Helmut, Jon, List,

That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't be 
wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a word 
with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:   academics 
who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical sense and 
everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.

In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be correct 
for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also considered 
'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the sound  of tones 
or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that subset of marks that 
could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those sounds as well as 
arbitrary sights and feelings.

That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was close 
to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since the 
overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little about the 
fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose terms that they 
are capable of remembering and using  correctly.

John

----------------------------------------
From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>

Helmut, List:

HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, 
that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much 
from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, 
intended to be recognizable by anybody else.

Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about 
using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by 
Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in 
order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign."

HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:

The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with 
the gist of it in accordance with synechism.

HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or".

Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy 
for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is 
icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp 
distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any 
object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any 
interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an 
interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate 
sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901).

HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if".

Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not 
rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, 
then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the 
three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or 
possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a 
possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, 
dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always 
a rheme.

HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the 
categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns).

Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic 
relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it 
can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic 
relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 
6.321, c. 1907).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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