Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, Jon, List, The following observation is a good starting point for analyzing the development iof Peirce's thought and writing from 1903 to 1908 and later: ET: I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. Yes indeed. Peirce's shift from Kant's language-based phenomenology to an image-based phaneroscopy was necessary to get rid of Kant's struggle with a Ding an sich, Peirce's1903 terminology was based on language, which, by itself, is hopelessly inadequate for mapping the phaneron to a linear notation. But his shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy coincided with an emphasis on diagrams and images as more fundamental representations than language or even his 1885 algebra of logic. That shift coincided with his generalization of term, proposition, argument to seme, pheme, and delome. For example, the following paragraph from 1906 summarizes the issues: "It is necessary that the Diagram should be an Icon in which the inferred relation should be preserved. And it is necessary that it should be insofar General that one sees that accompaniments are no part of the Object. The Diagram is an Interpretant of a Symbol in which the signification of the Symbol becomes a part of the object of the icon. No other kind of sign can make a Truth evident. For the evident is that which is presented in an image, leaving for the work of the understanding merely the Interpretation of the Image in a Symbol." (LNB 286r, 1906) In his version of phenomenology, Kant was left with an unbridgeable gap between a Ding an sich and the words that describe it. Peirce removed that gap by replacing phenomenology with phaneroscopy. Too many people treat those two words as synonyms. But the crucial difference is that the phaneron is in direct contact with the Ding an sich. by means of the sensations, feelings, and physical actions. The images and feelings become semes, and constructions of them become phemes. Phaneroscopy is the science of images, diagrams of images, and their mapping to symbols that may be expressed in various ways, including language. But language is secondary. It is not the primary medium of thought. That is why the 1903 lectures are just the starting point for his last decade of research and his evolution to completely new ways of thinking and a revolution in his methods of analyzing and diagramming his own thoughts and his system of representing it. I started to write an article for the book Kees was editing, but I missed the deadline because I kept revising it over and over again, as I kept running into all these issues. It eventually evolved into an article on phaneroscopy for the book that Ahti was editing. And after I finished that article, I saw how those issues were related to (1) the topics that Tony was working on and (2) the topics that Peirce was addressing with his Delta graphs. I believe that if Peirce had not had that accident in December 1911, he would have written an outstanding proof of pragmatism with the help of his Delta graphs and the methods he developed in the years after 1903. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" List I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his. But just a few points: 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a man to escape the predestined opinion" . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference”
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
I will try to answer in pints: > On Apr 4, 2024, at 8:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements > about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct > engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in this case. > Hopefully, I will not regret it. > > ET: I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ > or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that > ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to > other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint? > > Again, we are discussing an abstract classification of signs that utilizes a > series of different trichotomies, not the concrete process of semiosis that > consists of a series of different events. To say that one trichotomy follows > another is merely to say that classification in accordance with the first > trichotomy logically constrains classification in accordance with the second > trichotomy. If we assign numbers to the universes--1 for possibles, 2 for > existents, and 3 for necessitants--then the number assigned for each > subsequent trichotomy must be equal to or less than the number assigned for > the preceding trichotomy. 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes to the interpretants? > > ET: And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes > an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he > says: possible-existent-necessitant [for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But > this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. > > No, this is a misunderstanding of my position. It confuses the phaneroscopic > analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating (one sign, > two objects, three interpretants) with the classification of signs in > accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy using ten trichotomies for those six > correlates and their four distinct relations as divisions into three > universes (possibles, existents, necessitants). These are two different > applications of Peirce's three universal categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns). 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. > > ET: And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the > Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [understood as a necessitant] > but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten > has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns > and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. I think this is a key > point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of > 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot > impose constraint. > > This seems to be a reference to Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, not the 1908 taxonomy > that we are actually discussing. In that 1903 taxonomy, the third trichotomy > is not for the interpretant itself, but for its dyadic relation with the sign > (rheme/dicisign/argument). An argument is indeed the only sign class for > which this sign-interpretant relation is a necessitant, but no one is talking > about that relation or the final interpretant itself constraining > anything--its trichotomy constrains any subsequent trichotomies for sign > classification. For example, according to Peirce himself, the S-If trichotomy > constrains the S-Id trichotomy. 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. > > CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic > interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument [delome] only may be submitted > to its interpretant [indicative], as something the reasonableness of which > will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent [pheme] may be urged upon > the interpretant by an act of insistence [imperative]. 3rd, argument or > dicent may be, and a rheme [seme] can only be, presented to the interpretant > for contemplation [suggestive]. (CP 8.338, 1904 Oct 12) 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical modes. > > In fact, this is my fourth reason for believing that the proper logical order > of the three interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then > dynamical, then immediate--since the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: I have likewise already read (and carefully studied) about a dozen articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Sign Classes and the Philosophy of Representation*. Why assume otherwise? I still disagree with him on destinate=final and explicit=immediate (as I maintain) vs. destinate=immediate and explicit=final (as he maintains). However, having made our cases, I agree with him that we must ultimately "leave the list members to make up their own minds." The only authority that really matters here is that of Peirce himself. I strongly urge everyone to study *his *writings in light of our different arguments, and then draw their own conclusions about *his *views based on those texts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy > that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly > urge you to study his writings. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, List: In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in this case. Hopefully, I will not regret it. ET: I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint? Again, we are discussing an abstract *classification *of signs that utilizes a series of different *trichotomies*, not the concrete *process *of semiosis that consists of a series of different *events*. To say that one trichotomy *follows *another is merely to say that classification in accordance with the first trichotomy *logically constrains *classification in accordance with the second trichotomy. If we assign numbers to the universes--1 for possibles, 2 for existents, and 3 for necessitants--then the number assigned for each subsequent trichotomy must be equal to or less than the number assigned for the preceding trichotomy. ET: And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitant [for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. No, this is a *mis*understanding of my position. It confuses the phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating (one sign, two objects, three interpretants) with the classification of signs in accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy using ten trichotomies for those six correlates and their four distinct relations as divisions into three universes (possibles, existents, necessitants). These are two *different *applications of Peirce's three universal categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns). ET: And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. This seems to be a reference to Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, not the 1908 taxonomy that we are actually discussing. In that 1903 taxonomy, the third trichotomy is not for the interpretant *itself*, but for its dyadic *relation *with the sign (rheme/dicisign/argument). An argument is indeed the only sign class for which this sign-interpretant relation is a necessitant, but no one is talking about that relation or the final interpretant *itself *constraining anything--its *trichotomy *constrains any subsequent *trichotomies *for sign classification. For example, according to Peirce himself, the S-If trichotomy constrains the S-Id trichotomy. CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument [delome] only may be *submitted *to its interpretant [indicative], as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent [pheme] may be *urged *upon the interpretant by an act of insistence [imperative]. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme [seme] can only be, presented to the interpretant for *contemplation* [suggestive]. (CP 8.338, 1904 Oct 12) In fact, this is my fourth reason for believing that the proper logical order of the three interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--since the S-If trichotomy unambiguously comes *before *the S-Id trichotomy, it makes sense that the If trichotomy likewise comes *before *the Id trichotomy. ET: And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again, we are discussing sign classification, not "cognitive movement" (whatever that is). My position is that the *purpose *of the final interpretant (to produce feeling/action/self-control) constrains the *mode of being* of the dynamical interpretant (feeling/exertion/sign), which constrains the *mode of presentation* of the immediate interpretant (hypothetic/categorical/relative). The competing claim is that the mode of presentation of the immediate
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Jon, I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly urge you to study his writings. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/4/24 12:39 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end List: While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations. Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following restrictions. - A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only feelings. - Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead produce exertions or feelings. - A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present those effects as abstract qualities. - Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract qualities. Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns. By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to necessitant--which does not make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants. Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic sheet is a strictly logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the immediate interpretant must come after the one for the dynamical interpretant--if it were the other way around, then only relative propositions with at least two lines of identity could be scribed on the phemic sheet, which is obviously not the case. That said, since the trichotomy for the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we see, of course, the same format Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, not within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad. And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. Edwina > On Apr 4, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > List: > > While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing > that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign > classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign > classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more > plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the > possibility of misinterpretations. > > Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor > "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible > can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by > nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant > divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, > 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final > interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," > respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following > restrictions. > A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a > sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; > i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only > feelings. > Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, > can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is > necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or > possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally > produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might > instead produce exertions or feelings. > A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, > must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of > presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can > only present those effects as abstract qualities. > Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is > necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of > presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a > categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that > actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, > although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract > qualities. > Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic > percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic > percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, > categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is > misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a > different universe from that of its final interpretant's
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List: While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations. Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following restrictions. - A *gratific* sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a *sympathetic* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only feelings. - Only a *temperative* sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, can be a *usual* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a *percussive* sign) or possible (for a *sympathetic* sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead produce exertions or feelings. - A *sympathetic* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, must be a *hypothetic* sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present those effects as abstract qualities. - Only a *usual* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, can be a *relative* sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a *categorical* sign) or possible (for a *hypothetic* sign); i.e., only a sign that actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract qualities. Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is *mis*interpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns. By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to necessitant--which *does not* make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants. Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic sheet is a strictly *logical *quasi-mind, so it can *only *be determined to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the immediate interpretant must come *after* the one for the dynamical interpretant--if it were the other way around, then *only *relative propositions with at least two lines of identity could be scribed on the phemic sheet, which is obviously not the case. That said, since the trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its final interpretant (name/proposition/argument or seme/pheme/delome) presumably comes *after *all three trichotomies for the interpretants themselves, regardless of which way we arrange them, only categorical and relative signs can be propositions (phemes). Hypothetic signs can only be names (semes), which would be scribed on the phemic sheet without
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his. But just a few points: 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a man to escape the predestined opinion" . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161. I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’. And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to whether the terms are logical or temporal. 4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I reject JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that “reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its Representation” 4.536.1906. And “the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” SS197..1906. That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it becomes part of the semiotic process. And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. . 5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the Peircean framework. Edwina > On Apr 3, 2024, at 9:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > List: > > It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important > reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant > and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP > 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. > In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly supports my > position. > > TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition > of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is > present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce > gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: > ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., > the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic > Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, > 1908). > > Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being > "explicit." It is the interpretant that is right there in the sign itself, > which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign
