Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List, here is what I meant with the constructivist imperative: It is the "ethical imperative" by Heinz von Foerster, developed from Kant´s categorical imperative: "Always act in a way that makes the number of possibilities of actions increase". I think this would exclude the pursuit of ultimate aims. Lest you define this increase as ultimate aim. But this I find hard, though our economy is based on constant growth too. But I guess this makes it less ultimate in the sense of sustainability. Anyway, "ultimate" is a quibble-term, isn´t it? Best, Helmut.
 

 17. März 2018 um 22:13 Uhr
 "Jerry Rhee" 
wrote:



Dear list,

 

What a crazy.. uh, I mean creative concept, this having an ultimate aim.

There must, then, be more to this..

 

With best wishes,

Jerry R


 
On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 

Stephen, List,

I agree. To bring in aesthetics is triadic thinking: Like the sign (representamen) mediates between the object and the interpretant, aesthetics mediates between logic and ethics: It is the bridge from "is" to "ought". But I think there are two kinds of bridge, one false and one right. The false bridge is seeing aesthetics as confining thoughts to an "ultimate end of action", this is the naturalist fallacy. The good bridge, as I see it, is aesthetics in accord with the constructivist imperative, freeing thoughts and helping them evolve to a good, well, not end, but intermediate station of ethics based on both ratio and aesthetics. I hope this is what Peirce meant, but am afraid he didn´t, for he was using the term "ultimate", which in this context sounds odd.

Best, Helmut


 17. März 2018 um 20:29 Uhr
"Stephen C. Rose" 
 




The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection, assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W) presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different than saying what we think independently of Peirce. 
 


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted. But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one, because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.


But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?

Best, Helmut


 






 







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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



What a crazy.. uh, I mean creative concept, this having an ultimate aim.

There must, then, be more to this..



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Stephen, List,
> I agree. To bring in aesthetics is triadic thinking: Like the sign
> (representamen) mediates between the object and the interpretant,
> aesthetics mediates between logic and ethics: It is the bridge from "is" to
> "ought". But I think there are two kinds of bridge, one false and one
> right. The false bridge is seeing aesthetics as confining thoughts to an
> "ultimate end of action", this is the naturalist fallacy. The good bridge,
> as I see it, is aesthetics in accord with the constructivist imperative,
> freeing thoughts and helping them evolve to a good, well, not end, but
> intermediate station of ethics based on both ratio and aesthetics. I hope
> this is what Peirce meant, but am afraid he didn´t, for he was using the
> term "ultimate", which in this context sounds odd.
> Best, Helmut
>  17. März 2018 um 20:29 Uhr
> "Stephen C. Rose" 
>
> The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical
> reflection, assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will
> inevitably have some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself
> how far we have gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It
> was the Bush (W) presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the
> evolving of democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by
> force. That is binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its
> relation to Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought
> different than saying what we think independently of Peirce.
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, List,
>> OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of
>> action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an
>> apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted.
>> But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an
>> ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one,
>> because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me
>> moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is
>> evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of
>> the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end
>> of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.
>> But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly
>> suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>>
>>
>
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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Stephen, List,

I agree. To bring in aesthetics is triadic thinking: Like the sign (representamen) mediates between the object and the interpretant, aesthetics mediates between logic and ethics: It is the bridge from "is" to "ought". But I think there are two kinds of bridge, one false and one right. The false bridge is seeing aesthetics as confining thoughts to an "ultimate end of action", this is the naturalist fallacy. The good bridge, as I see it, is aesthetics in accord with the constructivist imperative, freeing thoughts and helping them evolve to a good, well, not end, but intermediate station of ethics based on both ratio and aesthetics. I hope this is what Peirce meant, but am afraid he didn´t, for he was using the term "ultimate", which in this context sounds odd.

Best, Helmut


 17. März 2018 um 20:29 Uhr
"Stephen C. Rose" 
 


The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection, assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W) presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different than saying what we think independently of Peirce. 
 


On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted. But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one, because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.


But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?

Best, Helmut


 






 





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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection,
assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have
some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have
gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W)
presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of
democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is
binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to
Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different
than saying what we think independently of Peirce.

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of
> action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an
> apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted.
> But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an
> ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one,
> because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me
> moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is
> evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of
> the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end
> of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.
> But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly
> suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?
> Best, Helmut
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I suppose the agreement we have achieved regarding Perfect Sign is what
Peirce must have meant when distinguishing between absolute truth and what
we do not doubt.  This analysis of our ultimate end of action is ready to
be deliberately adopted because it recommends itself in itself.  It is an
admirable ideal.  It possesses esthetic goodness.



I think this opinion is true.

I judge it to be good.

This is the upon which I am prepared and willing to act.



That is, it is assured that I am not engaged in “moral evil”,

for I am engaged in the active pursuit of *this*.



*In accordance with this, what you cannot in the least help believing is
not, justly speaking, wrong belief.  In other words, for you it is the
absolute truth.  *

*True, it is conceivable that what you cannot help believing to-day, you
might find you thoroughly disbelieve to-morrow. *



*In every stage of your excogitations, there is something of which you can
only say, “I cannot think otherwise,” and your experientially based
hypothesis is that the impossibility is of the second kind.  *



*Of course, that ultimate state of habit to which the action of
self-control ultimately tends, where no room is left for further
self-control, is, in the case of thought, the state of fixed belief, or
perfect knowledge.  *



*Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember.  *



*The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual.  *

*The second thing to remember is that the man’s circle of society is a sort
of loosely compacted person, in some respect of higher rank than the person
of an individual organism.  **But when a person finds himself in the
society of others, he is just as sure of their existence as of his own,
though he may entertain a metaphysical theory that they are
all hypostatically the same ego.*



*It is these two things alone that render it possible for you,- but only in
the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense,- to distinguish between absolute
truth and what you do not doubt.  *

With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:29 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Helmut, List:
>
> Obviously one should read the entire context of the quote, and not jump to
> conclusions based on the mere snippet that I offered to address a very
> specific point.
>
> CSP:  ... an ultimate end of action *deliberately *adopted,--that is to
> say, *reasonably *adopted,--must be a state of things that *reasonably
> recommends itself in itself* aside from any ulterior consideration. It
> must be an *admirable ideal*, having the only kind of goodness that such
> an ideal *can *have, namely, esthetic goodness. From this point of view
> the morally good appears as a particular species of the esthetically good.
> (CP 5.130, EP 2:201; 1903)
>
>
> Any end of action that fails this test is "An aim which cannot be adopted
> and consistently pursued ... It cannot properly be called an *ultimate
> aim* at all."  Therefore, anyone who actively pursues it is engaged in
> "moral evil."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> List,
>> the quote:
>>
>> CSP: But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate
>> end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for
>> or against it ... So then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which
>> can be consistently pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly
>> adopted, beyond all possible criticism, except the quite impertinent
>> criticism of outsiders. An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently
>> pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an *ultimate aim* at
>> all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP
>> 2:202; 1903)
>>
>> is completely evil, isn´t it? It could be from Hitler or the IS. Had
>> Peirce eaten, drunk, or smoked something wrong before writing it?
>> Best, Helmut
>> 16. März 2018 um 22:34 Uhr
>>
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>> wrote:
>> Gene, List:
>>
>> Thanks for your comments and questions.
>>
>> To clarify, all that I meant by "morally responsible Persons" was how I
>> defined "Person" in the previous thread on "Metaphysics of
>> Semiosis"--namely, "an embodied metaphysical Quasi-mind who additionally
>> has a *center of consciousness*, which provides a *unity of feeling* to
>> coordinate the corresponding continuity of reactions and bundle of habits,"
>> which "is what makes it possible to recognize the *Inner World* and
>> distinguish it from the *Outer World*," and thus exercise *self-control*.
>> As such, *every* Person is (by definition) "morally responsible"; i.e., 
>> subject
>> to moral approval *or *disapproval, praise *or *blame.
>>
>> The idea of *voluntary *participation comes from Peirce's remark that "the
>> ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of
>> the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

Obviously one should read the entire context of the quote, and not jump to
conclusions based on the mere snippet that I offered to address a very
specific point.

CSP:  ... an ultimate end of action *deliberately *adopted,--that is to
say, *reasonably *adopted,--must be a state of things that *reasonably
recommends itself in itself* aside from any ulterior consideration. It must
be an *admirable ideal*, having the only kind of goodness that such an
ideal *can *have, namely, esthetic goodness. From this point of view the
morally good appears as a particular species of the esthetically good. (CP
5.130, EP 2:201; 1903)


Any end of action that fails this test is "An aim which cannot be adopted
and consistently pursued ... It cannot properly be called an *ultimate aim*
at all."  Therefore, anyone who actively pursues it is engaged in "moral
evil."

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
> the quote:
>
> CSP: But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate
> end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or
> against it ... So then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which can
> be consistently pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly adopted,
> beyond all possible criticism, except the quite impertinent criticism of
> outsiders. An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a
> bad aim. It cannot properly be called an *ultimate aim* at all. The only
> moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202; 1903)
>
> is completely evil, isn´t it? It could be from Hitler or the IS. Had
> Peirce eaten, drunk, or smoked something wrong before writing it?
> Best, Helmut
> 16. März 2018 um 22:34 Uhr
>
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> wrote:
> Gene, List:
>
> Thanks for your comments and questions.
>
> To clarify, all that I meant by "morally responsible Persons" was how I
> defined "Person" in the previous thread on "Metaphysics of
> Semiosis"--namely, "an embodied metaphysical Quasi-mind who additionally
> has a *center of consciousness*, which provides a *unity of feeling* to
> coordinate the corresponding continuity of reactions and bundle of habits,"
> which "is what makes it possible to recognize the *Inner World* and
> distinguish it from the *Outer World*," and thus exercise *self-control*.
> As such, *every* Person is (by definition) "morally responsible"; i.e., 
> subject
> to moral approval *or *disapproval, praise *or *blame.
>
> The idea of *voluntary *participation comes from Peirce's remark that "the
> ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of
> the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable
> whenever, as the slang is, it is 'up to us' to do so."  I have no objection
> to your suggestion that people can and do also participate unwittingly, or
> even unwillingly; but my point was to highlight the specific *ethical 
> *implication
> that Peirce drew from his identification of the *esthetic *ideal, the *summum
> bonum*.
>
>
> CSP:  But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate
> end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or
> against it ... So then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which can
> be consistently pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly adopted,
> beyond all possible criticism, except the quite impertinent criticism of
> outsiders. An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a
> bad aim. It cannot properly be called an *ultimate aim* at all. The only
> moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202; 1903)
>
>
> As you might expect, my own rather traditional Christian theism is such
> that I part ways with Peirce on certain matters of religious philosophy.
> Statements like "sin is a creation of God" and "God delights in evil,"
> which are from R 890 (no date), are very much in that category.  What he
> wrote in "Evolutionary Love," amid various quotes from the Gospel and
> Epistle of John, is similar but somewhat less problematic for me.
>
>
> CSP:  Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller ... made the One Supreme
> Being, by whom all things have been made out of nothing, to be
> cherishing-love. What, then, can he say to hate? ... His statement that
> God is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes that we cannot
> tell whether God bears us love or hatred. "Nay," says John, "we can tell,
> and very simply! We know and have trusted the love which God hath in us.
> God is love." There is no logic in this, unless it means that God loves all
> men ... We are to understand, then, that as darkness is merely the defect
> of light, so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of {agapé} and
> {agathon}, love and loveliness ... That is to say, God visits no
> punishment on them; they punish themselves, by their natural affinity for
> the defective. Thus, the love that God is, 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

the quote:



CSP: But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or against it ... So then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which can be consistently pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly adopted, beyond all possible criticism, except the quite impertinent criticism of outsiders. An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202; 1903)


is completely evil, isn´t it? It could be from Hitler or the IS. Had Peirce eaten, drunk, or smoked something wrong before writing it?

Best, Helmut


 

16. März 2018 um 22:34 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Gene, List:
 

Thanks for your comments and questions.

 

To clarify, all that I meant by "morally responsible Persons" was how I defined "Person" in the previous thread on "Metaphysics of Semiosis"--namely, "an embodied metaphysical Quasi-mind who additionally has a center of consciousness, which provides a unity of feeling to coordinate the corresponding continuity of reactions and bundle of habits," which "is what makes it possible to recognize the Inner World and distinguish it from the Outer World," and thus exercise self-control.  As such, every Person is (by definition) "morally responsible"; i.e., subject to moral approval or disapproval, praise or blame.

 

The idea of voluntary participation comes from Peirce's remark that "the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is 'up to us' to do so."  I have no objection to your suggestion that people can and do also participate unwittingly, or even unwillingly; but my point was to highlight the specific ethical implication that Peirce drew from his identification of the esthetic ideal, the summum bonum.

 


CSP:  But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or against it ... So then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which can be consistently pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly adopted, beyond all possible criticism, except the quite impertinent criticism of outsiders. An aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202; 1903)


 

As you might expect, my own rather traditional Christian theism is such that I part ways with Peirce on certain matters of religious philosophy.  Statements like "sin is a creation of God" and "God delights in evil," which are from R 890 (no date), are very much in that category.  What he wrote in "Evolutionary Love," amid various quotes from the Gospel and Epistle of John, is similar but somewhat less problematic for me.

 


CSP:  Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller ... made the One Supreme Being, by whom all things have been made out of nothing, to be cherishing-love. What, then, can he say to hate? ... His statement that God is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes that we cannot tell whether God bears us love or hatred. "Nay," says John, "we can tell, and very simply! We know and have trusted the love which God hath in us. God is love." There is no logic in this, unless it means that God loves all men ... We are to understand, then, that as darkness is merely the defect of light, so hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of {agapé} and {agathon}, love and loveliness ... That is to say, God visits no punishment on them; they punish themselves, by their natural affinity for the defective. Thus, the love that God is, is not a love of which hatred is the contrary; otherwise Satan would be a coordinate power; but it is a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect stage of it, an Anteros--yea, even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object. For self-love is no love; so if God's self is love, that which he loves must be defect of love; just as a luminary can light up only that which otherwise would be dark ...

 

Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another's highest impulse ... Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my essay "The Law of Mind" must see that synechism calls for. (CP 6.287-289; 1893)


 

From my own perspective, rather than Peirce's--the bad news of the Law is that all men (and women) are evil and inclined to hatred, and separated from God accordingly; but the good news of the Gospel 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gene, List:

Thanks for your comments and questions.

To clarify, all that I meant by "morally responsible Persons" was how I
defined "Person" in the previous thread on "Metaphysics of
Semiosis"--namely, "an embodied metaphysical Quasi-mind who additionally
has a *center of consciousness*, which provides a *unity of feeling* to
coordinate the corresponding continuity of reactions and bundle of habits,"
which "is what makes it possible to recognize the *Inner World* and
distinguish it from the *Outer World*," and thus exercise *self-control*.
As such, *every* Person is (by definition) "morally responsible"; i.e., subject
to moral approval *or *disapproval, praise *or *blame.

The idea of *voluntary *participation comes from Peirce's remark that "the
ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of
the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable
whenever, as the slang is, it is 'up to us' to do so."  I have no objection
to your suggestion that people can and do also participate unwittingly, or
even unwillingly; but my point was to highlight the specific *ethical
*implication
that Peirce drew from his identification of the *esthetic *ideal, the *summum
bonum*.

CSP:  But the instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate end
of action, at that instant a categorical imperative pronounces for or
against it ... So then, it appears to me that any aim whatever which
can be consistently
pursued becomes, as soon as it is unfalteringly adopted, beyond all possible
criticism, except the quite impertinent criticism of outsiders. An aim
which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot
properly be called an *ultimate aim* at all. The only moral evil is not to
have an ultimate aim. (CP 5.133, EP 2:202; 1903)


As you might expect, my own rather traditional Christian theism is such
that I part ways with Peirce on certain matters of religious philosophy.
Statements like "sin is a creation of God" and "God delights in evil,"
which are from R 890 (no date), are very much in that category.  What he
wrote in "Evolutionary Love," amid various quotes from the Gospel and
Epistle of John, is similar but somewhat less problematic for me.

CSP:  Nevertheless, the ontological gospeller ... made the One Supreme
Being, by whom all things have been made out of nothing, to be
cherishing-love. What, then, can he say to hate? ... His statement that God
is love seems aimed at that saying of Ecclesiastes that we cannot tell
whether God bears us love or hatred. "Nay," says John, "we can tell, and
very simply! We know and have trusted the love which God hath in us. God is
love." There is no logic in this, unless it means that God loves all men ... We
are to understand, then, that as darkness is merely the defect of light, so
hatred and evil are mere imperfect stages of {agapé} and {agathon}, love
and loveliness ... That is to say, God visits no punishment on them; they
punish themselves, by their natural affinity for the defective. Thus, the love
that God is, is not a love of which hatred is the contrary; otherwise Satan
would be a coordinate power; but it is a love which embraces hatred as an
imperfect stage of it, an Anteros--yea, even needs hatred and hatefulness
as its object. For self-love is no love; so if God's self is love, that
which he loves must be defect of love; just as a luminary can light up only
that which otherwise would be dark ...

Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an
evolutionary
philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from I will not
say self-*sacrifice*, but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another's
highest impulse ... Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful,
gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of
evolution which every careful student of my essay "The Law of Mind" must
see that *synechism *calls for. (CP 6.287-289; 1893)


>From my own perspective, rather than Peirce's--the bad news of the Law is
that all men (and women) are evil and inclined to hatred, and separated
from God accordingly; but the good news of the Gospel is that God indeed
loves all men (and women) anyway, and sent His only Son ("the Word became
flesh," John 1:14) to die and rise again in order to redeem us and restore
us to a right relationship with Him.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Dear Jon S,
>  I enjoyed reading your Additament article.
>  In your post from this morning you say: " As embodied metaphysical
> Quasi-minds, we are both constituents and interpreters of the Universe as
> God's great Symbol and Argument.  Furthermore, as morally responsible
> Persons, we can also be contributors to it--we have the opportunity (and
> privilege) to participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative
> activity.  The Perfect Sign thus serves as an ideal, or regulative hope,
> which would be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Eugene Halton]

Dear Jon S,
 I enjoyed reading your Additament article.
 In your post from this morning you say: " As embodied metaphysical
Quasi-minds, we are both constituents and interpreters of the Universe as
God's great Symbol and Argument.  Furthermore, as morally responsible
Persons, we can also be contributors to it--we have the opportunity (and
privilege) to participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative
activity.  The Perfect Sign thus serves as an ideal, or regulative hope,
which would be achieved if all of us were to become fully welded with the
eternal Mind who is our Creator."

 Accepting for the moment the context of your argument, I'm wondering,
if I understand you correctly, why you seem to limit human contribution to
ongoing creation to "morally responsible Persons," and participation to
"voluntarily." What about "aesthetically expressive Persons" contributing,
and participating, say, from a deeply enraptured wonder beyond simply
voluntary?

And, and I realize I am pushing it, what about the possibility of
"morally irresponsible Persons," or even of evil as a contributor to
ongoing creation? I realize this is an offputting idea, it is for me. But
Hillary Putnam quoted a passage from a Peirce unpublished manuscript (I
don't have its number): "The only solution to the problem of evil is to
recognize that the Supreme Love embraces hate as a variety of itself, and
that sin is a creation of God, and as such, is good in certain stage[s] of
development. God delights in evil."

 Gene Halton


On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 8:58 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> If my latest hypothesis is correct that the Universe is the Perfect Sign,
> what would be its Object?  What is perpetually acting upon it with new
> Signs that give it fresh energy and kindle its previously dormant energy?
> What has the absolute freedom to introduce spontaneous changes into it?  In
> other words, what *sustains* the Universe as something that is living and
> growing, rather than succumbing to "the complete induration of habit
> reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to
> complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898)?
>
>
>
> CSP:  ... the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
> [3ns] must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions [2ns]
> and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]; and such part as these reactions and
> these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the
> Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP
> 2:193-194; 1903)
>
>
>
> Consistent with the conclusion of my recently published essay, "A
> Neglected Additament:  Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of
> God," the Dynamic Object of the Universe as the Perfect Sign is its perfect
> Utterer, *God Himself*, infinitely incomprehensible to us.  Its Immediate
> Object is *God's purpose*, which is the development of Reason, including
> the growth of our knowledge of God and of this Universe that He has
> created--*and is still creating*.
>
>
>
> CSP:  This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
> embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which
> did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but
> is going on today and never will be done, is this very developement of
> Reason. I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the
> admirable than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose
> admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself
> comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. (CP
> 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903)
>
>
>
> This is the *summum bonum* in accordance with the normative science of
> esthetics.  Peirce went on to draw the corresponding ethical and logical
> implications, since what he described as "Practice" and "Theory" in EP
> 2:304 correspond to "embodiment" and "manifestation" here, respectively.
>
>
>
> CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
> little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
> rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
> us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
> reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods
> as must develop knowledge the most speedily. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903)
>
>
>
> As embodied metaphysical Quasi-minds, we are both *constituents* and
> *interpreters* of the Universe as God's great Symbol and Argument.  
> Furthermore,
> as morally responsible Persons, we can also be *contributors* to it--we
> have the opportunity (and privilege) to participate *voluntarily *in
> God's still-unfolding creative activity.  The Perfect Sign thus serves as
> an ideal, or regulative hope, which *would* be achieved if all of us
> *were* to become fully welded 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

It is a very common and well-established practice--certainly in the
secondary literature on Peirce, as well as in general--to employ [brackets]
when inserting clarifying content into a quotation, and (parentheses) when
the author used either parentheses or brackets in the original work.  For
example, see http://www.thepunctuationguide.com/brackets.html.

In my opinion, given his own unmistakably explicit statements about his
metaphysical and religious views, it is indefensible to argue that Peirce
was anything other than a committed theist, especially late in his life.
Where did the Universe as symbol, argument, work of art, poem, symphony,
and painting come from, if not "a metaphysical agency"?  As genuine Signs,
Symbols and Arguments require an Utterer; and works of art require an
artist, whether poet, composer, or painter.  What are the three Universes
as "Modalities of Being" (EP 2:478; 1908), if not metaphysical
manifestations of the three Categories?  One certainly need not be a
theist *oneself
*in order to interpret Peirce correctly, but--again, in my opinion--one
cannot claim to be interpreting Peirce correctly while insisting that *he *was
not a theist.  He did not leave that option open to us; here are just two
obvious examples.

CSP:  So, then, the question being whether I believe in the reality of God,
I answer, Yes. (CP 6.496; c. 1906)


CSP:  The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is *the
*definable
proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*: in my belief Really creator of
all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)


Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 1:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> 1] Of course I know that the terms 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are your terms. But
> others who are not familiar with Peirce's work or the habits-of-this-list
> might not be so aware. So, nit-picking it may be, but I'll stand by my
> request to differentiate one's insertions from that of a copied text.
>
> 2] With regard to the 'reality' of God - I am aware that JAS is a deeply
> committed theist - but - I reject the view that Peirce Is such.  Certainly
> Peirce wrote:
>
> "I shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol
> of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" 5.119
>
> He also wrote:: "The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work
> of art, a great poem - for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -
> just as every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather
> with a painting...".5.119
>
> And - his discussion in 'the Reality of God [6.490 - compares this 'force
> with Pure Mind' -
>
> So- I think one has to compare the descriptions of the common conception
> of 'god' s a metaphysical agency with Peirce's description - and there is
> frankly, nothing metaphysical about Peirce's description. Instead, Peirce
> roots the term 'god' in the operation of the three categories - which are
> NOT metaphysical but operations of pragmatic semiosis.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 16/03/18 2:05 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon, list,
>
> Edwina wrote:
>
> ET: 1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce,
> please do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote below
> from CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in the
> original text but are your own commentary. I'm not saying these are
> incorrect assumptions - but, I think the reader ought to know the clear
> difference between Peirce's text and your own additions to it. Therefore -
> please inform the reader that the bracketed terms are your
> additions...that's all.
>
> To me this sounds like so much nit-picking. Not only does Peirce not use
> brackets in this way to my knowledge, but 3ns, 2ns, 1ns are abbreviations I
> invented a couple of decades ago and which some, including Jon, use rather
> than the more cumbersome thirdness, secondness, and firstness. I doubt that
> anyone on this list would think that 1ns, 2ns, 3ns reflect Peirce's own
> usage within or with out brackets.
>
> ET: 2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
> irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are simply
> opinions.
>
> Again, I completely disagree with you that Jon's analysis is simply an
> opinion. He brings together Peirce's own conception of "the Universe [as]
> a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose" with recent
> discussions of and his own reflections on the Quasi-Mind,
> Utterer-Interpreter, and Perfect Sign--all from Peirce's late work in
> semeiotic and in the context of his extraordinarily compelling, in my
> opinion (and, of course, this is simply my opinion) analysis in his
> paper, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality
> of God (see the link below).
>
> He does this--and even in this recent post--in a way which to my mind
> complements Peirce's own 

: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list:

1] Of course I know that the terms 1ns, 2ns, 3ns are your terms. But
others who are not familiar with Peirce's work or the
habits-of-this-list might not be so aware. So, nit-picking it may be,
but I'll stand by my request to differentiate one's insertions from
that of a copied text.

2] With regard to the 'reality' of God - I am aware that JAS is a
deeply committed theist - but - I reject the view that Peirce Is
such.  Certainly Peirce wrote:

"I shall reply that the universe is a vast representamen, a great
symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" 5.119

He also wrote:: "The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great
work of art, a great poem - for every fine argument is a poem and a
symphony - just as every true poem is a sound argument. But let us
compare it rather with a painting...".5.119

And - his discussion in 'the Reality of God [6.490 - compares this
'force with Pure Mind' - 

So- I think one has to compare the descriptions of the common
conception of 'god' s a metaphysical agency with Peirce's description
- and there is frankly, nothing metaphysical about Peirce's
description. Instead, Peirce roots the term 'god' in the operation of
the three categories - which are NOT metaphysical but operations of
pragmatic semiosis.

Edwina
 On Fri 16/03/18  2:05 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, Jon, list,

Edwina wrote:

ET: 1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from
Peirce, please do not add your comments within that quoted text. In
the quote below from CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns]
are NOT in the original text but are your own commentary. I'm not
saying these are incorrect assumptions - but, I think the reader
ought to know the clear difference between Peirce's text and your own
additions to it. Therefore - please inform the reader that the
bracketed terms are your additions...that's all.
To me this sounds like so much nit-picking. Not only does Peirce not
use brackets in this way to my knowledge, but 3ns, 2ns, 1ns are
abbreviations I invented a couple of decades ago and which some,
including Jon, use rather than the more cumbersome thirdness,
secondness, and firstness. I doubt that anyone on this list would
think that 1ns, 2ns, 3ns reflect Peirce's own usage within or with
out brackets. 

 ET: 2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are simply
opinions.

Again, I completely disagree with you that Jon's analysis is simply
an opinion. He brings together Peirce's own conception of "the
Universe [as] a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose"
with recent discussions of and his own reflections on the Quasi-Mind,
Utterer-Interpreter, and Perfect Sign--all from Peirce's late work in
semeiotic and in the context of his extraordinarily compelling, in my
opinion (and, of course, this  is simply my opinion) analysis in his
paper, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the
Reality of God (see the link below). 

He does this--and even in this recent post--in a way which to my
mind complements Peirce's own analysis of the universe as a symbol of
God's work. Along with other better known Peircean phenomenological
and semiotic notions (the categories, icon/index/symbol) he seems
moving in the direction of a deepening of that part of Peirce's
metaphysics which explicitly concerns God by applying these late
semiotic ideas.  

Finally, Jon offers this most recent message as the beginning of the
unpacking of a hypothesis. JAS: "If my latest hypothesis is correct
that the Universe is the Perfect Sign, what would be its Object?" You
may argue against his analysis on phenomenological, semeiotic, or
metaphysical grounds, but to dismiss it out of hand seems to me much
more like mere opinion than Jon's message (which, as I see it, is not
opinion at all). Peirce *was* a theist, and those who are theists (and
even those who aren't) may find Jon's work of considerable interest as
in effect developing and deepening these semeiotic/metaphysical ideas
of Peirce. See, especially, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic,
Cosmology, and the Reality of God, published recently in the journal,
Signs.  

https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244 [1]

Best,

Gary 
  Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [2]
 On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 9:18 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list:

1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce,
please do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote
below from CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in
the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, list,

Edwina wrote:

ET: 1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce,
please do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote below
from CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in the
original text but are your own commentary. I'm not saying these are
incorrect assumptions - but, I think the reader ought to know the clear
difference between Peirce's text and your own additions to it. Therefore -
please inform the reader that the bracketed terms are your
additions...that's all.

To me this sounds like so much nit-picking. Not only does Peirce *not* use
brackets in this way to my knowledge, but 3ns, 2ns, 1ns are abbreviations I
invented a couple of decades ago and which some, including Jon, use rather
than the more cumbersome thirdness, secondness, and firstness. I doubt that
anyone on this list would think that 1ns, 2ns, 3ns reflect Peirce's own
usage within or with out brackets.

ET: 2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are simply
opinions.

Again, I completely disagree with you that Jon's analysis is simply an
opinion. He brings together Peirce's own conception of "the Universe [as] a
vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose" with recent
discussions of and his own reflections on the Quasi-Mind,
Utterer-Interpreter, and Perfect Sign--all from Peirce's late work in
semeiotic and in the context of his extraordinarily compelling, in my
opinion (and, of course, this *is* simply my opinion) analysis in his
paper, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality
of God (see the link below).

He does this--and even in this recent post--in a way which to my mind
complements Peirce's own analysis of the universe as a symbol of God's
work. Along with other better known Peircean phenomenological and semiotic
notions (the categories, icon/index/symbol) he seems moving in the
direction of a deepening of that part of Peirce's metaphysics which
explicitly concerns God by applying these late semiotic ideas.

Finally, Jon offers this most recent message as the beginning of the
unpacking of a hypothesis. JAS: "If my latest hypothesis is correct that
the Universe is the Perfect Sign, what would be its Object?" You may argue
against his analysis on phenomenological, semeiotic, or metaphysical
grounds, but to dismiss it out of hand seems to me much more like mere
opinion than Jon's message (which, as I see it, is not opinion at all).
Peirce *was* a theist, and those who are theists (and even those who
aren't) may find Jon's work of considerable interest as in effect
developing and deepening these semeiotic/metaphysical ideas of Peirce. See,
especially, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the
Reality of God, published recently in the journal, Signs.

https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 9:18 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> 1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce, please
> do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote below from
> CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in the original
> text but are your own commentary. I'm not saying these are incorrect
> assumptions - but, I think the reader ought to know the clear difference
> between Peirce's text and your own additions to it. Therefore - please
> inform the reader that the bracketed terms are your additions...that's all.
>
> 2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
> irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are simply
> opinions.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 16/03/18 8:58 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List:
>
> If my latest hypothesis is correct that the Universe is the Perfect Sign,
> what would be its Object?  What is perpetually acting upon it with new
> Signs that give it fresh energy and kindle its previously dormant energy?
> What has the absolute freedom to introduce spontaneous changes into it?  In
> other words, what sustains the Universe as something that is living and
> growing, rather than succumbing to "the complete induration of habit
> reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to
> complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898)?
>
>
>
> CSP:  ... the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
> [3ns] must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions [2ns]
> and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]; and such part as these reactions and
> these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the
> Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list:

1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce,
please do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote
below from CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in
the original text but are your own commentary. I'm not saying these
are incorrect assumptions - but, I think the reader ought to know the
clear difference between Peirce's text and your own additions to it.
Therefore - please inform the reader that the bracketed terms are
your additions...that's all. 

2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are
simply opinions.

Edwina
 On Fri 16/03/18  8:58 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 List:
If my latest hypothesis is correct that the Universe is the Perfect
Sign, what would be its Object?  What is perpetually acting upon it
with new Signs that give it fresh energy and kindle its previously
dormant energy?  What has the absolute freedom to introduce
spontaneous changes into it?  In other words, what sustains the
Universe as something that is living and growing, rather than
succumbing to "the complete induration of habit reducing the free
play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete
death" (CP 6.201; 1898)? 
CSP:  ... the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of
God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now
every symbol [3ns] must have, organically attached to it, its Indices
of Reactions [2ns] and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]; and such part as
these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of
course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an
argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903) 
Consistent with the conclusion of my recently published essay, "A
Neglected Additament:  Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of
God," the Dynamic Object of the Universe as the Perfect Sign is its
perfect Utterer, God Himself, infinitely incomprehensible to us.  Its
Immediate Object is God's purpose, which is the development of Reason,
including the growth of our knowledge of God and of this Universe that
He has created--and is still creating. 
CSP:  This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe,
which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004
B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very
developement of Reason. I do not see how one can have a more
satisfying ideal of the admirable than the development of Reason so
understood. The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an
ulterior Reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so
far as we can comprehend it. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903) 
This is the summum bonum in accordance with the normative science of
esthetics.  Peirce went on to draw the corresponding ethical and
logical implications, since what he described as "Practice" and
"Theory" in EP 2:304 correspond to "embodiment" and "manifestation"
here, respectively. 
CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute
our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand
toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is,
it is "up to us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that
knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to
follow such methods as must develop knowledge the most speedily. (CP
1.615, EP 2:255; 1903) 
As embodied metaphysical Quasi-minds, we are both constituents and
interpreters of the Universe as God's great Symbol and Argument. 
Furthermore, as morally responsible Persons, we can also be
contributors to it--we have the opportunity (and privilege) to
participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity. 
The Perfect Sign thus serves as an ideal, or regulative hope, which
would be achieved if all of us were to become fully welded with the
eternal Mind who is our Creator. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

If my latest hypothesis is correct that the Universe is the Perfect Sign,
what would be its Object?  What is perpetually acting upon it with new
Signs that give it fresh energy and kindle its previously dormant energy?
What has the absolute freedom to introduce spontaneous changes into it?  In
other words, what *sustains* the Universe as something that is living and
growing, rather than succumbing to "the complete induration of habit
reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to
complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898)?



CSP:  ... the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
[3ns] must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions [2ns]
and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]; and such part as these reactions and
these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the
Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP
2:193-194; 1903)



Consistent with the conclusion of my recently published essay, "A Neglected
Additament:  Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God," the
Dynamic Object of the Universe as the Perfect Sign is its perfect Utterer, *God
Himself*, infinitely incomprehensible to us.  Its Immediate Object is *God's
purpose*, which is the development of Reason, including the growth of our
knowledge of God and of this Universe that He has created--*and is still
creating*.



CSP:  This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment,
that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very developement of Reason. I do not
see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the
development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness is
not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its
fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903)



This is the *summum bonum* in accordance with the normative science of
esthetics.  Peirce went on to draw the corresponding ethical and logical
implications, since what he described as "Practice" and "Theory" in EP
2:304 correspond to "embodiment" and "manifestation" here, respectively.



CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods
as must develop knowledge the most speedily. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903)



As embodied metaphysical Quasi-minds, we are both *constituents* and
*interpreters* of the Universe as God's great Symbol and Argument.
Furthermore,
as morally responsible Persons, we can also be *contributors* to it--we
have the opportunity (and privilege) to participate *voluntarily *in God's
still-unfolding creative activity.  The Perfect Sign thus serves as an
ideal, or regulative hope, which *would* be achieved if all of us *were* to
become fully welded with the eternal Mind who is our Creator.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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