John, Jon, Helmut, List,
JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
the following two sentences:
1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
Compare this to:
GR:
1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
"Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
the following two sentences:"
1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual
material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an
actual material sign."
To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my words"
"he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to 'x' ")
physical material is brought to mind."
That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.
JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( ____
token type)."
There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
discussed.
Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion
needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean
terminological matters -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic
value whatsoever." And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on
Peirce-L. "Get rid of it."
Best,
Gary
On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 1:04 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
> Jon, List,
>
> In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted
> Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be'
> should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual
> thing. See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of
> Peirce's statement.
>
> But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's
> unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.
>
> In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term
> 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the
> same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic
> sheet. Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just
> like a 'word', any word, say camel".
>
> I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the
> profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may
> be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( ____ token type). Consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had
> read Peirce's writings. For those of us who believe that it's important to
> bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we
> cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce
> scholars).
>
> In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else
> uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use. It
> is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer
> programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type) frequently, and
> some of them even mention Peirce. But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use
> 'tone' as the first term. And even Peirce scholars never use it for a
> broad audience.
>
> Fundamental principle: We live in the 21st C. Our readers live in the
> 21st C. The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is
> confusing to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic
> value whatsoever. Get rid of it.
>
> John
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):
>
> Great news! I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the
> word that names an abstract "might be" *SHOULD* have exactly the same
> spelling as the word that names the actual thing that we observe by any
> external of internal senses. Furthermore, his explanation takes just three
> sentences.
>
> Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph *REALLY *is an
> abstract might-be. However, we are permitted to call the perceptible
> replica on a phemic sheet an existential graph *PROVIDED **THAT *we
> acknowledge the distinction between the might-be and the replica.
>
> To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below. My words are
> enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of
> the MS): "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed
> anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so
> [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is
> [observed]. For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself
> [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might
> be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they
> are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel".
>
> As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and
> the actual is justified by Peirce: The word that is used for the might-be
> should be applicable to all the actual occurrences. Peirce's definition of
> 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or
> all external and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the
> phaneron).. But the word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of
> auditory sensations, is far less general than the word 'mark'.
>
> The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this
> subject. Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be
> generalized to any type of might-be and actual. If the principle is
> sufficiently general that it can be applied to camels, it should be
> applicable to marks.
>
> This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody
> has written in all the notes on this subject.
>
> John
> ___________________________
>
> Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an
> assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be
> incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December
> 1911).
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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