Gary F., Helmut, List: GF: You could also regard the rheme as a proposition with some parts missing, as Peirce sometimes does.
Exactly, which is why a Rheme has an Immediate Object just as much as a proposition/Dicisign. As a Symbol, it is necessarily Copulative, with its (incomplete) logical form as its IO; and it is also Designative and/or Descriptive, based on how one or more of its blanks are filled. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:29 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, you ask, > > “In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object > a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law." > Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?” > > No. A qualisign is a sign that IS a quality, and a sinsign IS a sign that > is an existent, not a sign OF an existent; same for a “sign of > law”/legisign. That trichotomy is about what the sign is in itself, not > what it is in respect to its immediate object. That sentence was Peirce’s > first (1904) attempt at a trichotomy of signs in respect to their immediate > objects, and it is not at all clear what it means! Peirce did better later > on. > > Regarding “the object as cognized in the sign, the idea,” you *might* > interpret that as saying that the predicational or qualitative content of > the sign is included in the immediate object. And you might say, as > Stjernfelt does, that Peirce “vacillates” on the point of how much > predicative content the immediate object has in itself. But I think > Stjernfelt gives a good explanation of why this would be the case. You > could also regard the rheme as a proposition with some parts missing, as > Peirce sometimes does. And things get even more complicated when Peirce > starts “throwing everything into the subject” or “throwing everything into > the predicate” in his late analyses of propositions. But in any case, that > shouldn’t cause you to ignore the less vague definitions Peirce gives of > the IO. > > Speaking of vagueness, Bellucci’s book includes a good explanation of the > difference between vagueness and generality which might help with the > question you were asking about that a few days ago: > > [[ A vague sign is the subject of a particular or existentially quantified > proposition like "Some man" in "Some man is wise." The "man" is indefinite, > i.e., vague, because the principle of contradiction does not apply to it. A > singular sign is the sign of an individual in a proposition, like > "Socrates" in "Socrates is wise." Both the principle of contradiction and > the principle of excluded middle apply to it. A general sign is the subject > of a general proposition, like "Any man" in "Any man is wise." The term > "man" is, as the medieval doctors used to say, "distributed" over a whole > collection of individuals. It is general because the principle of excluded > middle does not apply to it. ] Bellucci 2017, p. 295] > > *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 22-Jun-18 13:57 > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* [email protected]; 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate objec > > Sorry, Gary, not Gray! In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to > its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an > existent, or of a law." Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign? > > Gray, list, > > by having looked at the entries about the catchword "immediate object" in > Commens dictionary, I donot see a reason to believe that for Peirce rhemes > donot have one. In one place he writes that "many signs" have one, but > mostly he writes "signs", even "every sign" has an immediate object. Why > should the object as cognized in the sign, the idea, not be conveyed with a > rheme? I guess it is merely more "vague", I would prefer "general", than > with a proposition. > > Best, > > Helmut >
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