Peircers,
Submitted for you approval, another bitty brain teaser
from Our Dear Duns Scotus, care of Warren S. McCulloch.
In 1923 I gave up the attempt to write a logic of transitive verbs and began to see what I could do
with the logic of propositions. My object, as a psychologist, was to in
That's also found in CP 6.66, "Let he who has insight calculate the
number..."
Matt
On 4/2/14, 5:25 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Peircers,
The physics courses I took in college and all the extra reading I did
on the side taught that the rise of relativity and quantum mechanics
had overthrown forme
Jon, list,
I've thought of that quote quite a bit lately. It didn't quite hit me
like a bus, but it reinforces my feeling of imprecision about what a
cause is. - Best, Ben
On 4/2/2014 5:25 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Peircers,
The physics courses I took in college and all the extra reading I did
Peircers,
The physics courses I took in college and all the extra reading I did on the side taught that the
rise of relativity and quantum mechanics had overthrown former notions about the rock-bottom status
of causality, space, and time, placing the "causal picture" and the "spacetime picture"
So much for the deniers of chance!
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 02, 2014 16:23
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] leave room for chance
John, that's right, only the same applies to an an efficient cause. Let's say
that bus doesn't crush
John, that's right, only the same applies to an an efficient cause.
Let's say that bus doesn't crush the inattentive pedestrian chancing a
blind run, but, as the bus turns the corner, bumps him in the head as he
slides under it in the snow, so that he wakes up safe and sound under
the stopped b
List,
I've now posted Joe's transcription of MS 634, pp. 23-28 at Arisbe, so
there'll be an online place where the underlinings and italics in the
transcription are preserved.
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms634/ms634_23-28.htm
There are a couple of dissertations, each split up
Gary F, Auke, Cathy, list
Gary F, maybe I was indeed too quick and jumped the rationale of my claim.
Sure the predicate signifies characters of the subject and offers the depth
of a proposition. But saying that does not explain how we come to have the
concept of, say, yellow, as to apply to a chai
List,
Joseph Ransdell sent a transcription of MS 634, pp. 23-28 to peirce-l in
the his post of 29 May 2008, with subject line "CSP on the object as
cause of the sign (MS 634.23-28)". I have pasted it below. The
underlinings, italics, and centering appear in my winmail.dat copy of
the email bu
Ben, your remarks sound right to me.
But an “agent” may be produing an effect proper to its own being, as, say, in
reproduction; but an “agent” may also work in a chance event, as when an
inattentive pedestrian steps in front of a bus which, as “agent cause”,
proceeds to crush the pedestrian. B
John D., Frank, list,
I notice that I've made the distinctions sound more verbal than
substantive, but it's partly how I remember it from Aristotle. I would
add that some things lend themselves better to treatment as matter than
as efficient causes, and so on. In dynamics and decision processe
John D., Frank, list,
I'm not aware that _/agens/_ vs. _/efficiens/_ is aligned with proper
vs. accidental cause, in either order. I don't know whether such a thing
is what John D. had in mind, but it seems so.
As I understand it, based on my Latin studies decades ago and on my old
copy of _
Cathy, list
Thank you Cathy for sharing with us your very good, and also charming,
account of Peirce's basic ideas of perception. In my PhD thesis Minute
Semeiotic (2005) I found it very difficult to put my understanding in a
rhetoric narrative as you are presenting. My choice then was to intervie
Gary R., Edwina, Cathy, Jeffrey, list,
Gary, thanks for this explanation from Nöth, which is much more nuanced than
the bit from his Handbook of Semiotics (which I included in my reply to Jeff
before I saw your message).
The trouble with the pansemiotic issue is that it catches us between
s
Gary,
You replied to Vinicius:
With that in mind, I don't quite follow your argument here, and could use
some further explanation on these points:
"icons do not enter our concepts as such"
"depth signifies the object by applying to it percipua discriminated as
predicative terms (mortal,
Vinicius,
My previous message was inspired by the kind of thing Peirce says in the
"New Elements" essay of 1904:
[[ Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects.
All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are parts of
one and the same Universe
Peircers and Others ...
The sections my project on Inquiry Driven Systems where I introduce
the use of Objective Frameworks (OFs) may be of use in the discussion
of objects, pragmata, purposes, etc., so here is a copy of the first
installment. Anyone who wishes to read ahead may find this among
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