Clark, list,
Sorry, I got busy for a while.
Immediate objects may have averageness but the averageness seems not
definitive of them, and Peirce never makes it so. They may also have
distinctiveness; an unusual characteristic, perhaps displayed at an
unusual moment, might be a prominent part
> On Jun 29, 2016, at 10:37 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Immediate objects may have averageness but the averageness seems not
> definitive of them, and Peirce never makes it so.
It seems to me (perhaps incorrectly) that Peirce raises everydayness for
similar reasons to
> So "being" seems to be a quite boiled-down concept. "Truth" on the other hand
> is a concept, that should not be boiled down like that in my opinion.
I’m not sure I agree with that. It seems to me being for Peirce (and what I
tend to think) being is tied to this relation of the dynamic
Dear list:
Side by side with others:
Can we label immediate interpretant, sign, object, coming to agreement,
idea, truth, final interpretant, copula, etc., in this sequence?
"The “what is” questions point to “essences,” to “essential” differences-
to the fact that the whole consists of parts