has chosen that angle, since I
believe it misrepresents the situation: if you use encryption, the NSA
may indeed retain your encrypted traffic, but won't be able to read
it. If you don't use encryption, the NSA will
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On 17/06/13 14:12, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
One more generic comment/observation: clearly, Usenet or a
Usenet-ish mechanism will run on a smartphone. But I'm not sure
that's a good idea. Given the existence of things like CarrierIQ,
the propensity
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On 21/06/13 17:57, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
What about the theory that by encrypting all the things we are
feeding some massively large NSA cryptanalysis project that uses
different flavors of ciphertext to find weaknesses? Very conspiracy
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On 19/06/13 18:06, Steve Weis wrote:
I also noticed the verification code might be susceptible to a
timing attack: if (hex_hmac_sha1(key, text) === hmac)
It looks like the adversary might be able to bypass MAC checking
entirely: decryptNode()
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On 17/06/13 18:13, Anne Roth wrote:
We have compiled this 'Quick Guide to Alternatives', based on
Security in-a-box and more.
https://alternatives.tacticaltech.org
Hi Anne,
Thanks for making this resource available.
The descriptions of
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On 15/06/13 00:53, Guido Witmond wrote:
Encrypting everything should stop article spoofing. (Although
it doesn't stop article flooding, and an adversary could try
to overwhelm the network by injecting large amounts of
traffic. Deprecating the
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On 14/06/13 12:49, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
I think a *possible* fix for it -- or perhaps fix is too strong a
term, let me call it an approach -- is to remove the Path: header
(among others) and use the article body's checksum as a unique
identifier.
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On 11/06/13 17:47, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
Concealing these patterns would require users to send and
receive dummy data even when they weren't sending or receiving
calls, which would drain their batteries and data allowances. It
would be possible
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On 11/06/13 17:52, Sean Cassidy wrote:
I have created a simple anonymity network that broadcasts all
messages to participants so that you cannot associate chatters.
Hi Sean,
A few quick questions:
* Do routers subscribe to prefixes, or is it only
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Hi Anthony,
On 08/06/13 13:36, Anthony Papillion wrote:
1. Location is a particularly thorny issue. Presentations at either
HOPE or BlackHat demonstrated how easy it is to locate a mobile
even if you're not the government with a massive budget and
This law does not allow the targeting of any US citizen or of any person
located within the United States.
Note the wording of this denial: the *target* of collection may not be a US
citizen or a person located in the US. But if the *target* is, say, Al Qaeda
and affiliated organisations, does
Speaking just for myself, and if you quote me on this as speaking on anyone
else's behalf, you're a complete fool, if the government was able to build
infrastructure that could listen to all the traffic from a major provider for
a fraction of what it costs them to handle that traffic in the
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On 27/05/13 20:37, Bruce Potter at IRF wrote:
I have a friend working in a politically volatile environment
overseas environment who's interested in taking over a public
e-mail group/listserv as a public participation service. The friend
is based
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On 30/05/13 22:44, R. Jason Cronk wrote:
An interesting article that some on this list may find pertinent,
though not really ground breaking
http://www.ifex.org/international/2013/05/29/biometrics_programs/
http://t.co/YQ6loPZgtG
This link
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On 31/05/13 16:01, Travis McCrea wrote:
Services should have the option (as Google does) to pay for a
service, and not have to take part in advertising. I would love to
pay Facebook $5 a month, and not have any ads and no tracking.
Thought
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On 14/05/13 17:08, Julian Oliver wrote:
..on Tue, May 14, 2013 at 11:04:11AM -0500, Andrés Leopoldo Pacheco
Sanfuentes wrote:
I understand that the Skype traffic IS encrypted. The problem is
that Skype itself (and now, Microsoft) holds the key,
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Hi Nick,
I think the kind of taxonomy you're talking about would be really
useful, both for educating users and for helping developers to focus
on the right threats. I'm currently reading Folk Models of Home
Computer Security, which seems like it
Original Message
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 11:03:51 +0200
From: Carmela Troncoso ctronc...@gradiant.org
To: p...@lists.links.org
Hello everybody,
in the last year we have been developing at Gradiant
(http://www.gradiant.org/en.html) a Firefox addon that allows users to
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On 26/03/13 09:59, Julian Oliver wrote:
For your Linux laptop why not just use an encrypted file-system and
lid-switch? Close the lid and the machine hibernates. If you forget
to close the lid then time it out to a screen lock. Can be done in
a
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On 03/03/13 14:25, Jens Christian Hillerup wrote:
I basically just wanted to throw it out here. Does anybody have
experience in modulating data? Has this kind of digital one-way
communication been done in an activist setting before? Does it
make
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On 04/03/13 15:56, Jens Christian Hillerup wrote:
Nice information, thanks. Would it be wrong to assume larger data
rates to be attainable on an FM link than over the telephone
line? For music etc. FM has far superior sound quality in any
case.
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On 25/02/13 19:03, Raven Jiang CX wrote:
I think a subtle difference is what exactly the bargain entails. In
the case of television advertising, it's a relatively
straightforward exchange of your attention for entertainment.
Facebook is asking for
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On 21/02/13 18:32, Brian Conley wrote:
Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be
less susceptible?
iOS has several classes of encrypted storage. For the
NSFileProtectionComplete class, the class key that protects the
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On 06/02/13 15:52, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
Many operating systems and applications and even application
extensions (e.g., Firefox extensions) now attempt to discover the
presence of updates for themselves either automatically or because
a user
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On 29/12/12 13:47, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
Do any system besides WWW use the CA? SSL-guarded email in some
case for ęxample? Is HTTPS all to worry about?
Hi Jerzy,
Yes, SSL-based email uses the same CA system as HTTPS.
Cheers,
Michael
-BEGIN
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On 17/12/12 23:25, Eric S Johnson wrote:
Secure deletion is a problem we could solve in software, by
encrypting the data and then destroying the key to render the
data unrecoverable, *if* we had a few bytes of persistent,
erasable storage in which
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On 17/12/12 23:25, Eric S Johnson wrote:
I'm not aware of any suitable storage on current smartphones or
personal computers
Isn't this exactly how the iOS (v4+) can be remotely wiped in a
couple seconds? Everything's encrypted, so deleting the
Sorry, I misremembered the problem I ran into when trying to configure Etherpad
Lite with SSL support - the problem was with my certificate, not with Etherpad
Lite. Thanks for the correction.
Cheers,
Michael
Pavol Luptak wil...@trip.sk wrote:
On Wed, Oct 03, 2012 at 01:10:28PM +0100, Michael
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On 30/09/12 16:24, John Case wrote:
So the question ... what is the handset ?
If a handheld linux computer (archos ? old compaq ipaq ?) wasn't
designed as a mobile phone, it won't have speaker at the ear and
mic at the mouth as you would
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Hi Bernard,
There are two areas where I'd love to see some research. The first is
the effect of provenance on perceptions of security: when deciding how
secure they believe a tool to be, how strongly are people influenced
by their knowledge of who
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On 22/09/12 16:56, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb wrote:
I have the feeling (backed up by observation) there is a similar
approach by some people open source software, where the argument of
the developer is good so s/he wouldn't do anything bad.
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On 07/08/12 06:19, fr...@journalistsecurity.net wrote:
How many people on this list have spent time asking
non-technologists and other users who have tried, but have since
given up even trying to use tools like PGP? Or have examined how
new users
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On 05/08/12 05:24, Miles Fidelman wrote:
In some sense, the model sitting in the back of my mind, is: - NNTP
(with encryption and crypto-based access controls) - easier
management of (private) group creation - messages containing HTML
JavaScript
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On 21/07/12 18:02, Chris Ball wrote:
Hi,
On Sat, Jul 21 2012, Michael Rogers wrote:
Does anyone on the list know whether flash controller chips use
journalling? I'm guessing they might because YAFFS does.
I don't think so -- YAFFS
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Hi all,
If you're in London next Friday, I'll be hosting a Briar hackathon at
London Hackspace:
http://wiki.london.hackspace.org.uk/view/Workshops/Briar_hackathon
Please spread the word! The event's timed to coincide with Google's
Develop for Good
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