John,
For the first time, there seems to be a deep disagreement of views.
Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.
Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP. Which I
have taken to be one of the points in your most valuable mails. I must
say I feel confused.
Le
List:
> On Oct 18, 2017, at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Kirsti,
>> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
>> become actual.
>
> In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues: 'real',
> 'exist', and 'actual'. To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
> dictum
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough
attention to relations.
Edwina
On Wed 18/10/17 12:06 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
Kirsti and Gary R,
If a debate doesn't converge, the
Kirsti and Gary R,
If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
(a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.
Kirsti,
Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
become actual.
In tha
John,
Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist untill they become
actual. Thus a token.
There always is the Scylla and Charybnis between understandability and
logic. But claiming existance to possibilities just does not hold.
Kirsti
John F Sowa kirjoitti 17.10.2017 05:48:
This thr
John, list,
The snippet you quoted from this recent discussion of "existence" and
"reality" wasn't mine, so I'll confine myself to your conclusion. You wrote:
. . . many sentences that talk about possibilities and
generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
Therefore, t
agmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step
On 10/17/2017 8:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I would rather see as Mark Type Token, using Type as mediation...
I agree that the type is the mediator, but changing the order would
conflict with the names Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. It's
better to draw them in a triangle with Type at
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
John - yes, I agree that we are getting hung up on words, - I have
some thoughts on why - but won't go into them.
With regard to the Mark Token Type - which I would rather see as
Mark Type Token, using Type as
John, list:
I agree with you. And so do others.
"If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come
to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find
them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand
before the goal is
This thread is getting hung up on words. I recommend Peirce's
advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
from any options that anyone is debating.
Let's consider the two words 'real' and 'existence'.
Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
dictum: "To be
Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
de
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky
>>>>>> wrote:
>>
this view has been stated often
>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@
t;>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in
>>>>>> space
>>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se&#
xistent in
>>>>>> space
>>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>>>> their articulation within S
ng in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui
gical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17
a, List,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on
>>>>> logical
>>>>&g
gt;> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell
>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning”
>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready
>>>> to start post
>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand
ay into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
arting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell
>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving
>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this t
.ca [5]]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the
with
> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as
> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
> To: peirce-
Gary and Dan,
Dan
This is certainly a wonderful service to all.
I agree.
And if you have all of Lowell 2 available, please post it also.
When I get started reading something, I don't want to stop.
But the discussions can focus on the posted parts.
John
-
PEIRCE
]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 10:05
To: Gary Fuhrman mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
I am wondering if there is a single link available that will give the full,
non-disjointed transcrip
Downard < <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physica
ing of
Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jeffrey Brian
Downard mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: ov
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
second option.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
_
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ;
g...@gnusys
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lectu
he
second option.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE:
can never answer questions of fact. It has to assume its premisses to
be true.” (That’s a quote from Lowell 2).
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 15-Oct-17 13:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell L
e argument pretends that they will.”
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ;
g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
ends that they will.”
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Since truth " is a real law that existences will follow."
extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will.”
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Since truth " is a real law
Since truth " is a real law that existences will follow." and that
this is achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the
facts of the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels
confidence in the argument or not" [this is a comment against
subjective opinions]
[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener
sent Peirce the following question: "If not inconvenient for you, will you
be kind enough to give tonight a summary- however brief- of your answer to
the question 'What makes a Reasoning Sound?'" Peirce prepared a response
tha
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