Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

ful
>> club-footed affair that Hegel produced" 5.40.
>>
>> My understanding then, is that pure mathematics provides hypothetical
>> models of reality - and then,  'something is DONE [Peirce's emphasis] with
>> these hypothetical modelsobservations, experimentation with individual
>> schemata. This is NOT applied mathematics! It is: to repeat: Thereupon the
>> faculty of observation is called into play...Theorematic reasoning
>> invariably depends upon experimentation with individual
>> schemata...theorematic or mathematical reasoning proper, is reasoning with
>> specially constructed schemata" 4.233.
>>
>> Thus, from my reading of Peirce, I come up with a different understanding
>> of pure mathematics from that of De Tienne, who tells us that it is
>> essentially detached and isolate from the Real World to be almost
>> irrelevant.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 11/08/21 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>> sent:
>>
>> Bernard, List:
>>
>> I agree with Gary F.'s reply just now, but already drafted this one so I
>> am going ahead and posting it.
>>
>>
>> BM: This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
>> would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>>
>>
>> I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. The point is that for
>> Peirce, pure mathematics does not concern itself with whether or not its
>> hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.
>>
>>
>> BM: Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day
>> work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses experiments with
>> forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the
>> value of their underlying hypotheses.
>>
>>
>> As I have noted before, Peirce states very clearly that unlike all the
>> other sciences, pure mathematics is not a positive science. The
>> "experiments" conducted by pure mathematicians take place entirely in
>> the imagination, although often aided by concrete tokens of the relevant
>> diagram types.
>>
>>
>> BM: And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an
>> intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent
>> wild dreams cut off [from] the world.
>>
>>
>> Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's explicit definitions of pure 
>> mathematics
>> as reflected in the numerous quotations that I have previously provided,
>> although I would substitute "ideal hypotheses" for "wild dreams."
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM  wrote:
>>
>>> Bernard, list,
>>>
>>> Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a
>>> non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of
>>> his peculiar sense of humor.
>>>
>>> As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can
>>> indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary
>>> to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the
>>> internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between
>>> a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is
>>> virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to
>>> the metaphysical idea of reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience”
>>> as something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to
>>> it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar
>>> is it is purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm
>>> of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).
>>>
>>> As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow
>>> involves a focus on pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of
>>> mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do
>>> not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that
>>> phaneroscopy is.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
>>> Behalf Of Bernard Morand
>>> Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>>> Subject: Re

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Helmut Raulien]

6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow involves a focus on  pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23



Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance and truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only on their internal inferential coherence, not on the world of experience."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses  experiments with forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the world.

In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves the drawings of savage animals.

I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice as Peirce suggested it.

Bernard Morand







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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Helmut Raulien]

icians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the metaphysical idea of  reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience” as something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow involves a focus on  pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23



Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance and truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only on their internal inferential coherence, not on the world of experience."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses  experiments with forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the world.

In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves the drawings of savage animals.

I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice as Peirce suggested it.

Bernard Morand







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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

We cannot answer the question of "how we ought to practice the science of
phaneroscopy today" without first establishing what the science of
phaneroscopy *is*, which according to Peirce requires carefully
distinguishing it from mathematics as a strictly hypothetical science and
from all the other positive sciences.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 4:23 AM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

> Le 12/08/2021 à 02:10, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
>
> Bernard, List:
>
> BM: The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the exchanges that
> consist most often in some kind of gloss of Peirce's writings, as if they
> were gospels.
>
>
> JAS: Peirce's writings are our only definitive source for ascertaining
> what *his *views were, in this case *his *definition of mathematics as
> distinguished from phaneroscopy and all the other sciences in *his 
> *classification.
> Anyone is free to disagree with it, but not to attribute a *different 
> *definition
> to him.
>
> Agreed, but your statement doesn't exhaust the subject (the actuality of
> Peirce, including his classification of sciences)
>
> BM: In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
> concrete and daily activity of mathematicians.
>
>
> JAS: It may well be the case that Peirce's definition of mathematics is
> inconsistent with the actual practice of the people who call themselves
> mathematicians today. That is irrelevant to the primary topic at hand,
> which is the science of phaneroscopy as *he *defined and practiced it.
>
> if it was really inconsistent, there would be something to look for.
>
> Your primary topic is not the same as mine.  Mine is: how we ought to
> practice the science of phaneroscopy today.
>
> BM: The only response has been to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote
> one century before (and you know the extend to which I hold his merits)
>
>
> JAS: Any quotation of any author is removed from its original context, so
> an argument is needed to demonstrate that a *particular *quotation is
> being interpreted and presented in a way that somehow misrepresents its
> author's original intent.
>
> Agreed, but I prefer in place of your's to terminate with :  a
> particular quotation is being interpreted and presented in a way that
> somehow attests of its pertinence for the actual state of things, otherwise
> characterized.
>
> Evidently this little modification changes everything in making us pass
> from comment to living science.
>
> As regards to the author's intend I agree with what Edwina and John Sowa
> have already written.
>
> Bernard Morand
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 1:38 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> I agree with you that the materials used for the slow read  are only
>> supports for public presentations and not research papers.
>>
>> I had noticed this straight from the beginning of the slow read and I
>> thought that to use publicly such materials was not a good service made to
>> their author. As you say we remain ignorant of his oral presentation itself.
>>
>> Nevertheless, the direction of the argument that he is developing on pure
>> maths is as clear as erroneous. And I maintain my strong desagreement with
>> it.
>>
>> Despite the so-called sense of humor (which I have never experienced with
>> this author),  it leads his assertions as far as becoming false and abusing
>> his audience as well. One can laugh of everything but not with everybody
>> says the maxim.
>>
>> As regard to my participation to the list I will probably return to the
>> state of lurker. The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the
>> exchanges that consist most often in some kind of  gloss of Peirce's
>> writings, as if they were gospels.
>>
>> In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
>> concrete and daily activity of  mathematicians.  The only response has been
>> to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote one century before (and you know
>> the extend to which I hold his merits)
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> Bernard
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Bernard Morand]

Le 12/08/2021 à 02:10, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :

Bernard, List:

BM: The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the
exchanges that consist most often in some kind of gloss of
Peirce's writings, as if they were gospels.


JAS: Peirce's writings are our only definitive source for ascertaining 
what /his /views were, in this case /his /definition of mathematics as 
distinguished from phaneroscopy and all the other sciences in /his 
/classification. Anyone is free to disagree with it, but not to 
attribute a /different /definition to him.
Agreed, but your statement doesn't exhaust the subject (the actuality of 
Peirce, including his classification of sciences)


BM: In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to
the concrete and daily activity of mathematicians.


JAS: It may well be the case that Peirce's definition of mathematics 
is inconsistent with the actual practice of the people who call 
themselves mathematicians today. That is irrelevant to the primary 
topic at hand, which is the science of phaneroscopy as /he /defined 
and practiced it.


if it was really inconsistent, there would be something to look for.

Your primary topic is not the same as mine.  Mine is: how we ought to 
practice the science of phaneroscopy today.




BM: The only response has been to quote Peirce, out of context,
who wrote one century before (and you know the extend to which I
hold his merits)


JAS: Any quotation of any author is removed from its original context, 
so an argument is needed to demonstrate that a /particular /quotation 
is being interpreted and presented in a way that somehow misrepresents 
its author's original intent.


Agreed, but I prefer in place of your's to terminate with :  a 
particular quotation is being interpreted  and presented in a way that 
somehow attests of its pertinence for the actual state of things, 
otherwise characterized.


Evidently this little modification changes everything in making us pass 
from  comment to living science.


As regards to the author's intend I agree with what Edwina and John Sowa 
have already written.


Bernard Morand


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 1:38 PM Bernard Morand > wrote:


Gary R, list

I agree with you that the materials used for the slow read  are
only supports for public presentations and not research papers.

I had noticed this straight from the beginning of the slow read
and I thought that to use publicly such materials was not a good
service made to their author. As you say we remain ignorant of his
oral presentation itself.

Nevertheless, the direction of the argument that he is developing
on pure maths is as clear as erroneous. And I maintain my strong
desagreement with it.

Despite the so-called sense of humor (which I have never
experienced with this author),  it leads his assertions as far as
becoming false and abusing his audience as well. One can laugh of
everything but not with everybody says the maxim.

As regard to my participation to the list I will probably return
to the state of lurker. The main difficulty for me is the
doctrinal turn of the exchanges that consist most often in some
kind of  gloss of Peirce's writings, as if they were gospels.

In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
concrete and daily activity of mathematicians.  The only response
has been to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote one century
before (and you know the extend to which I hold his merits)

Regards

Bernard


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

tation with individual schemata...theorematic or mathematical
> reasoning proper, is reasoning with specially constructed schemata" 4.233.
>
> And "phenomenology, which does not depend upon any other positive science,
> nevertheless must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon
> the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of Pure Mathematics, whose only
> aim is to discover not how things actually are, but how they might be
> supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some other. A phenomenology
> which does not reckon with pure mathematicswill be the same pitiful
> club-footed affair that Hegel produced" 5.40.
>
> My understanding then, is that pure mathematics provides hypothetical
> models of reality - and then,  'something is DONE [Peirce's emphasis] with
> these hypothetical modelsobservations, experimentation with individual
> schemata. This is NOT applied mathematics! It is: to repeat: Thereupon the
> faculty of observation is called into play...Theorematic reasoning
> invariably depends upon experimentation with individual
> schemata...theorematic or mathematical reasoning proper, is reasoning with
> specially constructed schemata" 4.233.
>
> Thus, from my reading of Peirce, I come up with a different understanding
> of pure mathematics from that of De Tienne, who tells us that it is
> essentially detached and isolate from the Real World to be almost
> irrelevant.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed 11/08/21 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Bernard, List:
>
> I agree with Gary F.'s reply just now, but already drafted this one so I
> am going ahead and posting it.
>
>
> BM: This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
> would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>
>
> I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. The point is that for
> Peirce, pure mathematics does not concern itself with whether or not its
> hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.
>
>
> BM: Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work
> of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses experiments with forms,
> abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of
> their underlying hypotheses.
>
>
> As I have noted before, Peirce states very clearly that unlike all the
> other sciences, pure mathematics is not a positive science. The
> "experiments" conducted by pure mathematicians take place entirely in the
> imagination, although often aided by concrete tokens of the relevant
> diagram types.
>
>
> BM: And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an
> intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent
> wild dreams cut off [from] the world.
>
>
> Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's explicit definitions of pure 
> mathematics
> as reflected in the numerous quotations that I have previously provided,
> although I would substitute "ideal hypotheses" for "wild dreams."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM  wrote:
>
>> Bernard, list,
>>
>> Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a
>> non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of
>> his peculiar sense of humor.
>>
>> As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can
>> indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary
>> to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the
>> internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between
>> a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is
>> virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to
>> the metaphysical idea of reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience”
>> as something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to
>> it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar
>> is it is purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm
>> of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).
>>
>> As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow
>> involves a focus on pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of
>> mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not
>> refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: But isn't an argument also needed to demonstrate that a particular
quotation is being interpreted and presented in a way that truthfully
represents its author's original intent?


I typically provide quotations from Peirce as evidence that the views I am
attributing to him are consistent with his own words, or that the views
others are attributing to him are inconsistent with his own words. When
someone responds by *merely *alleging that a particular quotation is being
taken out of context, such that a straightforward reading of it is
supposedly misleading, an argument is needed to support that claim.

ET: Who will judge whether X-person's reading or Y-person's reading
'represents its author's original intent? Who has this capacity to make
such a judgment?


I explained my overall approach to this at some length in a thread just
over a year ago on "The Logic of Interpretation."

https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-07/msg00042.html
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-07/msg00045.html

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 7:48 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List,
>
> JAS wrote:
> "Any quotation of any author is removed from its original context, so an
> argument is needed to demonstrate that a particular quotation is being
> interpreted and presented in a way that somehow misrepresents its author's
> original intent."
>
> But isn't an argument also needed to demonstrate that a particular
> quotation is being interpreted and presented in a way that truthfully
> represents its author's original intent'?
>
> After all, since ALL informational interaction is semiosic; ie, triadic,
> made up of a DO and IO as experienced via the Ground or Representamen of a
> particular person and then, as interpreted within at least two
> Interpretants - doesn't this suggest that it is not easy to declare that
> one's own Interpretation actually 'represents its author's original intent'?
>
> Who will judge whether X-person's reading or Y-person's reading
> 'represents its author's original intent? Who has this capacity to make
> such a judgment?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Wed 11/08/21 8:10 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Bernard, List:
>
> BM: The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the exchanges that
> consist most often in some kind of gloss of Peirce's writings, as if they
> were gospels.
>
>
> Peirce's writings are our only definitive source for ascertaining what
> his views were, in this case his definition of mathematics as
> distinguished from phaneroscopy and all the other sciences in his 
> classification.
> Anyone is free to disagree with it, but not to attribute a different 
> definition
> to him.
>
> BM: In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
> concrete and daily activity of mathematicians.
>
>
> It may well be the case that Peirce's definition of mathematics is
> inconsistent with the actual practice of the people who call themselves
> mathematicians today. That is irrelevant to the primary topic at hand,
> which is the science of phaneroscopy as he defined and practiced it.
>
> BM: The only response has been to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote
> one century before (and you know the extend to which I hold his merits)
>
>
> Any quotation of any author is removed from its original context, so an
> argument is needed to demonstrate that a particular quotation is being
> interpreted and presented in a way that somehow misrepresents its author's
> original intent.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 1:38 PM Bernard Morand 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list
>>
>> I agree with you that the materials used for the slow read  are only
>> supports for public presentations and not research papers.
>>
>> I had noticed this straight from the beginning of the slow read and I
>> thought that to use publicly such materials was not a good service made to
>> their author. As you say we remain ignorant of his oral presentation itself.
>>
>> Nevertheless, the direction of the argument that he is developing on pure
>> maths is as clear as erroneous. And I maintain my strong desagreement with
>> it.
>>
>> Despite the so-called sense of humor (which I have never experienced with
>> this author),  it leads his assertions as far as becoming false and abusing
>> his audience as well. One can laugh of everything but not with everybody
>> says the maxim.
>>
>> As regard to my participation to the list I will probably return to the
>> state of lurker. The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the
>> exchanges that consist most often in some kind of  gloss of Peirce's
>> writings, as if they were gospels.
>>
>> In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
>> concrete and daily activity of  mathematicians.  The only response has been
>> to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List, 

JAS wrote: "Any quotation of any author is removed from its original
context, so an argument is needed to demonstrate that a particular
quotation is being interpreted and presented in a way that somehow
misrepresents its author's original intent."
 But isn't an argument also needed to demonstrate that a particular
quotation is being interpreted and presented in a way that truthfully
represents its author's original intent'?
 After all, since ALL informational interaction is semiosic; ie,
triadic, made up of a DO and IO as experienced via the Ground or
Representamen of a particular person and then, as interpreted within
at least two Interpretants - doesn't this suggest that it is not easy
to declare that one's own Interpretation actually 'represents its
author's original intent'?
 Who will judge whether X-person's reading or Y-person's reading
'represents its author's original intent? Who has this capacity to
make such a judgment? 
 Edwina
 On Wed 11/08/21  8:10 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Bernard, List:
 BM: The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the
exchanges that consist most often in some kind of gloss of Peirce's
writings, as if they were gospels.
 Peirce's writings are our only definitive source for ascertaining
what his views were, in this case his definition of mathematics as
distinguished from phaneroscopy and all the other sciences in  his
classification. Anyone is free to disagree with it, but not to
attribute a different definition to him.
 BM: In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to
the concrete and daily activity of mathematicians.
 It may well be the case that Peirce's definition of mathematics is
inconsistent with the actual practice of the people who call
themselves mathematicians today. That is irrelevant to the primary
topic at hand, which is the science of phaneroscopy as  he defined
and practiced it.
 BM: The only response has been to quote Peirce, out of context, who
wrote one century before (and you know the extend to which I hold his
merits)
 Any quotation of any author is removed from its original context, so
an argument is needed to demonstrate that a particular quotation is
being interpreted and presented in a way that somehow misrepresents
its author's original intent. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 1:38 PM Bernard Morand  wrote:
Gary R, list 

I agree with you that the materials used for the slow read  are 
 only supports for public presentations and not research papers. 

I had noticed this straight from the beginning of the slow read 
 and I thought that to use publicly such materials was not a good 
 service made to their author. As you say we remain ignorant of his   
   oral presentation itself. 

Nevertheless, the direction of the argument that he is developing   
   on pure maths is as clear as erroneous. And I maintain my strong   
   desagreement with it.
Despite the so-called sense of humor (which I have never  
experienced with this author),  it leads his assertions as far as
  becoming false and abusing his audience as well. One can laugh of   
   everything but not with everybody says the maxim. 

As regard to my participation to the list I will probably return
  to the state of lurker. The main difficulty for me is the  
doctrinal turn of the exchanges that consist most often in some  
kind of  gloss of Peirce's writings, as if they were gospels. 

In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to  
the concrete and daily activity of  mathematicians.  The only  
response has been to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote one 
 century before (and you know the extend to which I hold his  
merits)
Regards 

Bernard  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'morand.bern...@neuf.fr\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

BM: The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the exchanges that
consist most often in some kind of gloss of Peirce's writings, as if they
were gospels.


Peirce's writings are our only definitive source for ascertaining what
*his *views were, in this case *his *definition of mathematics as
distinguished from phaneroscopy and all the other sciences in *his
*classification.
Anyone is free to disagree with it, but not to attribute a *different
*definition
to him.

BM: In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
concrete and daily activity of mathematicians.


It may well be the case that Peirce's definition of mathematics is
inconsistent with the actual practice of the people who call themselves
mathematicians today. That is irrelevant to the primary topic at hand,
which is the science of phaneroscopy as *he *defined and practiced it.

BM: The only response has been to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote
one century before (and you know the extend to which I hold his merits)


Any quotation of any author is removed from its original context, so an
argument is needed to demonstrate that a *particular *quotation is being
interpreted and presented in a way that somehow misrepresents its author's
original intent.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 1:38 PM Bernard Morand 
wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> I agree with you that the materials used for the slow read  are only
> supports for public presentations and not research papers.
>
> I had noticed this straight from the beginning of the slow read and I
> thought that to use publicly such materials was not a good service made to
> their author. As you say we remain ignorant of his oral presentation itself.
>
> Nevertheless, the direction of the argument that he is developing on pure
> maths is as clear as erroneous. And I maintain my strong desagreement with
> it.
>
> Despite the so-called sense of humor (which I have never experienced with
> this author),  it leads his assertions as far as becoming false and abusing
> his audience as well. One can laugh of everything but not with everybody
> says the maxim.
>
> As regard to my participation to the list I will probably return to the
> state of lurker. The main difficulty for me is the doctrinal turn of the
> exchanges that consist most often in some kind of  gloss of Peirce's
> writings, as if they were gospels.
>
> In fact this his what has happened to my arguments refering to the
> concrete and daily activity of  mathematicians.  The only response has been
> to quote Peirce, out of context, who wrote one century before (and you know
> the extend to which I hold his merits)
>
> Regards
>
> Bernard
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

called into play...Theorematic reasoning invariably depends upon
experimentation with individual schemata...theorematic or
mathematical reasoning proper, is reasoning with specially
constructed schemata" 4.233. 

Thus, from my reading of Peirce, I come up with a different
understanding of pure mathematics from that of De Tienne, who tells
us that it is essentially detached and isolate from the Real World to
be almost irrelevant. 

Edwina 
 On Wed 11/08/21 10:45 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:Bernard, List:   I agree with Gary F.'s reply just now, but
already drafted this one so I am going ahead and posting it.  BM:
This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied. 
I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. The point is that
for Peirce, pure mathematics does not concern itself with whether or
not its hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.  BM:
Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day
work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses experiments
with forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak
of the value of their underlying hypotheses.  As I have noted
before, Peirce states very clearly that unlike all the other
sciences, pure mathematics is not a positive science. The
"experiments" conducted by pure mathematicians take place entirely in
the imagination, although often aided by concrete tokens of the
relevant diagram types.  BM: And since it will be repeated in the
following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure
mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off [from] the
world.  Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's explicit
definitions of pure mathematics as reflected in the numerous
quotations that I have previously provided, although I would
substitute "ideal hypotheses" for "wild dreams."   Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40
AM  wrote:

Bernard, list, 

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in
a non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a
manifestation of his peculiar sense of humor. 

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you
can indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense
which is contrary to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the
distinction between the internal and external worlds corresponds
directly to the difference between a “world of imagination” and
“the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually
identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the
metaphysical idea of   reality. Peirce usually refers to
“experience” as something forced upon us, indicating that
Secondness is essential to it. In these Peircean terms, the
“everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is purely
hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of
“degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211). 

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s
talk/slideshow involves a focus on  pure mathematics and a
corresponding neglect of mathematical applications. This is one
reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer to pure mathematics as
“experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.  

Gary f.   

    From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
 Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23   

Gary f. , list 

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle,
is not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop
existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at most be an
inconvenience." 

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied. 

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The
significance and truth-value of such constructs [those of
mathematicians] depends only on their internal inferential coherence,
not on the world of experience." 

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day
work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses  experiments
with forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak
of the value of their underlying hypotheses. 

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is
certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side.
But this is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be
repeated in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show
that pure mathematics are internally cohe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: The problem I have with De Tienne's outline of mathematics is the
intense focus he gives to its essential irrelevance to we who live in the
real world.


This continues to miss the point entirely, which is not that pure
mathematics is *irrelevant *to living in the real world, but that pure
mathematics *does not concern itself *with whether or not its ideal
hypotheses happen to correspond to anything in the real world. As soon as
we posit such a connection or begin to evaluate its validity, we are no
longer practicing *pure *mathematics, we are practicing *applied *mathematics
within metaphysics or one of the special sciences. Even phaneroscopy *does
not concern itself* with whether or not whatever is present to the mind is
real--such as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it--because that
assessment requires the normative science of logic as semeiotic.

ET: And he moves, not into applied mathematics but into phenomenology, for
'Thinking in general terms is not enough. It is necessary that something
should be DONE. In geometry, subsidiary lines are drawn. In algebra
permissible transformations are made. Thereupon the faculty of observation
is called into play...Theorematic reasoning invariably depends upon
experimentation with individual schemata...theorematic or mathematical
reasoning proper, is reasoning with specially constructed schemata" 4.233.


The quoted passage is *not *a description of phenomenology, it is a
description of pure mathematics. After all, it comes from a draft chapter
of *Minute Logic* entitled "The Simplest Mathematics" (CP 4.227-323, 1902),
specifically its first section entitled "The Essence of Mathematics." This
is the very same text where Peirce endorses his father's definition of
mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions" (4.229&239),
and the very same paragraph that he begins by stating plainly, "Mathematics
is the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things. That is its
essence and definition" (4.233). Here "the faculty of observation" is
employed only for studying the concrete tokens of diagram types that
mathematicians create as aids to their strictly deductive reasoning process
about the strictly hypothetical objects and (especially) their relations
that they represent as "specially constructed schemata."

CSP: The skeletonization or diagrammatization of the problem serves more
purposes than one; but its principal purpose is to strip the significant
relations of all disguise. Only one kind of concrete clothing is
permitted--namely, such as, whether from habit or from the constitution of
the mind, has become so familiar that it decidedly aids in tracing the
consequences of the hypothesis. Thus, the mathematician does two very
different things: namely, he first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all
features which do not concern the drawing of consequences from it, and *this
he does without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts
or not*; and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from
that hypothesis. (CP 3.559, 1898; bold added)


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 12:54 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Bernard, JAS, Gary F, Robert, list:
>
> The problem I have with De Tienne's outline of mathematics is the intense
> focus he gives to its essential irrelevance to we who live in the real
> world. I don't think it can be ascribed to his sense of humour. He repeats
> it often enough that we must consider that he takes this view very
> seriously.
>
> And - I don't agree with JAS's view that this focus is merely to
> differentiate 'pure' from 'applied' mathematics. We have to instead, ask
> WHY Peirce emphasized the role of pure mathematics in his SCIENCES. Surely
> it has a role in our scientific exploration and analysis of our Real World?
> Otherwise - why do it?
>
> Yes, mathematics "deals exclusively with hypothetical states of things and
> asserts no matter of fact whatever, and further, that it is thus alone that
> the necessity of its conclusions explained" 4.232. And Peirce warns against
> what we can consider as the'induction' process as the sole sense of
> information, with his comment "to assert that any source of information
> that is restricted to actual facts could afford us a necessary knowledge,
> that is, knowledge relating to a whole general range of possibility, would
> be a flat contradiction in terms" 4.232.
>
> And he moves, not into applied mathematics but into phenomenology, for
> 'Thinking in general terms is not enough. It is necessary that something
> should be DONE. In geometry, subsidiary lines are drawn. In algebra
> permissible transformations are made. Thereupon the faculty of observation
> is called into play...Theorematic reasoning invariably depends upon
> experimentation with individual 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Helmut Raulien]

types.

 




BM: And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off [from] the world.




 

Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's explicit definitions of pure mathematics as reflected in the numerous quotations that I have previously provided, although I would substitute "ideal hypotheses" for "wild dreams."

 

Regards,

 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt








On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:




Bernard, list,

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of his peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the metaphysical idea of  reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience” as something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow involves a focus on  pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23



Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance and truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only on their internal inferential coherence, not on the world of experience."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses  experiments with forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the world.

In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves the drawings of savage animals.

I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice as Peirce suggested it.

Bernard Morand







_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Bernard Morand]

afted this
one so I am going ahead and posting it.

BM: This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped
existing, there would no more exist mathematicians at all,
neither pure nor applied.


I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. The point is that
for Peirce, /pure /mathematics does not concern itself with
whether or not its hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.

BM: Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the
every day work of mathematicians who pass their time in
diverses *experiments *with forms, abstracts figures, models,
constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their
underlying hypotheses.


As I have noted before, Peirce states very clearly that unlike all
the other sciences, /pure /mathematics is not a /positive
/science. The "experiments" conducted by /pure /mathematicians
take place /entirely /in the imagination, although often aided by
concrete tokens of the relevant diagram types.

BM: And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it
has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are
internally coherent wild dreams cut off [from] the world.


Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's /explicit /definitions of
/pure /mathematics as reflected in the numerous quotations that I
have previously provided, although I would substitute "ideal
hypotheses" for "wild dreams."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:

Bernard, list,

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians
in a non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a
manifestation of his peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure
mathematics, you can indeed call it “experience,” but only in
a peculiar sense which is contrary to Peirce’s regular usage.
Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal and
external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between
a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of
externality is virtually identical with the idea of Secondness
and is closely related to the metaphysical idea of /reality/.
Peirce usually refers to “experience” as something /forced/
upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In
these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians,
/insofar is it is purely hypothetical/, takes place in an
internal world, a realm of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280,
W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s
talk/slideshow involves a focus on /pure/ mathematics and a
corresponding neglect of mathematical /applications/. This is
one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer to pure
mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.

*From:*peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> *On Behalf Of
*Bernard Morand
*Sent:* 11-Aug-21 09:18
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in
principle, is not concerned with anything but itself. The
world could stop existing, but to pure mathematicians that
would at most be an inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing,
there would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure
nor applied.

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The
significance and truth-value of such constructs [those of
mathematicians] depends only on their *internal* inferential
coherence, *not on the world of experience*."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every
day work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses
*experiments* with forms, abstracts figures, models,
constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their
underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of
language" is certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the
laughs on one's side. But this is not a valid scientific
argument. And since it will be repeate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

d as a logical blunder; I regard it as a
manifestation of his peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you
can indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense
which is contrary to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the
distinction between the internal and external worlds corresponds
directly to the difference between a “world of imagination” and
“the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually
identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the
metaphysical idea of  reality. Peirce usually refers to
“experience” as something forced upon us, indicating that
Secondness is essential to it. In these Peircean terms, the
“everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is purely
hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of
“degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s
talk/slideshow involves a focus on  pure mathematics and a
corresponding neglect of mathematical applications. This is one
reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer to pure mathematics as
“experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.

 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu [4]  On Behalf Of Bernard
Morand
 Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23 

Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle,
is not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop
existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at most be an
inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied. 

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The
significance and truth-value of such constructs [those of
mathematicians] depends only on their internal inferential coherence,
not on the world of experience."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day
work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses  experiments
with forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak
of the value of their underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is
certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side.
But this is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be
repeated in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show
that pure mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the
world. 

In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those
prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their
caves the drawings of savage animals.

I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the
phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any
prejudice as Peirce suggested it. 

Bernard Morand  


Links:
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

The point is that for
>> Peirce, *pure *mathematics does not concern itself with whether or not
>> its hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.
>>
>> BM: Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day
>> work of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses *experiments *with
>> forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the
>> value of their underlying hypotheses.
>>
>>
>> As I have noted before, Peirce states very clearly that unlike all the
>> other sciences, *pure *mathematics is not a *positive *science. The
>> "experiments" conducted by *pure *mathematicians take place *entirely *in
>> the imagination, although often aided by concrete tokens of the relevant
>> diagram types.
>>
>> BM: And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an
>> intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent
>> wild dreams cut off [from] the world.
>>
>>
>> Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's *explicit *definitions of
>> *pure *mathematics as reflected in the numerous quotations that I have
>> previously provided, although I would substitute "ideal hypotheses" for
>> "wild dreams."
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM  wrote:
>>
>>> Bernard, list,
>>>
>>> Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a
>>> non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of
>>> his peculiar sense of humor.
>>>
>>> As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can
>>> indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary
>>> to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the
>>> internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between
>>> a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is
>>> virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to
>>> the metaphysical idea of *reality*. Peirce usually refers to
>>> “experience” as something *forced* upon us, indicating that Secondness
>>> is essential to it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of
>>> mathematicians, *insofar is it is purely hypothetical*, takes place in
>>> an internal world, a realm of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).
>>>
>>> As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow
>>> involves a focus on *pure* mathematics and a corresponding neglect of
>>> mathematical *applications*. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do
>>> not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that
>>> phaneroscopy is.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>>> *On Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
>>> *Sent:* 11-Aug-21 09:18
>>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23
>>>
>>> Gary f. , list
>>>
>>> De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is
>>> not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but
>>> to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."
>>>
>>> This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
>>> would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>>>
>>> It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance
>>> and truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only
>>> on their *internal* inferential coherence, *not on the world of
>>> experience*."
>>>
>>> Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work
>>> of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses *experiments* with
>>> forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the
>>> value of their underlying hypotheses.
>>>
>>> The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is
>>> certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this
>>> is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the
>>> following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics
>>> ar

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Gary Richmond]

ous quotations that I have previously provided,
> although I would substitute "ideal hypotheses" for "wild dreams."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM  wrote:
>
>> Bernard, list,
>>
>> Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a
>> non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of
>> his peculiar sense of humor.
>>
>> As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can
>> indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary
>> to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the
>> internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between
>> a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is
>> virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to
>> the metaphysical idea of *reality*. Peirce usually refers to
>> “experience” as something *forced* upon us, indicating that Secondness
>> is essential to it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of
>> mathematicians, *insofar is it is purely hypothetical*, takes place in
>> an internal world, a realm of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).
>>
>> As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow
>> involves a focus on *pure* mathematics and a corresponding neglect of
>> mathematical *applications*. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do
>> not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that
>> phaneroscopy is.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> *On Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
>> *Sent:* 11-Aug-21 09:18
>> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23
>>
>> Gary f. , list
>>
>> De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is
>> not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but
>> to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."
>>
>> This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
>> would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>>
>> It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance
>> and truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only
>> on their *internal* inferential coherence, *not on the world of
>> experience*."
>>
>> Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of
>> mathematicians who pass their time in diverses *experiments* with forms,
>> abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of
>> their underlying hypotheses.
>>
>> The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is
>> certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this
>> is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the
>> following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics
>> are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the world.
>>
>> In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those
>> prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves
>> the drawings of savage animals.
>>
>> I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the
>> phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice
>> as Peirce suggested it.
>>
>> Bernard Morand
>>
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Bernard, list,

 

I just noticed that the point I was trying to make below (about “experience”) 
is more fully explained by Peirce in this 1893 text:

 

Experiencing (TS ·7) (gnusystems.ca) 
 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 11-Aug-21 10:40



 

Bernard, list,

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a 
non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of his 
peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed 
call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary to 
Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal 
and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between a “world of 
imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually 
identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the 
metaphysical idea of reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience” as 
something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In 
these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is 
purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of “degenerate 
Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow 
involves a focus on pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of 
mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer 
to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.

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► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Bernard, List:

I agree with Gary F.'s reply just now, but already drafted this one so I am
going ahead and posting it.

BM: This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there
would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.


I would call it hyperbole rather than a blunder. The point is that for
Peirce, *pure *mathematics does not concern itself with whether or not its
hypotheses correspond to anything that exists.

BM: Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work
of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses *experiments *with forms,
abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of
their underlying hypotheses.


As I have noted before, Peirce states very clearly that unlike all the
other sciences, *pure *mathematics is not a *positive *science. The
"experiments" conducted by *pure *mathematicians take place *entirely *in
the imagination, although often aided by concrete tokens of the relevant
diagram types.

BM: And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it has an
intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent
wild dreams cut off [from] the world.


Indeed, that is consistent with Peirce's *explicit *definitions of
*pure *mathematics
as reflected in the numerous quotations that I have previously provided,
although I would substitute "ideal hypotheses" for "wild dreams."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 9:40 AM  wrote:

> Bernard, list,
>
> Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a
> non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of
> his peculiar sense of humor.
>
> As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can
> indeed call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary
> to Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the
> internal and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between
> a “world of imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is
> virtually identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to
> the metaphysical idea of *reality*. Peirce usually refers to “experience”
> as something *forced* upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to
> it. In these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, *insofar
> is it is purely hypothetical*, takes place in an internal world, a realm
> of “degenerate Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).
>
> As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow
> involves a focus on *pure* mathematics and a corresponding neglect of
> mathematical *applications*. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do
> not refer to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that
> phaneroscopy is.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Bernard Morand
> *Sent:* 11-Aug-21 09:18
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23
>
> Gary f. , list
>
> De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is
> not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but
> to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."
>
> This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there would
> no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.
>
> It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance and
> truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only on
> their *internal* inferential coherence, *not on the world of experience*."
>
> Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of
> mathematicians who pass their time in diverses *experiments* with forms,
> abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of
> their underlying hypotheses.
>
> The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is
> certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this
> is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the
> following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics
> are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the world.
>
> In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those
> prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves
> the drawings of savage animals.
>
> I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the
> phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice
> as 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Bernard, list,

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a 
non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of his 
peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed 
call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary to 
Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal 
and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between a “world of 
imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually 
identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the 
metaphysical idea of reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience” as 
something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In 
these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is 
purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of “degenerate 
Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow 
involves a focus on pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of 
mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer 
to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

 

Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not 
concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure 
mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there would no 
more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance and 
truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only on their 
internal inferential coherence, not on the world of experience."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of 
mathematicians who pass their time in diverses experiments with forms, 
abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their 
underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is certainly a 
good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this is not a valid 
scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it 
has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent 
wild dreams cut off the world.

In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those prehistoric 
people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves the drawings of 
savage animals.

I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the 
phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice as 
Peirce suggested it.

Bernard Morand

Le 10/08/2021 à 16:09, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  a écrit :

Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an equally 
thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit acknowledgement of 
the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s choice of language at 
“the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response will be limited to this 
part of your post:

BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De Tienne is 
repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete, imaginary and 
existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding mathematics out of a 
scientific realm that will end confined into the experimental sciences.  I 
don't think that such a project can be qualified as peircian.

GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a putative 
attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics” from science 
and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled” to attribute 
malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his crusade, even to those 
who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of us are no less entitled to 
ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne is saying about phaneroscopy, 
and to maintain a focus on the actual content of his slides. 

After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis, which I 
soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited attention elsewhere. 
Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty or reading Peirce, I 
will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to carry on his crusade as 
long as he likes, and others are entitled to give it the attention they think 
it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say about it that hasn’t been said 
already.

Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about 
phaneroscopy, including its non-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Bernard Morand]

Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is 
not concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, 
but to pure mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."


This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there 
would no more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.


It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance 
and truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends 
only on their *internal* inferential coherence, *not on the world of 
experience*."


Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work 
of mathematicians who pass their time in diverses *experiments* with 
forms, abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the 
value of their underlying hypotheses.


The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is 
certainly a good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But 
this is not a valid scientific argument. And since it will be repeated 
in the following slide, it has an intended purpose: to show that pure 
mathematics are internally coherent wild dreams cut off the world.


In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those 
prehistoric people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves 
the drawings of savage animals.


I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the 
phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any 
prejudice as Peirce suggested it.


Bernard Morand

Le 10/08/2021 à 16:09, g...@gnusystems.ca a écrit :


Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an 
equally thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit 
acknowledgement of the emotional basis of your own response to De 
Tienne’s choice of language at “the starting point in slide 23.” But 
my own response will be limited to this part of your post:


BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De 
Tienne is repeating the well known duality between abstract and 
concrete, imaginary and existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as 
excluding mathematics out of a scientific realm that will end confined 
into the experimental sciences.  I don't think that such a project can 
be qualified as peircian.


GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a 
putative attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude 
mathematics” from science and from a Peircean understanding of it. He 
is also “entitled” to attribute malicious intent to anyone who does 
not sign on to his crusade, even to those who simply ignore it. But in 
my opinion, the rest of us are no less entitled to ignore it as simply 
irrelevant to what De Tienne is saying about phaneroscopy, and to 
maintain a focus on the actual content of his slides.


After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis, 
which I soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited 
attention elsewhere. Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading 
Marty or reading Peirce, I will choose Peirce every time. Robert is 
entitled to carry on his crusade as long as he likes, and others are 
entitled to give it the attention they think it deserves. As for me, I 
have nothing to say about it that hasn’t been said already.


Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about 
/phaneroscopy/, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics 
for abstract principles. The fact that nearly all sciences call upon 
mathematics for principles under which to organize their observations 
is /taken for granted/ in De Tienne’s talk, as it is too obvious to be 
made a focal point in a discussion of phaneroscopy. Robert and his 
fellow crusaders naturally interpret this taking-for-granted as a 
/denial/ of the importance of mathematics, and insist on reading this 
denial into De Tienne’s explicit text, regardless of what it actually 
says in its context. As we have seen, questioning this style of 
interpretation only leads to more unfounded accusations of malicious 
intent and various intellectual sins. Consequently I feel entitled to 
say nothing further about the whole crusade, which I consider a 
distraction from more relevant issues. In fact I’m already regretting 
giving so much time and thought to it in this post. Enough already.


Gary f.

*From:*Bernard Morand 
*Sent:* 9-Aug-21 12:02

Gary f., list

I think that the matter is much less simple than your way of stating 
it. In my opinion the discussion would gain in clarity by 
distinguishing 3 subjects.


First, the nature of mathematics qua science (as distinct from men who 
make it ), the definition of which by Robert Marty seems to me correct 
: " the exact study of idealized forms"


Second, the methods and reasonings in use in this discipline : 
"drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things" 
(being understood that "hypothetical" doesn't 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

John Alan , List
Jon Alan, not being a crusader against ADT, I am much less interested in
ADT's confusion than if he could explain (i.e. state more clearly, make
more intelligible) "these essential principles of mathematics" in such a
way that one can distinguish clearly what kind of mathematics is at their
foundation... Perhaps you can present them to me yourself because you must
know them?
Regards,
Robert
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le mar. 10 août 2021 à 20:25, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Gary F., List:
>
> I likewise remain puzzled by the persistent claims that André (or anyone
> else) is somehow "arguing against mathematics," especially with
> over-the-top language about an alleged "phaneroscopy vaccine against the
> mathematics virus." After all, he states plainly in slide 21 that 
> "*mathematics
> *comes up with fundamental principles essential to phaneroscopy." As for
> the acknowledged misquotation in slide 23, I brought it to André's
> attention yesterday and he replied as follows.
>
> ADT: Thanks, Jon, for alerting me to this conflation. How that could have
> happened is beyond my memory: I compiled a list of quotations many years
> ago, and put it to different uses over time. I’ll make the correction once
> I return next week from all an all-too-brief and rare vacation week.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 9:09 AM  wrote:
>
>> Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an
>> equally thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit
>> acknowledgement of the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s
>> choice of language at “the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response
>> will be limited to this part of your post:
>>
>> BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De
>> Tienne is repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete,
>> imaginary and existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding
>> mathematics out of a scientific realm that will end confined into the
>> experimental sciences.  I don't think that such a project can be qualified
>> as peircian.
>>
>> GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a
>> putative attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics”
>> from science and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled”
>> to attribute malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his
>> crusade, even to those who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of
>> us are no less entitled to ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne
>> is saying about phaneroscopy, and to maintain a focus on the actual content
>> of his slides.
>>
>> After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis,
>> which I soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited
>> attention elsewhere. Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty
>> or reading Peirce, I will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to
>> carry on his crusade as long as he likes, and others are entitled to give
>> it the attention they think it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say
>> about it that hasn’t been said already.
>>
>> Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about
>> *phaneroscopy*, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics
>> for abstract principles. The fact that nearly all sciences call upon
>> mathematics for principles under which to organize their observations is 
>> *taken
>> for granted* in De Tienne’s talk, as it is too obvious to be made a
>> focal point in a discussion of phaneroscopy. Robert and his fellow
>> crusaders naturally interpret this taking-for-granted as a *denial* of
>> the importance of mathematics, and insist on reading this denial into De
>> Tienne’s explicit text, regardless of what it actually says in its context.
>> As we have seen, questioning this style of interpretation only leads to
>> more unfounded accusations of malicious intent and various intellectual
>> sins. Consequently I feel entitled to say nothing further about the whole
>> crusade, which I consider a distraction from more relevant issues. In fact
>> I’m already regretting giving so much time and thought to it in this post.
>> Enough already.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I likewise remain puzzled by the persistent claims that André (or anyone
else) is somehow "arguing against mathematics," especially with
over-the-top language about an alleged "phaneroscopy vaccine against the
mathematics virus." After all, he states plainly in slide 21 that "*mathematics
*comes up with fundamental principles essential to phaneroscopy." As for
the acknowledged misquotation in slide 23, I brought it to André's
attention yesterday and he replied as follows.

ADT: Thanks, Jon, for alerting me to this conflation. How that could have
happened is beyond my memory: I compiled a list of quotations many years
ago, and put it to different uses over time. I’ll make the correction once
I return next week from all an all-too-brief and rare vacation week.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 9:09 AM  wrote:

> Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an
> equally thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit
> acknowledgement of the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s
> choice of language at “the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response
> will be limited to this part of your post:
>
> BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De
> Tienne is repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete,
> imaginary and existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding
> mathematics out of a scientific realm that will end confined into the
> experimental sciences.  I don't think that such a project can be qualified
> as peircian.
>
> GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a putative
> attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics” from
> science and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled” to
> attribute malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his crusade,
> even to those who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of us are
> no less entitled to ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne is
> saying about phaneroscopy, and to maintain a focus on the actual content of
> his slides.
>
> After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis,
> which I soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited
> attention elsewhere. Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty
> or reading Peirce, I will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to
> carry on his crusade as long as he likes, and others are entitled to give
> it the attention they think it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say
> about it that hasn’t been said already.
>
> Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about
> *phaneroscopy*, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics
> for abstract principles. The fact that nearly all sciences call upon
> mathematics for principles under which to organize their observations is 
> *taken
> for granted* in De Tienne’s talk, as it is too obvious to be made a focal
> point in a discussion of phaneroscopy. Robert and his fellow crusaders
> naturally interpret this taking-for-granted as a *denial* of the
> importance of mathematics, and insist on reading this denial into De
> Tienne’s explicit text, regardless of what it actually says in its context.
> As we have seen, questioning this style of interpretation only leads to
> more unfounded accusations of malicious intent and various intellectual
> sins. Consequently I feel entitled to say nothing further about the whole
> crusade, which I consider a distraction from more relevant issues. In fact
> I’m already regretting giving so much time and thought to it in this post.
> Enough already.
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an equally 
thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit acknowledgement of 
the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s choice of language at 
“the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response will be limited to this 
part of your post:

BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De Tienne is 
repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete, imaginary and 
existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding mathematics out of a 
scientific realm that will end confined into the experimental sciences.  I 
don't think that such a project can be qualified as peircian.

GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a putative 
attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics” from science 
and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled” to attribute 
malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his crusade, even to those 
who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of us are no less entitled to 
ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne is saying about phaneroscopy, 
and to maintain a focus on the actual content of his slides. 

After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis, which I 
soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited attention elsewhere. 
Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty or reading Peirce, I 
will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to carry on his crusade as 
long as he likes, and others are entitled to give it the attention they think 
it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say about it that hasn’t been said 
already.

Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about 
phaneroscopy, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics for 
abstract principles. The fact that nearly all sciences call upon mathematics 
for principles under which to organize their observations is taken for granted 
in De Tienne’s talk, as it is too obvious to be made a focal point in a 
discussion of phaneroscopy. Robert and his fellow crusaders naturally interpret 
this taking-for-granted as a denial of the importance of mathematics, and 
insist on reading this denial into De Tienne’s explicit text, regardless of 
what it actually says in its context. As we have seen, questioning this style 
of interpretation only leads to more unfounded accusations of malicious intent 
and various intellectual sins. Consequently I feel entitled to say nothing 
further about the whole crusade, which I consider a distraction from more 
relevant issues. In fact I’m already regretting giving so much time and thought 
to it in this post. Enough already.

Gary f.

 

 

From: Bernard Morand  
Sent: 9-Aug-21 12:02

Gary f., list

I think that the matter is much less simple than your way of stating it. In my 
opinion the discussion would gain in clarity by distinguishing 3 subjects.

First, the nature of mathematics qua science (as distinct from men who make it 
), the definition of which by Robert Marty seems to me correct : " the exact 
study of idealized forms"

Second, the methods and reasonings in use in this discipline : "drawing 
necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things" (being understood 
that "hypothetical" doesn't mean "not existing" nor irreal. Can we say that the 
number theory is just an hypothetical construct ?)

Third, the place and role of mathematics in some given classification of 
sciences. In the actual dicussion, it is the question of the relationship 
between mathematics and phaneroscopy, a relationship that can be seen as a 
dependance from the one to the other, but it counts only for the classification 
aspect. If phaneroscopy seems to depend logically from mathematics for its 
principles, it does not entail that mathematics cannot be feeded by the 
findings of phaneroscopy.

This last point makes me refuse since the beginning the starting point in slide 
23 ; "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not concerned with anything but 
itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at 
most be an inconvenience."

By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De Tienne is 
repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete, imaginary and 
existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding mathematics out of a 
scientific realm that will end confined into the experimental sciences.  I 
don't think that such a project can be qualified as peircian. 

We have to hold together three elements : the Real, the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary. It is a much more difficult task but it permits to ask the question 
: how does a purely abstract science can partake its own form discoveries with 
the experimental sciences ? It seems to me that the concept of isomorphism that 
does not claim a community of contents but a resemblance of forms is a good 
candidate by 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

y
come from CP 1.247 (part of the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics
is engaged solely in tracing out the consequences of hypotheses. As
such, she never at all considers whether or not anything be
existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility between CP
1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is concerned.
Anyway, Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need
not distract us from the point of slides 22-3, which is that
phaneroscopy does not and cannot provide mathematics with any
fundamental principle. 

Gary f.
From:  peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu [4]  On Behalf Of Jon Alan
Schmidt
 Sent: 8-Aug-21 20:54
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23
 Robert, List:
I sincerely appreciate the correction of the excerpt from CP 1.53
(c. 1896). It is surprising and indeed troubling that André would
insert his own words where he is purportedly quoting Peirce. My first
thought was that perhaps the additional phrase was in the original
manuscript and omitted (inadvertently or otherwise) by the CP
editors, which has happened in some other places, but inspection of R
1288:7 confirms that it is not the case here. As any examination of
the List archives would amply demonstrate, I am always eager to
understand and convey Peirce's ideas accurately by carefully citing
and reproducing his actual texts. 
For that very reason, I am also surprised that anyone would suggest
that when I provided a link to the Commens Dictionary entry for
"mathematics," I somehow "didn't read it well" and thus would find it
problematic that Peirce included the formulation of mathematical
hypotheses within the scope of a mathematician's practice. On the
contrary, I have never disputed this, I have merely insisted with
Peirce that mathematics is the science which draws necessary
conclusions about those hypothetical states of things. Moreover, as I
pointed out in an off-List exchange several months ago, CP 3.559 is
the central passage of an entire series of articles that I wrote for
my fellow structural engineers on "The Logic of Ingenuity" (
https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10490 [7]). Its last sentence
provides an excellent summary of the whole lengthy paragraph.
CSP: Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely,
he first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do
not concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does
without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts
or not; and, secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences
from that hypothesis. (CP 3.559, 1898) 
Returning to the subject at hand, the mathematician's hypothesis is
different from the phaneroscopist's hypothesis. Because the
mathematician's method is strictly deductive, it can only be applied
to an idealization that has been "stripped of all features which do
not concern the drawing of [necessary] consequences from it." That is
precisely why the mathematician must proceed "without inquiring or
caring whether it [the idealization] agrees with the actual facts or
not." By contrast, the phaneroscopist is inquiring about the phaneron
and thus cares very much whether a given hypothesis agrees with what
is being observed there. Consequently, although mathematics is an
indispensable aid to phaneroscopy, phaneroscopy is by no means
reducible to mathematics--just as mathematics is an indispensable aid
to  every other science, but none of them is reducible to mathematics.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

 Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [8] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[9]
 On Sun, Aug 8, 2021 at 4:29 PM robert marty  wrote:

1 -I have already pointed out in the Podium, [11] Section 3:  
Peirce, an architectonic philosopher (p. 8), how much André De
Tienne tried to minimize the role of mathematics in scientific
discovery and particularly in phaneroscopy. Here are two significant
extracts:
 1.1 "…after having acclaimed mathematics as "queen of all
sciences," he immediately sends mathematicians (and with them
mathematics) back to confinement in their own field: 'But the moment
inquiry turns the barest of attention to the conditions that give
experience its earthly flavor; the moment inquiry acquires a vested
interest in a realm of being purely detached  mathematicians are not
concerned with, that of positive experience.'" (De Tienne. 2004:
1)[emphasize mine]
 1.2 "Both [Mathematics and phaneroscopy] are acritical since both
refrain from making assertions about the object of their
investigation; mathematics only draw consequences out of initial
hypotheses, while phaneroscopy only describes what self-presents."
(De Tienne, 2004: 17) [emphasize mine].  

2- After the publication of my

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[robert marty]

List,

1- Gary F. has just validated the quote-cookie principle! You take a quote,
you choose in another context a compatible piece of another quote, and you
get a new quote that will produce the new meaning you want. It's a metaphor
of how messenger RNA works, which modifying the Spike protein (a quote)
leads the cell to produce antibodies... Against which virus? The "
*mathematics-virus*," of course...  Let's greet the inventors of the
phaneroscopy vaccine against the mathematics virus!

2- I do not polemicize AGAINST André De Tienne (who was never personally
present) but FOR Peirce.

3- GF > "*which is that phaneroscopy does not and cannot provide
mathematics with any fundamental principle*."I totally agree, but I claim
(with Peirce) that it is rigorously the opposite that happens ...and
therein lies the question: will mathematics presented (metaphorically) as a
dangerous virus penetrate the minds despite the antibodies?

4- I underlined (still in the Podium) that eminent Peircians are aware of
the problem and gave an answer to this question by conferring to the
classes of signs the quality of "mathematical" or logical" objects.
This is the case of:
- Nathan Houser: who confers on a simple list of three concepts the status
of "*formal mathematical conceptions"* ;
- Ahti-Vekkho Pietarinen: "*There are cross-divisions of these three
trichotomies across speculative grammar*."

Frederik Stjernfelt, for his part, does not hesitate to take and assume an
explicitly revisionist position funded on his personal opinion: *"But
Phenomenology seems to have received even its core principles the three
categories from a lower discipline, namely Metaphysics, and ultimately
Logic. An immediate conclusion from this may seem to be that the
ontological dependence hierarchy of sciences does not imply any privileged
trajectory of discovery.*"

5- Confronted with Peirce's constant assertions, the camp of the "
*opponents*" (a term I use for want of a better one) has chosen to evoke
mathematics and not more so that it becomes the "*unseen character*" that
we always talk about and never see.  But when they are presented with a "
*mathematical"* object that embodies Peirce's formal definitions, they
launch into a dubious battle of the kind of antivirus production for some,
and/or arguments of authority relying on a stream of quotations from
Brandolini's law for others.
Regards ...
Robert Marty
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*

-

Le lun. 9 août 2021 à 14:34,  a écrit :

> Jon S, list,
>
> Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the words
> “inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They come from CP 1.247 (part
> of the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the
> consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or
> not anything be existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility
> between CP 1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is
> concerned. Anyway, Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need
> not distract us from the point of slides 22-3, which is that phaneroscopy
> does not and cannot provide mathematics with any fundamental principle.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* 8-Aug-21 20:54
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23
>
>
>
> Robert, List:
>
>
>
> I sincerely appreciate the correction of the excerpt from CP 1.53 (c.
> 1896). It is surprising and indeed troubling that André would insert his
> own words where he is purportedly quoting Peirce. My first thought was that
> perhaps the additional phrase was in the original manuscript and omitted
> (inadvertently or otherwise) by the CP editors, which has happened in some
> other places, but inspection of R 1288:7 confirms that it is not the case
> here. As any examination of the List archives would amply demonstrate, I am
> always eager to understand and convey Peirce's ideas accurately by
> carefully citing and reproducing his actual texts.
>
>
>
> For that very reason, I am also surprised that anyone would suggest that
> when I provided a link to the Commens Dictionary entry for "mathematics," I
> somehow "didn't read it well" and thus would find it problematic that
> Peirce included the formulation of mathematical hypotheses within the scope
> of a mathematician's practice. On the contrary, I have never disputed this,
> I have merely insisted with Peirce that mathematics is the science which
> draws necessary conclusions about those hypothetical states of t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: We are, as far as I can understand, instead discussing the ROLE of
mathematics in our understanding of and relationship to the Real World. De
Tienne, in slide 23, makes it clear that there is no relation and no role
for mathematics.


Again, we need to distinguish *pure *mathematics from *applied *mathematics.
As quoted below, Peirce states that "Mathematics merely traces out the
consequences of hypotheses without caring whether they correspond to
anything real or not" (RL 107:17, 1904), "mathematical knowledge ... is a
knowledge of the consequences of arbitrary hypotheses" (EP 2:372, 1905),
and "Mathematics ... assumes no responsibility for the truth of its
premisses, but only for its conclusions necessarily following from those
premisses" (EP 2:458, 1909). Proper interpretation of his earlier reference
to "that real potential world" as the object of *pure *mathematics (CP
1.646, 1898) must be informed by these and other passages where he clearly
affirms that it does not concern itself with whether or not its
hypothetical premisses correspond to reality. That is instead a question to
be answered by *applied *mathematics within metaphysics and the special
sciences.

ET: And - to my knowledge, no-one has referred to the 'premisses' vs 'the
conclusions in discussing mathematics, so, I'm not sure why you are
introducing this issue.


Because it comes up explicitly in that third quotation. Again, I agree with
Robert (and Peirce) that *formulating *pure hypotheses falls within the
mathematician's business, but assessing how well (if at all) those
premisses correspond to a reality--i.e., something that is as it is
regardless of what anyone thinks about it--does not. On the other hand, the
conclusions that follow deductively from them *are *real in the
pragmaticistic sense of being *conditionally *necessary.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 12:52 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, Robert, Gary F, list
>
> JAS - I think you are introducing issues which we are not discussing;
> namely, we are not discussing whether or not mathematics refers to the
> actual vs the potential. I think the answer to this has been made very
> clear by Peirce.
>
> We are, as far as I can understand, instead discussing the ROLE of
> mathematics in our understanding of and relationship to the Real World.
>
> De Tienne, in slide 23, makes it clear that there is no relation and no
> role for mathematics. His example:  Poor Archimedes was killed by the Real
> World because his focus on mathematics meant that he isolated himself from
> its Reality.
>
> But what Peirce has been pointing out - and Robert Marty's many references
> have supported, is that, to the contrary, Peirce insisted that -and I
> repeat - 'The end that pure mathematics is pursuing is to discover that
> real potential world" 1.646. [my emphasis].  I'll emphasize 'end', which
> refers to the function/role..of mathematics; and of course, 'potential',
> which as has been often noted, focuses on that 'potential' vs' actual'.
>
> And - to my knowledge, no-one has referred to the 'premisses' vs 'the
> conclusions in discussing mathematics, so, I'm not sure why you are
> introducing this issue.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 09/08/21 12:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> As Gary F. already noted, there is no conflict between CP 1.53 (c. 1896)
> and CP 1.247 (1902). I also see no inconsistency between these passages and
> CP 1.646 (1898), and presumably neither does André since he also quotes the
> latter on slide 23. What CP 1.247 excludes from the scope of pure
> mathematics is "whether or not anything be existentially true," i.e.,
> actual rather than merely potential. Again, its method is strictly
> deductive, which entails that its subject matter is strictly
> hypothetical--idealizations that may or may not correspond to realities.
> That is why distinguishing realities from fictions is not a task for pure
> mathematics or even phaneroscopy--it instead falls under metaphysics,
> because it depends on the normative science of logic as semeiotic that
> encompasses not only deduction, but also abduction/retroduction and
> induction.
>
> CSP: Mathematics merely traces out the consequences of hypotheses without
> caring whether they correspond to anything real or not. It is purely
> deductive, and all necessary inference is mathematics, pure or applied. Its
> hypotheses are suggested by any of the other sciences, but its assumption
> of them is not a scientific act. Philosophy merely analyzes the experience
> common to all men. The truth of this experience is not an object of any
> science because it cannot really be doubted. All so-called 'logical'
> analysis, which is the method of philosophy, ought to be regarded as
> philosophy, pure or applied. ... The three main branches of philosophy are
> distinguished as follows. Phenomenology considers the phenomenon in
> general, or, whatever comes before the mind in any way, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, Robert, Gary F, list

JAS - I think you are introducing issues which we are not
discussing; namely, we are not discussing whether or not mathematics
refers to the actual vs the potential. I think the answer to this has
been made very clear by Peirce.

We are, as far as I can understand, instead discussing the ROLE of
mathematics in our understanding of and relationship to the Real
World.

De Tienne, in slide 23, makes it clear that there is no relation and
no role for mathematics. His example:  Poor Archimedes was killed by
the Real World because his focus on mathematics meant that he
isolated himself from its Reality. 

But what Peirce has been pointing out - and Robert Marty's many
references have supported, is that, to the contrary, Peirce insisted
that -and I repeat - 'The end that pure mathematics is pursuing is to
discover that real potential world" 1.646. [my emphasis].  I'll
emphasize 'end', which refers to the function/role..of mathematics;
and of course, 'potential', which as has been often noted, focuses on
that 'potential' vs' actual'.

And - to my knowledge, no-one has referred to the 'premisses' vs
'the conclusions in discussing mathematics, so, I'm not sure why you
are introducing this issue. 

Edwina
 On Mon 09/08/21 12:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 As Gary F. already noted, there is no conflict between CP 1.53 (c.
1896) and CP 1.247 (1902). I also see no inconsistency between these
passages and CP 1.646 (1898), and presumably neither does André
since he also quotes the latter on slide 23. What CP 1.247 excludes
from the scope of pure mathematics is "whether or not anything be
existentially true," i.e., actual rather than merely potential.
Again, its method is strictly deductive, which entails that its
subject matter is strictly hypothetical--idealizations that may or
may not correspond to realities. That is why distinguishing realities
from fictions is not a task for pure mathematics or even
phaneroscopy--it instead falls under metaphysics, because it depends
on the normative science of logic as semeiotic that encompasses not
only deduction, but also abduction/retroduction and induction. 
 CSP: Mathematics merely traces out the consequences of hypotheses
without caring whether they correspond to anything real or not. It is
purely deductive, and all necessary inference is mathematics, pure or
applied. Its hypotheses are suggested by any of the other sciences,
but its assumption of them is not a scientific act. Philosophy merely
analyzes the experience common to all men. The truth of this
experience is not an object of any science because it cannot really
be doubted. All so-called 'logical' analysis, which is the method of
philosophy, ought to be regarded as philosophy, pure or applied. ...
The three main branches of philosophy are distinguished as follows.
Phenomenology considers the phenomenon in general, or, whatever comes
before the mind in any way, and without caring whether it be fact or
fiction, discovers and describes the elements which will invariably
be present in it, that is, the categories. ... Metaphysics is still
more special, only considering the phenomenon in so far as it is a
sign of what is real. (RL 107:17-18, 1904) 
 CSP: Two meanings of the term "philosophy" call for our particular
notice. The two meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge
positive, that is, in making it a knowledge of things real, in
opposition to mathematical knowledge, which is a knowledge of the
consequences of arbitrary hypotheses ...Cenoscopy should be that
department of heuretic science which stands next after Mathematics,
and before Idioscopy, or special science ...
 Metaphysics is the proper designation for the third and completing
department of cenoscopy, which in places welds itself into idioscopy,
or special science. Its business is to study the most general features
of reality and real objects. (EP 2:372-375, 1906)
 CSP: Let Heuretic Science be divided into, first,  Mathematics,
which assumes no responsibility for the truth of its premisses, but
only for its conclusions necessarily following from those premisses;
second, Philosophy, or, as Bentham calls it, Cenoscopy, which makes
no new observations, but merely draws such conclusions as it can from
universally undoubted truths and universally admitted phenomena; and
thirdly, Special Science, Bentham's Idioscopy, which is chiefly
occupied with bringing to light phenomena hitherto unnoticed. ...
Under Philosophy, we shall find ourselves again forced,--unless we
wrench matters,--to make a trichotomy; recognizing first,
Phenomenology; second, the Critical, or Normative, Sciences, and
third, Metaphysics, the science of Reality. (EP 2:458-459, 1909) 
 As these excerpts clarify, according to Peirce it is not the
premisses of mathematics that are invariably real, such that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

As Gary F. already noted, there is no conflict between CP 1.53 (c. 1896)
and CP 1.247 (1902). I also see no inconsistency between these passages and
CP 1.646 (1898), and presumably neither does André since he also quotes the
latter on slide 23. What CP 1.247 excludes from the scope of pure
mathematics is "whether or not anything be *existentially *true," i.e.,
actual rather than merely potential. Again, its method is strictly
deductive, which entails that its subject matter is strictly
hypothetical--idealizations that may or may not correspond to realities.
That is why distinguishing realities from fictions is not a task for pure
mathematics or even phaneroscopy--it instead falls under metaphysics,
because it depends on the normative science of logic as semeiotic that
encompasses not only deduction, but also abduction/retroduction and
induction.

CSP: Mathematics merely traces out the consequences of hypotheses without
caring whether they correspond to anything real or not. It is purely
deductive, and all necessary inference is mathematics, pure or applied. Its
hypotheses are suggested by any of the other sciences, but its assumption
of them is not a scientific act. Philosophy merely analyzes the experience
common to all men. The truth of this experience is not an object of any
science because it cannot really be doubted. All so-called 'logical'
analysis, which is the method of philosophy, ought to be regarded as
philosophy, pure or applied. ... The three main branches of philosophy are
distinguished as follows. Phenomenology considers the phenomenon in
general, or, whatever comes before the mind in any way, and without caring
whether it be fact or fiction, discovers and describes the elements which
will invariably be present in it, that is, the categories. ... Metaphysics
is still more special, only considering the phenomenon in so far as it is a
sign of what is real. (RL 107:17-18, 1904)

CSP: *Two meanings of the term "philosophy"* call for our particular
notice. The two meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge positive,
that is, in making it a knowledge of things real, in opposition to
mathematical knowledge, which is a knowledge of the consequences of
arbitrary hypotheses ...
Cenoscopy should be that department of heuretic science which stands next
after Mathematics, and before Idioscopy, or special science ...
*Metaphysics *is the proper designation for the third and completing
department of cenoscopy, which in places welds itself into idioscopy, or
special science. Its business is to study the most general features of
reality and real objects. (EP 2:372-375, 1906)


CSP: Let Heuretic Science be divided into, first, *Mathematics*, which
assumes no responsibility for the truth of its premisses, but only for its
conclusions necessarily following from those premisses; second, *Philosophy*,
or, as Bentham calls it, Cenoscopy, which makes no new observations, but
merely draws such conclusions as it can from universally undoubted truths
and universally admitted phenomena; and thirdly, *Special Science*,
Bentham's Idioscopy, which is chiefly occupied with bringing to light
phenomena hitherto unnoticed. ... Under Philosophy, we shall find ourselves
again forced,--unless we wrench matters,--to make a trichotomy; recognizing
first, Phenomenology; second, the Critical, or Normative, Sciences, and
third, Metaphysics, the science of Reality. (EP 2:458-459, 1909)


As these excerpts clarify, according to Peirce it is not the *premisses *of
mathematics that are invariably real, such that they are as they are
regardless of what anyone thinks about them, but its *conclusions*. In
other words, it does not describe how anything *actually is*, but how
things necessarily *would be* if certain hypothetical states of things *were
*to be realized. That is why Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen describes Peirce's
overall philosophy of mathematics as pragmaticism, rather than situating it
within another established school of thought like intuitionism,
structuralism, fictionalism, or platonism (
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267174719_Pragmaticism_as_an_anti-foundationalist_philosophy_of_mathematics).
"Indeed, it is the reality of *some *possibilities that pragmaticism is
most concerned to insist upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354, 1905; emphasis added).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 9:14 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, Robert, Gary F, list:
>
> The fact that De Tienne changed a Peircean quotation and inserted other
> words from Peirce [and not His Own Words] doesn't change the FACT that De
> Tienne changed the meaning of that quotation by doing this. What was the
> result? To sideline the role of mathematics in our understanding of the
> Real World. I note, in this section,  how he also selected a brief quote
> from 1.646 to continue with his sidelining of mathematics - and ignored the
> full section where Peirce insisted on the role of mathematics to 'discover
> the real potential world'. 1.646. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, Robert, Gary F, list:
The fact that De Tienne changed a Peircean quotation and inserted
other words from Peirce [and not His Own Words] doesn't change the
FACT that De Tienne changed the meaning of that quotation by doing
this. What was the result? To sideline the role of mathematics in our
understanding of the Real World. I note, in this section,  how he also
selected a brief quote from 1.646 to continue with his sidelining of
mathematics - and ignored the full section where Peirce insisted on
the role of mathematics to 'discover the real potential world'.
1.646. That is, for Peirce, mathematics is not irrelevant  but is the
key scientific method for understanding the Real World. 

Peirce is quite specific in his outline of the nature and role of
mathematics. . - ie,  that 'The end that pure mathematics is pursuing
is to discover that real potential world" 1.646. [my emphasis].

 Peirce was quite specific about the difference between theory and
practice - and warned that the two should not be conflated, As he
wrote in that same section 1.641-645 , 'this 'march of discovery'
[1.640] is not to be merged with practical utilities'. He writes that
'the two masters, theory and practice, you cannot serve" [1.642].

So- I'm unsure who JAS is referring to with his assertion that ", it
appears that some are still confusing this aspect of  pure mathematics
with the application of mathematics in all the other sciences". I
don't think anyone is doing this. What is being pointed out is
Peirce's assertion of the role of mathematics " to discover that real
potential world" [1.646].

Edwina
 On Mon 09/08/21  9:32 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., List:
 Thanks for clarifying that the misquoted text is actually a
conflation of two different passages written by Peirce, not an
insertion by André of his own words. I have notified him of the
mistake, which again does not detract from the acknowledged fact that
mathematicians must formulate the idealized hypotheses from which they
subsequently draw necessary conclusions. Unfortunately, it appears
that some are still confusing this aspect of  pure mathematics with
the application of mathematics in all the other sciences.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
-  twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 7:34 AM  wrote:
 Jon S, list,

Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the
words “inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They
come from CP 1.247 (part of the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics
is engaged solely in tracing out the consequences of hypotheses. As
such, she never at all considers whether or not anything be
existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility between CP
1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is concerned.
Anyway, Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need
not distract us from the point of slides 22-3, which is that
phaneroscopy does not and cannot provide mathematics with any
fundamental principle. 

Gary f.  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'g...@gnusystems.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Thanks for clarifying that the misquoted text is actually a conflation of
two different passages written by Peirce, not an insertion by André of his
own words. I have notified him of the mistake, which again does not detract
from the acknowledged fact that mathematicians must *formulate *the
idealized hypotheses from which they subsequently draw necessary
conclusions. Unfortunately, it appears that some are still confusing this
aspect of *pure *mathematics with the *application *of mathematics in all
the other sciences.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 7:34 AM  wrote:

> Jon S, list,
>
> Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the words
> “inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They come from CP 1.247 (part
> of the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the
> consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or
> not anything be existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility
> between CP 1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is
> concerned. Anyway, Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need
> not distract us from the point of slides 22-3, which is that phaneroscopy
> does not and cannot provide mathematics with any fundamental principle.
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Jon S, list,

Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the words 
“inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They come from CP 1.247 (part of 
the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the 
consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or not 
anything be existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility between CP 
1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is concerned. Anyway, 
Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need not distract us from 
the point of slides 22-3, which is that phaneroscopy does not and cannot 
provide mathematics with any fundamental principle.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 8-Aug-21 20:54
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

 

Robert, List:

 

I sincerely appreciate the correction of the excerpt from CP 1.53 (c. 1896). It 
is surprising and indeed troubling that André would insert his own words where 
he is purportedly quoting Peirce. My first thought was that perhaps the 
additional phrase was in the original manuscript and omitted (inadvertently or 
otherwise) by the CP editors, which has happened in some other places, but 
inspection of R 1288:7 confirms that it is not the case here. As any 
examination of the List archives would amply demonstrate, I am always eager to 
understand and convey Peirce's ideas accurately by carefully citing and 
reproducing his actual texts.

 

For that very reason, I am also surprised that anyone would suggest that when I 
provided a link to the Commens Dictionary entry for "mathematics," I somehow 
"didn't read it well" and thus would find it problematic that Peirce included 
the formulation of mathematical hypotheses within the scope of a 
mathematician's practice. On the contrary, I have never disputed this, I have 
merely insisted with Peirce that mathematics is the science which draws 
necessary conclusions about those hypothetical states of things. Moreover, as I 
pointed out in an off-List exchange several months ago, CP 3.559 is the central 
passage of an entire series of articles that I wrote for my fellow structural 
engineers on "The Logic of Ingenuity" (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10490). 
Its last sentence provides an excellent summary of the whole lengthy paragraph.

 

CSP: Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he first 
frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not concern the 
drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without inquiring or caring 
whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and, secondly, he proceeds to 
draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis. (CP 3.559, 1898)

 

Returning to the subject at hand, the mathematician's hypothesis is different 
from the phaneroscopist's hypothesis. Because the mathematician's method is 
strictly deductive, it can only be applied to an idealization that has been 
"stripped of all features which do not concern the drawing of [necessary] 
consequences from it." That is precisely why the mathematician must proceed 
"without inquiring or caring whether it [the idealization] agrees with the 
actual facts or not." By contrast, the phaneroscopist is inquiring about the 
phaneron and thus cares very much whether a given hypothesis agrees with what 
is being observed there. Consequently, although mathematics is an indispensable 
aid to phaneroscopy, phaneroscopy is by no means reducible to mathematics--just 
as mathematics is an indispensable aid to every other science, but none of them 
is reducible to mathematics.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sun, Aug 8, 2021 at 4:29 PM robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> > wrote:

1-I have already pointed out in the  
<https://www.academia.edu/49325877/The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases>
 Podium, Section 3:  Peirce, an architectonic philosopher (p. 8), how much 
André De Tienne tried to minimize the role of mathematics in scientific 
discovery and particularly in phaneroscopy. Here are two significant extracts:

 

1.1 "…after having acclaimed mathematics as "queen of all sciences," he 
immediately sends mathematicians (and with them mathematics) back to 
confinement in their own field: 'But the moment inquiry turns the barest of 
attention to the conditions that give experience its earthly flavor; the moment 
inquiry acquires a vested interest in a realm of being purely detached 
mathematicians are not concerned with, that of positive experience.'" (De 
Tienne. 2004: 1)[emphasize mine]

 

1.2 "Both [Math

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, List

Thank you for this clarification of the role of mathematics.

1] I find that De Tienne's slide 23 is troubling. Note how his five
paragraphs, which include an example of a mathematician, seem geared
to show the alienation of mathematics [and mathematicians] from the
real world.

De Tienne sets up mathematics as essentially irrelevant to us who
live in the real world. One has to ask: What's the point of doing
mathematics? He has given us the image of an isolate almost insane
mathematician, so engrossed in his own internal voices that he is
killed by the Real World [a Roman soldier]. Therefore one has to ask:
why did Peirce put mathematics in the foreround?

And we can see that answer in the quotations ignored by De Tienne. 
Robert gave us this one:

>1895 [c.] | On the Logic of Quantity, and especially of Infinity |
MS [R] 16:1

Mathematics may be defined as the study of the substance of exact
hypotheses. It comprehends
 1st, the framing of hypotheses, and
  2nd, the deduction of their consequences.
2] Note how mathematics is explained as an action. It is the action
of developing hypotheses! And then, examining the necessary results.
That's the function of mathematics: and what are some examples given
by Peirce? Not someone alienated from the real world - and after all
- can De Tienne really prove that Archimedes' death was due to his
'contemplation of a diagram'? 

But, what if we continue on with the selection offered by De Tienne
as his fourth paragraph - a selection of which he chose to leave out
the whole substance of what Peirce was writing: 1.646

"The host of men who achieve the bulk of each year's new discoveries
are mostly confined to narrow ranges. For that reason you would expect
the arbitrary hypotheses of the different mathematicians to shoot out
in every direction into the boundless void of arbitrariness. But you
do not find any such thing. On the contrary what you find is that men
working in fields as remote from one another as the African diamond
fields are from the Klondike reproduce the same forms of novel
hypothesis. Rieman had apparently never heard of his contemporary
Listing. The latter was a naturalistic geometer, occupied with the
shapes of leaves and birds' nests, while the former was working upon
analytical functions. And yet that which seems the most arbitrary in
the ideas created by the two men are one and the same form. This
phenomenon is not an isolated one; it characterizes the mathematics
of our times, as is, indeed, well known ...'The end that pure
mathematics is pursuing is to discover that real potential world".
[1.646]

And that is the substance of mathematics: developing hypotheses and
tracing their consequences.. And note - these examples are not of men
alienated from the real world but deeply involved in reasoning about
and attempting to explain it. As Peirce outlines in 1.641-645, this
'march of discovery [1.640] is not to be merged with 'practical
utilities'.  He writes that "the two masters, theory and practice,
you cannot serve" [1.642]. This, I suggest, is what he means by his
comments that 'the scientific man is not in the least wedded to his
conclusions" 1.635]. And his statements  that the mathematician does
not 'care a straw' to 'inquire into the truth of that postulate' and
was only focused on that deduction of their consequences. 

I suggest that this outline of mathematics as the development of
hypotheses - and tracing out their consequences does not mean, as De
Tienne seems to imply, an activity alienated from and irrelevant to
the Real World. Indeed, Peirce's outline seems instead to tell us
that mathematics offers us the basic means of 'discovering the real
potential world'.

Edwina
 On Sun 08/08/21  5:28 PM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
1-I have already pointed out in the Podium, Section 3:   Peirce, an
architectonic philosopher (p. 8), how much André De Tienne tried to
minimize the role of mathematics in scientific discovery and
particularly in phaneroscopy. Here are two significant extracts: 
1.1 "…after having acclaimed mathematics as "queen of all
sciences," he immediately sends mathematicians (and with them
mathematics) back to confinement in their own field: 'But the moment
inquiry turns the barest of attention to the conditions that give
experience its earthly flavor; the moment inquiry acquires a vested
interest in a realm of being purely detached mathematicians are not
concerned with, that of positive experience.'" (De Tienne. 2004:
1)[emphasize mine] 
1.2 "Both [Mathematics and phaneroscopy] are acritical since both
refrain from making assertions about the object of their
investigation; mathematics only draw consequences out of initial
hypotheses, while phaneroscopy only describes what self-presents."
(De Tienne, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I sincerely appreciate the correction of the excerpt from CP 1.53 (c.
1896). It is surprising and indeed troubling that André would insert his
own words where he is purportedly quoting Peirce. My first thought was that
perhaps the additional phrase was in the original manuscript and omitted
(inadvertently or otherwise) by the CP editors, which has happened in some
other places, but inspection of R 1288:7 confirms that it is not the case
here. As any examination of the List archives would amply demonstrate, I am
always eager to understand and convey Peirce's ideas accurately by
carefully citing and reproducing his actual texts.

For that very reason, I am also surprised that anyone would suggest that
when I provided a link to the Commens Dictionary entry for "mathematics," I
somehow "didn't read it well" and thus would find it problematic that
Peirce included the formulation of mathematical hypotheses within the scope
of a mathematician's practice. On the contrary, I have never disputed this,
I have merely insisted with Peirce that mathematics is the science which
draws necessary conclusions about those hypothetical states of things.
Moreover, as I pointed out in an off-List exchange several months ago, CP
3.559 is the central passage of an entire series of articles that I wrote
for my fellow structural engineers on "The Logic of Ingenuity" (
https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10490). Its last sentence provides an
excellent summary of the whole lengthy paragraph.

CSP: Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he
first frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not
concern the drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and,
secondly, he proceeds to draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis.
(CP 3.559, 1898)


Returning to the subject at hand, the mathematician's hypothesis is
different from the phaneroscopist's hypothesis. Because the mathematician's
method is strictly deductive, it can only be applied to an idealization
that has been "stripped of all features which do not concern the drawing of
[necessary] consequences from it." That is precisely why the mathematician
must proceed "without inquiring or caring whether it [the idealization]
agrees with the actual facts or not." By contrast, the phaneroscopist is
inquiring about the phaneron and thus cares very much whether a given
hypothesis agrees with what is being observed there. Consequently, although
mathematics is an indispensable aid to phaneroscopy, phaneroscopy is by no
means reducible to mathematics--just as mathematics is an indispensable aid
to *every *other science, but *none *of them is reducible to mathematics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Aug 8, 2021 at 4:29 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> *1*-I have already pointed out in the Podium,
> 
>  Section
> 3:  Peirce, an architectonic philosopher (p. 8), how much André De Tienne
> tried to minimize the role of mathematics in scientific discovery and
> particularly in phaneroscopy. Here are two significant extracts:
>
>
>
> *1.1* "…after having acclaimed mathematics as "*queen of all sciences*,"
> he immediately sends mathematicians (and with them mathematics) back to
> confinement in their own field: '*But the moment inquiry turns the barest
> of attention to the conditions that give experience its earthly flavor*;
> the* moment inquiry acquires a vested interest in a realm of being purely
> detached mathematicians are not concerned with, that of positive
> experience.'" *(De Tienne. 2004: 1)[emphasize mine]
>
>
>
> *1.2* "*Both* [Mathematics and phaneroscopy] *are acritical since both
> refrain from making assertions about the object of their investigation;
> mathematics **only** draw consequences out of initial hypotheses, while
> phaneroscopy only describes what self-presents**."* (De Tienne, 2004: 17)
> [emphasize mine].
>
> *2*- After the publication of my preprint, I discover, on the occasion of
> the slow read, that 17 years later, De Tienne affirms even more strongly
> his position in a presentation on the Peirce Edition Project website
> presented in Milford (April 2019), Milan (April 2021) and also in Tokyo. I
> find the same strategy of a strong tribute followed by an even less gentle
> exit. I notice slide 23 and particularly the quotation CP 1.53, which
> provokes in my mind a feeling that I translate into "it is not possible
> that Peirce wrote that!" I do as Saint Thomas who only believes what he
> sees, and I go and check in the Collected Papers and here it is:
>
>
>
> *CP 1.53** in COLLECTED PAPERS :*
>
> "The most abstract of all the sciences is mathematics. That this is so,
> has been made 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slow Read Slide 23

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Robert, List ...

The catch, of course, occurs in the qua-le-fication
“(qua mathematician)”, by which the writer abstracts
an idealization from the concrete realities of being,
as does the reader who subscribes to the quale-fiction.

Regards,

Jon

CP 1.53 in COLLECTED PAPERS :

“The most abstract of all the sciences is mathematics.
 That this is so, has been made manifest in our day;
 because all mathematicians now see clearly that
 mathematics is only busied about purely hypothetical
 questions.  As for what the truth of existence may
 be the mathematician does not (qua mathematician)
 care a straw.”


On 8/8/2021 5:28 PM, robert marty wrote:

*1*-I have already pointed out in the Podium,

Section
3:  Peirce, an architectonic philosopher (p. 8), how much André De Tienne
tried to minimize the role of mathematics in scientific discovery and
particularly in phaneroscopy. Here are two significant extracts:

*1.1* "…after having acclaimed mathematics as "*queen of all sciences*," he
immediately sends mathematicians (and with them mathematics) back to
confinement in their own field: '*But the moment inquiry turns the barest
of attention to the conditions that give experience its earthly flavor*; the*
moment inquiry acquires a vested interest in a realm of being purely
detached mathematicians are not concerned with, that of positive
experience.'" *(De Tienne. 2004: 1)[emphasize mine]

*1.2* "*Both* [Mathematics and phaneroscopy] *are acritical since both
refrain from making assertions about the object of their investigation;
mathematics **only** draw consequences out of initial hypotheses, while
phaneroscopy only describes what self-presents**."* (De Tienne, 2004: 17)
[emphasize mine].

*2*- After the publication of my preprint, I discover, on the occasion of
the slow read, that 17 years later, De Tienne affirms even more strongly
his position in a presentation on the Peirce Edition Project website
presented in Milford (April 2019), Milan (April 2021) and also in Tokyo. I
find the same strategy of a strong tribute followed by an even less gentle
exit. I notice slide 23 and particularly the quotation CP 1.53, which
provokes in my mind a feeling that I translate into "it is not possible
that Peirce wrote that!" I do as Saint Thomas who only believes what he
sees, and I go and check in the Collected Papers and here it is:

*CP 1.53** in COLLECTED PAPERS :*

"The most abstract of all the sciences is mathematics. That this is so, has
been made manifest in our day; because all mathematicians now see clearly
that *mathematics is only busied about purely hypothetical questions. As
for what the truth of existence may be the mathematician does not (qua
mathematician) care a straw."*

(I highlight the part of 1.53 concerned by slide 23)

*CP 1.53** in *SLIDE 23 :

"Mathematics is only busied about *purely hypothetical questions*, *tracing
out the consequences of hypotheses*. As for what the truth of existence may
be the mathematician does not (qua mathematician) care a straw" (CP 1.53)

I note the insertion of the subordinate proposition:

"* tracing out the consequences of hypotheses*.*"*

*3*- We can therefore see that André De Tienne has modified Peirce's
quotation. This statement illustrates a little more the determination of De
Tienne to hide the role and the function of Mathematics in its relations
with the phaneroscopy according to Peirce.

*4*- In addition, I recall that Jon Alan, in support of this viewpoint,
argued "that it was found nearly two dozen different quotations" in
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/mathematics.

He didn't read it well because it includes:

*   4.1* The most blunt:


1897 [c.] | On Multitude | MS [R] 26:1


Mathematics is a study of exact hypotheses, in so far as consequences can
be deduced from them. *To limit mathematics to the deduction of those
consequences would be to separate from it some of the greatest of the
achievements of modern mathematicians*, – achievements which nobody but
mathematicians could have performed, – such as the formation of the idea of
the *system of imaginarie*s, and of the idea of *Riemann surfaces**. It
must be allowed, therefore, that the formation of the hypotheses is a part
of the business of mathematics.*

*4.2* And a few others

*> *1895 [c.] | On Quantity, with special reference to Collectional and
Mathematical Infinity | MS [R] 14:4

Mathematics is the study of the substance of hypotheses *with a view to*
the tracing of necessary conclusions from them.

*>*1895 [c.] | On the Logic of Quantity, and especially of Infinity | MS
[R] 16:1

Mathematics may be defined as the study of the substance of exact
hypotheses. It comprehends
*1st, the framing of hypotheses*, and
2nd, the deduction of their consequences. [emphasize mine]

*>*1895 [c.] | Elements of Mathematics | NEM 2:10

… the mathematicians duty has three parts, namely,

1st, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read Slide 23

[Jon Awbrey]

Helmut,

As it happens, I still remember a problem we had in Algebra I my freshman year
of high school.  A man fires a rifle at a balloon directly overhead (dumb thing
to do but that's just men).  The muzzle velocity of the bullet and the altitude
of the balloon are given and so we have a quadratic equation for the trajectory
of the bullet as a parabolic plot of the bullet's altitude over the time axis.
The quadratic equation gave two results, 3 seconds and 97 seconds, for the time
when the bullet hit the balloon.  Our textbook's advice in problems like these
was to choose the solution making the most sense and to ignore the other one.
The reason I remember all this probably due to the pat on the head I got for
figuring out what the other solution meant, and I'll bet you can, too.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/8/2021 4:18 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Gary, List
I have a question for a mathematician: A quadratic equation delivers two
results. Is it clear in pure mathematics, whether these two results are
connected with an "and", so are both true, or are connected with an "xor", so
only one of them is true? Or can you only decide, whether it is "and" or "xor",
after aplying it to a real-world-problem? For example, you want to calculate a
volume. Volumes are only positive. So, if you have one negative and one positive
result, only the positive result can be true. So in this case it is "xor". But:
Isn´t it so, that this can only be seen after having applied mathematics to a
real-world-problem? Before having done that, the pure mathematician has not
known, whether it is "and" or "xor", but after the application to reality he
knows, that at least in some cases it is "xor". This is a result which concerns
pure mathematics too. So, isn´t it so, that pure mathematics does depend on
phaneroscopy and reference to reality outside itself, so it is not purely
hypothetical?
Best,
Helmut
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