Hello,
Thus far in this ongoing discussion about the nature of immediate object, considerable attention has been paid to the question of what passages support one or another interpretation of Peirce's account and how those passages ought to be read. I'm wondering if we might make some progress by also considering the reasons that seemed to be guiding Peirce when he developed the distinctions between the two different kinds of objects and the three different kinds of interpretants. If we pay attention to the reasons that seemed to be controlling in the development of the distinctions, can an argument be given--for or against--one or another line of interpretation? Or, can an argument be given for or against one or another way of developing and interpreting these conceptions within the context of the semiotic theory? The aim of a theory of critical logic is to explain what is essential for abductive, deductive and inductive arguments to be valid. The aim of a speculative grammar is to explain what is essential for any kind of sign to have a significant character. Taking these two related aims in mind, why is the conception of the immediate object essential for the further development--by Peirce or by us--of a pragmatically oriented semiotic theory? Peirce is not the kind of philosopher who theorizes in a vacuum. Rather, he sees a need to develop hypothetical explanations that engage with other leading theorists on disputed questions. So, consider what he says in his review of Fraser's edition of the works of Berkeley: This realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the realist will not be the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious doubts. For according to him it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality. What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. And if a general belief, which is perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way be produced, though it be by the fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in such belief is utterly absurd. The realist will hold that the very same objects which are immediately present in our minds in experience really exist just as they are experienced out of the mind; that is, he will maintain a doctrine of immediate perception. He will not, therefore, sunder existence out of the mind and being in the mind as two wholly improportionable modes. When a thing is in such relation to the individual mind that that mind cognizes it, it is in the mind; and its being so in the mind will not in the least diminish its external existence. For he does not think of the mind as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to be out of. To make a distinction between the true conception of a thing and the thing itself is, he will say, only to regard one and the same thing from two different points of view; for the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the reality. The realist will, therefore, believe in the objectivity of all necessary conceptions, space, time, relation, cause, and the like. (bold and underlined are my emphasis) Peirce is responding here to a number of the main positions that were taken in the debates between the empiricists and rationalists—especially as those took shape in the arguments and positions of Kant and Hume. He claims that this formulation of realism may be more “definitely” expressed than has been done before. As such, he seems to think that this formulation involves some kind of clarification of what the dispute is really over. We should keep in mind that the position “involves a phenomenalism”, but it is one that is inspired considerable more by the arguments of Kant than those of Hume. Indeed, he says, “what Kant called his Copernican step was precisely the passage from the nominalistic to the realistic view of reality.” (CP, 8.15) As such, Peirce appears to be further developing this Copernican turn—or perhaps shifting it in a more pragmaticist direction. The key idea, I take it, is that this pragmatic theory of cognition is being shaped within a realist framework that endorses a doctrine of immediate perception. This framework conceives of what is in mind and what is out of mind in a manner that differs in important respects from the way that distinction was made by the likes of Hume and his followers. Drawing on these sorts of considerations, I tend to think the conception of the immediate object was well established within the debates of the modern and medieval philosophers, and that Peirce is simply refining that conception for the sake of offering what he thinks are better explanations of the differences between such things as (a) what it is for a thing to be within mind or without it, and (b) what it is for an assertion to be true and false. If we take this conception of the immediate object of thought and then generalize on it, where should we draw the line in terms of the kinds of signs that might have such immediate objects? Do all classes of signs have such objects, or do only those signs that have the character of a dicisign have such objects? Since we all seem to agree that propositions expressed symbolically have immediate objects, what follows from that? The inference I am tempted to draw is that any sign—even a rhematic iconic qualisign--that might be thought or expressed as part of a symbolic proposition has, in some sense, an immediate object--at least as a possible object if not as a existent or as a necessitant. My argument for this claim is that the meaning of an immediate perception of, say, a green cushion on a yellow chair seems to involve the following: (1) elements of firstness that are connected in particular ways in the percept, (2) a visual percept of a chair with a definite spatial shape, (3) a direct perception of the differences between the connectives involved in having a percept of a yellow chair with a green cushion versus that of a green chair with a yellow cushion, (4) a perception of the opposition between the two objects that involves (5) a double awareness. (see CP 7.625). So, what difference does it make—for the sake of what we trying to explain in this theory of cognition—in holding that the rhematic iconic qualisigns or the rhematic indexical sinsigns involved in the immediate perception of a green cushion on a yellow chair each have their immediate objects or in claiming that only the dicisign expressed in the perceptual judgment has such an object? For my part, I tend to think that is natural to explain the character of the immediate object that is involved in the perceptual judgment and the relation it has to the dynamical object and to the various signs and their interpretants by appealing to the immediate objects—possible if not actual--of the rhematic signs that are involved in such dicisigns. After all, within the context of this theory of semiotics, it is natural to conceive of rhematic signs as limited cases of dicisigns, just as it is natural to conceive of dicisigns as limiting cases of inferences. If these conceptions pick out natural and not arbitrary classes of things, then there is a continuous shading between the classes and not a sharp line. The lack of a sharp line leads me to think such explanations should be forthcoming. I may be wrong to think that such explanations will really serve to explain anything, but that, at least, is my interpretative conjecture about how we might interpret Peirce's position as well as my substantive conjecture about the nature of the immediate object. While this is a hypothesis that I currently find attractive, I do not at this point have compelling reasons to reject other competing explanations. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, June 22, 2018 3:52 PM To: Peirce-L; gary.richmond Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary F, Jon S, list Gary wrote: GF: Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of the Immediate Object — not yours. I do not see anything idiosyncratic about Jon's definition of the IO. It is certainly mine; I've argued along the same lines as Jon in an earlier discussion with you on this matter. In fact, I believe that many if not most Peirce scholars would tend to agree with Jon that (1) there is no sign that can convey all the qualities and characters of the DO and, so (2) the IO conveys just those characters and qualities which *some* sign means to convey. This is the case even for the rheme: 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as they are determined | EP 2:292 A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so. [—] Or we may say that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent its Object in its characters merely… GF; The problem I have with [Jon's definition] is that you take it as definitive of the IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the immediate object of any rhematic sign. As Bellucci says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only dicisigns are said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two objects by definition. But Peirce does say--and in several places where the context doesn't involve the dicising whatsoever--that every sign has an IO. In my understanding that must necessarily be so for the reason given just above, viz., that any and every sign must convey something of its DO, and it does so through the IO. So, yes, in the context of speaking of dicisigns Peirce does emphasize the two objects (and it seems likely that the IO plays a peculiar and distinctive role in that sign class), but it seems to me that few insist that only the "dicisign has two objects." GF: Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding becomes the basis of your definition. And it seems to me that you are paying only attention to the quotes by Peirce and arguments by Bellucci which support your view, and that it's a problem when a novel understanding becomes the basis of your definition. GR: Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in which he’s using it. Peirce says that every sign has an Immediate Object many more times than two (see some additional examples below). And how many times does Peirce say definitively that only the DIcisign has two objects? I'd suggest that if he does the, he does it possibly only once. GF: One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 Syllabus (and elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives of these “signs.” We know that that Peirce wrote (confusingly in my opinion) that a sign is not a real thing, but that it must be embodied in, expressed as a real thing, namely, a replica "which is a sinsign" (EP 2.291). In EP 311 (which you refer to below), he states that "A sign is something that exists in replicas." So, as I see it, a Sign (say, two, 2, the vocalization, zwei, deux, etc.) is real, but only exists as some sinsign (replica). And if one is "principally" and "in particular" discussing, say, Propositions (Dicisigns), then those will be ones examples. But to extrapolate from this that such examples suggest that these are the only signs that have IO seems to me to be not warranted. GF: In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has propositional signs in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the Commens entry where that phrase occurs. This interpretation (perhaps correct enough in the particular passage discussed by you in KS) serves your argument. But to extrapolate from that that "For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” brought to my mind the response that for all we know, you may be wrong. GF: After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) is part of his speculative grammar. This generalization about logicians doesn't necessarily apply to Peirce who is, after all, the inventor of modern triadic semiotic. Propositions and arguments are principally the concern of those working in critical logic (critic, "logic as logic"). But I know I need not remind you that Peirce established two other branches of semiotic, speculative grammar and methodeutic. GF: [Peirce] quite naturally and often uses the terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians are traditionally concerned with. He does some times and he doesn't at other timess. Again, it depends on such matters as which of the branches of semeiotic he's working in. Also, some times his "short hand" can lead astray, and this is not uncommon in Peirce. For one famous example, Peirce sometimes uses "exist" or "existent" inter-changeably with 'real', and this has sometimes led to some consideration confusion in the literature. For example, in one of the quotations you offered above to the effect that "a sign is not a real thing," it seems likely that what Peirce actually means is that a sign is not in itself an "existent" thing (but that it *is* real), but exists only in replicas (see the passage stating this below, EP 311) GF: That’s one reason why it’s unwise to ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that only propositions have IOs.” One will certainly agree that is is wise not to ignore the context of Peirce's use of "sign." But when one starts to select just certain contexts, ignoring other, well, that's a problem in my view. And while you've asked Jon to cite occasions where Peirce stated explicitly that "all signs have immediate objects" (which he has, but which quotations haven't satisfied you, apparently), I think that if you can't offer a citation of Peirce explicitly stating that only Dicisigns have IOs, that is at least as problematic. GF: It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you can. I do not agree with your claim that "everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions." It seems strange to me to read that. Here are some counter-examples. 1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | MS [R] 1334:53 …there are two aspects of the object: The object as acting on the sign. That is called the real object The object as represented in the sign, or the immediate object. 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.536 … we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation. I don't recall either of these passages being within a context which focuses on the Dicisign exclusively. See also discussions of the Immediate vs the Dynamic Object in, for example, Peirce's letters to Lady Welby (EP 2:477, 2:482). Here I am certain there is no discussion of the proposition or dicisign. GR: Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of symbols, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” must have immediate objects, because the doubleness of object is built into the definition of the dicisign as well as the proposition. I do not see that the fact that propositions and other dicisigns have two objects (even if explicitly in the definition of the dicisign) precludes other signs from having immediate objects. I think you and Bellucci may have made too much of that singular "definition." GF: Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s division of signs according to their immediate objects produces the trichotomy vague/actual/general. This appears in the Logic Notebook for July 7, 1905: “In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is Vagosign if it represents that Obj[ect) as possible, [it is] Actisign [if it represents that Object as] existent, [it is] General [if it represents that Object as] law” (R 339 DDR 247r). But this is prefigured in KS, where Peirce says (EP2:311) that “the distinctions of vague and distinct, general and individual are propositional distinctions.” Now, in KS Peirce ignores the dynamic/immediate object distinction (as well as the the proposition/dicisign distinction); but taking that into account, he is saying that the distinctions pertaining to the sign’s relation to its immediate object “are propositional distinctions.” That’s enough for me, and since you are quite familiar with KS, I don’t see why it wouldn’t be enough for you. Gary, I think that you and Bellucci are concentrating on the specificity of a context while ignoring other contexts. Other contexts contradict this exclusive reading (which, btw, as I see it is not at all "Fregean" as you wrote in an earlier post--on what do you base that?) GF: All of the above is to question your claim that “every sign,” presumably including at least the ten types defined in the Syllabus (if not the notorious 66), “has an immediate object.” If you’re going to stick to that claim, and base your definition of the IO on it, then I’m not interested in prolonging discussion on the matter. And if you are to insist that your (and Bellucci's) interpretation is the only correct one and that a position held my many other scholars--namely, that every sign has two objects), then I don't see why Jon would be interested in prolonging a discussion with you in this matter. Nor, for that matter, would I. GF: I’d prefer to focus on what Peirce actually says about immediate objects, in the contexts where he says these things, rather than argue for or against an abstract schema of sign taxonomy. Just my personal preference, of course. You are claiming that your interpretation (cherry picking the context which supports your view), namely, that only propositions/dicisigns have immediate objects, is "what Peirce actually says about immediate objects," and that Jon has been arguing in the context of "an abstract schema of sign taxonomy" (which I do not see that he has been doing) is ipso facto wrong and not worth considering as clearly not Peirce's view. I find that not helpful in forwarding this particular inquiry. But perhaps you are settled in your opinion and don't wish to carry the inquiry further. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 11:46 AM, <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, list, Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of the Immediate Object — not yours. The problem I have with yours is that you take it as definitive of the IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the immediate object of any rhematic sign. As Bellucci says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only dicisigns are said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two objects by definition. Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding becomes the basis of your definition. Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in which he’s using it. One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 Syllabus (and elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives of these “signs.” For example (EP2:303-4): [[ The sentence “Roxana was the queen of Alexander” is a sign of Roxana and of Alexander, and though there is a grammatical emphasis on the former, logically the name “Alexander” is as much a subject as is the name “Roxana”; and the real persons Roxana and Alexander are real objects of the sign. Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. ]] In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has propositional signs in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the Commens entry where that phrase occurs. After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) is part of his speculative grammar. He quite naturally and often uses the terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians are traditionally concerned with. That’s one reason why it’s unwise to ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that only propositions have IOs.” It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you can. Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of symbols, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” must have immediate objects, because the doubleness of object is built into the definition of the dicisign as well as the proposition. Another connection becomes apparent when we consider that Peirce’s division of signs according to their immediate objects produces the trichotomy vague/actual/general. This appears in the Logic Notebook for July 7, 1905: “In its relation to its Immediate Object, it is Vagosign if it represents that Obj[ect) as possible, [it is] Actisign [if it represents that Object as] existent, [it is] General [if it represents that Object as] law” (R 339 DDR 247r). But this is prefigured in KS, where Peirce says (EP2:311) that “the distinctions of vague and distinct, general and individual are propositional distinctions.” Now, in KS Peirce ignores the dynamic/immediate object distinction (as well as the the proposition/dicisign distinction); but taking that into account, he is saying that the distinctions pertaining to the sign’s relation to its immediate object “are propositional distinctions.” That’s enough for me, and since you are quite familiar with KS, I don’t see why it wouldn’t be enough for you. All of the above is to question your claim that “every sign,” presumably including at least the ten types defined in the Syllabus (if not the notorious 66), “has an immediate object.” If you’re going to stick to that claim, and base your definition of the IO on it, then I’m not interested in prolonging discussion on the matter. I’d prefer to focus on what Peirce actually says about immediate objects, in the contexts where he says these things, rather than argue for or against an abstract schema of sign taxonomy. Just my personal preference, of course. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: 21-Jun-18 23:46 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object Gary F., List: GF: Are you denying that indicating is an indexical function? I am not convinced that Peirce intended "indicated" in that particular context to be strictly understood as entailing indexical function, since Qualities cannot indicate in that sense; after all, a Qualisign cannot be an Index. Just a couple of days later, he instead wrote that Descriptives "determine their Objects by stating the characters of the latter" (EP 2:484; 1908, emphasis mine), which is what I had in mind when I said earlier that a Descriptive Sign is precisely one that does refer to its DO "exclusively by describing it." That is why it is classified as a "Descriptive"! GF: Can you give me one or two examples of these facts that you are referring to? There are two cars located in the direction that the guy is pointing, relative to his current position. One of them is red, and the other is blue. The guy is calling someone else's attention to the red one. GF: OK, if the Peirce quotes amassed by Bellucci don’t loosen your hold on the Fregean interpretation of the IO, I certainly can’t do better. I am not necessarily endorsing the Fregean interpretation of the IO; for one thing, I do not know enough about Frege's views to judge them one way or the other. I am just continuing to define the IO as I have been doing for several months now--the partial combination of attributes of the DO by which the Sign denotes it. GF: I would appreciate it, though, if you could cite one or two of the “multiple occasions”, other than early drafts of MS 318, where Peirce states explicitly that every sign has an Immediate Object. Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). Two of the quotes there state explicitly that "every sign" has an IO, only one of which is from MS 318. Many of the others say something like "a sign has two objects" or "there are two aspects of the Object," or simply define the two Objects in a way that at least implies that both pertain to any Sign. Can you cite even one occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that only propositions have IOs? As I have pointed out before, Bellucci bases this novel assertion on a single passage, which I believe he clearly misinterprets. CSP: ... when we speak of the object of a sign ... we may mean the immediate object, the object as the sign represents it. For some signs separately represent their objects. Every proposition does so. (R 284:54-55) FB: The immediate object is the "object as the sign represents it," that is to say, the object which those signs which separately represent an object do in fact represent. The sentence "for some signs separately represent their objects" is crucial here. Not all signs separately represent an object: rhemes do not; only propositions and proposition-like signs (dicisigns) do, because these signs have a part that indicates the object of which the other part says something. Thus, only signs of this sort can have an immediate object. For the immediate object is the "object as the sign represents it," and only proposition-like signs independently represent an object, and thus can be divided according to the way they represent the immediate object. (p. 294) Bellucci's conclusion here simply does not follow; the fact that a Rheme does not separately or independently represent its Object obviously does not entail that it does not represent its Object at all, and therefore cannot have an IO. On the contrary, every Sign represents its Object--that is what it means for something to be a Sign in the first place!--and the IO is simply "the Object as represented in the sign" (EP 2:498; 1909). Furthermore, since only Arguments separately represent their Interpretants, Bellucci's reasoning implies that only Arguments can have Immediate Interpretants. Again, where did Peirce ever impose such a limitation? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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