Hi Jeff, Gary R, List,
I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the 9
sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in order
for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of the 10
classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic
Hello Gary F., List,
In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a
sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a
more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction between a
sufficiently complete sign and those parts
Jeff, Gary F. list,
I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example
of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more
complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy
Matt, list,
Can you give your source for this?
I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not
mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific
terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the
development of a language to the point
Edwina, list,
I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as
all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and
signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language
determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means
Matt, list,
So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as understood as being a type,
e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
This is still a poor way of stating the matter. The token is not a type;
but your statement, as worded, suggests that it is. There is smoke as
Hi Gary R,
You wrote :
"As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do
not consider the 9 parameters (121915-1)
as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied
signs, I am *always* referring to
the 10 classes."
I have
John, list,
I agree about Peirce’s difference with Lewis wrt the a priori. I don’t see
> how that is related to the issue of the effability of percepts, though.
Because Lewis views percepts (the "given") as ineffable, he requires the
introduction of the pragmatic a priori in order to interpret
Sung, list,
When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess
all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of
that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic
qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To
