Sung, list, When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html
As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 classes. What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe). Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point clear before there was any further confusion. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, > > I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the > 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in > order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of > the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as > "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. > However, > > "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to > feel it. (121915-1) > For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and > applied one of them to it." > > Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which > renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index > or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the > character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not > lose that character if there were no interpretant". > > By extension, I wonder if we can say that > > "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a > sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) > > > Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). > > > Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding > confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e., > 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs: > > "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are > experimentally measurable; (121915-3) > Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but only > the latter can be > used as a means of communicating information." > > In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs > as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs > as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being > composed of elementary quarks. > > A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all ! > > Sung > > > > > On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jeff, Gary F. list, >> >> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example >> of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more >> complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Hello Gary F., List, >>> >>> In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts >>> of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential >>> characters of a more complete sign." How should we understand this >>> distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign >>> that are less complete? >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: [email protected] [[email protected]] >>> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM >>> To: 'PEIRCE-L' >>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>> >>> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic >>> Relations,” EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main >>> text this thread has been referring to, so far. >>> >>> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed >>> at some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of >>> the manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius >>> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or >>> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” >>> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is >>> Peirce’s. — gary f. >>> >>> On the Foundations of Mathematics >>> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining >>> rendered as italics] >>> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think >>> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The >>> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor >>> to analyze it. >>> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular >>> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is >>> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not >>> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though >>> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more >>> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of >>> determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately >>> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never >>> contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On >>> the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause >>> appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although >>> there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be >>> because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present >>> condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of >>> feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a >>> sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore >>> essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. >>> Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a >>> real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of >>> definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the >>> sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under >>> “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one >>> thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that >>> there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every >>> real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there >>> must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a >>> sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any >>> replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real >>> object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though >>> it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever >>> the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of >>> itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that >>> proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even >>> if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently complete, >>> there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the >>> ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a >>> sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that >>> universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a sign need not refer to all the >>> real objects to which the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to >>> the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in >>> an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch was >>> translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was translated.’ >>> Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, in case >>> the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant of >>> the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not >>> specially refer, but only generally refers. Thus, the sign ‘Any man there >>> may be is mortal’ does not refer to any real man, unless it so happens that >>> it is a part of a sign which otherwise refers to such a real thing. But if >>> it be a part of a sign of which another part is ‘some man sings,’ the sign >>> ‘some man is mortal’ becomes an interpretant of it. This may be more >>> conveniently expressed by speaking of an ‘utterer’ and an ‘interpreter.’ >>> Then the utterer says to the interpreter, “you are at liberty to understand >>> me as referring to any man [of] whom you can get any indication, and of >>> him, I say, ‘he is mortal.’” Tenthly, a sign sufficiently complete must >>> signify some quality; and it is no more important to recognize that the >>> real object to which a sign refers is not a mere sign than to recognize >>> that the quality it signifies is not a mere sign. Take the quality of the >>> odor of attar. There is no difficulty in imagining a being whose entire >>> consciousness should consist in this alone. But, it may be objected, if it >>> were contrasted with nothing could it be recognized? I reply, no; and >>> besides, such recognition is excluded by the circumstance that a >>> recognition of the smell would not be the pure smell itself. It may be >>> doubted by some persons, however, whether the feeling could exist alone. >>> They are the persons whom it ought to be easiest for me to convince of my >>> point. For they, at least, must admit that if such pure homogeneous quality >>> of feeling were to exist alone, it would not be a sign. Everybody ought to >>> admit it because it would be alone, and therefore would have no object >>> different from itself. Besides, there would be no possible replica of it, >>> since each of two such things would be nonexistent for the other; nor could >>> there be any third who should compare them. So, then, the whole question of >>> whether such a quality is a sign or not resolves itself into the question >>> of whether there could be such a tinge upon the consciousness of a being, >>> supposing the being could be conscious (for I shall show presently that the >>> fact that he would be asleep is only in my favor). In order to decide this >>> question, it will be sufficient to look at any object parti-colored in >>> bright red and bright blue and to ask oneself a question or two. Would >>> there be any possibility of conveying the idea of that red to a person who >>> had no feeling nearer to it than that blue? Plainly not, the quality of the >>> red is in the red itself. The proximity of the blue heightens the shock >>> up[on] the seer[']s organism, emphasizes it, renders it vivid, perhaps >>> slightly confuses the feeling. But the red quality is altogether positive >>> and would remain if the blue were not there. If every other idea were >>> removed, there would be no shock, and there would be sleep. But the quality >>> of that sleep would be red, in this sense, that if it were taken away >>> frequently and brought back so as to wake the being up, the tinge of his >>> consciousness would be of that quality. A quality, in itself, has no being >>> at all, it is true. It must be embodied in something that exists. But the >>> quality is as it is positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign, >>> which exists only by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A >>> quality, then, is not a sign. Eleventhly, we may assume that this is as >>> true of what is, with excusable inaccuracy, called a composite quality as >>> of a simple one. In itself, one quality is as simple as another. A person >>> who should be acquainted with none but the spectral colors would get no >>> idea of white by being told that it was the mixture of them all. One might >>> as well tell him to make a mixture of water, patriotism, and the square >>> root of minus one. Find a man who has had no idea of patriotism; and if you >>> tell him that it is the love of one's country, if he knows what love is, >>> and what a man's country, in its social sense, is, he can make the >>> experiment of connecting ideas in his imagination, and noting the quality >>> of feeling which arises upon this composition. Tell him this in the >>> evening, and he will repeat the experiment several times during the night, >>> and in the morning he will have a fair idea of what patriotism means. He >>> will have performed an experiment analogous to that of mixing colored >>> lights in order to get an idea of white. If a treasure is buried in the >>> midst of a plain, and there are four signal poles, the place of the >>> treasure can be defined by means of ranges, so that a person who can take >>> ranges and set up new poles can find the treasure. In like manner the name >>> of any color may be defined in terms of four color disks so that a person >>> with a color-wheel can experimentally produce the color and thereafter be >>> able to use the name. Every definition to be understood must be treated as >>> a precept for experimentation. The imagination is an apparatus for such >>> experimentation that often answers the purpose, although it often proves >>> insufficient. No point on the plain where the treasure is hid is more >>> simple than other. Colors may be defined by various systems of coördinates, >>> and we do not know that one color is in itself simpler than another. It is >>> only in a limited class of cases that we can define a quality as simply a >>> mixture of two qualities. In most cases, it is necessary to introduce other >>> relations. But even when that is the case, if a quality is defined as being >>> at once a and b, there will always be another way of defining it as that >>> which is at once c and d. Now all that is either a or c will have a certain >>> quality p, common and peculiar to that class; the class of possible objects >>> that are b or c will be similarly related to a quality, r; and the class of >>> possible objects that are either b or d will be similarly related to a >>> quality, s. Then that quality which was defined as, at once, a and b, can >>> be more analytically defined as that which is at once p, q, r, and s; and >>> so on ad infinitum. We may not be able to make out these qualities; but >>> there is reason to believe that any describable class of possible objects >>> has some quality common and peculiar to it. It is certain that a pure >>> quality, in its mode of being as a pure quality, does not cease to be >>> because it is not embodied in anything. Every situation in life appears to >>> have its peculiar flavor. This flavor is what it is positively and in >>> itself. For the experiment by which it may be reproduced an adequate >>> prescription may be given; but the definition will not itself have that >>> flavor. To say that a flavor, or pure quality, is composed of two others, >>> is simply to say that on experimentally mixing these others in a particular >>> way, that first flavor will be reproduced. Every sufficiently complete sign >>> determines a sign to the effect that on a certain occasion, that is, in a >>> certain object a certain flavor or quality may be observed. >>> This attempt to begin an analysis of the nature of a sign may seem to be >>> unnecessarily complicated, unnatural, and ill-fitting. To that I reply that >>> every man has his own fashion of thinking; and if such is the reader's >>> impression let him draw up a statement for himself. If it is sufficiently >>> full and accurate, he will find that it differs from mine chiefly in its >>> nomenclature and arrangement. [Not unlikely he might insist on distinctions >>> which I avoid as irrelevant.] He will find that, in some shape, he is >>> brought to recognize the same three radically different elements that I do. >>> Namely, he must recognize, first, a mode of being in itself, corresponding >>> to my quality; secondly, a mode of being constituted by opposition, >>> corresponding to my object; and thirdly, a mode of being of which a >>> branching line Y is an analogue, and which is of the general nature of a >>> mean function corresponding to the sign. >>> §2. Partly in hopes of reconciling the reader to my statement, and >>> partly in order to bring out some other points that will be pertinent, I >>> will review the matter in another order. >>> The reference of a sign to the quality which is its ground, reason, or >>> meaning appears most prominently in a kind of sign of which any replica is >>> fitted to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself certain qualities >>> which it would equally possess if the interpretant and the object did not >>> exist at all. Of course, in such case, the sign could not be a sign; but as >>> far as the sign itself went, it would be all that [it] would be with the >>> object and interpretant. Such a sign whose significance lies in the >>> qualities of its replicas in themselves is an icon, image, analogue, or >>> copy. Its object is whatever that resembles it its interpretant takes it to >>> be the sign of, and [it is a] sign of that object in proportion as it >>> resembles it. An icon cannot be a complete sign; but it is the only sign >>> which directly brings the interpretant to close quarters with the meaning; >>> and for that reason it is the kind of sign with which the mathematician >>> works. For not only are geometrical figures icons, but even algebraical >>> arrays of letters have relations analogous to those of the forms they >>> represent, although these relations are not altogether iconically >>> represented. >>> The reference of a sign to its object is brought into special prominence >>> in a kind of sign whose fitness to be a sign is due to its being in a real >>> reactive relation,—generally, a physical and dynamical relation,—with the >>> object. Such a sign I term an index. As an example, take a weather-cock. >>> This is a sign of the wind because the wind actively moves it. It faces in >>> the very direction from which the wind blows. In so far as it does that, it >>> involves an icon. The wind forces it to be an icon. A photograph which is >>> compelled by optical laws to be an icon of its object which is before the >>> camera is another example. It is in this way that these indices convey >>> information. They are propositions. That is they separately indicate their >>> objects; the weather-cock because it turns with the wind and is known by >>> its interpretant to do so; the photograph for a like reason. If the >>> weathercock sticks and fails to turn, or if the camera lens is bad, the one >>> or the other will be false. But if this is known to be the case, they sink >>> at once to mere icons, at best. It is not essential to an index that it >>> should thus involve an icon. Only, if it does not, it will convey no >>> information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct reaction from a remarkable >>> situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no further information. The letters >>> in a geometrical figure are good illustrations of pure indices not >>> involving any icon, that is they do not force anything to be an icon of >>> their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a slight degree; since it has the same >>> startling quality as the situation that compells it. The index acts >>> compulsively on the interpretant and puts it into a direct and real >>> relation with the object, which is necessarily an individual event (or, >>> more loosely, a thing) that is hic et nunc, single and definite. >>> A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into >>> prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any >>> particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it stands in >>> any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because it >>> will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a symbol. As an >>> example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve. This >>> is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the cause of >>> its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it does is >>> that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only determines an >>> interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special determinant, (the >>> acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to determine. By virtue of >>> thus specially showing its intended interpretant (out of thousands of >>> possible interpretants of it) it is an argument. An index may be, in one >>> sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, that of an >>> argumentation. It determines such interpretant as it may, without >>> manifesting a special intention of determining a particular interpretant. >>> It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; but it is not essential to >>> a symbol that it should do so. Erase the conclusion of an argumentation and >>> it becomes a proposition (usually, a copulative proposition). Erase such a >>> part of a proposition that if a proper name were inserted in the blank, or >>> if several proper names were inserted in the several blanks, and it becomes >>> a rhema, or term. Thus, the following are rhematic: >>> Guiteau assassinated ______ >>> ______ assassinated ______ >>> Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these >>> terms; but I shall venture to do so. >>> >>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On >>> Behalf Of Sungchul Ji >>> Sent: 18-Dec-15 16:22 >>> >>> Gary F, Jeff, List, >>> >>> Please excuse my ignorance. >>> What is NDTR ? >>> >>> Thanks in advance. >>> >>> Sung >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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