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}Jon - with regard to the example in section 3.
I maintain that the Representamen is the bird's knowledge base. This
is not just its individual collateral experience but also the
biological 'habits' or laws of its
Edwina, List:
1. Again, I am still sorting out what the IO is, beyond being the Object
as represented in the Sign. I have not said anything to suggest that it is
"mechanical."
2. Again, we do not disagree about this at all.
3. Okay, I understand now that you are treating the loud sound--the
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}Jon
1. You still haven't explained' what is the IO. It surely can't be
just a mechanical 'site' within the Sign. It has to have some
informational content.
2. Peirce's objective idealism is that 'the one
l.
>
> Maybe we *are* making progress.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 1-Feb-18 16:08
>
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
>
Edwina, List:
1. Again, I have been trying to sort out what I think the IO is throughout
this thread; but where did Peirce *ever *define it as "sensate data"?
2. Peirce's stated view was "that matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP
1:293; 1891), not the other way around. Of course, he later famou
dn’t thought of that way of visualizing the matter, but I think it works
> quite well.
>
> Maybe we *are* making progress.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 1-Feb-18 16:08
>
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
> *
it works quite well.
Maybe we are making progress.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 1-Feb-18 16:08
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Gary F., List:
Okay, I think tha
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}Jon - we are simply light-years apart..
1] What do you think the IO is - if not sensate data received from
the external world?
2] You and I have a totally different view of 'what is a Sign'. As
I've said
Edwina, List:
Again, my reading of Peirce is very different from yours.
1. If you have quotes where he explicitly defined the Immediate Object to
be "sensate data," I would like to see them; I did not find any in CP or
EP. This whole thread is about trying to get a better handle on what the
IO
So I’m putting this whole inquiry into incubation phase,
> for the time being, and will turn to some other issues I’m trying to work
> out. I will however be reading any further posts in the thread, to see if
> someone can do better than I’ve done here.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Jon A
Gary R., List:
Okay, I think that we are making some progress. The actual vase is the
Dynamic Object (DO), and your initial thoughts about it are a series of
Signs. Nevertheless, how you proceed to talk about the Immediate Object
(IO) remains problematic for me.
- You say at first that the D
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}Jon - we'll have to 'agree to disagree'. There is simply a HUGE gap
between your view and mine - and an even bigger gap between my view
and that of Gary F.
1. I can come up with quotes as welland your use of '
Edwina, List:
As you know, my reading of Peirce is very different from yours, but
hopefully we can engage in some constructive dialogue anyway.
1. Here are three quotes where Peirce explicitly defined the Immediate
Object to be the Object as it is represented in the Sign. "… there are two
aspec
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Gary F., List:
I apologize for giving the impression that I think I have all of this figured
out; that is certainly not the case. In fact, coincidentally, the very
questions that you posed
Jon, list,
You wrote: "I am still having trouble matching up Signs with Immediate
Objects in your thought experiment. Are we talking about ..."
* "vase" as a common noun, or "this vase" as a particular thing
I am talking about "this vase" as a particular thing, ,a dynamic object,
which becomes
Stephen, List
> On Feb 1, 2018, at 9:29 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
> Semiotics seems to me almost a meta thing.
Why?
Are you really considering the vast range of signs that are used by various
disciplines that contribute to the non-monotonic course of lives?
> A means of making academic w
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}List - I've kept out of this baffling exchange because ...it was too
baffling. I had and have no idea what Gary F and Jon AS are talking
about. I'll just try to clear up a few things - as I see them.
1. The Immedi
Stephen, List:
All I can offer in response is what Peirce himself said.
CSP: Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in
order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be
satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one
corollary which
Semiotics seems to me almost a meta thing. A means of making academic what
would be clear if not meta-ed up with interpretive elaboration and
complexity. We live day by day and our time is necessarily limited. We
encounter things and think about them and then act or express. If one
wants to analyze
Stephen, List:
It is certainly valid to question the purpose of any line of inquiry,
especially since that is what should guide how it proceeds. In this case,
at the moment I am mostly seeking to translate Peirce's various and
fragmented writings about speculative grammar into a concise summary,
Mike, List:
In one sense, I agree that it is simple--the Immediate Object is the Object
as it is represented in the Sign, while the Dynamic Object is the Object as
it really is. On the other hand, once we start trying to identify these
and other constituents within a concrete example of semiosis-
?
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
>>
>> *Sent:* 31-Jan-18 14:11
>> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
>> Lecture 3.14)
&g
Hi Jon, List,
I know this thread has been going on for a while, and I have
not followed every blow closely. So I apologize if I try to make
something simple that in fact is not. But I guess I'm having a
hard time seeing what is so confusing here.
The immed
Gary R., List:
I appreciate you taking another stab at this. I think that you are exactly
right about my bent toward abstract analysis being very different from your
much more concrete, experiential approach. Perhaps for that very reason, I
am still having trouble matching up Signs with Immediat
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
>
> *Sent:* 31-Jan-18 14:11
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
> Lecture 3.14)
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> I am afraid that I
Jon, list,
Thanks for your good wishes regarding my cataract surgery. As I noted
earlier, I've pretty much run out of time before the Friday surgery and
wanted to respond not only to you and Gary f, which I was able to do a few
times recently, but I also wanted to respond to Jeff as I hadn't had t
: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 31-Jan-18 14:11
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Gary F., List:
I am afraid that I continue to be baffled by your response. Peirce explicitly
stated
Dear list,
Drat!
I ought to have said, “What, pray tell, has Peirce said ‘*on the soul*’?
Oh well, maybe next time..
Best,
Jerry R
On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 2:40 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Dear Jon, list:
>
>
>
> I am sure I do not know what you mean.
>
>
>
> What, pray tell, has Peirce
Dear Jon, list:
I am sure I do not know what you mean.
What, pray tell, has Peirce said of ‘soul’?
Is it something harsh, and crabbed?
Or is it something musical as is Apollo’s lute,” etc.,
Best,
Jerry R
On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 2:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Jerry R., List:
>
>
Jerry R., List:
Please read more carefully. Gary F. is the person who said that he feels
obligated (as do I) to make his usage of "Immediate Object" (corresponding
to "soul") conform to that of Peirce (corresponding to Person A) as much as
possible.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, U
use divisions of sign types, but for
>> me, that would be putting the cart before the horse. For you, if you find
>> it useful and informative to rely on the assumption that all “signs” have
>> “immediate objects”, then you should keep on doing that until the ground
>> gives way
signs” have
> “immediate objects”, then you should keep on doing that until the ground
> gives way, as Peirce’s metaphor put it. I am certainly not arguing against
> that assumption. I just have no use for it, myself.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gma
Gary R., List:
Best wishes on your upcoming procedure. I must admit to being disappointed
not to receive more feedback from you on my last couple of posts,
especially regarding my analysis of Peirce's statue example.
"Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's clue as
I h
Peirce’s metaphor put it. I am certainly not arguing against that assumption. I
just have no use for it, myself.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 31-Jan-18 10:39
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was
r of qualisigns and the relations they bear
> to their objects and interpretants.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
List:
> On Jan 31, 2018, at 9:38 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> GF: This ["Immediate Object"] being a Peircean term, i.e. one invented and
> defined by Peirce, I feel obligated to make my usage of it conform to his as
> much as possible.
>
> It probably goes without sa
Gary F., List:
GF: This ["Immediate Object"] being a Peircean term, i.e. one invented and
defined by Peirce, I feel obligated to make my usage of it conform to his
as much as possible.
It probably goes without saying by now that I agree wholeheartedly with
this. Consequently ...
GF: Since th
;> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>&
as an immediate object.” And I
definitely want to make some sense of it before arguing over whether it’s true
or not.
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 29-Jan-18 21:43
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
nks for those thought experiments! Now I see where the disagreement
>>> lies: your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from mine,
>>> because what you have in mind is *temporal* immediacy, so your
>>> “immediate objects” are pretty close to “first impression
Jerry C, Gary f, list,
You wrote: "I am not familiar with the notion of "(Partial) signs."
This is actually Gary f's coinage. In a post in this thread Gf offered
three Peirce quotations and commented on them. In his comments he suggested
that in these passages Peirce was saying that only the prop
u give in your
>> thought-experiments conform to Peirce’s definition of “immediate object,”
>> but I’ll have to sleep on that.
>>
>> This difference in conceptions is the sort of thing I was referring to at
>> the end of my post. We don’t agree on what it means t
> On Jan 29, 2018, at 4:12 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may have
> Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore be
> called (Partial) signs,
I am not familiar with the notion of "(Partial) signs”
C
> On Jan 29, 2018, at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> So, like Jon S, I too am likely to remain unconvinced by Bellucci "that,
> according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects"
I heartily concur!
In my view, immediate objects are necessarily prior to the emanations that are
e
List:
> On Jan 29, 2018, at 9:08 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> I reply, let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its
> Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is
> common to her mind and mine,—not the character of it, but the identity of it.
now what *that* sign means — if we
> don’t have a common idea of what the object of that sign is.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 29-Jan-18 17:12
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomen
— if we don’t have a
common idea of what the object of that sign is.
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 29-Jan-18 17:12
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Gary f, Jon S, Jeff, list,
Gf: &quo
tants.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Gary Richmond
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 3:12 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lect
the former” — or in other words,
> is a proposition or quasi-proposition or essential *part* of a
> proposition. The only way we assure ourselves whether this is the case for
> a given statement about “signs” is to read the context clues. That’s what I
> intend to do when I come acr
Gary F., List:
I just finished reading Bellucci's article, and was pretty much tracking
with him up until the beginning of section 3, where he makes the
leap--still unwarranted, in my opinion--to the claim that "only
propositions and proposition-like signs have immediate objects." In
particular,
] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Garys, List:
As Gary R. already reiterated, all of those definitions either explicitly state
or clearly imply that every Sign has an Immediate Object, contrary to
Bellucci's attribution to Peirce of the claim that only propositions do
in inferential processes.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* Monday, January 29, 2
Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, January 29, 2018 8:56:10 AM
To: Gary Richmond; Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Garys, List:
As
Garys, List:
As Gary R. already reiterated, all of those definitions either explicitly
state or clearly imply that *every *Sign has an Immediate Object, contrary
to Bellucci's attribution to Peirce of the claim that *only *propositions
do. In fact, if Bellucci were correct, then the mode of prese
, we can assure ourselves that we are not
> confusing the immediate *object* with the immediate *interpretant* by
> conflating the *identity* of an idea with its *quality*.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 28-Jan-18 21:15
>
: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
3.14)
Gary f, Jon S, list,
I have to agree with Jon S that every sign has an immediate object. Here are a
few examples (taken from the Commens Dictionary) to that effect.
1906 [c.] | On the System of
its reasonably well Peirce’s
>> later definitions of the Immediate Object.
>>
>>
>>
>> I think this will need some further looking into. Which I don’t have time
>> for right now, partly because I want to read your Additament piece first!
>>
>>
>>
>&g
...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 28-Jan-18 17:09
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture
> 3.14)
>
>
>
> Jeff, List:
>
>
>
> CP 2.311 is from the 1903 Syllabus and discus
-Jan-18 17:09
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)
Jeff, List:
CP 2.311 is from the 1903 Syllabus and discusses the Secondary Object, not the
Immediate Object. Peirce referred to the Immediate
Jeff, List:
CP 2.311 is from the 1903 Syllabus and discusses the Secondary Object, not
the Immediate Object. Peirce referred to the Immediate Object earlier in
the very same writing (CP 2.293)--a fact that is obscured by the editors'
unfortunate insertion of CP 2.295-308, which came from elsewher
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