List I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his.
But just a few points: 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a man to escape the predestined opinion" . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161. I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’. And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to whether the terms are logical or temporal. 4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I reject JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that “reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its Representation” 4.536.1906. And “the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” SS197..1906. That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it becomes part of the semiotic process. And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. . 5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the Peircean framework. Edwina > On Apr 3, 2024, at 9:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > List: > > It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important > reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant > and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP > 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. > In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly supports my > position. > > TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition > of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is > present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce > gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: > ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., > the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic > Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, > 1908). > > Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being > "explicit." It is the interpretant that is right there in the sign itself, > which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classification is a > division according to its mode of presentation. > > CSP as quoted by TJ: The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result > to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently > considered ... The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. > (SS 111, 1909) > > Here the final interpretant is unambiguously identified as the "destined" > interpretant, i.e., the "destinate" interpretant. > > CSP as quoted by TJ: But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of > Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which > would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of > the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP > 2:496, 1909) > > As Peirce says elsewhere, "No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, > it is assumed that he will end in one predestinated belief" (CP 7.327, 1873). > Also, "No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other > facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the > predestinate opinion" (CP 5.407, 1878). Also, "The logician maintains that > there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that of carrying > belief, in the long run, toward certain predestinate conclusions which are > the same for all men" (CP 3.161, 1880). Also, "I call 'truth' the > predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which would > ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that > particular direction" (EP 2:457, 1911). Since the "ultimate opinion" is the > "predestinate opinion," the final interpretant is likewise the "destinate" > interpretant. > > TJ: JAS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic > object is genuine and the immediate degenerate ... > > Indeed, Peirce's recognition around 1904 that each sign has two objects and > three interpretants is the result of phaneroscopic analysis--within the > genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, the > sign is the first and simplest correlate, the object is the second correlate > of middling complexity, and the interpretant is the third and most complex > correlate (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903). Accordingly, the dynamical object > is the genuine object, as it is in itself, independent of the sign; and the > immediate object is the degenerate object, as it is represented by the sign. > > TJ: It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a > classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is defined > to be present. > > It is perfectly logical in a classification of signs, because the three > correlates of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating are the > genuine correlates--the sign itself, its dynamical object, and its final > interpretant. On the other hand, there is only a degenerate triadic relation > between the sign, its dynamical object, and its dynamical interpretant--it is > reducible to the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its dynamical > object/interpretant, each of which has its own trichotomy; and there are only > degenerate dyadic relations between the sign and its immediate > object/interpretant, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for > these relations. Moreover, all six discrete correlates are entia > rationis--artifacts of analysis prescinded from the real and continuous > process of semiosis. > > TJ: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which > the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) > might take place, surely not after the final interpretant. > > Again, this is a matter of logical ordering for the classification of signs, > not causal/temporal sequence within the process of semiosis. The final > interpretant is not the last interpretant in a series of dynamical > interpretants--recall that in 1906, "I confess that my own conception of this > third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536). Instead, it > is the normative interpretant, hence "normal interpretant" in some > places--the dynamical interpretant that the sign would produce under ideal > circumstances. It is "final" in the sense of a final cause, "that toward > which the actual [dynamical interpretant] tends," not an efficient cause that > deterministically necessitates the dynamical interpretant. > > TJ: There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant determines the > sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the exponent). > > All three interpretants of a linguistic sign are aspects of its meaning. The > immediate interpretant is the range of what it possibly could mean in > accordance with its constituent word definitions and grammatical syntax, the > dynamical interpretant is what it actually does mean to any one interpreter > of it, and the final interpretant is what it necessarily would mean under > ideal circumstances, including after infinite investigation by an infinite > community. > > TJ: And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the degree of > congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the utterer and the > actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii > is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign and > If a future tendency) surely suggest that the only possibility of > misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is > not congruent with the intended interpretation. > > On the contrary, a sign is mis-uttered to the extent that its immediate > interpretant deviates from the utterer's intention, while it is > mis-interpreted to the extent that a dynamical interpretant of it deviates > from its final (normative) interpretant. We are not always completely > successful in accurately conveying our intentions with the signs that we > utter, so their final interpretants are not strictly dictated by those > intentions. "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to > the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the > Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that > sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). As William Abraham nicely puts it, "If meaning has > an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in > achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author > intended" > (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=asburyjournal, > p. 20). > > TJ: To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) > displaying 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and > 1908, of which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS > - all the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final > interpretants. > > I do not have the book, but Peirce's late taxonomies are almost always > arranged in phaneroscopic order--from the simplest correlate (sign) to the > most complex correlate (interpretant); for each correlate, from the most > degenerate (immediate) to the genuine; for each dyadic relation, coming right > after its second correlate; and for the genuine triadic relation, coming > last. He never provided a typology with all ten trichotomies arranged in > their proper logical order for sign classification--if he had done so, then > there would obviously be no room for debate about what he had in mind. > Instead, we have only a few partial orderings--S, S-Od, S-If (1903); S-If, > S-Id (1904); and Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii (1908), taking destinate=final and > explicit=immediate. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 2:46 AM Anthony Jappy <anthony.ja...@gmail.com > <mailto:anthony.ja...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> List, >> >> I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the >> three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper >> published in Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text >> mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his >> posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless >> will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater >> detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant >> ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to >> two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to >> support my position. First this statement: >> >> ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical >> determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination >> within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines >> the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate >> correlate (Ii)’. (JS) >> >> Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably: >> >> 1) That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical >> (causal, temporal). As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought >> and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern >> of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination >> out in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The >> action of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and >> the interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds of >> insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying >> signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought >> in action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there >> is no difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which >> the empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the >> six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the >> process of semiosis. >> 2) That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within >> the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly >> degenerate). If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, for >> example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically within >> each interpretant division, following the universe distinction from least to >> most complex within the possible, existent and necessitant universe >> hierarchy. Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to point out >> that there are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and >> the suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), >> there is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are hierarchically >> organized; they simply differ in complexity. JS’s phenomenological hierarchy >> would suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate >> degenerate, which is surely not the case. >> >> What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, >> opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources. >> >> I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons (there >> are others): >> >> · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear >> definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means >> that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to >> descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the >> interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the >> Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in >> the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the >> mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). >> >> It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a >> classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is defined >> to be present. >> >> · As for the possibility of misinterpretation, consider the >> descriptions Peirce gives LW in 1909 of his three interpretants: >> >> ‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have >> its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My Dynamical >> Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and >> is different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is >> the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come >> if the sign is sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is an >> abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a >> single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual >> tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909) >> >> ...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it >> immediately expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added) >> >> And of the final interpretant (If) he says this: >> >> That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached), >> interpretant (final I mean, in the logical sense of attaining the purpose, >> is also final in the sense of bringing the series of translations [to a >> stop] for the obvious reason that it is not itself a sign) is to be regarded >> as the ultimate signification of the [sign]. (LI: 356-357; 1906) >> >> The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every >> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... >> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, 1909) >> >> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which >> I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be >> decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were >> carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) >> >> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s ordering: >> if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which the >> actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) might >> take place, surely not after the final interpretant. There is no suggestion >> here that the final interpretant determines the sign’s meaning (of which the >> immediate interpretant is the exponent). And surely misinterpretation and >> misconception depend upon the degree of congruence between the intended >> meaning emanating from the utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the >> interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent >> interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) >> surely suggest that the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from >> when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the >> intended interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that >> there is ‘the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind >> of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the >> mind of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii >> follows the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the >> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. >> >> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of >> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the >> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when >> accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations.’ (JS) >> >> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying >> 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of >> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - all >> the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants. >> >> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), The Logic of >> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie >> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) >> >> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own >> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. >> >> TJ >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
