Jon, List,
On that point, we are in complete agreement:
JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any
noun in the English language.
JAS: In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it
is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and
Follow-up:
Please tell me, if it is not ok. to write a follow-up this way.
Well, I think it is possible to have a table of ten classes of relations, with close analogy to Peirce´s table of ten classes of signs. Maybe it not even is an analogy, but just a renaming. But I think, it makes clear,
John, List:
JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost
any noun in the English language.
In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it
is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction
between a "graph" as a type
Jon,
The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any noun in
the English language. As I'm now looking out the window, I see three tree
instances nearby and many more instance of trees farther down the hill. But
the word 'instance' may be dropped when there is no need
supplement: I just googled involution, but it is something medicinical. So what´s the noun of to involve, is it involution, involvement, or involvation?
Jerry, List,
yes, but all that doesn´t mean, that there isn´t a sharp distinction between classes. It just says, that classes can
Jerry, List,
yes, but all that doesn´t mean, that there isn´t a sharp distinction between classes. It just says, that classes can involve each other. But there still isn´t a gradient between the involving and the involved class, and neither one between two parallelly involved classes. The
List, Jon:
> On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon,
> index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.
>
> According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or
John, List:
JFS: He uses exactly the same word with no change whatsoever for the
abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, lines, and ovals) and
the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet.
It is remarkable that someone can read a short paragraph and then seriously
claim that
Jon, Gary, List,
Please reread the paragraph below by Peirce from L376 (December 1911). The
example he uses is 'existential graph'. He uses exactly the same word with no
change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots,
lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it
Jon, List,
That 'something' which is, as Peirce writes, ". . . a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are," I have for many
years referred to as "a would-be' *if.* . .". That "if" emphasizes the
Gary, List:
Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
CSP: Any visible
Dear All, Supplement:
I want to add, that my classification of relations is not an arbitrary idea, but it is derived after the Peircean categories: Though Peirce said, that composition is thirdness, I think that is because it is a relation. But, if i classify it as a kind of relation, I
John, Jon, Helmut, List,
JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
the following two sentences:
1. A hump is a tone
John, List:
JFS: 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Thanks for demonstrating once again that the common meaning and usage of
"mark" today render it a terrible alternative for "tone" as the possible
counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." Any
Jon, List,
In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted Peirce's
explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be' should have exactly
the same spelling as the word that names the actual thing. See below for a
copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of
Jon, List,
my ideas are all very tentative. Maybe composition, determination, classification are the three kinds of relation? These three kinds each have three kinds again, e.g. composition may be one of traits, spatiotemporal, or functional. So it might be possible, to talk more specificly,
Helmut, List:
HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three
relations.
According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more
generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical)
object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is
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