[PEIRCE-L] Tone, Token, Type, was, Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Gary Richmond
Jon, Helmut, List,

This is a bald an expression of why "the word "mark" is a terrible
choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic
will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual
material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with
"token."

In my opinion (and after reviewing your extended exchange with John Sowa on
the topic), it seems to me clear that you have well argued (with
*considerable *textual support) as to why 'tone' is *far preferable* to
'mark' for the "possible sign" under consideration. However, if one is
'married' to a term (because, say, he's published work using that term, or
plans to use it in future papers and presentations, etc.) then he will find
reasons to reject any other term. Yet I am *completely* willing to admit
that if he has weighed the arguments and still feels that
his argumentation is superior, well, that is that.

So, as I began the paragraph above, *all *of this is merely 'my opinion'.

Again, I expect Peirce-L members will make up their own minds on the
matter. In my thinking, it's really quite simple: either "mark" suggests "a
material sign" rather than a possible one, or it does not. But, on the
other hand, if one concludes that, in addition to those problematic
material associations with the term 'mark', that one finds nothing
connoting that which is 'material' about the term, 'tone', and for that
reason, along with other reasons which have been argued for it, that it is
the nature, and so, superior, term for the 'possible sign' being
considered, well that is in my view but an expression of critical
commonsense.

Best,

Gary

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 11:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
> the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
> details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
> misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
> treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of
> "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Helmut, Jon, List,
>>
>> That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't
>> be wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.
>>
>> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
>> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>>
>> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use
>> a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:
>> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical
>> sense and everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.
>>
>> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be
>> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also
>> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the
>> sound  of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that
>> subset of marks that could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those
>> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings.
>>
>> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was
>> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since
>> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little
>> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose
>> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly.
>>
>> John
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
John, List:

On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of
"tone/tuone/tinge/potisign."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Helmut, Jon, List,
>
> That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't
> be wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.
>
> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>
> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a
> word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:
> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical
> sense and everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.
>
> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be
> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also
> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the
> sound  of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that
> subset of marks that could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those
> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings.
>
> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was
> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since
> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little
> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose
> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread John F Sowa
Helmut, Jon, List,

That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't be 
wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a word 
with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:   academics 
who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical sense and 
everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.

In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be correct 
for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also considered 
'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the sound  of tones 
or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that subset of marks that 
could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those sounds as well as 
arbitrary sights and feelings.

That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was close 
to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since the 
overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little about the 
fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose terms that they 
are capable of remembering and using  correctly.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about 
using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by 
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in 
order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with 
the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy 
for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is 
icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp 
distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any 
object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any 
interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an 
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate 
sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not 
rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, 
then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the 
three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or 
possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a 
possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, 
dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always 
a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the 
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic 
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it 
can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic 
relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 
6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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[PEIRCE-L] Tone Token Type, was Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Gary Richmond
Helmut, Jon, List,

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.


JAS: Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token
in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign."


 ". . . a mark is an actual material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . .
is never *itself  *"an actual material sign." Exactly. When one offers
examples of marks they are invariably composed of or involve some* materia*l:
a mark on a blackboard is chalk; a beauty mark is composed of skin cells; a
mark on a dart board is painted wood, etc. Even when 'mark' is used
figuratively ("mark my words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a
mark of collegiality to 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind.

On the other hand, the tone (timbre) of a flute is its
characteristic sound, it's "tone quality" musicians say,  far different
from the timbre of an oboe;, we recognized the characteristic timbre (tone)
of a friend's voice and notice that the tone changes when she is
angry.These tone/timbres are, shall we say, not the physical, material
'instrument', but rather are positioned on or upon the physical source of
the sound (the flute or someone's vocal chords).

I continue to be convinced that the argument for 'tone' v 'mark' (which has
been explicated rather fully by Jon and John) is far stronger for 'tone'.
List members will, of course, make up their own minds.

Best,

Gary



On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 1:48 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Helmut, List:
>
> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>
>
> Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
> about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
> Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent
> token in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual
> material sign."
>
> HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>
>
> The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree
> with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.
>
> HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is
> "either-or".
>
>
> Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
> trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
> is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
> distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
> any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
> any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and
> an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a 
> *degenerate
> *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
> 1901).
>
> HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".
>
>
> Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then,
> but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a
> necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be
> in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be
> either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible,
> the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a
> symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign
> or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.
>
> HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the
> categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification
> (3ns).
>
>
> Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic
> relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks
> it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is
> itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the
> composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>>
>> List,
>>
>> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.


Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned
about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token
in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:


The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree
with the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".


Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and an
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a
*degenerate
*sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".


Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then, but
not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a
necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be
in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be
either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible,
the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a
symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign
or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification
(3ns).


Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks
it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is itself
a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the
composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> List,
>
> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt,
> that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too
> much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material
> sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>
> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no
> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world
> itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be
> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and
> shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words
> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are
> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be
> obsolete today."
>
> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there
> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and
> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or,
> as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
>
> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of
> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes,
> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think
> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then"
> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation
> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and
> classification (3ns).
>
> Best regards
> Helmut
>
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

2024-04-15 Thread Helmut Raulien
 

 
 

supplement: thinking about it, I am not clear anymore, if composition "is"or"". Also classification is not simply "either-or", this either-or only applies to parallel classes, but between a class and a subclass it seems more complicated. How exactly, that is how to translate composition, determination, and classification into logic (e.g. Boole, EG, EntG, Venn) I haven´t worked out yet. I even don´t know, whether it is translatable at all, as propositional logic to me seems to suit classification, but not composition. Maybe an Euler-diagram is good for composition? But how to translate one into EG?



 


List,

 

I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

 


"But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today."

 

Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, as a matter of retrospection, in the past.

 

In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

 

Best regards

Helmut


 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 14. April 2024 um 03:21 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Edwina Taborsky" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Ahti Pietarinen" , "Francesco Bellucci" , "Anthony Jappy" , "Nathan Houser" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type



Edwina, Jon, List,

 

Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across.  

 

ET:   I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues.  No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines.

 

JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species.

 

JAS:  Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them.

 

Yes, of course.   As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that.  And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them.

 

But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today.  

 

JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'.

 

JAS:  Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out...

 

Please note what I was trying to say.  I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy:  The Science of Diagrams".  That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy".  For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article.

 

But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term.  There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point.  In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy".   I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.    Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word.

 

I believe that Peirce's theories