List:
Some responses are interwoven:
On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:49 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
>> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler
>> wrote:
>>
>> I find CSP to be rather inconsistent with regard to the deeper philosophical
>> structures of mathematics and its origins and the pragma
Terms, Propositions, Arguments:
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/
Jon, Lists,
I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means accepting that there
are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely matters of
convention. This can allow for truths that don't require knowledge of any
specific particular instances to know, but require knowledge
List, Clark:
On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> Peirce just doesn’t see the whole universe in those terms unlike Leibniz or
> Spinoza.
Your judgment is hard for me accept.
I could argue that CSP not only sees the whole universe, but he see's it with
the exquisite details availa
List:
On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> Men many times fancy that
> they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute
> to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents
> to satisfy the teasing “why’s” of the ego. The extent of this
>
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> I find CSP to be rather inconsistent with regard to the deeper philosophical
> structures of mathematics and its origins and the pragmatism of applied
> mathematics as it relates to the conceptualization of the exactness of
> logi
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:39 PM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
>> I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his
>> scholastic realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or
>> Leibniz.
>
> I disagree.
List, Clark:
On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his
> scholastic realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or
> Leibniz.
I disagree.
CSP's "fill in the blanks" sentences are a direct extension
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:04 PM, John Collier wrote:
>
> Yes, this agrees with my understanding, which has not changed, but has
> matured and become more clear over time. <>
>
After I posted that I thought about it some more and there is a way in which
Peirce is like Leibniz or Spinoza and th
List, Jeff:
Another fine post, Jeff, along with several other posts in this thread. I do
not have time to prepare detailed responses but think I can add a bit here.
I will focus on the phrase:
> b) a principle of continuity that guides us in the formation of hypotheses
> that will make the ex
Yes, this agrees with my understanding, which has not changed, but has matured
and become more clear over time.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 9:46 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 12:23 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> An idealist like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by
> Platonists like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that
> thoughts are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view
> require
Terms, Propositions, Arguments:
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/
OK, thanks Jon. That is clear enough. You are right on all counts, I think. I
would think that Russell and Frege come out as rationalists (my version) on
this account, but Peirce does not (on these grounds at least). That would put
Peirce closer to my position than I could argue for previously,
John, all,
This is just one of those points I've been pressing
for the last quarter of a century or so, for example,
if I may append a self-quotation:
Peirce's claim that his definition of a sign involves no
reference to human thought means no necessary reference.
The adjective "nonpsychologic
Hello John, Jon, Lists,
As you might expect, there are quite a number of points of disagreement and
also agreement between Descartes and Peirce. Let's pick one, and let's set to
the side all questions of metaphysics. Here is a question that both try to
answer: for the purposes of engaging in
Jon, Lists,
I agree that starting with Cartesian dualism will give a bad interpretation of
Peirce, but I am not sure what you mean by your first distinction. Could you
expand?
The Cartesian position is a consequence of what I called rationalism if it
accepts material substance. Idealism is th
Frances to Sung and all listers---
Allow me to start a new topic culled from the old topic on those supersign
interpretant effects called terms and propositions and arguments.
Sung recently on the biosemiotics list roughly wrote in effect the following
muse with my libera
John, all,
It is necessary to distinguish non-psychological from anti-psychological and
independence from exclusion.
It is impossible to make sense of Peirce's position if you start by assuming
the Cartesian dualism that he rejected.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> On Nov 19,
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