Dear list:
Side by side with others: Can we label immediate interpretant, sign, object, coming to agreement, idea, truth, final interpretant, copula, etc., in this sequence? "The “what is” questions point to “essences,” to “essential” differences- to the fact that the whole consists of parts which are heterogeneous, not merely sensibly but noetically: to understand the whole means to understand the “What” of each of these parts, of these classes of beings, and how they are linked with one another. Such understanding cannot be the reduction of one heterogeneous class to others or to any cause or causes other than the class itself; the class, or the class character, is the cause par excellence. Socrates conceived of his turn to the “what is” questions as a turn, or a return, to sanity, to “common sense”: while the roots of the whole are hidden, the whole manifestly consists of heterogeneous parts. One may say that according to Socrates the things which are “first in themselves” are somehow “first for us”; the things which are “first in themselves” are in a manner, but necessarily, revealed in men’s opinions. Those opinions have as opinions a certain order…” ~Strauss, On Aristotle’s Politics On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 1:18 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > So "being" seems to be a quite boiled-down concept. "Truth" on the other > hand is a concept, that should not be boiled down like that in my opinion. > > > I’m not sure I agree with that. It seems to me being for Peirce (and what > I tend to think) being is tied to this relation of the dynamic object > whereas truth is tied to the hope of the final interpretant. Yet the very > notion of the final interpretant is the final stable representation of the > dynamic object where being is what leads to that. > > To the degree that being/copula functions in semiotics it expresses the > relation of the general term to the universe itself. The copula brings > together the replicas of the subject and rheme but also the dynamic and > immediate objects. It seems very difficult to separate that from truth > except to say it is what makes truth possible. > > So, one person or one observer, maybe one impersonal sign recipient, a > molecule or a particle, can be "all who investigate", like an electron > saying "ouch, this photon has really hit me", so any sufferer of any > interaction may be sufficient to make something be. > > > I’d say the presentations of generals as tied to subjects is always a > manifestation of being. It’s true that this also is what enables error. (To > be wrong is to be still) If by “boiled down” you mean simply that being can > present erroneously then I fully agree. > > Truth in this universal sense is not a product of perfect statistics or > final interpretants, but the earth was a ball already before there were any > interpreters. > > > I think you may be confusing truth with dynamic objects. > > This also gets into the question of whether Peirce’s notion of truth is > merely a regulative notion (what we mean by the term) or whether it has to > be possible rather than merely something we hope for. This is a common > critique of Peirce since given contemporary science it’s not hard to > conceive of ways information is lost and the final interpretant broken. I > think taking it as regulative avoids this problem, although I still think > this problem of information loss is a bigger one than many Peirceans do. > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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