> So "being" seems to be a quite boiled-down concept. "Truth" on the other hand > is a concept, that should not be boiled down like that in my opinion.
I’m not sure I agree with that. It seems to me being for Peirce (and what I tend to think) being is tied to this relation of the dynamic object whereas truth is tied to the hope of the final interpretant. Yet the very notion of the final interpretant is the final stable representation of the dynamic object where being is what leads to that. To the degree that being/copula functions in semiotics it expresses the relation of the general term to the universe itself. The copula brings together the replicas of the subject and rheme but also the dynamic and immediate objects. It seems very difficult to separate that from truth except to say it is what makes truth possible. > So, one person or one observer, maybe one impersonal sign recipient, a > molecule or a particle, can be "all who investigate", like an electron saying > "ouch, this photon has really hit me", so any sufferer of any interaction may > be sufficient to make something be. I’d say the presentations of generals as tied to subjects is always a manifestation of being. It’s true that this also is what enables error. (To be wrong is to be still) If by “boiled down” you mean simply that being can present erroneously then I fully agree. > Truth in this universal sense is not a product of perfect statistics or final > interpretants, but the earth was a ball already before there were any > interpreters. I think you may be confusing truth with dynamic objects. This also gets into the question of whether Peirce’s notion of truth is merely a regulative notion (what we mean by the term) or whether it has to be possible rather than merely something we hope for. This is a common critique of Peirce since given contemporary science it’s not hard to conceive of ways information is lost and the final interpretant broken. I think taking it as regulative avoids this problem, although I still think this problem of information loss is a bigger one than many Peirceans do.
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