subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] Classifying Signs \(was Mark Token Type\)"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-20 Thread John F Sowa

Jon, List,

On that point, we are in complete agreement:

JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any 
noun in the English language.

JAS: In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it 
is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction 
between a "graph" as a type and a "graph-instance" as a token, and sometimes he 
also advocates doing the same with "word" and "word-instance."

Yes, indeed.  That is also the reason why we need to use exactly the same 
character string with the option of adding "instance" whenever there might be 
any possibility of a mistake.

As for the choice of Peirce's many character strings to adopt, see the attached 
2-page extract from Tony Jappy's article and 2017 book on this subject.   That 
extract contains four tables from his 2017 book, which started this lengthy 
thread.

By the way, this is not an argument from authority.  This is a citation of an 
expert who has done more research and publications on these issues than any of 
us -- in fact, more than any any subscriber to Peirce list.  If anybody has any 
doubts on this subject, please consult Tony (email address above).Tony 
prefers not to debate issues on P-list because they can become interminably 
long (such as this one).  But I am sure that he would be very gracious in 
answering any questions anyone may have.

Meanwhile, the issues of relating Peirce's work to the 21st C are a more 
important topic for most subscribers to P-List.

John


Jappy_Tables.pdf
Description: Adobe PDF document
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-20 Thread Helmut Raulien

Follow-up:

Please tell me, if it is not ok. to write a follow-up this way.

Well, I think it is possible to have a table of ten classes of relations, with close analogy to Peirce´s table of ten classes of signs. Maybe it not even is an analogy, but just a renaming. But I think, it makes clear, that you can use Peirce´s semiotics for systems theory and relations theory.

In the horizontal direction, instead of the correlates S, S-O, S-I relations, you have composition, determination, and classification. In the vertical direction you have the three kinds of each of these. These three kinds are, according to the categories, a qualitative kind, an actual (spatial/temporal) kind, and a mediative, functional kind.

Or maybe it would be better (initially just because of analogy, later, due to examples it may turn out to be better), to call the horizontally arranged elements composition, composition-determination-relation, and composition-classification-relation.

The way, ten classes of relations are possible, is the same way as with Peirce´s signs-table.

That is all, very simple. A paper about that so far would just be a plagiarism, but maybe later I will deliver some examples. Then we will see, whether the renamed table makes sense, or the known signs-table would do as well for these.

Best regards, Helmut

18. April 2024 um 16:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"

Dear All, Supplement:

I want to add, that my classification of relations is not an arbitrary idea, but it is derived after the Peircean categories: Though Peirce said, that composition is thirdness, I think that is because it is a relation. But, if i classify it as a kind of relation, I do so calling it firstness in this respect, determination 2ns, and classification 3ns. I did so, because a composition is the same from any point of view. Determination, 2ns, is different from two points, that of the determining agent and that of the determined one. And it might be regarded actual, even brute somehow. Classification has, maybe in different ways like the interpretant, three points of view, e.g. subclass, superclass, reason for classifying. And it has to do with mediation and representation somehow.

I further have catergorally classified composition in 1ns.: Composition of traits, this is 1ns, because you might also call it composition of qualities (this might even be better anyway). Spatiotemporal composition is 2ns, it suits to reaction and actuality. Functional composition is 3ns, it suits mediation. More specificly, these are 1ns of 1ns, 2ns of 1ns, 3ns of 1ns (because composition is 1ns).

How to further classify determination and classification I have not satisfyingly worked out yet. At the end there would result a table like that of the sign classes. Maybe it is even more general, because I think, that a sign is a composition (of sounds, patterns,...), an object a determining agent, and an interpretant a classification. Or you might say so about the three correlates sign, sign-object-relation, sign-interpretant relation.

The starting point of all this was Stanley N. Sathe´s paper "Salthe12Axiomathes", in which he described composition and subsumption as the two kinds of systems hierarchy. Subsumption, I think, is the relation between super- and subset in a classification. Or maybe it just is classification.

I hope, that with this analysing tool, derived from the Peircean categories, it is possible to specify relations, e.g. tell, what involution exactly is in some certain case, e.g. the way a sign triad involves the three correlates exactly is, that the triad´s quality is composed from the qualities of the correlates (qualities-composition, was traits-composition, you see for me the communication with you all helps).

Best regards, Helmut

Jon, List,

my ideas are all very tentative. Maybe composition, determination, classification are the three kinds of relation? These three kinds each have three kinds again, e.g. composition may be one of traits, spatiotemporal, or functional. So it might be possible, to talk more specificly, instead of saying "relation of relations of relations" e.g.: The ten classes of signs is (are as a whole) a classification of compositions of classes. More specifically, the first classification is a double one: ten possible classes versus 17 impossible ones, and the ten possible ones are further classified. The composition is the relation of the three correlates, this is a traits-composition, not a spatial one, as the DO is not close, and not a functional one, because the three correlates donot have a function, the function is irreducibly that of the triad. The last classification is having picked each correlate out of three respectively possibilities.

I have called it "traits-composition", not "properties-comp.", because in English "property" has two meanings, trait and ownership. It means, that not the relation, but only the traits of the relation are composed of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost
any noun in the English language.


In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it
is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction
between a "graph" as a type and a "graph-instance" as a token, and
sometimes he also advocates doing the same with "word" and
"word-instance." In case anyone is somehow still in doubt about this, here
are several additional relevant passages from his writings, most of which
will appear in the forthcoming volume 3/1 of *Logic of the Future*. The
first one also confirms that "instance" directly replaces "replica" as used
in his earlier writings and gives the reason why. The third one is clearly
a draft of CP 4.537 and includes yet another alternative for the name of
the other (possible) member of the trichotomy for the nature of the sign
itself, "phantasm," which Peirce evidently considered but promptly
discarded.

CSP: But by a *graph* in this system is meant, a type of a sign which
according to the conventions of this system would express a proposition,
this type being determinate in all its significant features that are
internal, that is regardless of its concomitants, but being indeterminate
in all features which are in themselves insignificant. An individual
existing embodiment of such a type is called a *graph-instance*, or a[n]
*instance* of a graph. I formerly called it a *replica*, forgetting that
Mr. Kempe, in his Memoir on Mathematical Forms, §170, had already preempted
this word as a technical term relating to graphs, and that in a highly
appropriate sense, while my sense was not at all appropriate. I therefore
am glad to abandon this term. (R 1589:4-5, LF 2:171, 1904)

CSP: Any sign scribed on this system (which by the way is called the System
of *Existential Graphs*) ... and which expresses an assertion is called
*graph*, or, more accurately, an *existential graph*, whether it is
disconnected or joined to other graphs. The term graph is taken in the
sense of a type; and that which is actually on the paper is a
*graph-instance*. But the word "scribe" is taken in such a sense that to
put a graph-instance on any area is accurately described as "scribing the
graph" of which it is an instance on the same area. (R 292:56[30], LF 3,
1906)

CSP: By a *graph* (a word which has been overworked of late years) I, for
my part, following its introducers, Clifford and Sylvester, confine to a
diagram principally composed of spots and of lines connecting these spots.
But in the system I am about to describe, I give the word a special
meaning; and in order to explain this, I will begin by proposing a division
of all signs according to their mode of being as objects simply, regardless
of their significations. Dr. Edward Eggleston introduced a simple mode of
expressing the quantity of matter for the press contained in any manuscript
by counting the words. There will usually be found on an ordinary small
octavo page a little over twenty *the*s, on the average. These, of course,
Dr. Eggleston would count as twenty words or more. But in a different
sense, there is but *one* word in the English language which is used as a
definite article, and this word is no more printed than it is pronounced.
In a literal sense, it *cannot* be printed nor pronounced; it can only
govern and determine what is printed or pronounced. Its being consists in
its so governing existents, while it does not itself exist. I term such a
sign a *Type*. A sign which is either a single event happening once and
only once, or which is an existent single thing or single collection which
at one time can exist only in one place, and can *never* be in another,
unless by a continuous motion thither, I call a *Token*. For the vernacular
meaning of *token* is as near this meaning as a vernacular word can be
expected to approach in meaning to a term of philosophy. Other languages
might conveniently borrow the English word for the purpose. But a sign may
be neither a Type (which is a sort of intention or element of habit) nor a
Token. It may be a mere *Phantasm*, or appearance. This is the division of
signs which I now propose: *Type*, *Token*, *Phantasm*. In order that a
Type, such as the word *the*, should be employed, a *Token* that represents
it must be spoken or written; and I propose to call a *Token* that is
employed as representing a given *Type*, an *Instance* of that Type. I
would also propose to continue, as we now do, to use the words *write*,
*pronounce*, and the like, in such a sense that, when we put an Instance of
a Type into existence on paper or invoice, we may properly speak of writing
or pronouncing the Type. But since *Existential Graphs*, which are Types,
are partly written and partly rather drawn, and partly, indeed, conceived
as cut out with a penknife, I will use the term "scribe a graph" to mean
give individual existence to a Graph-instance. (R 292b, LF 3, 1906)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-19 Thread John F Sowa

Jon,

The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any noun in 
the English language.  As I'm now looking out the window, I see three tree 
instances nearby and many more instance of trees farther down the hill.  But 
the word 'instance' may be dropped when there is no need to emphasize that 
distinction.  Most English speakers never use the word 'instance'. They would 
just say "I see three trees nearby and many more down the hill"

In mathematics, everything is abstract (a "might be" as Peirce would say).  But 
when mathematicians who speak any language draw instances of geometrical 
entities (circles, triangles, hexagons...) on a blackboard or whiteboard or 
paper..., they do not refer to them as circle instances, hexagon instances, 
etc.  They just call them circles or hexagons.  Nobody gets confused by that 
convention.

JAS:  Peirce only uses the word "graph" for "a mere form, an abstraction, a 
'general' or as I call it a 'might-be'"; and he states explicitly that "it 
would be incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that 
would be an impossibility."

On that point, we are in total agreement.  And since Peirce is trying to teach 
his readers a totally new notation for expressing a new form of diagrammatic 
reasoning, he uses that OPTIONAL word 'instance' to emphasize the distinction.

But I suggest that you look at any book on mathematics.  To make the comparison 
more obvious, look at books on geometry from Euclid to the present.   Most 
authors rarely or never use the word 'instance' when they talk about circles or 
triangles they draw.

JAS:  Peirce also acknowledges the convenience of talking only about graphs (or 
words), not graph-instances (or word-instances).

Thank you for acknowledging what I have been saying.   The only point where 
there may be some disagreement is over the word 'convenience'.  In English, the 
default form (what linguists call the "unmarked form") does not use the word 
'instance'.  They would call the addition of the word 'instance' a "marked 
form" that is used for emphasis.  Except for an introductory tutorial, I 
believe that Peirce is being unnecessarily pedantic.

CSP: Any shape or combination of shapes that put on the Sheet of Assertion 
would be an assertion, I term a graph, and your act of putting it on any 
surface by writing or drawing or a mixture of the two I express by saying that 
you scribe that sign on that area; and the result of doing so, that is any 
single one among the inexhaustible multitude of possible embodiments of the 
graph, I call a graph-instance. To illustrate the utility of this distinction, 
I call your attention to the fact that we most commonly use the word "word" 
with a meaning analogous to that of "graph,"--for we say that hounds, beagles, 
curs, mastiffs, spaniels, terriers, poodles, and an incredible variety of other 
stocks are alike included under the single word, dog. Yet when an editor asks 
me to write him a paragraph of a hundred words on some subject, he means to 
count every occurrence of "the" as a separate word. He does not mean words, but 
word-instances; but in this case the value of brevity outweighs that of 
accuracy. In the case of graphs and graph-instances, it is quite the other way. 
(R 650:10-11, LF 1:164-165, 1910 Jul 23)

Mathematicians have been choosing brevity since Euclid, and they still do.  As 
for the question about how many identical graph instances occur on the phemic 
sheet, that is a moot point -- because the rules of inference allow copies in 
the same area to be made or erased at any time.  It's irrelevant how you count 
them, because you can change the count without changing the meaning of what is 
on the phemic sheet.

JAS:  Here Peirce explicitly denies that a graph is a "mark," which he 
explicitly equates with an "existent or actual individual," i.e., a token--so 
"mark" is plainly unsuitable for naming a different member of the same 
trichotomy.

No.  In a letter to Welby, he explicitly adopted the word 'mark' as a 
replacement for 'potisign' (possible sign).  That shows that he recognized a 
standard practice in the English language:  Use exactly the same word for the 
abstract "may be" and the actual instance.   He also admits that option for its 
 "value as brevity."

GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the 
orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. Those 
two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, 
whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.

JFS: Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples 
is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that might 
distinguish one tone of voice from another.

JAS:  No, the word "tone" in Gary's examples is used to refer to a certain 
quality of the actual sound that is heard, which can distinguish one flute from 
another or one utterance from

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

supplement: I just googled involution, but it is something medicinical. So what´s the noun of to involve, is it involution, involvement, or involvation?

Jerry, List,

yes, but all that doesn´t mean, that there isn´t a sharp distinction between classes. It just says, that classes can involve each other. But there still isn´t a gradient between the involving and the involved class, and neither one between two parallelly involved classes. The gradient is the degree of involution (quantitative), but not between the characteristics of e.g. indexicality and symbolicity (qualitative). For example, if there is a book about frogs with a chapter about toads in it, the topic is frogs, but the book involves toads, then there still is a sharp distinction between frogs and toads.

Best regards, Helmut

19. April 2024 um 05:22 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler"

List, Jon:

On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and semes, and all phemes involve semes.

Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors. Note the three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics.

For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth. (It is probable that CSP was aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, C(n)H(2n+2).

Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability.

Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS. Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was knowledgable of the state of the art.

Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in? Or, are semantics merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to substances?

More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency?

Cheers

Jerry

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-19 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jerry, List,

Best regards, Helmut

19. April 2024 um 05:22 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler"

List, Jon:

On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting point or boiling point and flammability.

More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency?

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, Jon:

> On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, 
> index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.
> 
> According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or 
> symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and 
> icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately 
> iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately 
> indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones 
> as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant 
> Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its 
> instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other 
> eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, 
> although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, 
> and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be 
> either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and 
> semes, and all phemes involve semes.

Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to 
ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would 
presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors.  Note the 
three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics.

For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of 
saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, 
septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth.  (It is probable that CSP was 
aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated 
hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, 
C(n)H(2n+2). 

Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting 
point or boiling point and flammability.

Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of 
the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of 
chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS.  Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced 
a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was 
knowledgable of the state of the art.  

Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any 
other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in?  Or, are semantics 
merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to 
substances?

More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such 
terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency? 

Cheers

Jerry 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: He uses exactly the same word with no change whatsoever for the
abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, lines, and ovals) and
the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet.


It is remarkable that someone can read a short paragraph and then seriously
claim that it says *exactly the opposite* of what it plainly says. Peirce *only
*uses the word "graph" for "a mere form, an abstraction, a 'general' or as
I call it a 'might-be'"; and he states explicitly that "it would be
incorrect to say that the graph *itself *is put upon the sheet. For that
would be an impossibility." What, then, *is *put upon the sheet? Peirce
does not give it *any *name in R L376, but in various other texts, he
repeatedly calls it a "graph-instance"; and in a published article, he
presents this as a *paradigmatic *example of the distinction between a *type
*and a *token *that is an *instance *of a type (CP 4.537, 1906). Again,
there is nothing at all in the letter to Risteen about the *other *member
of this trichotomy, whether we call it a "tone" or a "mark."

JFS: Teachers who are explaining how to draw, use, and talk about EGs call
them graphs, not graph instances.


Indeed, because what they are discussing (for the most part) are
graphs as *general
*types, not graph-instances as *individual *tokens. Peirce also
acknowledges the *convenience *of talking only about graphs (or words), not
graph-instances (or word-instances).

CSP: Any shape or combination of shapes that put on the Sheet of Assertion
would be an assertion, I term a *graph*, and your act of putting it on any
surface by writing or drawing or a mixture of the two I express by saying
that you *scribe *that sign on that *area*; and the result of doing so,
that is any single one among the inexhaustible multitude of possible
embodiments of the graph, I call a graph-instance. To illustrate the
utility of this distinction, I call your attention to the fact that we most
commonly use the word "word" with a meaning analogous to that of
"graph,"--for we say that hounds, beagles, curs, mastiffs, spaniels,
terriers, poodles, and an incredible variety of other stocks are alike
included under the *single word*, *dog*. Yet when an editor asks me to
write him a paragraph of a hundred words on some subject, he means to count
every occurrence of "the" as a separate word. He does not mean *words*, but
*word-instances*; but in this case the value of brevity outweighs that of
accuracy. In the case of graphs and graph-instances, it is quite the other
way. (R 650:10-11, LF 1:164-165, 1910 Jul 23)


Note well Peirce's last remark here--the value of accuracy in *distinguishing
*"graphs" (types) and "graph-instances" (tokens) outweighs that of brevity
in simply using "graphs" for both. For example ...

CSP: "The father g.o." [g.o. = goes out] is a *graph*, even if it is not
scribed on the sheet. For a graph is what is true or false, and its being
scribed does not make it so. Also suppose we have on the Sheet of Truth

The mother g.o. The mother g.o.

The mother g.o. The mother g.o.

Then there is only *one *graph on the sheet, but there are *four
graph-instances*. This is a very useful distinction to prevent
misunderstandings. A *graph-instance* is a single scribing according to
this System of that which must either be true or false. A *graph *is the
one *form *of all possible graph-instances which express the same meaning
in precisely the same way. Thus

The MOTHER g.o. and The mother goes out

are two instances of the same graph because their differences are entirely
*insignificant*, that is do not amount to different ways of expressing the
fact, but only to different ways of writing. But

The mother g.o. and The mother g.o. The mother g.o.

are two different graphs, though their meaning is the same. (R 514:7-8, LF
1:478-479, 1904)


Again, a graph is a *type*, "a definitely significant Form"; while a
graph-instance is a *token*, "A Single event which happens once and whose
identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which
is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing
being significant only as occurring just when and where it does" (CP
4.537). Also ...

CSP: A *Graph*, then, as the word is used when it is plain that an *Existential
*Graph is meant, is not a sign or mark or any other existent or actual
individual, but is a *kind *of sign which if scribed on the Phemic Sheet
(i.e. if an *Instance *of it stood on the Sheet) would make an assertion.
The individual sign that results from the scribing of a Graph has been
called an "*Instance*" of the Graph. This word "Instance" might
conveniently be introduced into ordinary parlance. For example, only two
words in our language are called articles; but one of these, the definite
article, *the*, will commonly occur, on an average page of novel or essay,
over twenty times. They are reckoned by the editor who asks for an article
of so many thousand

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread John F Sowa

Jon, Gary, List,

Please reread the paragraph below by Peirce from L376 (December 1911).  The 
example he uses is 'existential graph'.  He uses exactly the same word with no 
change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, 
lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet.

CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an 
assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be 
incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that would be 
an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a 
"general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something which might be if 
conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like 
a "word,"--any word, say camel. (R L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)

This is Peirce's final word on the subject:  the word 'graph' (or the longer 
phrase 'existential graph') is the correct term to use for BOTH the abstract 
form and for the visible drawing on a phemic sheet.  If you need more examples, 
look at how Peirce writes about the EGs he is using to SOLVE problem or PROVE a 
theorem.  In every such example, he calls them graphs, not graph-instances.  
The  only cases when he might talk about a graph instance is in METALANGUAGE 
about the theory.  If anybody finds such examples, please let us know.

JAS:  However, this contradicts John's claim instead of corroborating it, by 
explicitly stating that we cannot say that what is being observed is the [mark] 
itself--we need a different word for the embodiment of the [mark], such as 
"graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is the right word 
for the embodiment, then we need a different word for the form itself.

No.  That claim confuses two very different ways of talking about two very 
different topics.  Teachers who are explaining how to draw, use, and talk about 
EGs call them graphs, not graph instances.  However, philosophers who are 
distinguishing theory and practice, use a metalanguage for distinguishing the 
abstract form (a might-be) from the actual visible drawings.

Just look at any book on geometry from Aristotle to the present.  The words 
such as 'circle' or 'triangle' refer to abstract forms.  And EXACTLY the same 
words are used to describe the drawings in a book or computer screen (or even 
on sand, as they often did in the olden days).

But as a philosopher, Plato made a very sharp METALEVEL distinction between the 
abstract Platonic forms and the visible patterns drawn in ink, chalk, wax, or 
sand.  Nevertheless, all working mathematicians use the simple words circle, 
triangle, square... when they're solving problems, proving theorems, and 
writing explanations for both experts and students.  Please note how Peirce 
writes about EGs when he's using them to solve problems.  He does not call them 
graph-instances.

In an earlier note, I commented on the last phrase by Peirce in the above 
quotation:   "in that respect [a graph is] just like a "word,"--any word, say 
camel."Then I gave the following examples to show why the word 'mark' is 
better than 'tone' in the trichotomy of (Mark Token Type):

1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.

Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would 
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider the 
following two sentences:

1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.

Those two examples not only sound silly, they  show why a word like 'tone', 
which is limited to sounds is much more confusing than the word 'mark', which 
may be used for any sensory modality.

GR:
1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the 
orchestra.
2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

GR:  "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would 
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.

Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples is 
used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that might 
distinguish one tone of voice from another.

GR: Now consider the following two sentences:

1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the 
orchestra.
2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

In these two sentences, the word 'mark' is incorrect because the literal word 
'tone' would be appropriate.

GR:  Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion 
needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean 
terminological matters

Au contraire, please note that I have not claimed any authority of my own.  In 
my comments about Peirce's position, I have used his own words, as he stated 
them in L376.  Nobody has found anything later (or better at any time) on this 
topic.

To reinforce Peirce's claims, I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, List,

That 'something' which is, as Peirce writes, ". . . a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are," I have for many
years referred to as "a would-be' *if.* . .". That "if" emphasizes the
futurity of generals,  of 3ns, or rather of all that "the third Universe
comprises.: What is *necessary *in a "necessitant" is that *if* the
conditions are such -- that is, if they allow for it -- the general *will*
grow (and, of course, if such conditions are *not* in place, or *do not
come into place*, then there is no growth towards the future. This is as
much the case for linguistic symbols in semiosis ("symbols grow") as it is
for the evolution of living organisms in biosemiosis.

The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active
power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign -- not the mere body of the Sign, which is not
essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in
its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such,
too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of
a plant. Such is a living constitution -- a daily newspaper, a great
fortune, a social "movement." Peirce: CP 6.455

So, again, that *if* referred to above seems to me of paramount importance,
for lacking it there will be no growth (egs., a newspaper lacking resources
goes out of business; a catastrophic change in an environment results in
the extinction of a species), or it will be thwarted until such *necessary*
conditions  doarise. Returning to our text, you wrote:

JAS: Peirce explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as
"a 'general,'' thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are
an existential graph and the word "camel,'' both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.

Note: I tweaked your generalization for readability (Jon's original is in
the post to which I'm responding).

GR's version of JAS's 'generalization': Any observable form is called a
*type * -- if it were embodied anywhere it would be a token. If it actually
be so embodied it would be incorrect to say that the type *itself* is
embodied. For that would be an impossibility, since the *type* itself is a
mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as Peirce calls it, a
"would-be", i.e. something which would be if conditions were otherwise than
they are; and in that respect it is just like a "*word*,"--*any* word,
say *camel
*or* rose.*

I remember Peirce once giving 'rose' as an example of this, but in a
half-hour of searching today I couldn't find it. As I recall, he remarks
that the word 'rose' doesn't refer to any particular rose present, past, or
future or, for that matter, imagined. And this is so precisely because it
"is a mere form, an abstraction', a 'general', or. . . a 'would-be'.

From all that we've been arguing, you are undoubtedly correct, Jon, in
concluding that ". . .the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no
relevance whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name."

Best,

Gary

On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 2:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
> quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
> best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
>
> CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
> be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it
> would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet.
> For that would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere
> form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e.
> something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in
> that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
> L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
>
>
> John also proposed the following generalization.
>
> JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
> would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
> would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
>
>
> However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
> explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary, List:

Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).

CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it would
be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet. For that
would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)

John also proposed the following generalization.

JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.

However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is the
[mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the [mark],
such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is
the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different* word for the
form itself.

Moreover, as I have already explained at length (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce
explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a
'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an
existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.

JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be
[a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would
be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that would
be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something
which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*.

After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely
significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent
embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537,
1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance
whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> JFS:
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
>
> Compare this to:
>
> GR:
> 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
> the following two sentences:"
>
> 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon:  ". . . a mark is an actual
> material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself  *"an
> actual material sign."
>
> To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my
> words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to
> 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind."
>
> That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
> camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
> synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
> the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.
>
> JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
> emphasizes the profound

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-18 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear All, Supplement:

Best regards, Helmut

Jon, List,

Well, this is tentative, an idea of which I am not sure whether or not it would be good to further pursue it. It makes everything more complicated, but maybe it is complicated?

Best regards, Helmut

16. April 2024 um 20:10 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations.

According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is irreducibly triadic, such that it is not composed of its constituent dyadic relations, although it involves the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant.

HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Gary Richmond

John, Jon, Helmut, List,

JFS:
1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.

Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
the following two sentences:

1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.

Compare this to:

GR:
1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

"Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
the following two sentences:"

1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the
orchestra.
2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.

Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon:  ". . . a mark is an actual
material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself  *"an
actual material sign."

To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my words"
"he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to 'x' ")
physical material is brought to mind."

That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of
synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is
the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.

JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( 
token type)."

There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
discussed.

Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion
needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean
terminological matters  -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic
value whatsoever."   And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on
Peirce-L. "Get rid of it."

Best,

Gary

On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 1:04 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted
> Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be'
> should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual
> thing.   See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of
> Peirce's statement.
>
> But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's
> unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.
>
> In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term
> 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the
> same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic
> sheet.  Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just
> like a 'word', any word, say camel".
>
> I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the
> profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may
> be used for the first term in the trichotomy (  token type).   Consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had
> read Peirce's writings.  For those of us who believe that it's important to
> bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we
> cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce
> scholars).
>
> In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else
> uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use.  It
> is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer
> programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type)  frequently, and
> some of them even mention Peirce.  But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use
> 'tone' as the first term.  And even Peirce scholars never use it for a
> broad audience.
>
> Fundamental principle:  We live in the 21st C.  Our readers live in the
> 21st C.  The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is
> confusing to our readers today.   It has no redeeming social or academic
> value whatsoever.  Get rid of it.
>
> John
>
> --
> The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):
>
> Great news!  I came across

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

JFS: 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.


Thanks for demonstrating once again that the common meaning and usage of
"mark" today render it a terrible alternative for "tone" as the possible
counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." Any word that
properly fills the blank in "A hump is a ___ of a camel" and "A trunk is a
___ of an elephant" is *utterly inconsistent* with how Peirce variously
defines the first member of the trichotomy for classifying a sign according
to its own mode of being/presentation/apprehension.


JFS: The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is confusing
to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic value
whatsoever. Get rid of it.


There is a stark contrast between such severe (and unwarranted)
condemnation of "tone" and what Gary and I have repeatedly said about
"mark"--anyone is welcome to attempt making a case that it is a better
choice than "tone," even though we strongly disagree and no one can
accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice.

JFS: The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):


The message reproduced below with this label was never sent to the List.
Peirce's 1911 remark about EGs as quoted at the bottom is clearly
describing instances of *general *types, not embodiments of *indefinite *tones,
notwithstanding his odd use of "might be" instead of "would be" for 3ns or
"may be" for 1ns as usual. In fact, he is simply reiterating what he had
already said about EGs several years earlier--"The term (Existential) *Graph
*will be taken in the sense of a Type; and the act of embodying it in a
*Graph-Instance* will be termed *scribing *the Graph (not the Instance),
whether the Instance be written, drawn, or incised" (CP 4.537, 1906). He
also elaborated on this published statement in a contemporaneous manuscript.

CSP: It is necessary to recognize the facile distinction between a graph
and a graph-instance. A graph-instance is a *token*, that is, is an
existent individual object, which signifies a proposition. It can never be
duplicated. Although I duplicate it, and the duplicate will be a
graph-instance of the same signification in all respects, but it will not
be that individual graph-instance of which it is the precise copy. I
*scribe*, that is, write or draw, a sign meaning Tully was Cicero. I
duplicate it precisely. The new sign will be substantially the same. It
will only differ so much as is necessary to make it a second scribing of
precisely the same type. But it will not be the same graph-instance. A
*graph*, on the other hand, is a type. ... An *instance *of a graph is a
Token. The distinction between a Graph and a Graph-instance has a certain
importance. (R 498, 1906)


In summary, as I have said before, every explicitly scribed EG is an
instance (token) of a type. Likewise, the additional example of "camel" is
one that Peirce had given previously.

CSP: A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme is a sign connected with its
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica
calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or
dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a General Concept. A Replica of the word "camel"
is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through
the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real
camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the
auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls
up the idea of a camel. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903)


The word "camel" is a rhematic symbol--i.e., a term--and therefore a type,
not a tone. Accordingly, it "signifies through an instance of its
application, which may be termed a *Replica *of it" (CP 2.246, EP 2:291),
and each such token *involves *tones--"camel," "CAMEL," "*camel*," "*camel*,"
and "camel" are all instances of the same type but have different tones
that may affect their dynamical interpretants in certain contexts.
Similarly, an EG is a *dicent *symbol--i.e., a proposition--and therefore a
type that signifies through its instances (tokens), although its only tones
are the heaviness of any lines of identity and the shading of any oddly
enclosed areas. These are indefinite in the sense that no *specific *shape,
thickness, or color is prescribed for them, although Peirce suggests in one
manuscript that the colors of names and lines of identity *could *be
utilized as tones to

[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread John F Sowa

Jon, List,

In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted Peirce's 
explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be' should have exactly 
the same spelling as the word that names the actual thing.   See below for a 
copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of Peirce's statement.

But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's unfortunate 
choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy.

In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term 
'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the same 
spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic sheet.  
Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a 
"general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just like a 'word', any 
word, say camel".

I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the profound 
difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may be used for 
the first term in the trichotomy (  token type).   Consider the following 
two sentences:

1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.

Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would 
understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider the 
following two sentences:

1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.

Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had read 
Peirce's writings.  For those of us who believe that it's important to bring 
Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we cannot assume 
that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce scholars).

In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else uses one 
of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use.  It is abundantly 
clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer programmers have adopted 
and used the pair (token type)  frequently, and some of them even mention 
Peirce.  But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use 'tone' as the first term.  And 
even Peirce scholars never use it for a broad audience.

Fundamental principle:  We live in the 21st C.  Our readers live in the 21st C. 
 The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is confusing to our 
readers today.   It has no redeeming social or academic value whatsoever.  Get 
rid of it.

John

--
The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):

Great news!  I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the word 
that names an abstract "might be" SHOULD have exactly the same spelling as the 
word that names the actual thing that we observe by any external of internal 
senses.  Furthermore, his explanation takes just three sentences.

Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph REALLY is an abstract 
might-be.  However, we are permitted to call the perceptible replica on a 
phemic sheet an existential graph PROVIDED THAT we acknowledge the distinction 
between the might-be and the replica.

To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below.  My words are 
enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of the 
MS):   "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere] would 
be [a mark] is called [a mark].  If it actually be so [observed], it would be 
incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed].  For that would be an 
impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a 
"general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something which might be if 
conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like 
a "word", any word, say camel".

As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and the 
actual is justified by Peirce:  The word that is used for the might-be should 
be applicable to all the actual occurrences.  Peirce's definition of 'mark' in 
Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or all external 
and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the phaneron)..  But the 
word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of auditory sensations, is far 
less general than the word 'mark'.

The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this 
subject.  Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be generalized 
to any type of might-be and actual.  If the principle is sufficiently general 
that it can be applied to camels, it should be applicable to marks.

This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody has 
written in all the notes on this subject.

John
___

Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an 
assertion is called a graph.  If it actually be so scribed, it would be 
incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet.  For that would 
be an

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-17 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

Well, this is tentative, an idea of which I am not sure whether or not it would be good to further pursue it. It makes everything more complicated, but maybe it is complicated?

Best regards, Helmut

16. April 2024 um 20:10 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations.

According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's relation with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself as a correlate, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies would result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this.

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

you wrote:

"Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon

[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

2024-04-16 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three
relations.

According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more
generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical)
object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is *irreducibly *triadic,
such that it is not *composed *of its constituent dyadic relations,
although it *involves *the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and
its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant,
and its final interpretant.

HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone"
is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of
three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes.

According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's *relation *with
itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself *as
a correlate*, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's
genuine dyadic *relations *with its (dynamical) object and (final)
interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign
classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later
tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns
(types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes
of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns
(phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908
taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the
sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the
genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies *would *result
in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of
determination, but Peirce himself never did this.

HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon,
index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.

According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or
symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols *involve *indices
and icons, and all indices *involve *icons. Moreover, a sign can be
*predominately
*iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or
*predominately* indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other
hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as
"definitely significant Forms" are *embodied *in tokens, such that every
type *involves* tokens (its instances) and every token *involves *tones.
Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908
taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically *involves
*the existent and the possible, and the existent *involves *the possible.
For example, every sign must be *either *a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but
all delomes *involve *phemes and semes, and all phemes *involve *semes.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Jon, List,
>
> you wrote:
>
> "Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903
> trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object
> is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp
> distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting
> any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying
> any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and
> an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a 
> *degenerate
> *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c.
> 1901)."
>
> I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three
> relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure"
> one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it
> is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be
> said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign
> and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a
> composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel
> classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a
> sharp distinction.
>
> Best regards, Helmut
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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