On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical
sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems.
I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable
> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?
> What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?
I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While
Kirsti, List:
I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but
not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do. On the contrary,
I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in
particular--which is why I sought input from the List.
"Our existing
> On Apr 8, 2017, at 10:46 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of
> determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas,
> or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of
Jerry, List,
did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only
> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have
> exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
> and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
>
> The outer layers are always
List:
The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three
critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:
1. issues that relate realism to idealism
2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and
3. issues that relate the sciences to the
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John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is,
Kirsti,
Thanks for the notice.
Of course that setup is barely a beginning.
It is only the grounds out of which understanding must grow,
IF our understanding is to proceed on these two conditions:
MAT. We take the methods and tools that C.S. Peirce gave us seriously.
COR. We take the context
Jon A.
Seems valid to me. But it does not answer the quest for understanding. -
If you see my point.
Kirsti
Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 7.4.2017 02:02:
Jon, List ...
I've mentioned the following possibility several times before, but
maybe not too recently.
A sign relation L is a subset of a
John,
I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with
"laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science
with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got
angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just
Jon,
The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If
you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs,
and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.
"Our existing universe" does not
Jaakko Hintikka Memorial
Special Issue of Logica Universalis
Edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Call for Papers
Any paper related to the work of Hintikka is welcome, in particular those
dealing with the following topics:
- Knowledge and Belief
- Independence-friendly logic
- Lingua Universalis vs
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