Hello,
Thus far in this ongoing discussion about the nature of immediate object,
considerable attention has been paid to the question of what passages support
one or another interpretation of Peirce's account and how those passages ought
to be read. I'm wondering if we might make some
Gary F, Jon S, list
Gary wrote:
GF: Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign
signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which
taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in
continuing this dialogue if we can base it on
Gary F., Helmut, List:
GF: You could also regard the rheme as a proposition with some parts
missing, as Peirce sometimes does.
Exactly, which is why a Rheme has an Immediate Object just as much as a
proposition/Dicisign. As a Symbol, it is necessarily Copulative, with its
(incomplete) logical
Gary F., List:
GF: Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those
two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have
not been published.
More than one is multiple, and manuscript sources that have not (yet) been
published are the necessary basis
Helmut, you ask,
“In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object a sign
may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law." Does that not
mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?”
No. A qualisign is a sign that IS a quality, and a sinsign IS a sign that is an
Helmut, list
We cannot assume that a Sign [the triad] is interpreting a Dynamic
Object 'correctly'. That is why the Scientific Method [Peirce's 4th
method of fixing belief] is necessary - since it is a process going
through many semiosic actions to, possibly, but not always,
Sorry, Gary, not Gray! In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law." Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?
Gray, list,
by having looked at the entries about the catchword
Gray, list,
by having looked at the entries about the catchword "immediate object" in Commens dictionary, I donot see a reason to believe that for Peirce rhemes donot have one. In one place he writes that "many signs" have one, but mostly he writes "signs", even "every sign" has an immediate
Edwina,
I see your points. Maybe we are talking about different kinds of investment: Surely there are justful and sincere investors and managers. But slavers are not, and often the land was and is not bought, but stolen by bribing the authority officials, or conquered. One might say, that a
Jon, list,
Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are
certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together
constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this
dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of
Hardly off topic. We are all saying the same thing in different ways.
Peirce said consistently in many ways that we are not to confine science to
the narrow limits of materiality. If one accepts those limits one is
closing the door. Your post echoes Malet to me -- another ignored and
therefore
List,
Maybe this is off-topic. But I see that it has relevance to Peirce for a
number of reasons, so I thought Id run it past our forum.
CONJECTURE: Could it be that dreams are what we experience when our sleeping
self connects with another mind-body located elsewhere?
My reasons for taking
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