Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Jon, I completely agree with the following paragraph: JAS> Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. But your paragraph is a discussion of a dialog between two two persons: an inquirer and an respondent. One of them is uttering a sentence (complete or partial) and the other is interpreting it. But Helmut and I were not talking about a dialog between two people. We were talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may use for testing a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1-ness, 2-ness, or 3-ness. Those are two totally different activities. The test is not a method of communication by means of sentences. It is a method for determining the structure of a sign. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/15/24 9:47 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why) John, List: At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I think that Peirce would not have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic. If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the dyadic proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the triadic proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch. Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog retrieved the book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He gave it to his wife." A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye." Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition. Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously asserting a dyadic proposition. These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa wrote: I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two sentences. JAS> JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The question begins with the word
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
John, List: At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I think that Peirce would *not *have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic. If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a *logical *standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a *monadic *relation, you are asserting the *dyadic *proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a *logical *standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a *monadic *relation, you are asserting the *triadic *proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch. Put another way, a who or what question is often a *rheme*, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog *retrieved *the book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He *gave *it to his wife." A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye." Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition. Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously asserting a dyadic proposition. These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa wrote: > I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two > sentences. > > JAS> > JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to > her. > > JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer > (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the > transfer was made. > > > The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own > admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your > criterion. "*Why* did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a > completely different question that would require a completely different > answer. > > By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic > answer to a dyadic question. That includes more information than was > requested. In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated > less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on > question to get the reason why. > > The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly the requested > information is one reason why Helmut's criterion, although equivalent to a > why-question, may be a better way to elicit the correct information. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two sentences. JAS> JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer. By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic answer to a dyadic question. That includes more information than was requested. In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on question to get the reason why. The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly the requested information is one reason why Helmut's criterion, although equivalent to a why-question, may be a better way to elicit the correct information. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/15/24 2:56 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why) John, List: It seems that we both made mistakes when addressing the e-mails reproduced below. I apologize for sending mine to the List, it was intended for only Gary as its moderator. Because of our unfortunate history of contentious interactions, I often use him as a sounding board whenever I consider replying to one of your posts. I sincerely hope that we can make the best of it and move on. I meant no insult with my last remark, I was simply stating my honest opinion, and my preceding claim was not mistaken. JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of 3ns that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer. JFS (corrected by JAS): Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why" but is not a genuine example of 3ns? JAS: Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it. JFS: The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred, but it does not say why. The question begins with the word "Why," thereby meeting your only stipulation; and by your own admission, the answer is dyadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. The fact that someone might ask additional questions that have triadic answers, such as why the spark occurred, is irrelevant. Here is another counterexample--Why did the woman wear the brooch? It is red. This answer is monadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. Hence, I stand by my statement that distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns solely on the alleged basis that the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions are monadic, dyadic, and triadic indicates a serious misunderstanding of both Peirce's categories and his semeiotic. As you reiterated for the umpteenth time in another thread late last night ... JFS: It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to be careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended. Accordingly, without exact quotations, nobody can claim that Peirce would have agreed with the novel suggestion that every example of 3ns can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word "why," let alone that he would have been "delighted" by it. Would you really find it unobjectionable for me to say, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested my solution"? (For the record, I would never actually say such a thing--we should not ascribe sentiments to him without exact quotations, any more than intentions.) Regards, Jon On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:17 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, List, Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end). But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Jerry, Jon, List, Helmut had an excellent suggestion: Every why-question can be answered with a because-answer. Therefore, every instance of Thirdness can be explained in sentence that contains the word 'because'. See my comments below and Helmut's original note below that. If you find my original explanation hard to understand, you might find Helmut's point easier to accept. But either explanation is based on the fact that in any instance of Thirdness, the third item C is the reason or intention or goal or purpose that explains the dyadic relationship between A and B. Again, I repeat: I cannot say for certain that Peirce would be delighted with this explanation, but he was always looking for simpler and more convincing ways of explaining his basic principles. That is the primary reason why he found Lady Welby's correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. That is the primary difference between his Kantian-influenced phenomenology and his later, more concrete phaneroscopy. There is more to say about these issues. In particular, the emphasis on the explanatory role of C is critical for analyzing Peirce's writings in his last decade. John From: "John F Sowa" Helmut, Thanks for mentioning the word 'because'. That's another way to explain the 3-way connection that answers a why-question, In general, every instance of thirdness that relates (A B C) can be explained by a sentence of the form "A is related to B because C."But some linguistic transformations may be needed to transform the answer sentence into the syntactic form of a because-sentence, Some transformations may sound awkward, but they would be intelligible answers. For your question: The simplest way to show that a four-way connection can be reduced to two three-way connections is to draw a diagram. To avoid going to my drawing tools, I'll just explain how you can draw the diagram with a pencil and paper First draw a large dot that is connected to A, B, C, and D. Then translate that four-way connection to two three way connections. Start by drawing two dots: Then connect the one on the left to A and B, and the one on the right to C and D. You now have two two-way connections. Now draw a line that connects both of the dots. As a result, the left dot has three connections: A, B, and the dot on the right. And the dot on the right also has three connections: C, D, and the dot on the left. You can repeat this procedure for reducing a dot that connects A, B, C, D, and E to a middle dot that has three connections: the first to the A, B pair, the second to the C, D pair, and the third to E. For 6, the dot in the middle will connect to three pairs, A,B, C,D, E,F, For 7 and 8, the dot in the middle will have four connections. Use the procedure for A,B,C,D to split a 4-way connection to two 3-way connections. Then keep going for as many connections as you need. John _ From: "Helmut Raulien" John, List, The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions: -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? Best, helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Helmut, List: Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) are discovered in the primal positive science of phaneroscopy (quality/reaction/mediation) and diagrammatized in the hypothetical science of mathematics (monadic/dyadic/triadic relations). I do not know whether anyone has posted a mathematical proof of Peirce's reduction thesis on the Internet. Robert Burch wrote an entire book to present his ( https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Peircean_Reduction_Thesis.html?id=MK-EIAAJ) and provides a very brief summary in his SEP entry about Peirce ( https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#red), while Sergiy Koshkin purports to demonstrate it even more rigorously in a recent paper ( https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/article/886447). Personally, I find Peirce's own diagrammatic demonstration to be simple and persuasive enough--relations of any adicity can be built up of triads, but triads cannot be built up of monads or dyads despite involving them (EP 2:364, 1905). [image: image.png] I likewise noticed that the Commens website (http://www.commens.org/) was down for a while, so I was using the 12/31/23 Internet Archive version ( https://web.archive.org/web/20231231054741/http://www.commens.org/), but it came back up a couple of days ago. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 1:37 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again! > John, List, > The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself > being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just > say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". > Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something > (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the > secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of > inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness > can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two > sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean > categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. > BTW, I have two questions: > > -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad > is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? > > -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong > with my computer, or with the website? > > Best, helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Helmut, Thanks for mentioning the word 'because'. That's another way to explain the 3-way connection that answers a why-question, In general, every instance of thirdness that relates (A B C) can be explained by a sentence of the form "A is related to B because C."But some linguistic transformations may be needed to transform the answer sentence into the syntactic form of a because-sentence, Some transformations may sound awkward, but they would be intelligible answers. For your question: The simplest way to show that a four-way connection can be reduced to two three-way connections is to draw a diagram. To avoid going to my drawing tools, I'll just explain how you can draw the diagram with a pencil and paper First draw a large dot that is connected to A, B, C, and D. Then translate that four-way connection to two three way connections. Start by drawing two dots: Then connect the one on the left to A and B, and the one on the right to C and D. You now have two two-way connections. Now draw a line that connects both of the dots. As a result, the left dot has three connections: A, B, and the dot on the right. And the dot on the right also has three connections: C, D, and the dot on the left. You can repeat this procedure for reducing a dot that connects A, B, C, D, and E to a middle dot that has three connections: the first to the A, B pair, the second to the C, D pair, and the third to E. For 6, the dot in the middle will connect to three pairs, A,B, C,D, E,F, For 7 and 8, the dot in the middle will have four connections. Use the procedure for A,B,C,D to split a 4-way connection to two 3-way connections. Then keep going for as many connections as you need. John From: "Helmut Raulien" Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again! John, List, The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions: -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website? Best, helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
List, Jon > On Feb 14, 2024, at 12:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > There are indeed six classes of signs according to their dyadic relations > with their two external interpretants (immediate is internal), but they have > nothing to do with "the six basic question words.” Thanks for pointing back to the metaphysics of Peircian categories! I re-read this text for the first time in at least two decades and now find it to be profound. Because, if you read this text from the modern views of categorical logics, it clarifies the semantic of his materially oriented metaphysical conjectures as sources of the syntactical elements of logic. Profound indeed. I will have more to say about this later, perhaps even attempt to address Edwinia tensions with her internal conundrums with her concepts of semiosis! :-) WRT John Sowa’s argument asserting some formal? connnections between the interrogatives and the Peircian metaphysics, I would make a much stronger argument. That is, a logician would be hard put to relate CSP’s concept of Being in the sense of his categories/ relations/ correlations with these six interrogatives. Formally, both classical logics as well as modal logics are difficult if not impossible to assert the format of representations of truth consequences implied by Peircian categories. I would invite our meta-physicians to take a serious look at the tensions implicit in John’s Sowa’s assertions. BTW, Edwinia, I am curious if you have a rationalization for QM that coheres with CSP’s categories? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
John, List: It seems that we both made mistakes when addressing the e-mails reproduced below. I apologize for sending mine to the List, it was intended for only Gary as its moderator. Because of our unfortunate history of contentious interactions, I often use him as a sounding board whenever I consider replying to one of your posts. I sincerely hope that we can make the best of it and move on. I meant no insult with my last remark, I was simply stating my honest opinion, and my preceding claim was *not *mistaken. JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of 3ns that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "*Why* did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer. JFS (corrected by JAS): Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why" but is not a genuine example of 3ns? JAS: Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it. JFS: The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred, but it does not say why. The question begins with the word "Why," thereby meeting your only stipulation; and by your own admission, the answer is dyadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. The fact that someone might ask *additional *questions that have triadic answers, such as why the spark occurred, is irrelevant. Here is another counterexample--Why did the woman wear the brooch? It is red. This answer is monadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. Hence, I stand by my statement that distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns solely on the alleged basis that the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions are monadic, dyadic, and triadic indicates a serious misunderstanding of both Peirce's categories and his semeiotic. As you reiterated for the umpteenth time in another thread late last night ... JFS: It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to be careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended. Accordingly, without exact quotations, nobody can claim that Peirce would have agreed with the novel suggestion that every example of 3ns can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word "why," let alone that he would have been "delighted" by it. Would you really find it unobjectionable for me to say, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested my solution"? (For the record, I would never actually say such a thing--we should not ascribe sentiments to him without exact quotations, any more than intentions.) Regards, Jon On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:17 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for > my previous note (copied at the end). > > But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted > as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why". > > I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is > an example of Thirdness. But that is not what I wrote above or in my > previous notes, Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness". But in > order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some > sort (most likely words and sentences). But I expect the readers to look > beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to > indicate. > > If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example > of Thirdness. Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found > in a sentence that answers a why-question. Or conversely, an answer to a > why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or > implicit. > > And why do you think Peirce would disagree? He was always looking for > clear criteria to test and explain his theories. I also prefixed by claim > that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I > believe". I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce. I was stating *MY > OPINION* about his reaction. > > And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a > competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank > them for the correction. For example, I thank you for correcting my > mistake below: > > JFS> Can
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again! John, List, The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions: -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website? Best, helmut 15. Februar 2024 um 19:17 Uhr Von: "John F Sowa" Jon, List, Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end). But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why". I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness. But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes, Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness". But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences). But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness. Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question. Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. And why do you think Peirce would disagree? He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories. I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe". I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce. I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction. And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction. For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below: JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'? JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Yes, indeed. I admit that I made a mistake in that statement. But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration. You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong. But an insult is never appropriate. And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim: JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Gary: As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar. JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all. JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves. JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test. I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
John, List, The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions: -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website? Best, helmut 15. Februar 2024 um 19:17 Uhr Von: "John F Sowa" Jon, List, Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end). But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why". I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness. But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes, Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness". But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences). But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness. Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question. Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. And why do you think Peirce would disagree? He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories. I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe". I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce. I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction. And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction. For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below: JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'? JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Yes, indeed. I admit that I made a mistake in that statement. But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration. You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong. But an insult is never appropriate. And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim: JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Gary: As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar. JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all. JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves. JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test. I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Jon, List, Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (copied at the end). But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why". I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is an example of Thirdness. But that is not what I wrote above or in my previous notes, Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness". But in order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some sort (most likely words and sentences). But I expect the readers to look beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to indicate. If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example of Thirdness. Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found in a sentence that answers a why-question. Or conversely, an answer to a why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or implicit. And why do you think Peirce would disagree? He was always looking for clear criteria to test and explain his theories. I also prefixed by claim that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I believe". I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce. I was stating MY OPINION about his reaction. And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction. For example, I thank you for correcting my mistake below: JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'? JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Yes, indeed. I admit that I made a mistake in that statement. But insults are never appropriate in any collaboration. You have every right to state your opinions, right or wrong. But an insult is never appropriate. And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken claim: JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Gary: As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar. JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all. JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves. JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test. I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic. So much for not putting words in his mouth, claiming to know what he intended, or (in this case) attributing specific sentiments to him without exact quotations. Just imagine how JFS would have reacted if I had said in my post, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested this solution." JAS: On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns, because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between its object and its interpretant. JFS: That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of answers. Exactly--there is no distinction between the three kinds of answers that corresponds to Peirce's three categories. All signs, including every answer to every question, are examples of 3ns. Qualities and reactions are examples of 1ns and 2ns, respectively, not any answers to any questions. JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
Evgenii, List, The reason for the bacterium is its need. Its individual need is contained inside its boundary (membrane, skin), but its need is similar with that of all bacteria and other organisms: Nutrition. The latin word is causa finalis. The stone does not have a need, it falls down due to universal laws, which force it to do so. The latin word for this forceful reason is causa efficiens. This force is not limited to individual boundaries, the boundary is the universe. The gravitational (or space-bending, Einstein) effects of this falling stone too pass through the whole universe, other than the hunger-relief of the bacterium, that is merely sensed by it. I think: An animal with a brain does not only respond to needs and forces, but also to wishes. A wish is not necessarily the same as with other brain animals, a wish may be unique (as we all know, don´t we?). It requires the brain´s ability of depicting. I´d say, the latin word for this volitional reason would be "causa exemplaris", but in its secularized version, as originally "causa exemplaris" has a religious meaning. Now we have three basic causae, like we should have, because with Peirce it always has to be three. Best, Helmut Donnerstag, 15. Februar 2024 um 12:22 Uhr "Evgenii Rudnyi" wrote: Am 15.02.2024 um 04:11 schrieb John F Sowa: > The biologist Lynn Margulis explained that all living things from > bacteria on up exhibit goal-directed actions that non-living things > never do. Her simplest example is a bacterium swimming upstream in a > glucose gradient. > > No non-living things would ever do that. What would be the difference in this case between a bacterium and a stone falling to the Earth? Evgenii _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] CfP - 1st Pan African Logic Congress - Cairo, Egypt, April 28-30, 2024
1st Pan African Logic Congress The logic of nature & the nature of logic in Africa April 28–30, 2024 - The British University in Egypt, Cairo This congress aims to promote logic in Africa. It is focused on Nature in a double sense. Wildlife is very important in Africa, the flora and fauna are very impressive. This is the place where there is the highest number and variety of animals. And for this reason, the people especially in central Africa have a strong connection with nature. It is the opportunity therefore to reflect on the logic of nature and to examine to what extent it is different from the logic of the technological and industrial world (computers, artificial intelligence, and so on). This is a way therefore to challenge the very nature of logic. From this perspective, logic is understood in a very wide sense and in relation to all aspects of the world, natural and artificial. The purpose of this event is to reveal and explore different manners of reasoning embedded in African cults, myths, arts, religions, rituals, economic systems, traditional justice systems, and architectural systems. This congress will enrich logical studies and their relative subjects like AI through elaborating logical interpretations of different aspects of African cultures. Deadline for submission of an abstract for presenting a talk: March 15, 2024 https://africanlogiccongress.com/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
Am 15.02.2024 um 04:11 schrieb John F Sowa: The biologist Lynn Margulis explained that all living things from bacteria on up exhibit goal-directed actions that non-living things never do. Her simplest example is a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient. No non-living things would ever do that. What would be the difference in this case between a bacterium and a stone falling to the Earth? Evgenii _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
