Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two
tokens of the same type.


This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an
indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can
have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things
can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types.

JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice.


Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of
> 'mark':
>
> Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
> Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)
>
> Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same
> mark are two tokens of the same type.
>
> It confirms Peirce's final choice.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark'
instead of 'tone'.


Again, going by the manuscript dates, Peirce's *final *choice was "tone" (R
339, 27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i), not "mark"
(CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)--especially since the latter passage
includes the word "might" and a parenthetical question mark, clearly
indicating that "mark" was tentative rather than definitive.

JFS: The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she
admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason
for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system


As quoted, Lady Welby does not say that she does not *understand *Peirce's
"exposition of the 'possible' Sign"--on the contrary, she calls it
"profoundly interesting"--only that she is "not equal to the effort of
discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone *to *mark*"; and
again, her stated rationale for this preference is strikingly similar to
Peirce's stated rationale for coining "tone" in the first place (CP 4.537,
1906). Besides ...

JFS: That is the primary reason why he [Peirce] found Lady Welby's
correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining
principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and
difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more
convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html)


Why think that "tone" vs. "mark" was an exception to this, such that her
"homely" opinion about it did not sway him--especially since he was still
vacillating between these two options, and specifically *asked *her to help
him choose one?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 1:08 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Tony, Jon, List,
>
> I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line:  Evolution.  I
> believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in
> from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which
> he highlighted the features he considered important.  I'd also emphasize
> Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues,
> terminology, and notations of 1903.   That was an important beginning, but
> the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes.
>
> One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology.   He
> coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the
> end.  But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new
> words.  The points where he changed terms also involve critical
> innovations.  If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important
> indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm).  For example,
> the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911.
>
> There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and
> every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system.  The shift
> from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that
> it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete
> examples that Lady Welby used.   Another shift from the word-based
> terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images,
> such as semes and phemes, is significant.  Since  semes include hypericons,
> he never again needed that word.   He also used the term "phemic sheet" as
> replacement for 'sheet of assertion'.
>
> I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead
> of 'tone'.  The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she
> admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason
> for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system:  "Your
> exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not
> equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer
> *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say
> 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).
>
> There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I
> have the time.
>
> John
>
> PS:   The initials JS are ambiguous.   It's better to write JAS or JFS.
>
> --
> *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation
> from 1903 to the end
>
> This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr.
> Jappy [TJ]. .
>
> I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of
> Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process
> of mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.
>
> This would require that the three 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most
important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final
interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant
(SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly
imply this. In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below
strongly *supports
*my position.

TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear
definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means
that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to
descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the
interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the
Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in
the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the
mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908).


Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being
"explicit." It is the interpretant that is *right there* in the sign
itself, which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classification
is a division according to its mode of *presentation*.

CSP as quoted by TJ: The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative
result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is
sufficiently considered ... The Final Interpretant is that toward which the
actual tends. (SS 111, 1909)


Here the final interpretant is unambiguously identified as the "destined"
interpretant, i.e., the "destinate" interpretant.

CSP as quoted by TJ: But we must note that there is certainly a third kind
of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that
which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if
consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion
were reached. (EP 2:496, 1909)


As Peirce says elsewhere, "No matter what his opinion at the outset may be,
it is assumed that he will end in one predestinated belief" (CP 7.327,
1873). Also, "No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of
other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to
escape the predestinate opinion" (CP 5.407, 1878). Also, "The logician
maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that
of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain predestinate
conclusions which are the same for all men" (CP 3.161, 1880). Also, "I call
'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that
which *would
*ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that
particular direction" (EP 2:457, 1911). Since the "ultimate opinion" is the
"predestinate opinion," the final interpretant is likewise the "destinate"
interpretant.

TJ: JAS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic
object is genuine and the immediate degenerate ...


Indeed, Peirce's recognition around 1904 that each sign has two objects and
three interpretants is the result of phaneroscopic analysis--within the
genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, the
sign is the first and simplest correlate, the object is the second
correlate of middling complexity, and the interpretant is the third and
most complex correlate (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903). Accordingly, the
dynamical object is the *genuine *object, as it is in itself, independent
of the sign; and the immediate object is the *degenerate *object, as it is
represented by the sign.

TJ: It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in
a classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is
defined to be present.


It is perfectly logical in a classification of *signs*, because the three
correlates of the *genuine *triadic relation of representing/mediating are
the *genuine *correlates--the sign itself, its *dynamical *object, and
its *final
*interpretant. On the other hand, there is only a *degenerate *triadic
relation between the sign, its dynamical object, and its *dynamical
*interpretant--it
is reducible to the sign's genuine *dyadic *relations with its dynamical
object/interpretant, each of which has its own trichotomy; and there are
only *degenerate *dyadic relations between the sign and its immediate
object/interpretant, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for
these relations. Moreover, all six discrete correlates are *entia
rationis*--artifacts
of analysis prescinded from the real and continuous process of semiosis.

TJ: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward
which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation
(Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final interpretant.


Again, this is a matter of *logical *ordering for the classification of
signs, not *causal/temporal* sequence within the process of semiosis. The
final interpretant is not the *last *interpretant in a series of dynamical
interpretants--recall 

[PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark':

Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark)

Yes indeed.   That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are 
two tokens of the same type.

It confirms Peirce's final choice.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Tony, Jon, List,

I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line:  Evolution.  I 
believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in from 
1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which he 
highlighted the features he considered important.  I'd also emphasize Tony's 
point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, terminology, and 
notations of 1903.   That was an important beginning, but the evolution in the 
following decade made fundamental changes.

One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology.   He coined 
and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the end.  But 
there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new words.  The points 
where he changed terms also involve critical innovations.  If he never again 
uses the old terms, that is an important indication that he began a new way of 
thinking (paradigm).  For example, the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished 
in June 1911.

There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and every 
one of them shows a significant innovation in his system.  The shift from 
phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that it 
indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete examples 
that Lady Welby used.   Another shift from the word-based terminology, such as 
dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, such as semes and phemes, 
is significant.  Since  semes include hypericons, he never again needed that 
word.   He also used the term "phemic sheet" as replacement for 'sheet of 
assertion'.

I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 
'tone'.  The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she 
admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for 
preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system:  "Your exposition of 
the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort 
of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer tone to mark for the homely 
reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to 
his tone'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).

There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I have 
the time.

John

PS:   The initials JS are ambiguous.   It's better to write JAS or JFS.


From: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 
to the end

This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy 
[TJ]. .

I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of 
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of 
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.

This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this 
generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate 
Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most 
immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic 
Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not 
always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result.

And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes.

The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an 
priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the 
Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the 
opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis.

And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant 
follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of 
the authoritarian FI.

Edwina

On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy  wrote:

List,
I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three 
interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in 
Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by John 
Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer not to 
get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an alternative 
interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in Chapter Four of my 
recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one 
proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. 
These replies are sufficient to support my position. First this statement:
‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical 
determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination 
within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines 
the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate 
(Ii)’. (JS)
Here are two premisses on which we disagree 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] determination

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Robert, List,

 

Thank you! And is that definition different from my Boolean assumption? Boole is about true/false, but "renders definitely to such as it will be", and "particular manner" sound like something between true or false, but is that so? "Not particular" and "not definitely" might be translated with "false", i think.

 

Best regards, Helmut

 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 03. April 2024 um 18:06 Uhr
Von: "robert marty" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" , "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination


Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it will be"

"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.(CP 8.361)342-379 M-20b (1908))

Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of determination is transitive.

Best regards, Robert

 




Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

 







 

	
		
			
			Sans virus.www.avast.com
		
	


 


Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :




Dear list members,

 

some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.

 

Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity.

 

Best regards, Helmut


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] determination

[robert marty]

Helmut, list
According to Peirce, the definition if "renders definitely to be such as it
will be"

*"We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be
such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner.*(CP 8.361)342-379
M-20b *(1908))*

Within the MS 611, p.67-68, Peirce verify that his definition of
determination is transitive.

Best regards, Robert


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *




Sans
virus.www.avast.com

<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

Le mer. 3 avr. 2024 à 16:36, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Dear list members,
>
> some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds
> of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also
> determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and
> classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it
> more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the
> second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that
> determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or
> "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or,
> if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.
>
> Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society
> determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there
> is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined
> by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the
> government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines
> the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself
> as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion
> (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and
> classification form a complexity.
>
> Best regards, Helmut
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at
> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the
> links!
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Edwina Taborsky]

This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy 
[TJ]. .

I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of 
Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of 
mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process.

This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this 
generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate 
Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most 
immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic 
Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not 
always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result.

And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes.

The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an 
priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the 
Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the 
opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis.

And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant 
follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of 
the authoritarian FI. 

Edwina

> On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three 
> interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in 
> Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by 
> John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer 
> not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an 
> alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in 
> Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of 
> David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his 
> objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my 
> position. First this statement:
> 
> ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical 
> determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination 
> within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines 
> the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate 
> correlate (Ii)’. (JS)
> 
> Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably:
> 
> 1)  That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical 
> (causal, temporal). As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought 
> and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern 
> of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination out 
> in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The action 
> of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and the 
> interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds of 
> insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying 
> signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought in 
> action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there is no 
> difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which the 
> empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the 
> six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the 
> process of semiosis.
> 2)  That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within 
> the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly 
> degenerate). If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, for 
> example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically within each 
> interpretant division, following the universe distinction from least to most 
> complex within the possible, existent and necessitant universe  hierarchy. 
> Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to point out that there 
> are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and the 
> suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), there 
> is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are hierarchically organized; 
> they simply differ in complexity. JS’s phenomenological hierarchy would 
> suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate 
> degenerate, which is surely not the case.
> 
> What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, 
> opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources.
> 
> 
> 
> I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons (there 
> are others):
> 
> · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear 
> definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means 
> that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions 
> Peirce gives of the 

[PEIRCE-L] determination

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear list members,

 

some time later maybe I will work on my idea, that there are three kinds of systems hierarchy, besides the Salthean composition and subsumption also determination, so it is composition (1ns), determination (2ns) and classification (3ns). I call subsumption classification, because I find it more common. Do you think that is ok would be my first question, and the second is about the meaning of determination: I am just now thinking, that determination merely means: "A determines B" means "Not B without A", or "If B then A". Like, if there is a sign, then there is an/its object, or, if there is an interpretant, then there is a/its sign.

 

Or, e.g., if there is a citizen, then there is a society, the society determines the citizen (the individual`s status as its citizen). If there is an individual within the range of a government, with the range defined by the government (composition), and so the individual defined as the government´s subservient (classification), then the government determines the individual, regardless of whether the individual classifies him/herself as its citizen or not, the determination is either ex- or inclusion (composition). This example shows, that composition, determination and classification form a complexity.

 

Best regards, Helmut
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end

[Anthony Jappy]

List,

I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the
three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper
published in *Semiotica *(which is indeed the published version of the text
mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his
posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless
will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much
greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the
interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS
and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are
sufficient to support my position. First this statement:

‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical
determination for sign classification, not *causal* nor *temporal*
determination within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate
(If) determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly
degenerate correlate (Ii)’. (JS)

Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably:

1)  *That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical
(causal, temporal).* As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of
thought and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the
concern of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of
ratiocination out in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies
alike (‘The action of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the
utterer and the interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and
many kinds of insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs,
and lying signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is
simply thought in action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process
in which there is no difference between the logical and the empirical, a
process in which the empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I
maintain that the six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a
‘blueprint’ for the process of semiosis.

2)  *That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within
the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly
degenerate).* If such values were to be associated with the interpretant,
for example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically
*within* each interpretant division, following the universe distinction
from least to most complex within the possible, existent and necessitant
universe  hierarchy. Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to
point out that there are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories
suggest them, and the suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’
(R318: 251, 1907), there is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are
hierarchically organized; they simply differ in complexity. JS’s
phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic object is
genuine and the immediate degenerate, which is surely not the case.

What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions,
opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources.


I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons
(there are others):

· In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear
definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means
that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to
descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the
interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the
Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in
the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the
mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908).

It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a
classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is
defined to be present.

· As for the possibility of misinterpretation, consider the
descriptions Peirce gives LW in 1909 of his three interpretants:



‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have
its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My Dynamical
Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and
is different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is
the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to
come if the sign is sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is
an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is
a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the
actual tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909)



...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it
*immediately* expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added)

And of the *final interpretant* (If) he says this:

That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached),
interpretant (final