List: It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly *supports *my position.
TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being "explicit." It is the interpretant that is *right there* in the sign itself, which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classification is a division according to its mode of *presentation*. CSP as quoted by TJ: The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered ... The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS 111, 1909) Here the final interpretant is unambiguously identified as the "destined" interpretant, i.e., the "destinate" interpretant. CSP as quoted by TJ: But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP 2:496, 1909) As Peirce says elsewhere, "No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestinated belief" (CP 7.327, 1873). Also, "No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion" (CP 5.407, 1878). Also, "The logician maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain predestinate conclusions which are the same for all men" (CP 3.161, 1880). Also, "I call 'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which *would *ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular direction" (EP 2:457, 1911). Since the "ultimate opinion" is the "predestinate opinion," the final interpretant is likewise the "destinate" interpretant. TJ: JAS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate degenerate ... Indeed, Peirce's recognition around 1904 that each sign has two objects and three interpretants is the result of phaneroscopic analysis--within the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, the sign is the first and simplest correlate, the object is the second correlate of middling complexity, and the interpretant is the third and most complex correlate (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903). Accordingly, the dynamical object is the *genuine *object, as it is in itself, independent of the sign; and the immediate object is the *degenerate *object, as it is represented by the sign. TJ: It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is defined to be present. It is perfectly logical in a classification of *signs*, because the three correlates of the *genuine *triadic relation of representing/mediating are the *genuine *correlates--the sign itself, its *dynamical *object, and its *final *interpretant. On the other hand, there is only a *degenerate *triadic relation between the sign, its dynamical object, and its *dynamical *interpretant--it is reducible to the sign's genuine *dyadic *relations with its dynamical object/interpretant, each of which has its own trichotomy; and there are only *degenerate *dyadic relations between the sign and its immediate object/interpretant, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for these relations. Moreover, all six discrete correlates are *entia rationis*--artifacts of analysis prescinded from the real and continuous process of semiosis. TJ: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final interpretant. Again, this is a matter of *logical *ordering for the classification of signs, not *causal/temporal* sequence within the process of semiosis. The final interpretant is not the *last *interpretant in a series of dynamical interpretants--recall that in 1906, "I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536). Instead, it is the *normative *interpretant, hence "normal interpretant" in some places--the dynamical interpretant that the sign *would *produce under ideal circumstances. It is "final" in the sense of a final cause, "that toward which the actual [dynamical interpretant] tends," not an efficient cause that deterministically necessitates the dynamical interpretant. TJ: There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the exponent). All three interpretants of a linguistic sign are aspects of its meaning. The immediate interpretant is the range of what it *possibly could* mean in accordance with its constituent word definitions and grammatical syntax, the dynamical interpretant is what it *actually does* mean to any one interpreter of it, and the final interpretant is what it *necessarily would* mean under ideal circumstances, including after infinite investigation by an infinite community. TJ: And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended interpretation. On the contrary, a sign is mis-*uttered *to the extent that its immediate interpretant deviates from the utterer's intention, while it is mis- *interpreted* to the extent that a dynamical interpretant of it deviates from its *final *(normative) interpretant. We are not always completely successful in accurately conveying our intentions with the signs that we utter, so their final interpretants are not strictly dictated by those intentions. "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that *sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). As William Abraham nicely puts it, "If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author intended" ( https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=asburyjournal, p. 20). TJ: To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - *all *the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants. I do not have the book, but Peirce's late taxonomies are almost always arranged in *phaneroscopic *order--from the simplest correlate (sign) to the most complex correlate (interpretant); for each correlate, from the most degenerate (immediate) to the genuine; for each dyadic relation, coming right after its second correlate; and for the genuine triadic relation, coming last. He *never *provided a typology with all ten trichotomies arranged in their proper *logical *order for sign classification--if he had done so, then there would obviously be no room for debate about what he had in mind. Instead, we have only a few *partial *orderings--S, S-Od, S-If (1903); S-If, S-Id (1904); and Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii (1908), taking destinate=final and explicit=immediate. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 2:46 AM Anthony Jappy <anthony.ja...@gmail.com> wrote: > List, > > I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the > three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper > published in *Semiotica *(which is indeed the published version of the > text mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his > posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless > will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much > greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the > interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS > and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are > sufficient to support my position. First this statement: > > ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical > determination for sign classification, not *causal* nor *temporal* > determination within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate > (If) determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly > degenerate correlate (Ii)’. (JS) > > Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably: > > 1) *That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical > (causal, temporal).* As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of > thought and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the > concern of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of > ratiocination out in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies > alike (‘The action of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the > utterer and the interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and > many kinds of insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, > and lying signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is > simply thought in action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process > in which there is no difference between the logical and the empirical, a > process in which the empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I > maintain that the six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a > ‘blueprint’ for the process of semiosis. > > 2) *That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values > within the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii > doubly degenerate).* If such values were to be associated with the > interpretant, for example, it would surely be more logical to apply them > vertically *within* each interpretant division, following the universe > distinction from least to most complex within the possible, existent and > necessitant universe hierarchy. Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is > now necessary to point out that there are three kinds of interpretant. Our > categories suggest them, and the suggestion is confirmed by careful > consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), there is no suggestion in the manuscript > that they are hierarchically organized; they simply differ in complexity. > JS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic object > is genuine and the immediate degenerate, which is surely not the case. > > What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, > opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources. > > I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons > (there are others): > > · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear > definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means > that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to > descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the > interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the > Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in > the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the > mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). > > It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a > classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is > defined to be present. > > · As for the possibility of misinterpretation, consider the > descriptions Peirce gives LW in 1909 of his three interpretants: > > > > ‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have > its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My Dynamical > Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and > is different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is > the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to > come if the sign is sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is > an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is > a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the > actual tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909) > > > > ...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it > *immediately* expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added) > > And of the *final interpretant* (If) he says this: > > That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached), > interpretant (final I mean, in the logical sense of attaining the purpose, > is also final in the sense of bringing the series of translations [to a > stop] for the obvious reason that it is not itself a sign) is to be > regarded as the ultimate signification of the [sign]. (LI: 356-357; 1906) > > > > The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every > Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... > The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, > 1909) > > > > But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, > which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally > be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter > were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) > > It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s > ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that > toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual > interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final > interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant > determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the > exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the > degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the > utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These > definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the > actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that > the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual > semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended > interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is ‘the > *Intentional *Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the > utterer; the *Effectual *Interpretant, which is a determination of the > mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii > follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the > interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. > > · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of > determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the > order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when > accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.’ (JS) > > To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 14 > six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of > which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - > *all* the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final > interpretants. > > NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), *The Logic of > Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series*, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie > Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) > > With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own > minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. > > TJ >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
