Jerry, list,
My comments are inserted.
Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 29.4.2016 16:15:
Kristi, Clark, List:
On Apr 29, 2016, at 12:05 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
The most common form these problems appear, is in the form of just
jumping from "the level of individuals" (be they chemical re
Jerry. Clark, list,
Jerry wrote:
Of course, things are always more complex than they first appear.
I would argue for a completely connected world if my purpose were
metaphysical in nature.
But, language itself separates the world from its totality into
manageable parts.
And culture has found it
> On Apr 29, 2016, at 7:29 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> It is a fact that the natural sciences use several notational systems to
> express the consequences of inquiries. These notational systems use
> different meanings of symbols in order to create a coherent (logical,
> mathematical
Clark, Kirsti, List:
> On Apr 25, 2016, at 1:37 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> As I understand it these issues of metamathematics are an ongoing fruitful
> area of mathematics. I’ll confess I don’t know as much about it as I perhaps
> should. I’m more familiar with certain “uses” of Gödel and met
Kristi, Clark, List:
> On Apr 29, 2016, at 12:05 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
>
> The most common form these problems appear, is in the form of just jumping
> from "the level of individuals" (be they chemical reactions, organisms or
> organelles, human or animal individuals) into the leve
Clark,
I agree with your points. - But I did not use the word "necessarily".
As long as one stays within mathematics, what you write:
" While none of
these are in the Peircean arena, I think they fit in rather well.
(Inquiry as a continual generation of higher metalanguage in terms of
semiosis)
> On Apr 25, 2016, at 12:15 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
>
> The idea of meta-languages presents the way of thinking in levels
> (characteristic to modern age). Thinking in terms of levels involves jumps.
> Triadic thinking doen not. It incorpotes the idea of growth.
I’m not sure the two
The idea of meta-languages presents the way of thinking in levels
(characteristic to modern age). Thinking in terms of levels involves
jumps. Triadic thinking doen not. It incorpotes the idea of growth.
Within triadic thinking one may enlarge or diminish the scope, the
perspective. At will, p
> On Apr 22, 2016, at 9:37 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> What might you mean by the term “master” meta-language?
I was thinking more in terms of Peirce’s concept of continuity.
There’s a presumption there is a meta-language that can make things make sense
now but I’m very skeptical of
Clark, Kirsti, List:
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 4:09 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
>>
>> The issue of concern to me is the interpretation given to the meta-languages
>> that use mathematical symbols.
>>
>> Tarski’s insistence of the role of meta-languages in logical and
>> mathematical communication s
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 4:09 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> Or, an other way of putting the interesting question is can one have a
> precept that is not perceptable.
>
Mathematics itself?:-)
Cheers
Jerry
-
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> On Apr 20, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> Of course, things are always more complex than they first appear.
> I would argue for a completely connected world if my purpose were
> metaphysical in nature.
> But, language itself separates the world from its totality into mana
List, Clark:
> On Apr 19, 2016, at 2:25 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> I raise this not necessarily to disagree but to just suggest that things are
> more complex than they first appear - and perhaps in a fashion Peirce would
> have agreed with. (I think Putnam’s paper on semi-empirical methods is
Is this not another version of the question, “Is there a Newton of the
blade of grass?”
If not phi spiral abduction, which?
Because nano-mesoscale integration about an actual, natural situation;
where the annoyance of reason-giving will hit an ultimate limit, ie, we’ll
get bored, and eventual
> On Apr 19, 2016, at 10:28 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> Pure mathematics avoids the concept of scaling, and its implication of
> natural units. It makes no appeals to nature. For a pure mathematician to
> appeal to nature would defy the Gods of the mathematical universe!
I suppose thi
List, Kirsti:
Very interesting response, it is appended below.
Yes, a crucial question is the relation, if any, between natural phenomenology
and artificial phenomenology.
This question appears to be a conundrum that is not solvable by either topology
or category theory because of the nature o
Jerry, list,
Your response helped a lot in proceeding towards some answers, hopefully
more connecting with your interests & current problems you are seeking
to find solutions. (I hope!)
First, it now seems clear to me, that your homefield is to be found in
naturalistic philosophy. Thus I hea
Kirsti, List:
A few controversial comments are interlaced within your text.
(But first, I would like to point CSP students to an important paper on the
current state of modern logics. “13 Questions about universal logic”. Study of
the 13 questions asked in this paper serves to compare the pa
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